A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

IN THREE BOOKS;

WRITTEN BY THE LATE
FRANCIS HUTCHESON, L. L. D.
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

PUBLISHED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT,
BY HIS SON FRANCIS HUTCHESON, M. D.

To which is prefixed
SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND CHARACTER OF THE AUTHOR,
BY THE REVEREND WILLIAM LEECHMAN, D. D.
PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE SAME UNIVERSITY.

VOLUME I.

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TO THE RIGHT REVEREND

FATHER IN GOD,

EDWARD,

LORD BISHOP OF ELPHIN.

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordſhip's known regard for the ſacred intereſts of Virtue and true Religion, is ſufficient to enſure your favourable reception of any work which tends to promote thoſe great and important ends. The following has yet a farther claim to your Lordſhip's favour. The Author, my excellent Father, (your Lordſhip knows I exceed not the truth in calling him ſo) was formerly honoured with a place in your friendſhip. As this was a ſource of the higheſt pleaſure to him while he lived, ſo it muſt reflect particular honour upon his memory. It is with pleaſure I embrace this public opportunity of declaring myſelf, with the higheſt reſpect and gratitude,

MY LORD,

Your LORDSHIP's *moſt obedient,*

and moſt humble Servant,

DUBLIN,
Jan. 25, 1755.

FRANCIS HUTCHESON.

THE

PREFACE,

Giving ſome ACCOUNT of the LIFE, WRITINGS, and CHARACTER of the AUTHOR.

DR. FRANCIS HUTCHESON was born on the 8th of Auguſt, A. D. 1694. His father, Mr. John Hutcheſon, was miniſter of a diſſenting congregation in the North of Ireland; a perſon of good underſtanding, conſiderable learning, and reputation for piety, probity, and all virtue. His ſon Francis, when about eight years of age, was ſent to be educated along with his elder brother, under the eye and direction of their grandfather Mr. Alexander Hutcheſon, who was alſo a worthy diſſenting clergyman in the ſame part of the country, but had come from Scotland. He was ſecond ſon of an ancient and reputable family in the ſhire of Ayr in that kingdom.

A ſuperior capacity, an ardent thirſt for knowledge, and the ſeeds of the fineſt diſpoſitions ſoon began to

ſhew themſelves in Francis: particularly a ſingular warmth of affection and diſintereſtedneſs of temper, for which he was diſtinguiſhed thro' his whole life, appeared in many inſtances in this early period of it. The innocence and ſweetneſs of his temper, his great capacity and application to his learning ſoon procured him a diſtinguiſhing place in his grandfather's affections. But ſuch was his love for his brother, that his grandfather's fondneſs gave him no joy while his brother did not equally ſhare it: nay the preference that was ſhewn him gave him real concern, and put him upon employing all means and innocent artifices in his power to make his brother appear equally deſerving of his grandfather's regard. And when his grandfather in his laſt will had made an alteration of a prior ſettlement of his family-affairs in his favour, tho' many arguments were uſed by his relations to prevail with him to accept of it, he peremptorily refuſed, and inſiſted to the laſt that the firſt ſettlement ſhould take place. Theſe, and many other inſtances of the like kind which might be related, were promiſing preſages of remarkable diſintereſtedneſs in more advanced years.

When he had gone thro' the common courſe of ſchool education he was ſent to an Academy at ſome diſtance from his parents to begin his courſe of Philoſophy: he was taught there the ordinary Scholaſtic Philoſophy which was in vogue in thoſe days, and to which he applied himſelf with uncommon aſſiduity and diligence.

In the year 1710 he removed from the Academy, and entered a ſtudent in the Natural Philoſophy claſs in the Univerſity of Glaſgow, and at the ſame time renewed his ſtudy of the Latin and Greek languages: and in all parts of literature, to which he applied himſelf, he made ſuch proficiency as might be expected from a genius like his cultivated with great care and diligence.

After he had finiſhed the uſual courſe of philoſophical ſtudies, his thoughts were turned toward Divinity, which he propoſed to make the peculiar ſtudy and profeſſion of his life. For proſecution of which deſign he continued ſeveral years more at the Univerſity of Glaſgow ſtudying Theology under the direction of the reverend and learned Profeſſor John Simſon.

Among the manifold theological enquiries which occurred to him as deſerving his moſt ſerious examination; he chuſed to begin with the grand fundamental one concerning the being, perfections, and providence of God. The reverend Dr. Clark's learned and ingenious book on this ſubject, publiſhed a ſhort time before, fell into his hands. Tho' he moſt heartily approved of all the Doctor's concluſions, and had the higheſt ſenſe of his ſingular abilities and virtues, yet after the moſt ſerious and attentive conſideration of his arguments, he did not find that conviction from them which he wiſhed and expected. In order to procure more ſatisfaction on this ſubject, and particularly with regard to the force and ſolidity of the arguments *a priori* (as they are commonly called) he wrote a letter to him, about the year 1717, urging his objections, and deſiring a further explication. Whether the Doctor returned any anſwer to this letter does not appear from Dr. Hutcheſon's papers. After all the enquiry he could make, he ſtill continued extremely doubtful of the juſtneſs and force of all the metaphyſical arguments, by which many have endeavoured to demonſtrate the exiſtence, unity, and perfections of

the Deity. He not only thought that theſe kind of arguments were not adapted to the capacity of the bulk of mankind, but even that they could afford no ſolid and permanent conviction to the learned themſelves. It was his opinion in this early part of his life, and he never ſaw cauſe to alter it, that as ſome ſubjects from their nature are capable of a demonſtrative evidence, ſo others admit only of a probable one; and that to ſeek demonſtration where probability can only be obtained is almoſt as unreaſonable as to demand to ſee ſounds or hear colours. Beſides he was perſuaded that attempts to demonſtration on ſuch ſubjects as are incapable of it were of very dangerous conſequence to the intereſts of truth and religion: becauſe ſuch attempts inſtead of conducting us to the abſolute certainty propoſed, leave the mind in ſuch a ſtate of doubt and uncertainty as leads to abſolute ſcepticiſm: for if once we refuſe to reſt in that kind of evidence, which the nature of the ſubject only admits of, and go on in purſuit of the higheſt kind, ſtrict demonſtration, we immediately conclude there is no evidence, becauſe we do not meet with that kind of it which we expected: and thus the mind remains in a ſtate of

abſolute uncertainty, imagining there is no evidence, when all that the nature of the caſe admits of is laid before it, and enough to ſatisfy every one whoſe underſtanding is not diſordered with an unnatural thirſt for ſcientifical knowledge on all ſubjects alike. This opinion of the various degrees of evidence adapted to various ſubjects firſt led Dr. Hutcheſon to treat morals as a matter of fact, and not as founded on the abſtract relations of things. But of this more particularly hereafter.

After he had ſpent ſix years at the Univerſity of Glaſgow, he returned to Ireland, and ſubmitted to trials, in order to enter into the miniſtry, and was licenſed to preach among the Diſſenters. He was juſt about to be ſettled a miniſter in a ſmall diſſenting congregation in the North of Ireland, when ſome gentlemen about Dublin, who knew that his abilities and virtues qualified him to be more extenſively uſeful than he could poſſibly be in that remote congregation, invited him to take up a private academy there. He complyed with the invitation, and acquitted himſelf in that ſtation with ſuch dignity and ſucceſs as gave entire ſatisfaction to all thoſe who committed their

children to his care; and ſoon drew the attention of the public upon him. He had been fixed but a ſhort time in Dublin when his ſingular merit and accompliſhments made him generally known: men of all ranks, who had any taſte for literature, or eſteem for learned men, ſought his acquaintance and friendſhip. Among others he was honoured with a place in the eſteem and friendſhip of the late Lord Viſcount Moleſworth, who took pleaſure in his converſation, and aſſiſted him with his criticiſms and obſervations to improve and poliſh the Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, before it came abroad. The reverend Dr. Synge, now Lord Biſhop of Elphin, whoſe friendſhip Dr. Hutcheſon always regarded as one of the greateſt pleaſures and advantages of his life, likewiſe reviſed his papers, and aſſiſted him in the general ſcheme of the work.

The firſt edition came abroad without the author's name, but the merit of the performance would not ſuffer him to be long conceal'd: ſuch was the reputation of the work, and the ideas it had raiſed of the author, that Lord Granville, who was then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, whoſe diſcernment and taſte as to

works of genius and literature is univerſally acknowledged, ſent his private ſecretary to enquire at the bookſellers for the author, and when he could not learn his name, he left a letter to be conveyed to him, in conſequence of which he ſoon became acquainted with his Excellency, and was treated by him all the time he continued in his government with the moſt diſtinguiſhing marks of familiarity and eſteem.

From this time his acquaintance began to be ſtill more courted by moſt men of diſtinction either for ſtation or literature in Ireland. Archbiſhop King, the author of the book *De Origine Mali*, held Dr. Hutcheſon in great eſteem, and his friendſhip was of great uſe to him in an affair which might otherwiſe have been very troubleſome to him, and perhaps ended in putting an entire ſtop to his uſefulneſs in that place. There were two ſeveral attempts made to proſecute Mr. Hutcheſon, in the Archbiſhop's court, for daring to take upon him the education of youth, without having qualified himſelf by ſubſcribing the eccleſiaſtical canons, and obtaining a licence from the Biſhop. Both theſe attempts were effectually diſcouraged by his Grace, with expreſſions of hearty diſpleaſure againſt

the perſons who were ſo forward as to commence them. And at the ſame time he aſſured him that he needed be under no apprehenſion of diſturbance from that quarter, as long as it continued in his power to prevent it.

He had alſo a large ſhare in the eſteem of the late Primate Bolter, who, thro' his influence, made a donation to the Univerſity of Glaſgow, of an yearly fund for an exhibitioner, to be bred to any of the learned profeſſions. This is only one inſtance among many of that prelate's munificent temper. Mr. Weſt, a gentleman of great abilities, and of known zeal for the intereſts of civil and religious liberty, was particularly fond of Dr. Hutcheſon, and lived in great intimacy with him, while he continued in Ireland.

A few years after the Enquiry the Treatiſe on the Paſſions was publiſhed: as both theſe books have been long abroad in the world and undergone ſeveral impreſſions, a ſufficient proof of the reception they have met with from the public, it would be needleſs to ſay any thing concerning them. About this time he wrote ſome philoſophical papers accounting for Laughter, in a different way from Mr. Hobbs, and more honour-

able to human nature: theſe papers were publiſhed in the collection called Hibernicus Letters. Some letters in the London Journal 1728 ſubſcribed Philaretus, containing objections to ſome parts of the doctrine in *the Enquiry*, occaſioned Mr. Hutcheſon's giving anſwers to them in thoſe public papers: both the letters and anſwers were afterwards publiſhed in a ſeparate pamphlet. The debate was left unfiniſhed, Philaretus's death having put an end to the correſpondence, which was propoſed to have been afterward carried on in a more private manner.

After he had taught the private Academy in Dublin for ſeven or eight years with great reputation and ſucceſs; in the year 1729 he was called to Scotland to be a Profeſſor of Philoſophy in the Univerſity of Glaſgow. His eſtabliſhed reputation for literature and worth was the only conſideration that induced the Univerſity to elect him into the place vacant by the death of the learned and worthy Mr. Gerſhom Carmichael. The public approved of their choice, and the event abundantly juſtified the wiſdom of it. The Profeſſors were ſoon ſenſible, that his admiſſion into their body had good effects both upon the reputation and inte-

reſts of the ſociety. Several young gentlemen came along with him from the Academy, and his juſt fame drew many more both from England and Ireland. But it will probably be rather matter of ſurprize to the reader, that he accepted of the place, than that the Univerſity unſolicited made him the offer of it. If any one ſhould ask, as it is natural to do, how it came to paſs that a man of Dr. Hutcheſon's accompliſhments and virtues, and who could count ſuch liſts of honourable perſons, and many of them of great authority and influence, in the number of his friends, ſhould continue to teach a private Academy for ſeven or eight years in the heart of a country where there were ſo many beneficial places proper to be beſtowed on men of genius and merit. Or if any one ſhould ask, how it came to paſs that he was permitted, to leave his country, break off all connections with his relations and friends, and in the midſt of life remove to another kingdom to accept a place in an Univerſity far from being lucrative and very laborious? It is ſufficient to anſwer to theſe queſtions: that it was not the want either of inclination or power in his friends to ſerve him that was the ſtop to his preferment. He

had private reaſons which determined him neither to ſeek promotion, nor to encourage the moſt probable ſchemes propoſed to him for obtaining it. It is but juſtice to his character to ſay, that he was uſeful and contented in that ſtation in which it had pleaſed Divine Providence to fix him, and that neither the love of riches, nor of the elegance or grandeur of human life prevailed ſo far in his breaſt as to make him offer the leaſt violence to his inward ſentiments. To which it may be added, that the ſilent and unſeen hand of an all-wiſe Providence which over-rules all the events of human life, and all the reſolutions of the human will, conducted him to that ſtation in life, which tho' far from being the higheſt in external diſtinction, yet was perhaps of all others the moſt ſuited to the ſingular talents with which he was endowed, and gave him the opportunity of being more eminently and extenſively uſeful than he could have been in any other.

After his ſettlement in the College he was not obliged (as when he kept the Academy) to teach the languages and all the different parts of Philoſophy, but had leiſure to turn his chief attention to his favourite ſtudy Human Nature: he had high thoughts of its

original dignity, and was perſuaded, that even in this corrupt ſtate, it was capable of great improvements by proper inſtruction and aſſiduous culture. The profeſſion of Moral Philoſophy was the province aſſigned him in the College. In cultivating this ſcience he purſued the ſame method in which he began, ſetting aſide all reſearches into the abſtract relations and eternal fitneſs and unfitneſs of things, and directing his enquiries into what is more obvious and immediately known from obſervation and experience, viz. What is in fact the preſent conſtitution of human nature; what is that ſtate of heart, and courſe of life which is moſt correſpondent to the whole frame.

He had obſerved, that it was the happineſs and glory of the preſent age, that they had thrown off the method of forming hypotheſes and ſuppoſitions in natural philoſophy, and had ſet themſelves to make obſervations and experiments on the conſtitution of the material world itſelf, and to mark the powers and principles which are diſcerned operating in it: he ſaw plainly that it was by adhering ſtrictly to this method that natural philoſophy had been carried to a greater degree of perfection than ever it was before, and that

it is only by purſuing the ſame method that we can hope to reach higher improvements in that ſcience. He was convinced that in like manner a true ſcheme of morals could not be the product of genius and invention, or of the greateſt preciſion of thought in metaphyſical reaſonings, but muſt be drawn from proper obſervations upon the ſeveral powers and principles which we are conſcious of in our own boſoms, and which muſt be acknowledged to operate in ſome degree in the whole human ſpecies. And that therefore, one proper method at leaſt to be followed in the moral ſcience, is to inquire into our internal ſtructure as a conſtitution or ſyſtem compoſed of various parts, to obſerve the office and end of each part, with the natural ſubordination of thoſe parts to one another, and from thence to conclude what is the deſign of the whole, and what is the courſe of action for which it appears to be intended by its great Author. He thought there was ground to hope, that from a more ſtrict philoſophical enquiry into the various natural principles or natural diſpoſitions of mankind, in the ſame way that we enquire into the ſtructure of an animal body, of a plant, or of the ſolar ſyſtem, a more

exact theory of morals may be formed, than has yet appeared: and a theory too built upon ſuch an obvious and firm foundation as would be ſatisfactory to every candid enquirer. For we can be as certain of the ſeveral parts of our internal frame from inward perception and feeling, as we are of the ſeveral parts of an animal ſtructure from ocular inſpection: and we can as little doubt of the ends for which the principal parts at leaſt of our internal conſtitution are intended, as we can doubt of the ends for which the members of our body, or our external ſenſes were framed: and whatever evidence we have for the exiſtence and perfections of the Supreme Being, we have the ſame evidence that the moral conſtitution of our nature is his work, and thence we conclude, that it is moſt certainly his will, that we ſhould cultivate that temper of mind, and purſue that courſe of life, which is moſt correſpondent to the evident ends and purpoſes of his divine workmanſhip; and that ſuch a ſtate of heart and plan of life, as anſwers moſt effectually the end and deſign of all the parts of it, muſt be its moſt perfect manner of operation, and muſt conſtitute the duty, the happineſs, and perfection of the order of beings to whom it belongs.

Our author has attempted in the following work, firſt to unfold the ſeveral principles of the human mind as united in a moral conſtitution, and from thence to point out the origin of our ideas of moral good and evil, and of our ſenſe of duty, or moral obligation; and then to enquire what muſt be the ſupreme happineſs to a ſpecies conſtituted as mankind are; and then he proceeds to deduce the particular laws of nature, or rules neceſſary to be obſerved for promoting the general good in our common intercourſes with one another as members of ſociety. How far he has ſucceeded, muſt be left to the judgment of the attentive and candid reader.

Whatever corrections or improvements his ſcheme may be ſuppoſed to admit of, after longer obſervation and further examination into the frame and operations of our minds, one thing is certain that the reſult of his obſervations and reaſonings muſt meet with entire approbation, as it places the higheſt virtue and excellence of a human character, where all ſound Philoſophy and Divine Revelation has placed it, viz. *In ſuch habitual and prevailing exerciſe of all theſe good affections to God and man, as will reſtrain all other appetites, paſſions, and affections within juſt bounds, and*

*carry us out uniformly to purſue that courſe of action, which will promote the happineſs of mankind in the moſt extenſive manner to which our power can reach**. And it muſt alſo be acknowledged, that our Author's doctrine, which aſſerts that we are laid under a real internal obligation, of a moſt ſacred kind, from the very conſtitution of our nature †, to promote the good of mankind, tho' at the expence of ſacrificing life itſelf and all its enjoyments, coincides, or at leaſt is no way inconſiſtent with theſe precepts of Chriſtianity, by which we are enjoined to lay down our lives for the

* Some ſeem to have miſtaken our Author's doctrine ſo widely, as to imagine that he placed virtue in the mere ſentiment or perception of moral beauty and deformity in affections and actions, which it is owned the worſt of mankind may retain in a very conſiderable degree. Whereas he always places it in the exerciſe of theſe affections and actions flowing from them which the moral faculty recommends and enjoins. Or in other words, virtue does not lye in the mere ſentiment of approbation of certain affections and actions, but in acting agreeably to it.

† Some ſeem to have miſtaken Dr. Hutcheſon ſo far on this ſubject, as to imagine, that when he ſays we are laid under a moſt real and intimate obligation by the moral ſenſe to act virtuouſly, he meant to aſſert that all other obligations from the conſideration of the will of God, and the effects of his favour or diſpleaſure in this and in another world were ſuperſeded. Nothing could be farther from his thoughts; nor is it a conſequence of his ſcheme. He was fully ſenſible of the importance and neceſſity of inforcing the practice of virtue upon mankind from all poſſible conſiderations, and eſpecially from theſe awful ones of future rewards and puniſhments. If any one ſhould ſay, that there is a natural ſenſe of equity implanted in the human mind, which will operate in ſome degree even on thoſe who know not that there is a God or a future ſtate: it could not juſtly be concluded from thence, that ſuch a perſon alſo maintained, that this natural ſenſe of equity alone, was ſufficient to enſure the uniform practice of juſtice, in all mankind, even when meeting with numberleſs ſtrong temptations to depart from it. The application is ſo obvious, that it is needleſs to inſiſt upon it.

bretheren; while at the ſame time it gives us more juſt, more amiable and worthy ideas of human nature, as originally intended to be actuated by more diſintereſted principles, than theſe philoſophers are willing to allow, who labour to reduce all the motions of the human mind to ſelf-love at bottom, however much they may ſeem to be different from it at firſt appearance. According to our Author's views of human nature, tho' theſe generous principles may be born down and over-powered in this corrupt ſtate, by ſenſual and ſelfiſh paſſions, ſo as not to exert themſelves with ſufficient vigour, even when there is proper occaſion for them; yet the intention of the Author of Nature is abundantly manifeſt from this important circumſtance, that the moral ſenſe is always ſo far true to its office, that it never fails to give the higheſt and warmeſt approbation to every inſtance of truly diſintereſted virtue. The leſs ſuſpicion there is of any view even to future fame in the behaviour of the martyr, the patriot, or hero, when he yields up his life in a worthy cauſe, ſo much louder and ſtronger is the applauſe of all ſpectators, and ſo far as any intereſted conſiderations are ſuppoſed to influence him, the approbation

given to him is proportionably diminiſhed: according to this repreſentation of things, the ſoul of man, not only bears a reſemblance of the Divine Intelligence in its rational faculties, but alſo of the Divine diſintereſted benignity in its ſocial and public affections: and thus too our internal conſtitution, formed for purſuing the general good, beautifully tallies with the conſtitution of the univerſe: we ſee thro' the whole of Nature what admirable proviſion is made for carrying on the general intereſts of all the ſpecies of living beings. So that it is quite agreeable to the analogy of Nature, that mankind, the higheſt order of creatures in this lower world, ſhould be formed with diſpoſitions to promote the general good of their ſpecies, and with a diſcernment that it is their duty to part with life itſelf, when a public intereſt requires it.

But Dr. Hutcheſon's character, as a man of parts and learning, does not depend merely on the peculiarities of a ſcheme of morals. His knowledge was by no means confined to his own ſyſtem: that he was well acquainted with the writings both of the ancients and moderns relative to morality, religion, and government will appear evident to every one who per-

uſes the following work. Nor did the ſtudy of morals, even in this extenſive view, engroſs his whole time and attention. An ardent love of knowledge was natural to him. He loved truth, and ſought after it with impartiality and conſtancy. His apprehenſion was quick and his memory ſtrong: he was not only patient of thought and enquiry, but delighted in it. His mind was never ſubject to that languor which frequently interrupts the ſtudies of worthy men: his faculties were always at his command and ready for exerciſe. A mind endowed and diſpoſed in ſuch a manner, and employed in ſtudy for a long courſe of years, muſt have been furniſhed with a large compaſs of knowledge.

In the earlier part of his life he entered deeply into the ſpirit of the ancients, and was ſoon ſenſible of and admired that juſtneſs and ſimplicity both of thought and expreſſion which has preſerved and diſtinguiſhed their writings to this day. He read the hiſtorians, poets, and orators of antiquity with a kind of enthuſiaſm, and at the ſame time with a critical exactneſs. He had read the poets eſpecially ſo often, that he retained large paſſages of them in his memory, which he frequently and elegantly applied to the ſubjects he

had occaſion to treat in the courſe of his prelections. His knowledge and taſte in Latin appears from what he has wrote in it. His Synopſis of Metaphyſics, Pneumatics, Natural Theology, and his Compend of Ethics are written with a ſpirit and purity of ſtyle ſeldom to be met with in modern Latin compoſitions.

He had ſtudied all the parts of Philoſophy with ſuch care as to have attained clear and comprehenſive views of them. He compoſed a ſmall treatiſe of Logic, which tho' not deſigned for the public eye, yet gives ſufficient proof how much he was maſter of that ſcience. It appears from his treatiſe of Metaphyſics, that he was well acquainted with the logomachies, meaningleſs queſtions, and trivial debates of the old Scholaſtics, which had thrown a thick darkneſs on that part of Philoſophy: he has ſet that branch of knowledge in a clear light, and rendered it inſtructive and entertaining. He underſtood Natural Philoſophy as it is now improved by the aſſiſtance of Mathematics and experiments, and applied his knowledge of it to the noble purpoſes of eſtabliſhing the grand truths of the exiſtence, the perfections, and government of God. He was well acquainted with the hiſtory of the arts

and ſciences: he had carefully traced them from their origin, thro' all their various improvements, progreſſes, interruptions, and revolutions, and marked the characters of the moſt remarkable Philoſophers, and the diſtinguiſhing doctrines and peculiar genius of their Philoſophy. Beſides he knew the civil and eccleſiaſtical hiſtory both of antient and modern times with an exactneſs that was ſurprizing in one ſo much converſant in deeper and ſeverer ſtudies. He had ſtudied too the original language of the Old Teſtament, and tho' his other neceſſary ſtudies had not permitted him to become a critic in it himſelf, yet he knew the moſt important criticiſms of the learned in that way.

His great capacity appeared in the ſtrongeſt light, in his converſation with his friends; there he diſcovered ſuch a readineſs of thought, clearneſs of expreſſion, and extent of knowledge, on almoſt every ſubject that could be ſtarted, as gave delight to all who heard him. There are ſome men who have amaſſed great ſtores of learning, but it is repoſited as it were in ſome corner of the mind, and requires time to recollect it and bring it forth. In others you ſee their great erudition ſeems to darken their conceptions and

diſturb their views of things, by the different ideas which crowd into their minds at once. But the whole compaſs of his knowledge lay as it were always before him, and was at his command at all times; and he ſaw at once whatever was connected with his preſent ſubject, and rejected what did not belong to it. He ſpoke on the moſt difficult and abſtruſe ſubjects without any labour and with a degree of perſpicuity which would have coſt other men of no mean parts repeated efforts, without equal ſucceſs: he expoſed and took to pieces deceitful reaſonings with the greateſt facility; and diſtinguiſhed at once, betwixt true learning and falſe, betwixt ſubjects which admit of demonſtration, and ſuch as do not, and betwixt queſtions which are uſeful and important, and ſuch as are only curious and amuſing. He gave an habitual attention to the real uſes to which knowledge could be applied in life. He did not chuſe to amuſe with inſignificant ſpeculations, but in all his enquiries having the real good and utility of mankind in view, he took occaſion even from metaphyſical diſputes, (of which no other uſe could be made) to repreſs that pride and vanity that is apt to puff up young minds from a notion of their

ſuperior knowledge, by ſhewing how uncapable the acuteſt of mankind are of penetrating into the intimate nature and eſſences of things.

Theſe ſingular abilities and talents were united in Dr. Hutcheſon with the moſt amiable diſpoſitions and moſt uſeful virtues: the purity of his manners was unſpotted from his youth: as he always expreſt the higheſt indignation againſt vice, he kept at the greateſt diſtance from it, avoiding even the ſmalleſt indecencies of conduct: but this ſeverity of virtue was without any thing of that ſourneſs, ſtiffneſs, or unſociableneſs which ſometimes accompanies it, and renders characters, otherwiſe valuable, in ſome reſpects diſagreeable, and prevents the good effects that the example of their virtues might produce upon others. His integrity was ſtrict and inviolable: he abhorred the leaſt appearance of deceit either in word or action: he contemned thoſe little artifices which too frequently paſs in the world for laudable arts of addreſs, and proofs of ſuperior prudence: his nature was frank, and open, and warmly diſpoſed, to ſpeak what he took to be true: you ſaw at firſt ſight his ſincere and upright ſoul, and in all further intercourſe with him you found

him always the ſame. He was all benevolence and affection; none who ſaw him could doubt of it; his air and countenance beſpoke it. It was to ſuch a degree his prevailing temper, that it gave a tincture to his writings, which were perhaps as much dictated by his heart as his head: and if there was any need of an apology for the ſtreſs that in his ſcheme ſeems to be laid upon the friendly and public affections, the prevalence of them in his own temper would at leaſt form an amiable one.

His heart was finely turned for friendſhip; he was ſparing indeed of the external profeſſions of it, but liberal of its moſt important offices: he was the refuge of his friends for advice and aſſiſtance in all caſes of perplexity and diſtreſs. The ardor of his affection for his friends got the better of a natural reluctance he had to ask favours, which no regard for his own intereſts could have overcome: his kind offices were far from being confined to the circle of his particular friends and relations; his heart overflowed with goodwill to all around him, and prompted him to embrace every opportunity of doing kind and obliging things. Tho' there are but few to be found who had ſuch a

keen thirſt for knowledge, or who purſued it with ſuch unremitting attention and vigour; yet even this taſte yielded on all occaſions to the more important one of doing good. Among many other acts of beneficence, he took a peculiar delight in aſſiſting worthy young men, in ſtraitened circumſtances, to proſecute their ſtudies with his money, and admitting them to attend his colleges without paying the cuſtomary fees.

A remarkable degree of a rational enthuſiaſm for the intereſts of learning, liberty, religion, virtue, and human happineſs, which animated him at all times, was a diſtinguiſhing part of his character: he was viſibly moved by ſome of theſe noble principles in whatever he ſaid or did. They had ſuch an aſcendency over him as gave a peculiar caſt to his whole converſation and behaviour, and formed in him a public ſpirit of a very extenſive kind. Public ſpirit in him was not a vague and undetermined kind of ardor, for ſomething unknown or not diſtinctly underſtood; but it was an enlightened and univerſal zeal for every branch of human happineſs, and the means of promoting it. His love of valuable knowledge, his unabating activity in purſuing it and ſpreading a taſte for it, fitted him, in a

very ſingular manner, for that ſtation which Providence had aſſigned him. And perhaps very few men, even in ſimilar ſtations, have diſcovered equal zeal, or had equal ſucceſs, in promoting a taſte for true literature: but his zeal was not confined to what peculiarly belonged to his own profeſſion, but extended to every thing that could contribute to the improvement of human life. When he ſpoke, you would have imagined that he had been employed in almoſt all the different ſtations in ſociety, ſo clearly did he appear to underſtand the intereſts of each, and ſuch an earneſt deſire did he expreſs for promoting them. His benevolent heart took great delight in planning ſchemes for rectifying ſomething amiſs, or improving ſomething already right, in the different orders and ranks of mankind. Theſe ſchemes were not airy and romantic, but ſuch as were practicable, and might have deſerved the attention of thoſe whoſe power and influence in ſociety could have enabled them to carry them into execution. This warm zeal for public good appeared uppermoſt in his thoughts not only in his more ſerious, but alſo in his gayer hours. But while he abounded in projects for the intereſts of others, none

ever heard of one which centered in himself. It has already been observed, that in the earlier part of life, when the taste for external enjoyments is commonly strongest, he did not listen to proposals which offered prospects of rising to wealth and preferment: in a more advanced age, but when he was still in such a vigorous state of health, as he might have hoped for many years longer of life, he had offers made of removing him to the University of Edinburgh, to be Professor of Moral Philosophy there, which might have been a more lucrative place to him, and given him better opportunities of forming connections with people of the first rank and distinction in this country, but he was contented with his present situation, and discouraged all attempts to change it.

These singular accomplishments and moral endowments rendered his conversation, especially among his friends, so entertaining and instructive, that it was a school of wisdom to those who had the happiness to enjoy it. It must have been an undiscerning company which did not receive both pleasure and improvement from him. A remarkable vivacity of thought and expression, a perpetual flow of chearfulness and good-

will, and a visible air of inward happiness, made him the life and genius of society, and spread an enlivening influence every where around him. He was gay and pleasant, full of mirth and raillery, familiar and communicative to the last degree, and utterly free from all stateliness or affectation. No symptoms of vanity or self-conceit appeared in him. He sought not after fame, nor had he any vain complacency in the unsought possession of it. While he was visibly superior to others about him, he was the only one that was quite insensible of it. His own talents and endowments were not the objects on which his thoughts were employed: he was always carried away from attending to himself, by the exercise of kind affections, zeal for some public generous designs, or keen enquiries after truth. This was such an acknowledged part of his character, that even those who were least disposed to think well of him, never insinuated that he was proud or vain: the natural modesty of his temper was heightened and refined by his religious sentiments.

He had a full persuasion and warm sense of the great truths of natural and revealed religion, and of the importance of just and rational devotion to the happi-

neſs of human life, and to the ſtability and purity of a virtuous character. The power of devout ſentiments over his mind appeared in his converſation: in his public prelections he frequently took occaſion from any hints which his ſubject afforded him, as well as when it was the direct ſubject itſelf, to run out at great length, and with great ardor, on the reaſonableneſs and advantages of habitual regards to God, and of referring all our talents, virtues, and enjoyments to his bounty. Such habitual references appeared to him the ſureſt means of checking thoſe emotions of pride, vain complacency, and ſelf-applauſe, which are apt to ſpring up in the minds of thoſe, who do not ſeriouſly and frequently reflect, that they did not make themſelves *to differ from others, and that they have nothing but what they received.* Such ſentiments deeply rooted in the mind, he looked upon as the proper foundation of that ſimplicity of heart and life, which is the higheſt perfection of a virtuous character.

Such abilities, ſuch diſpoſitions, and ſuch ſtores of knowledge, as have been mentioned, accompanied with a happy talent of ſpeaking with eaſe, with propriety and ſpirit, rendered him one of the moſt maſterly and

engaging teachers that has appeared in our age. He had a great fund of natural eloquence and a perſuaſive manner: he attended indeed much more to ſenſe than expreſſion, and yet his expreſſion was good: he was maſter of that preciſion and accuracy of language which is neceſſary in philoſophical enquiries. But he did not look upon it as his duty, either in his prelections, or in his writings upon moral and religious ſubjects, to keep up ſtrictly at all times to the character of the didactive teacher, by confining himſelf to all the preciſion requiſite in accurate explication and ſtrict argument. He apprehended that he was anſwering the deſign of his office as effectually, when he dwelt in a more diffuſive manner upon ſuch moral conſiderations as are ſuited to touch the heart, and excite a reliſh for virtue, as when explaining or eſtabliſhing any doctrine, even of real importance, with the moſt philoſophical exactneſs: he regarded the culture of the heart as a main end of all moral inſtruction: he kept it habitually in view, and he was extremely well qualified for ſucceeding in it, ſo far as human means can go: he had an uncommon vivacity of thought and ſenſibility of temper, which rendered him quickly ſuſcep-

tible of the warmeſt emotions upon the great ſubjects of morals and religion: this gave a pleaſant unction to his diſcourſes, which commanded the attention of the ſtudents, and at the ſame time left ſtrong impreſſions upon their minds: he filled their hearts with a new and higher kind of pleaſure than they had any experience of before, when he opened to their view, in his animated manner, large fields of ſcience of which hitherto they had no conception: when, for inſtance, he pointed out to his pupils, in his lectures on Natural Theology, the numberleſs evidences of wonderful art and kind deſign in the ſtructure of particular things, and the ſtill more aſtoniſhing evidences of the wiſeſt contrivance, and of the moſt benign intention, in the whole material ſyſtem conſidered as one thing, it is eaſy to conceive that their tender minds, warm with the love of knowledge, would be greatly ſtruck. Such views of nature were new diſcoveries to them, which filled them with delight and aſtoniſhment, and gave them at the ſame time the moſt joyful and ſatisfying conviction of the being and perfections of the great Author of all. In like manner, when he led them from the view of the external world to the contemplation of

the internal one, the ſoul of man, and ſhewed them like inſtances of Divine wiſdom and benignity in the contrivance of its moral conſtitution, they were filled with freſh delight and wonder, and diſcerned new and encreaſing proofs of the glorious perfections of the Father of our ſpirits. And when he deſcribed the ſeveral virtues exerciſed in real life, as beautiful in themſelves, as the nobleſt employment of our rational and moral powers, as the only ſources of true dignity and happineſs to individuals and to communities, they were charmed with the lovely forms, and panted *to be* what they beheld. The pleaſure ſpringing from the light of truth and beauty of virtue breaking in upon ingenious and well-diſpoſed minds, excited ſuch a keen deſire of knowledge, and ſuch an ardor of purſuing it, as ſuſpended for a time thoſe impulſes of youthful paſſions which are apt to hurry young men away, in that period of life. But that it may not be imagined theſe ſtrong effects are entirely to be aſcribed to the charms of novelty, it deſerves to be taken notice of, that ſtudents advanced in years and knowledge chuſed to attend his lectures on Moral Philoſophy, for four, five, or ſix years together, ſtill finding

freſh entertainment, tho' the ſubject in the main was the ſame every ſeaſon.

It was a great addition to the uſefulneſs of his leſſons, that they were not confined to high ſpeculations, and the peculiarities of a ſcheme, but frequently deſcended to common life, ſometimes pointing out and expoſing faſhionable vices and follies in the upper part of the world, departures from real juſtice and equity in the buſy and commercial part of it, and the dangerous rocks on which youth is apt to ſplit and make ſhipwreck both of virtue and happineſs; and at other times inſiſting upon matters acknowledged by all, to be of the higheſt importance. The grand maxims he dwelt upon, and laboured to inſtil into the minds of his pupils, were to rejoice above all things in the firm perſuaſion of the univerſal Providence of a Being infinitely wiſe and good, who loves all his works, and cannot be conceived as hating any thing he hath made. This he conſtantly inculcated in the warmeſt manner, "as a ſteady foundation of entire truſt and "confidence in him, and chearful ſubmiſſion to his "will in all events. That ſufferings may be conſidered "as our greateſt bleſſings, by giving us an opportu-

" nity of practiſing the moſt ſublime virtues, ſuch as " reſignation to the will of God, forgiving of injuries, " returning good for evil, and by leading us to form " juſt notions of the vanity of all things, except the " love of God, and the love and practice of univerſal " goodneſs: that all our advantages, of all kinds, are " things which ought never to be aſcribed to ourſelves, " but to God the giver of all. That love and gratitude " aſcribing to him the glory of all that is excellent, " joined to a vigorous zeal of doing good, ſeems to " be the height of human perfection." He delivered himſelf on theſe grand topics in that ſimple but ſtriking manner which immediately touches the heart, and preſents the imagination with the moſt beautiful and engaging forms.

As he had occaſion every year in the courſe of his lectures to explain the origin of government, and compare the different forms of it, he took peculiar care, while on that ſubject, to inculcate the importance of civil and religious liberty to the happineſs of mankind: as a warm love of liberty, and manly zeal for promoting it, were ruling principles in his own breaſt, he always inſiſted upon it at great length, and with the greateſt

ſtrength of argument and earneſtneſs of perſuaſion: and he had ſuch ſucceſs on this important point, that few, if any, of his pupils, whatever contrary prejudices they might bring along with them, ever left him without favourable notions of that ſide of the queſtion which he eſpouſed and defended.

Beſides his conſtant lectures five days of the week, on Natural Religion, Morals, Juriſprudence, and Government, he had another lecture three days of the week, in which ſome of the fineſt writers of antiquity, both Greek and Latin, on the ſubject of Morals, were interpreted, and the language as well as the ſentiment explained in a very maſterly manner.

Beſides theſe ſetts of lectures he gave a weekly one on the Sunday-evening, on the truth and excellency of Chriſtianity, in which he produced and illuſtrated, with clearneſs and ſtrength, all the evidences of its truth and importance, taking his views of its doctrines and divine ſcheme from the original records of the New Teſtament, and not from the party-tenets or ſcholaſtic ſyſtems of modern ages: this was the moſt crowded of all his lectures, as all the different ſorts and ranks of ſtudents, being at liberty from their pe-

culiar purſuits on this day, chuſed to attend it, being always ſure of finding both pleaſure and inſtruction.

A Maſter, of ſuch talents, ſuch aſſiduity in the duties of his office, with the accompliſhments of the gentleman, and fond of well-diſpoſed youth, entering into their concerns, encouraging and befriending them on all occaſions, could not fail to gain their eſteem and affections in a very high degree. This gave him a great influence over them, which he employed to the excellent purpoſes of ſtamping virtuous impreſſions upon their hearts, and awakening in them a taſte for literature, fine arts, and every thing that is ornamental or uſeful to human life. And he had remarkable ſucceſs in reviving the ſtudy of ancient literature, particularly the Greek, which had been much neglected in the Univerſity before his time: he ſpread ſuch an ardor for knowledge, and ſuch a ſpirit of enquiry every where around him, that the converſation of the ſtudents at their ſocial walks and viſits turned with great keenneſs upon ſubjects of learning and taſte, and contributed greatly to animate and carry them forward in the moſt valuable purſuits. He did not confine his attention to the pupils immediately under his care, but laid

himſelf out to be uſeful to the ſtudents in all the different faculties, whenever any opportunity offered: and he was eſpecially ſolicitous to be ſerviceable to the ſtudents of divinity, endeavouring, among other important inſtructions, to give them juſt notions of the main deſign of preaching. High ſpeculations on diſputable points, either of Theology or Philoſophy, he looked upon as altogether improper for the pulpit, at leaſt on all ordinary occaſions. He particularly inſiſted upon the uſeleſſneſs and impropriety of handling in the pulpit ſuch ſpeculative queſtions, as, whether human nature is capable of diſintereſted affections, whether the original of duty or moral obligation is from natural conſcience, or moral ſenſe, from law, or from rational views of intereſt, and ſuch like enquiries. Tho' ſuch diſquiſitions might be proper and even neceſſary in a ſchool of philoſophy *, yet in his view of things

* According to our Author's ſcheme it is only vindicating the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs, manifeſted in the conſtitution of our nature, to aſſert the exiſtence and binding authority of the moral ſenſe; becauſe whatever other obligations we may be under, this internal one will co-operate with them, when the mind perceives them, and will exereiſe its authority without them, when thro' a variety of cauſes we may be hindered from attending to them. Is the law of God duely promulgated the ſupreme obligation on all intelligent beings? in this view of obligation, the internal law will co-operate with the external one, when we are attentive to its authority; and when we are not, it will be a rule of action, in ſome degree at leaſt, without it. Beſides it may be obſerved, that if the obligation of the moral ſenſe be admitted to be a real one, men of the moſt ſceptical turn of mind muſt be conſidered

they did not fall within the province of the preacher, whoſe office is not to explain the principles of the human mind, but to addreſs himſelf to them, and ſet them in motion: beſides, as to the philoſophical queſtion concerning moral obligation, all the different ways of explaining it conſpire to preſs the ſame virtuous courſe of action, which is the main thing the ſacred orator ſhould be concerned about. The general plan of preaching which he recommended was to this purpoſe: As mankind are weak, ignorant, guilty creatures, altogether inſufficient for their own happineſs, and every moment expoſed to many unavoidable calamities, let them be called upon to reflect upon themſelves as ſuch, and let theſe doctrines of natural and revealed religion, which will impart conſolation to them under theſe humbling views of themſelves, be ſet before them in the ſtrongeſt light: As they are apt to

as remaining under its authority when they have ſet themſelves at liberty from all other ties. Let us ſuppoſe a perſon ſo unhappy as not to believe that there is a God, or a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, or that it is his intereſt upon the whole in this life to act the virtuous part; even ſuch a perſon is ſtill under the power of the internal ſentiment, that one thing is right and another wrong. If he acts contrary to it he violates a known obligation, and muſt be conſcious that he deſerves puniſhment, and that it awaits him, if there is a judge and puniſher. If we ſuppoſe that the ſenſe of right and wrong is entirely erazed, then on our Author's ſcheme, as well as that of others, he is ſtill accountable at leaſt for the previous ſteps he had taken to bring himſelf into this ſtate of total inſenſibility as to all moral perceptions and views.

be ſeduced both from their duty and happineſs by ſelfiſh and ſenſual paſſions, let both the awful doctrines of religion, which may ſtrike a dread and check the impulſes of bad paſſions, and the joyful ones, which may excite and encourage to the practice of purity, ſincerity, and all goodneſs, be diſplayed before them in all their force. And as they are prone to reſt in the general knowledge of their duty, without ſeriouſly applying it to the government of their hearts and lives, let the religious inſtructor take care not to dwell too much upon ſuch general topics as the beauty, excellency, and reaſonableneſs of the Divine Laws, but commonly deſcend, in a minute and particular manner, to direct their conduct in all the relations and ſtations of life, even the loweſt, and in the ordinary buſineſs and intercourſes of it. And let all theſe things be done without laboured elevation of language, in that plain and ſimple manner which touches the heart, and brings things home to the conſcience and immediate feeling of every one.

To all which it is but juſt to add, that he was a moſt valuable member of the Univerſity in all other reſpects as well as that of an inſtructor of youth, his

great talents qualifying him, and his unwearied zeal prompting him on all occaſions to promote all its civil as well as literary intereſts.

Such was the life of this worthy perſon, ſpent in a courſe of aſſiduous but not painful ſtudy, in continually doing good to the utmoſt of his power, and propagating truth, virtue, and religion among mankind. To conclude, he had uncommon abilities, uncommon virtues, and ſmall failings, and theſe ariſing from good qualities; if he was at any time too much or too ſoon heated, it was owing to the quickneſs of his parts and ſenſibility of his temper; if his indignation was ſtrong, it was only provoked by ſuch baſeneſs or malignity as his heart abhorred; if at any time he was open, when reſerve might have been more proper, it proceeded from an honeſty and ſincerity of heart unaccuſtomed to diſſemble. Some were diſpleaſed with his honeſt freedom, ſome might emulate his reputation, ſome traduce him thro' prejudice, ſome thro' bigotry; but his parts, his ſpirit, and his worth, will be remembered, when any prejudices that were raiſed againſt him will be entirely forgotten.

A firm conſtitution and a pretty uniform ſtate of

good health, except ſome few ſlight attacks of the gout, till ſome months before his death, ſeemed to promiſe the world much longer enjoyment of ſo valuable a life; but it pleaſed all-wiſe Providence to cut him off, after a few months of an uncertain ſtate of health, and a few days of a fever, in the fifty-third year of his age, and about ſixteen years after his coming to Glaſgow, to the great regret of the lovers of learning and virtue, and the irreparable loſs of the ſociety of which he had been a moſt excellent member, and of all who were connected with him, either by blood, friendſhip, or acquaintance.

He was married, ſoon after his ſettlement in Dublin, to Mrs. Mary Wilſon, a daughter of Francis Wilſon, Eſq; a gentleman of eſtate in the county of Langford, who diſtinguiſhed himſelf at the Revolution as a Captain in the ſervice of the late King William of glorious and immortal memory. He ſhowed the ſame liberal and generous principles in this tranſaction, which appeared in all the other ſteps of his life. He had an abhorrence of that ſpirit of traffick which often mingles ſo deeply in forming this alliance: he was determined ſolely by the good ſenſe, lovely diſpoſitions,

and virtuous accompliſhments of the lady: and the uniform happineſs of their whole conjugal ſtate juſtified the wiſdom and virtue of his choice: he has left behind him one ſon, Francis Hutcheſon, Doctor of Medicine, who gave early marks of genius, and is the publiſher of this Work. If any one ſhould wiſh to know any thing about Dr. Hutcheſon's external form; it may be ſaid it was an image of his mind. A ſtature above middle ſize, a geſture and manner negligent and eaſy, but decent and manly, gave a dignity to his appearance. His complexion was fair and ſanguine, and his features regular. His countenance and look beſpoke ſenſe, ſpirit, kindneſs and joy of heart. His whole perſon and manner raiſed a ſtrong prejudice in his favour at firſt ſight.

It only remains to be added, that it has been intended, in any thing that is ſaid of the Author's Philoſophy, to deliver his ſentiments without any regard to what may be the writer's own views of theſe ſubjects. The Author was a lover of truth and freedom of thought, and did not wiſh that any one ſhould eſpouſe his opinions, farther than the evidence with which they were ſupported, determined him. There

appears thro' the work ſuch a manifeſt aim of promoting piety and virtue, and the good of mankind, that it is hoped the main of it muſt be approven of by all unprejudiced and well-diſpoſed perſons, however the writer of theſe memoirs or others may differ from the Author, as to particular ſentiments, or the deciſion of particular queſtions.

Some very good judges may think, and perhaps not without reaſon, that by any thing yet ſaid, juſtice has not been done to Dr. Hutcheſon's character as an author: "That he has been repreſented only as en-
"quiring into the mind of man as a moral conſtitu-
"tion, and aſſerting a diſtinct order of affections in
"it terminating ultimately on the good of others, and
"a Moral Senſe, by which we inſtantaneouſly perceive
"a certain ſet of affections, characters, and actions
"as good, and a contrary one as bad; all which is com-
"monly done by that whole order of Philoſophers
"who agree with him in admitting generous princi-
"ples in human nature: whereas he juſtly deſerves to
"be exhibited to the public in the light of an ori-
"ginal, original in the moſt capital of all articles re-
"lative to the ſcience of human nature and morality:

" for tho' all the diſciples of the generous philoſophy
" aſſert, in the ſtrongeſt manner, a diſtinct order of
" affections in our nature, having the happineſs of
" others for their ultimate object, yet when the agent
" is put upon determining the moſt important mea-
" ſure of human conduct, Why am I to gratify this
" preſent deſire? or why ſhould I rather chuſe to con-
" troul it in favour of another? the anſwer which this
" order of philoſophers has given, is very different
" from that which is and muſt be given by Dr. Hut-
" cheſon: according to the former the agent is refer-
" red to the conſideration of his perſonal happineſs *
" (ariſing indeed from the prevalence of virtuous af-
" fections) as the determiner of his choice; taking it
" for granted, that there can be but one ultimate
" end of the agent's cool and deliberate purſuit, viz.
" his own higheſt intereſt or perſonal happineſs: but
" Dr. Hutcheſon's doctrine is far otherways; accord-
" ing to him, there are three calm determinations in
" our nature, namely, the calm deſire of our own
" happineſs, the calm deſire of the happineſs of other
" beings, and the calm deſire of moral perfection,

* Shaft. Inq. from p. 77 to 174, and p. 69 middle ſect. Lond. Ed.

" each of them alike ultimate; that betwixt the ſe-
" cond and third determination there can ſcarce hap-
" pen any oppoſition, but that it is quite otherwiſe
" betwixt the firſt and the other two, where an appa-
" rent oppoſition at leaſt may often fall out, and in
" all ſuch caſes it is ſo far from being intended by the
" conſtitution of our nature, that the deſire of pri-
" vate happineſs ſhould controul the other deſires, that
" the Moral Senſe never fails to dictate to the agent
" the voluntary ſacrifice of the firſt, to either of the
" other two †: the whole is a queſtion of fact, and
" every one muſt judge of it for himſelf: but the diffe-
" rence is the greateſt imaginable, whether the deſire
" of moral excellence, or the deſire of private happi-
" neſs is deſtined to be the ſupreme controuling prin-
" ciple according to the actual conſtitution of our na-
" ture: and none of the Philoſophers before our Au-
" thor has ever hinted at ſuch a repreſentation of our
" nature as pleads for the former as the juſt account
" of the matter: nature has formed the union be-
" tween the latter two of the three great ultimate de-
" terminations of the human mind; but it is religion

† Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.

" alone, according to him, that can render all the " three invariably harmonious, and incapable of ac- " ting in different and oppoſite directions."

It may be acknowledged that Dr. Hutcheſon has taught this doctrine more fully and explicitly than any of the Philoſophers either antient or modern ‡; but that none of them have *ever hinted at it*, tho' it ſhould be ſo, cannot well be poſitively aſſerted without a very extenſive, and at the ſame time a very particular ſurvey of their works. Our Author has indeed made no pretenſions to new diſcoveries, but rather expreſsly diſclaimed them *: but this may be owing to the particular modeſty of his genius and diſpoſition: it was probably owing, in ſome degree, to this amiable turn of mind, that he chuſed to conſider morals rather in the humbler way of a matter of fact, than in the more pompous one of ſcientifical knowledge: and this too made him always more ſolicitous that his doctrine ſhould in the main coincide with that of other good Moraliſts, than that it ſhould be different or oppoſite: thus he endeavoured to ſhew,

‡ Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.
* Pref. to Eſſay on the Paſſ. p. 18 and 19.

that once admitting the generous affections into human nature and the Moral Senſe, the doctrine of the eternal fitneſs and unfitneſs of things, and of immutable moral truths was very juſt and ſolid. But it is time to leave the candid reader to the peruſal of the Work itſelf, and to form ſuch judgments of the Author's doctrine in all reſpects, as upon ſerious examination ſhall appear to him to be well founded.

W. LEECHMAN.

GLASGOW-COLLEGE,
Dec. 24. 1754.

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A

SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK I.

Concerning the Conſtitution of HUMAN NATURE, *and the* SUPREME GOOD.

CHAPTER I.

Of the Conſtitution of Human Nature and its Powers, and firſt the Underſtanding, Will and Paſſions.

Moral Philoſophy, what.

I. THE INTENTION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IS TO direct men to that courſe of action which tends moſt effectually to promote their greateſt happineſs and perfection; as far as it can be done by obſervations and concluſions diſcoverable from the conſtitution of nature, without any aids of ſupernatural revelation: theſe maxims, or rules of conduct are therefore reputed as laws of nature, and the ſyſtem or collection of them is called the LAW of NATURE.

Knowledge of the human powers neceſſary to it.

As human happineſs, which is the end of this art, cannot be diſtinctly known without the previous knowledge of the conſtitution of this ſpecies, and of all its perceptive and active powers, and their natural objects; (ſince happineſs denotes the ſtate of the ſoul ari-

BOOK I. ſing from its ſeveral grateful perceptions or modifications;) the moſt natural method in this ſcience muſt be firſt to inquire into the ſeveral powers and diſpoſitions of the ſpecies, whether perceptive or active, into its ſeveral natural determinations, and the objects from whence its happineſs can ariſe; and then to compare together the ſeveral enjoyments this ſpecies is capable of receiving, that we may diſcover what is its ſupreme happineſs and perfection, and what tenor of action is ſubſervient to it.

In this inquiry we ſhall but briefly mention ſuch parts of our conſtitution, whether in body or mind, as are not of great conſequence in morals; avoiding unneceſſary controverſies, and often referring to other authors for thoſe points which have been tolerably well explained by them. Thus we paſs over many ingenious anatomical obſervations upon the advantages and dignity of the human body above that of other animals. The reader may find them in the anatomical authors, and Dr. Cumberland.

Early infirmities of men. II. Conſider mankind from their birth, you ſee a ſpecies at firſt weaker and leſs capable of ſubſiſting, without the aid of the adult, than any other; and continuing longer in this infirm ſtate. Animals of ſeveral other kinds attain to their full vigour and the perfect uſe of all their powers in a few months; and few require more than four or five years to their maturity. Ten or twelve years are neceſſary to mankind before they can obtain ſubſiſtence by their own art or labour, even in civiliſed ſocieties, and in the fineſt climates af-

ter they have been cleared of all beasts of prey. Many other animals are both cloathed and armed by nature, and have all that is necessary for their defence or convenient subsistence without any care or contrivance of their own: the earth uncultivated offers them their food, and the woods or rocks their shelter. Mankind are naked and unarmed; their more salutary and agreeable food is more rare, requiring much art and labour: their bodies are less fit to resist the injuries of weather, without more operose contrivances for cloathing and shelter. Their preservation therefore, in their tender years, must depend on the care of the adult; and their lives must always continue miserable if they are in solitude, without the aids of their fellows. CHAP. I.

their final causes.

This is no unreasonable severity in the Author of Nature to our species. We shall soon discover the natural remedy provided for this lasting imbecillity of our younger years, in the tender parental affection of a rational species; and the final causes of it, in the several improvements we are capable of receiving. The means of subsistence to our species require much contrivance and ingenuity: we are capable of many noble enjoyments unknown to other animals, and depending on useful and delightful arts, which we cannot attain to without a long education, much instruction and imitation of others. How much time is requisite for learning our mother-tongues? how much for dexterity even in the commonest arts of agriculture, or in domestic service? full strength of body, without a mind equally advanced in

BOOK I. knowledge and arts and ſocial habits, would make us ungovernable and untractable to our parents or inſtructors. Since we need to be ſo long in ſubjection, we ſhould not ſoon be able to ſhake off the neceſſary and friendly yoke.

Powers which appear firſt. III. The natural principles which firſt diſcover themſelves are our external ſenſes, with ſome ſmall powers of ſpontaneous motion, an appetite for food, and an inſtinct to receive and ſwallow it. All theſe powers exert themſelves in a way too dark for any of us ever to apprehend completely: much leſs have the brutes any knowledge to direct them to the teats of their dams, or notion of the preſſure of the air upon which ſucking depends. At firſt indeed we all alike act by inſtincts wiſely implanted by a ſuperior hand.

Our external ſenſes ſoon introduce to the mind ſome perceptions of pleaſure and pain: and along with theſe perceptions there immediately appears a natural conſtant determination to deſire the one and repel the other; to purſue whatever appears to be the cauſe or occaſion of pleaſure, and to ſhun the cauſes of pain. Theſe are probably our firſt notions of natural good or evil, of happineſs or miſery.

Proper ideas of ſenſation. The external ſenſes are thoſe "determinations of "nature by which certain perceptions conſtantly ariſe "in the mind, when certain impreſſions are made upon "the organs of the body, or motions raiſed in them." Some of theſe perceptions are received ſolely by one ſenſe, others may be received by two or more. Of the former claſs, are theſe five ſorts, viz. colours, ſounds,

tastes, smells, cold or heat; some ingenious authors reckon more: these we may call the proper ideas of sensation. CHAP. I.

These sensations, as the learned agree, are not pictures or representations of like external qualities in objects, nor of the impression or change made in the bodily organs. They are either *signals*, as it were, of new events happening to the body, of which experience and observation will shew us the cause; or *marks*, settled by the Author of Nature, to shew us what things are salutary, innocent, or hurtful; or intimations of things not otherways discernable which may affect our state; tho' these marks or signals bear no more resemblance to the external reality, than the report of a gun, or the flash of the powder, bears to the distress of a ship. The pleasant sensations of taste, smell, and touch, generally arise from objects innocent or salutary, when used in a moderate degree; the disagreeable or painful sensations, from such as are pernicious or unfit for common use. But sight and hearing seem not to be immediate avenues of pain; scarcely is any visible form or any sound the immediate occasion of it; tho' the violent motion of light or air may cause painful feelings; and yet by sight and hearing the exquisite pleasures of beauty and harmony have access to the soul, as well as the ideas of magnitudes, figures, situation, and motion. It is by the former senses, and not by those, that we receive the pleasures commonly called *sensual*.

The ideas of two or more senses are Duration, num- *Concomitant ideas of sensation.*

BOOK I. ber, extenſion, figure, motion, reſt. Duration and number are applicable to every perception or action of the mind, whether dependent upon bodily organs or not. The ſimpler ideas of this claſs, which ſome call the Concomitant ideas of ſenſation, are not generally either pleaſant or painful. It is from ſome complex modes of figure and motion that pleaſure is perceived: beauty, from ſome proportions of figure with colour: harmony, from ſome proportions of time as well as of tones or notes. The proportions of numbers and figures are the field in which our reaſoning powers have the moſt free and vigorous exerciſe. Of theſe hereafter.

Ideas of conſciouſneſs or reflection.

IV. There is another natural power of perception, always exerciſed but not enough reflected upon, an inward ſenſation, perception, or conſciouſneſs, of all the actions, paſſions, and modifications, of the mind; by which its own perceptions, judgments, reaſonings, affections, feelings, may become its object: it knows them and fixes their names; and thus knows itſelf in the ſame manner that it does bodies, by qualities immediately perceived, tho' the ſubſtance of both be unknown.

Judging and reaſoning.

Theſe two powers of perception, *ſenſation* and *conſciouſneſs*, introduce into the mind all its materials of knowledge. All our primary and direct ideas or notions are derived from one or other of theſe ſources. But the mind never reſts in bare perception; it compares the ideas received, diſcerns their relations, marks the changes made in objects by our own action or that of

others; it inquires into the natures, proportions, causes, effects, antecedents, conſequents, of every thing, when it is not diverted by ſome importunate appetite. Theſe powers of judging and reaſoning are more known and better examined by all philoſophers than any other, and therefore we paſs them over. All theſe ſeveral powers, of external ſenſation, conſciouſneſs, judging, and reaſoning, are commonly called the acts of the *underſtanding*. CHAP. I.

V. Tho' there are many other ſorts of finer perceptions to be conſidered as natural to men, yet as ſome of them have the acts of the *will*, the affections, and paſſions, for their objects, it is neceſſary to take a ſhort view of the will and its natural determinations, before we proceed to theſe finer perceptions. *The acts of the will.*

Here it is plain, as ſoon as any ſenſe, opinion, or reaſoning, repreſents an object or event as immediately good or pleaſant, or as the means of future pleaſure, or of ſecurity from evil, either for ourſelves or any perſon about whom we are ſollicitous, there ariſes immediately a new motion of the ſoul, diſtinct from all ſenſation, perception, or judgment, a *deſire* of that object or event. And upon perception or opinion of an object or event as the occaſion of pain or miſery, or of the loſs of good, ariſes a contrary motion called *averſion;* on all occaſions of this ſort, theſe primary motions of the will naturally ariſe without any previous choice or command, and are the general ſprings of action in every rational agent.

Four general claſſes of the acts of the will.

To the *will* are commonly referred alſo two other

BOOK I. modifications, or new ſtates, ariſing from our apprehenſions of objects or events, as obtained or not obtained, according to our previous deſire; or repelled and prevented, or not, according to our previous averſions; which are called *joy* and *ſorrow*. But as they do not immediately move the ſoul to action, they ſeem rather new *feelings* or *ſtates* of the ſoul, than acts of the will, more reſembling ſenſations than volitions. Theſe words however are often uſed promiſcuouſly, as are many other names of the actions and paſſions of the ſoul. Thus *delight* or *joy*, is often uſed for the deſire of any event which when it befals will give delight; ſo is *ſorrow*, for fear and averſion. Thus we have the * old diviſion of the motions of the will into four general ſpecies, Deſire, Averſion, Joy, and Sorrow. Nor can we eaſily imagine any ſpirit without theſe modifications and motions of Will of one ſort or other. The Deity indeed, as he is poſſeſſed of all power and all perfection, muſt be incapable of every modification implying pain.

Theſe ſelfiſh or benevolent.

The acts of the will may be again divided into two claſſes, according as one is purſuing good for himſelf, and repelling the contrary, or purſuing good for others and repelling evils which threaten them. The former we may call *ſelfiſh*, the later *benevolent*. Whatever ſubtile debates have been to prove that all moti-

* See Cicero's Tuſcul. lib. iii. & iv. *Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudentque.* Virg.
The Stoics, the avowed enemies of the paſſions, allowed the βουλησεις and ευλαβειαι, and χαραι, in the perfecteſt character, even the Deity; but all theſe of an higher ſort than the turbulent paſſions; of which diſtinction hereafter.

ons of the *will* ſpring from one fountain, no man can deny that we often have a real internal undiſſembled deſire of the welfare of others, and this in very different degrees. CHAP. I.

VI. There are two calm natural determinations of the will to be particularly conſidered on this occaſion. Firſt, an invariable conſtant impulſe toward one's own perfection and happineſs of the higheſt kind. This † inſtinct operates in the bulk of mankind very confuſedly; as they do not reflect upon, or attend to, their own conſtitution and powers of action and enjoyment; few have conſidered and compared the ſeveral enjoyments they are capable of, or the ſeveral powers of action. But whoſoever does ſo will find a calm ſettled deſire of the perfection of all our active powers, and of the higheſt enjoyments, ſuch as appear to us, upon compariſon, of the greateſt importance to our happineſs. Thoſe who have not made ſuch reflections and compariſons, naturally deſire all ſorts of enjoyments they have any notion of by their ſenſes or any higher powers they have exerciſed, as far as they are conſiſtent with each other, or appear to be ſo; and deſire the perfection of ſuch powers as they attend to. Where ſeveral enjoyments appear inconſiſtent, the mind, while it is calm, naturally purſues, or deſires in preference to others, thoſe which ſeem of the greateſt importance to its happineſs. So far all agree. *The two calm determinations of will.* *Self-love.*

The other determination alleged is toward the *Benevolence.*

† We need no apology, for uſing the word inſtinct for our higheſt powers, to thoſe who know the Latin language. Appetite is in our language much confined to lower powers; but in Latin the word is applied to the higheſt.

BOOK I. universal happiness of others. When the soul is calm and attentive to the constitution and powers of other beings, their natural actions and capacities of happiness and misery, and when the selfish appetites and passions and desires are asleep, 'tis alleged that there is a calm impulse of the soul to desire the greatest happiness and perfection of the largest system within the compass of its knowledge. Our inward consciousness abundantly testifies that there is such an impulse or determination of the soul, and that it is truly ultimate, without reference to any sort of happiness of our own. But here again, as few have considered the whole system of beings knowable by men, we do not find this determination exerted generally in all its extent; but we find natural desires of the happiness of such individuals, or societies, or systems, as we have calmly considered, where there has intervened no prejudice against them, or notion that their happiness is any way opposite to our own.

Affections extensive or limited.

As the notion of one's own highest happiness, or the greatest aggregate or sum of valuable enjoyments, is not generally formed by men, it is not expressly desired or intended. And therefore we cannot say that every particular calm desire of private good is aiming directly at that sum, and pursuing its object under the notion of a necessary part of that sum. Men naturally desire, even by calm motions of the soul, such objects as they conceive useful or subservient to any valuable enjoyment, such as wealth, power, honour, without this conception of their making a part

of this greateſt ſum. In like manner we have calm benevolent affections toward individuals, or ſmaller ſocieties of our fellows, where there has not preceeded any conſideration of the moſt extenſive ſyſtem, and where they are not conſidered formally as parts of this largeſt ſyſtem, nor their happineſs purſued as conducing to the greateſt ſum of univerſal happineſs. Such are our calm benevolent affections to friends, countries, men of eminent worth, without any reference in our thoughts to the moſt extenſive ſyſtem. We can make theſe references of all ſelfiſh enjoyments purſued by us to the greateſt ſum of private happineſs, whenever we pleaſe; and we can in like manner refer all our calm particular kind affections to the general extenſive benevolence; and 'tis of great conſequence to have theſe large conceptions, and to make theſe references. But 'tis plain the ſeveral particular affections, whether ſelfiſh or benevolent, operate, and that too without turbulent or paſſionate commotions, where no ſuch references have preceeded. CHAP. I.

VII. But beſide all theſe calm motions of the will more or leſs extenſive, there are many particular paſſions and appetites which naturally ariſe on their proper occaſions, each terminating ultimately on its own gratification, without further reference; and attended with violent, confuſed, and uneaſy ſenſations, which are apt to continue till the object or gratification is obtained. Of theſe turbulent paſſions and appetites ſome are ſelfiſh, ſome benevolent, and ſome may partake of both characters. Of the ſelfiſh are hunger, thirſt, luſt, *Turbulent paſſions ſelfiſh or benevolent.*

BOOK I. paſſions for ſenſual pleaſure, wealth, power, or fame. Of the benevolent kind are pity, condolence, congratulation, gratitude, conjugal and parental affections, as often as they become violent and turbulent commotions of the ſoul. Anger, envy, indignation, and ſome others, may be of either kind, according as they ariſe either on account of ſome oppoſition to our own intereſts, or to thoſe of our friends or perſons loved and eſteemed. Theſe all ariſe on their natural occaſions, where no reference is made by the mind to its own greateſt happineſs, or to that of others.

The difference between the calm motions of the will and the paſſionate, whether of the ſelfiſh or benevolent kinds, muſt be obvious to any who conſider how often we find them acting in direct oppoſition. * Thus anger or luſt will draw us one way; and a calm regard, either to our higheſt intereſt the greateſt ſum of private good, or to ſome particular intereſt, will draw the oppoſite way: ſometimes the paſſion conquering the calm principle, and ſometimes being conquered by it. The calm deſire of wealth will force one, tho' with reluctance, into ſplendid expences, when neceſſary to gain a good bargain or a gainful employment; while the paſſion of avarice is repining at theſe expences. The ſedate deſire of a child's or a friend's virtue and honour and improvement, will make us ſend them abroad amidſt dangers; while the parental and friendly paſſions are oppoſing this purpoſe. Gratitude, pity, and friendly paſſions, ſolicite to one ſide;

* See this well deſcribed in *Plato. Rep. l.* 9. and *Ariſtot. Eth. Nicom.*

and love of a country, or a yet more extenſive benevo- CHAP. I.
lence, may be ſoliciting on the other ſide. We cor-
rect and reſtrain our children, we engage them in un-
eaſy ſtudies and labours, out of calm good-will, while
this tender paſſion is oppoſing every thing that is un-
eaſy to them. Deſire of life perſuades to abſtinence,
to painful cures and nauſeous potions, in oppoſiti-
on to the appetites deſtined to preſerve life in the
order of nature.

As there belong to the underſtanding not only the lower powers of ſenſation, common to us with the brutes, but alſo thoſe of reaſoning, conſciouſneſs, and *pure intellect*, as 'tis called; ſo to the will belong not only the bodily appetites and turbulent paſſions, but the ſeveral calm and extenſive affections of a nobler order.

VIII. To the Will we alſo aſcribe the power of Spon- *Powers of motion.*
taneous Motion; ſince, in conſequence of our willing it, we find many parts of the body move as we incline. All its parts are not thus ſubjected to be moved as we pleaſe; but only ſuch as 'tis neceſſary or uſeful in life for us to have thus ſubjected. The inward parts go on, in thoſe motions upon which the continuance of life immediately depends, without any acts of our will; nor can we directly, by any volition, accelerate or retard them. To ſuperintend motions continually neceſ-
ſary would engroſs the mind perpetually, and make it incapable of any other buſineſs. Nor does every mo-
tion or impreſſion on the parts of the body excite ſen-
ſations in the ſoul. There is no ſenſation of the inter-

BOOK I. nal motions on which life immediately depends, while the body is in good order. Such ſenſation would be an uneaſy uſeleſs diſtraction of the mind from all valuable purpoſes; as we experience, when a diſeaſe makes the contraction of the heart, or beatings of the pulſe, become ſenſible. Senſations indicate only ſuch changes, and new events, or objects, as 'tis convenient we ſhould be apprized of. Thus volitions move the head, the eyes, the mouth, the tongue, the limbs, and, that exquiſite inſtrument of a rational inventive and artful ſpecies, the hand. All theſe are plain indications of the wiſe and benign counſel of our Creator. Nay our limbs are moved immediately in conſequence of the contraction of muſcles, and of ſome power ſent down by nerves from the head. But in our ſpontaneous motions we neither know nor will theſe intermediate ſteps: we intend the laſt motion; and thoſe other motions are performed without any knowledge or will of ours. Senſation in like manner immediatly enſues upon ſome motion in a nerve continued to the brain: we perceive no motion in the brain; but have a ſenſation immediatly referred to the extremity of the body where the impreſſion was made, and ſeeming to occupy that place; in a manner quite inexplicable. Theſe conſiderations have led ſome ingenious and pious men to conclude that a ſuperior Being, or the Deity himſelf, is the ſole phyſical cauſe of all our motions; according to certain general laws; and the ſole efficient cauſe of all our ſenſations too, in the like manner.

CHAP. II.

Concerning the finer Powers of Perception.

I. AFTER the general account of the perceptive powers, and of the will, we proceed to consider ſome finer powers of perception, and ſome other natural determinations of will, and general laws of the human conſtitution.

To the ſenſes of ſeeing and hearing, are ſuperadded in moſt men, tho' in very different degrees, certain powers of perception of a finer kind than what we have reaſon to imagine are in moſt of the lower animals, who yet perceive the ſeveral colours and figures, and hear the ſeveral ſounds. Theſe we may call the ſenſes of beauty and harmony, or, with Mr. Addiſon, the *imagination*. Whatever name we give them, 'tis manifeſt that, the ſeveral following qualities in objects, are ſources of pleaſure conſtituted by nature; or, men have natural powers or determinations to perceive pleaſure from them. *Pleaſures of imagination.*

1. Certain forms are more grateful to the eye than others, even abſtracting from all pleaſure of any lively colours; ſuch complex ones, eſpecially, where, uniformity, or equality of proportion among the parts, is obſervable; nor can we, by command of our will, cauſe all forms indifferently to appear pleaſant, more than we can make all objects grateful to the taſte. *Beauty.*

2. As a diſpoſition to imitate is natural to man- *Imitation.*

BOOK I. kind from their infancy, so they universally receive pleasure from imitation*. Where the original is beautiful, we may have a double pleasure; but an exact imitation, whether of beauty or deformity, whether by colours, figures, speech, voice, motion or action, gives of itself a natural pleasure.

Harmony. 3. Certain compositions of notes are immediatly pleasant to the generality of men, which the artists can easily inform us of. The simpler pleasures arise from the concords; but an higher pleasure arises from such compositions as, in sound and time, imitate those modulations of the human voice, which indicate the several affections of the soul in important affairs. Hence PLATO† and LYCURGUS‡ observed a moral character in musick, and looked upon it as of some consequence in influencing the manners of a people.

Design. 4. As we are endued with reason to discern the fitness of means for an end, and the several relations and connexions of things; so, there is an immediate pleasure in knowlege§, distinct from the Judgment itself, tho' naturally joined with it. We have a pleasure also in beholding the effects of art and design, in any ingenious machinery adapted to valuable purposes, in any utensil well fitted for its end; whether we hope to have the use of it or not. We have delight in exercising our own rational, inventive, and active powers; we are pleased to behold the like exercises of others, and the artful effects of them. In such works of art

* *Aristot.* Poet. c. 4. calls man ζῶον μιμητικώτατον. † De Repub. l. 3. ‡ Plut. in Lycurgo. § *Inquiry* b. i. c. 3. and *Aristot. Ethic.* there cited.

we are pleaſed to ſee intermixed the beauty of form, and imitation, as far as it conſiſts with the deſign; but the ſuperior pleaſure from the execution of the deſign makes us omit the inferior when it is inconſiſtent. CHAP. 2.

Cauſe of variety of taſtes.

II. Granting all theſe diſpoſitions to be natural, we may account for all that diverſity of fancies and taſtes which we obſerve; ſince ſo many qualities are naturally pleaſing, ſome of which may be chiefly regarded by one, and others by others. The neceſſitous, the buſy, or the ſloathful, may neglect that beauty in dreſs, architecture, and furniture, which they might obtain, and yet not be inſenſible to it. One may purſue only the ſimpler kind in the uniformity of parts; others may alſo interſperſe imitation of the beautiful works of nature; and, of theſe, ſome may chuſe one ſet of natural objects, and others may chuſe other objects of greater beauty or dignity: the manner too of imitation may be more or leſs perfect. Again, ſome in their works may chiefly regard the pleaſure from appearance of deſign, and uſefulneſs, admitting only the pleaſures of beauty and imitation as far as they conſiſt with it. In the moſt fantaſtick dreſſes there is uniformity of parts, and ſome aptitude to the human ſhape, and frequently imitation. But our modern dreſſes are leſs fitted for eaſy motion, and the diſplaying of the human ſhape, than the antient. Spectators who regard theſe ends may prefer the ancient dreſſes; thoſe who do not think of them, or regard them, may prefer the modern.

In like manner as to architecture; they who diſ-

BOOK I.

cern the imitation of the proportions of the human body in certain parts, may reliſh one manner on that account. Others, who know the uſes of which certain parts preſent the appearance, may reliſh this deſign; others, without theſe views, may be pleaſed with the uniformity of the parts: others may like or diſlike through ſome * aſſociations of ideas; of which hereafter.

not reducible to uſefulneſs.

One who would reduce all ſenſe of beauty in forms to ſome real or apparent uſefulneſs diſcerned, will never be able to explain how the ſpectator reliſhes thoſe uſeful forms from which he gets no benefit, nor expects any beyond the pleaſure of beholding them; nor how we are pleaſed with the forms of flowers, of birds, and wild beaſts, when we know not any real or apparent uſes indicated by them; nor how any ſpectator, quite a ſtranger to the views of the architect, ſhall be pleaſed with the firſt appearance of the work; nor whence it is that we are all pleaſed with imitations of objects, which, were they really placed where their images are, would be of no advantage; one may as well aſſert that, before we can be pleaſed with a ſavour, we muſt know the figures of the minute particles, and ſee their inoffenſive nature to our nerves.

of great conſequence in life.

The pleaſures of theſe † finer ſenſes are of no ſmall importance in life. How much ſoever they ſeem ne-

* See the *Inquiry* into Beauty. b. i. c. 7. §. 4.

† One who would make all theſe to be perceptions of the external ſenſes, and deny that we have any diſtinct powers of perception, may as well aſſert that the pleaſures of geometry, or perſpective, are ſenſual, becauſe 'tis by the ſenſes we receive the ideas of figure.

glected by the votaries of wealth and power, they are generally much in their view for themselves, in some future period of life, or for their posterity: as for others who have a more elegant taste, they are the end of a great part of their labours: and the greatest part of men, when they are tolerably provided against the uneasy cravings of appetite, shew a relish for these pleasures: no sooner are nations settled in peace than they begin to cultivate the arts subservient to them, as all histories will inform us. CHAP. 2.

To these pleasures of the imagination may be added two other grateful perceptions arising from novelty and grandeur. The former ever causes a grateful commotion when we are at leisure; which perhaps arises from that curiosity or desire of knowlege which is deeply rooted in the soul; of which hereafter. Grandeur also is generally a very grateful circumstance in any object of contemplation distinct from its beauty or proportion. Nay, where none of these are observed, the mind is agreeably moved with what is large, spacious, high, or deep, even when no advantage arising from these circumstances is regarded. The final causes of these natural determinations or senses of pleasure may be seen in some * late authors. *Relish for grandeur and novelty.*

III. Another important determination or sense of the soul we may call the *sympathetick*, different from all the external senses; by which, when we apprehend the state of others, our hearts naturally have a fellow-feeling with them. When we see or know the pain, dis- *The sympathetick sense. Compassion.*

* See *Spectator* N. 412. and the *Inquiry* into *Beauty*, last section.

BOOK I. treſs, or miſery of any kind which another ſuffers, and turn our thoughts to it, we feel a ſtrong ſenſe of pity, and a great proneneſs to relieve, where no contrary paſſion with-holds us. And this * without any artful views of advantage to accrue to us from giving relief, or of loſs we ſhall ſuſtain by theſe ſufferings. We ſee this principle ſtrongly working in children, where there are the feweſt diſtant views of intereſt; ſo ſtrongly ſometimes, even in ſome not of the ſofteſt mould, at cruel executions, as to occaſion fainting and ſickneſs. This principle continues generally during all our lives.

Congratulation. We have a like natural diſpoſition to Congratulation with others in their joys; where no prior emulation, imagined oppoſition of intereſt, or prejudice, prevents it. We have this ſympathy even with the brute animals; and hence poets ſo ſucceſsfully pleaſe us with deſcriptions of their joys. But as our own ſelfiſh paſſions which repel evil, ſuch as fear, anger, reſentment, are generally ſtronger commotions of ſoul than the paſſions purſuing private good; ſo pity is a ſtronger benevolent paſſion than congratulation. And all this is wiſely contrived, ſince immunity from pain ſeems previouſly neceſſary to the enjoyment of good. Thus the ſtronger motions of the mind are directed toward that which is moſt neceſſary. This ſympathy ſeems to extend to all our affections and paſſions. They all ſeem naturally contagious. We not only ſorrow with the diſtreſſed, and rejoice with the proſpe-

* See *Inquiry* into *Virtue* ſect. 2.

rous; but admiration, or ſurpriſe, diſcovered in one, raiſes a correſpondent commotion of mind in all who behold him. Fear obſerved raiſes fear in the *obſerver* before he knows the cauſe, laughter moves to laugh, love begets love, and the devout affections diſplayed diſpoſe others to devotion. One eaſily ſees how directly ſubſervient this ſympathy is to that grand determination of the ſoul toward univerſal happineſs. CHAP. 2.

IV. Before we mention ſome other finer ſenſes, which have actions of men for their objects, we muſt obſerve one general determination of the ſoul to exerciſe all its active powers. We may ſee in our ſpecies, from the very cradle, a conſtant propenſity to action and motion; children graſping, handling, viewing, taſting every thing. As they advance they exert other powers, making all tryals poſſible; obſerving all changes, and inquiring into their cauſes; and this from an impulſe to action and an implanted inſtinct toward knowledge, even where they are not allured by any proſpects of advantage. Nay we ſee almoſt all other animals, as ſoon as they come to light, exerciſing their ſeveral powers by like inſtincts, in the way that the Author of Nature intended; and by this exerciſe, tho' often laborious and fatiguing, made happier than any ſtate of ſlothful ſenſuality could make them. Serpents try their reptile motions; beaſts raiſe themſelves and walk or run; birds attempt to raiſe themſelves with their wings and ſoar on high; water-fowl take to the water as ſoon as they ſee it. The colt is practiſing for the race,* the bull is butting with his *A natural propenſity to action in moſt animals.*

* *Dente lupus*, &c. Hor. lib. i. ſat. 1. l. 52.

BOOK I. horns, and the hound exerciſing himſelf for the chace.

chiefly in men. Children are ever in motion while they are awake, nor do they decline wearineſs and toil: they ſhew an averſion to ſleep till it over-powers them againſt their wills: they obſerve whatever occurs, they remember and inquire about it; they learn the names of things, inquire into their natures, ſtructures, uſes, and cauſes; nor will their curioſity yield to rebukes and affronts. Kind affections ſoon break out toward thoſe who are kind to them; ſtrong gratitude, and an ardor to excel in any thing that is praiſed; in vying with their fellows they are tranſported with ſucceſs and victory, and exceedingly dejected when they are out-done by others. They are ſoon provoked to anger upon any imagined injury or hurt; are afraid of experienced pain, and provoked at the cauſe of it; but ſoon appeaſed by finding it undeſigned, or by profeſſions of repentance. Nothing do they more reſent than falſe accuſation or reproach. They are prone to ſincerity, and truth, and openneſs of mind, until they have experienced ſome evils following upon it. They are impatient to relate to others any thing new or ſtrange, or apt to move admiration or laughter; ready to gratify any one with what they have no uſe for themſelves; fond of pleaſing, and void of ſuſpicion, till they have had experience of injuries.

High pleaſures in action. This impulſe to action continues during life, while we retain the uſe of our powers. The men who are moſt worthleſs and ſlothful yet are not wholly idle; they have their games, their cabals and converſation

to employ them, or ſome mean ingenuity about ſenſual pleaſures. We ſee in general that mankind can be happy only by action of one kind or other; and the exerciſe of the intellectual powers is one ſource of natural delight from the cradle to the grave. Children are tranſported with diſcoveries of any thing new or artificial, and impatient to ſhew them to others. Publick ſhows, rarities, magnificence, give them high entertainment: but above all, the important actions of great characters; the fortunes of ſuch men, and of the ſtates where they lived, whether related, read, or repreſented by action, are the delight of all ages. Here the pleaſure is heightened by our ſocial feelings of joy, and the keeneſs of inquiry increaſed by our impulſe to compaſſion, and our concern about the perſons we admire. CHAP. 2.

When men have the proper genius, and acceſs to more laborious knowlege, what ardour of mind do ſome ſhew for geometry, numbers, aſtronomy, and natural hiſtory? All toils and watchings are born with joy. Need we mention even fabulous hiſtory, mythology, philology? 'Tis manifeſt there is an high natural pleaſure in knowledge without any allurements of other advantage. There is a like pleaſure in practical knowlege about the buſineſs of life, and the effects of actions upon the happineſs of individuals, or that of ſocieties. How contrary are all theſe appearances of Nature to that Philoſophy which makes the ſole impulſe or determination of the ſoul to be a deſire of

BOOK I. such pleasures as arise from the body and are referred to it, or of immunity from bodily pain!

A moral sense. V. Action is constituted to mankind the grand source of their happiness by an higher power of perception than any yet mentioned; namely, that by which they receive the moral notions of actions and characters. Never was there any of the human species, except ideots, to whom all actions appeared indifferent. Moral differences of action are discerned by all, even when they consider no advantage or disadvantage to redound to themselves from them. As this moral sense is of high importance, it shall be more fully considered in a subsequent chapter. It may suffice at present to observe what we all feel, that a certain temper, a set of affections, and actions consequent on them, when we are conscious of them in ourselves, raise the most joyful sensations of approbation and inward satisfaction; and when the like are observed in others, we have a warm feeling of approbation, a sense of their excellence, and, in consequence of it, great good-will and zeal for their happiness. If we are conscious of contrary affections and actions, we feel an inward remorse, and dislike to ourselves; when we observe the like in others, we dislike and condemn their dispositions, reputing them base and odious.

The affections which excite this moral approbation are all either directly benevolent, or naturally connected with such dispositions; those which are disapproved and condemned, are either ill-natured, by which one is inclined to occasion misery to others; or

ſuch ſelfiſh diſpoſitions as argue ſome unkind affection, or the want of that degree of the benevolent affections which is requiſite for the publick good, and commonly expected in our ſpecies.

univerſal in mankind.

This moral diſcernment is not peculiar to perſons of a fine education and much reflection. The rudeſt of mankind ſhew ſuch notions; and young minds, who think leaſt of the diſtant influences of actions upon themſelves or others, and have ſmall precaution about their own future intereſts, are rather more moved with *moral forms* than others. Hence that ſtrong inclination in children, as ſoon as they underſtand the names of the ſeveral affections and tempers, to hear ſuch ſtories as preſent the moral characters of agents and their fortunes. Hence that joy in the proſperity of the kind, the faithful, and the juſt; and that indignation and ſorrow upon the ſucceſſes of the cruel and treacherous. Of this power we ſhall treat more fully hereafter.

A ſenſe of honour;

VI. As by the former determination we are led to approve or condemn ourſelves or others according to the temper diſplayed, ſo by another natural determination, which we may call a ſenſe of honour and ſhame, an high pleaſure is felt upon our gaining the approbation and eſteem of others for our good actions, and upon their expreſſing their ſentiments of gratitude; and on the other hand, we are cut to the heart by cenſure, condemnation, and reproach. All this appears in the countenance. The fear of infamy, or cenſure, or contempt, diſplays itſelf by bluſhing.

BOOK I.

an immediate principle.

'Tis true, we may obſerve from our infancy, that men are prone to do good offices to thoſe they approve and honour. But we appeal to the hearts of men, whether they have not an immediate pleaſure in being honoured and eſteemed, without thinking of any future advantages, and even when they previouſly know that they can receive none. Are not we generally ſolicitous about our characters after our death? And whence is it that bluſhing accompanies this ſort of fear, and not the fears of other diſadvantages, if this is not an immediate principle?

* ARISTOTLE's account of this pleaſure, tho' more elegant, is not juſt: "that we reliſh honour as it is a "teſtimony to our virtue, which we are previouſly "conſcious is the greateſt good." This conſideration may ſometimes make honour very grateful to men who are doubtful and diffident of their own conduct. But have not alſo the men of greateſt abilities, who are perfectly aſſured of the goodneſs of their conduct, a like natural joy in being praiſed, diſtinct from their inward ſelf-approbation?

The kind intention of God in implanting this principle is obvious. 'Tis a ſtrong incitement to every thing excellent and amiable: it gives a grateful reward to virtue: it often ſurmounts the obſtacles to it from low worldly intereſts: and even men of little virtue are excited by it to ſuch uſeful ſervices as they would have otherways declined. The ſelfiſh are thus, beyond their inclination, made ſubſervient to a publick intereſt; and ſuch are puniſhed who counteract it.

* *Ethic. ad Nicom.* l. i. c. 5.

What may further prove that this ſenſe of honour is an original principle, is this; we value the praiſe of others, not in proportion to their abilities to ſerve us, but in proportion to their capacity of judging in ſuch matters. We feel the difference, between the intereſted deſire of pleaſing the man in power who can promote us; and the inward joy from the approbation of the judicious or ingenious, who cannot do us any other good offices. The deſire of praiſe is acknowleged to be one of the moſt univerſal paſſions of the ſoul. CHAP. 2.

VII. Tho' it is by the moral ſenſe that actions become of the greateſt conſequence to our happineſs or miſery; yet 'tis plain the mind naturally perceives ſome other ſorts of excellence in many powers of body and mind; muſt admire them, whether in ourſelves or others; and muſt be pleaſed with certain exerciſes of them, without conceiving them as moral virtues. We often uſe words too promiſcuouſly, and do not expreſs diſtinctly the different feelings or ſenſations of the ſoul. Let us keep *moral approbation* for our ſentiments of ſuch diſpoſitions, affections, and conſequent actions, as we repute virtuous. We find this warm approbation a very different perception from the admiration or liking which we have for ſeveral other powers and diſpoſitions; which are alſo reliſhed by a ſenſe of *decency* or *dignity*. This ſenſe alſo is natural to us, but the perceptions very different from moral approbation. We not only know the uſe of ſuch valuable powers, and of their exerciſe, to the perſon poſſeſſed of them; but *A ſenſe of decency and dignity.*

BOOK I. have agreeable commotions of admiration and liking, and theſe in ſeveral degrees. Thus beauty, ſtrength, ſwiftneſs, agility of body, are more decent and eſteemable than a ſtrong voracious ſtomach, or a delicate palate. The manly diverſions of riding, or hunting, are beheld with more pleaſure and admiration than eating and drinking even in a moderate degree. A taſte for theſe manly exerciſes is often valued; whereas purſuits of mere ſenſuality appear deſpicable even when they do not run into exceſs, and at beſt are only innocent. Nay there is ſomething graceful, in the very ſhape geſture and motion, and ſomething indecent and uncomely; abſtracting from any indications of advantage diſcerned by the ſpectators.

in different degrees.

But this is ſtill more obvious about the powers of the mind and their exerciſe. A penetrating genius, capacity for buſineſs, patience of application and labour, a tenacious memory, a quick wit, are naturally admirable, and reliſhed by all obſervers; but with a quite different feeling from moral approbation. To every natural power there ſeems to be a correſponding ſenſe or taſte, recommending one ſort of exerciſe, and diſliking the contrary. Thus we reliſh the exerciſe of all the ingenious arts, machinery of every kind, imitation in painting, ſculpture, ſtatuary, poetry; gardening, architecture, muſick. We not only behold the works with pleaſure, but have a natural admiration of the perſons in whom we diſcern a taſte and genius for theſe arts. Whereas the exerciſe of our lower powers, merely ſubſervient to ſenſual gratification, are

at beſt beheld with indifference, are often matter of ſhame, and the cauſe of contempt. CHAP. 2.

Thus according to the juſt obſervation of ARISTOTLE, "The chief happineſs of active beings muſt "ariſe from action; and that not from action of eve- "ry ſort, but from that ſort to which their nature is "adapted, and which is recommended by nature." When we gratify the bodily appetites, there is an immediate ſenſe of pleaſure, ſuch as the brutes enjoy, but no further ſatisfaction; no ſenſe of dignity upon reflection, no good-liking of others for their being thus employed. There is an exerciſe of ſome other bodily powers which ſeems more manly and graceful. There is a manifeſt gradation; ſome fine taſtes in the ingenious arts are ſtill more agreeable; the exerciſe is delightful; the works are pleaſant to the ſpectator, and reputable to the artiſt. The exerciſe of the higher powers of the underſtanding, in diſcovery of truth, and juſt reaſoning, is more eſteemable, when the ſubjects are important. But the nobleſt of all are the virtuous affections and actions, the objects of the moral ſenſe. *Happineſs of active beings is in action.*

Some other abilities and diſpoſitions of ſoul, which are naturally connected with benevolent diſpoſitions, and inconſiſtent with the higheſt ſelfiſhneſs and ſenſuality, ſeem to be immediatly approved by the moral ſenſe itſelf. Theſe we refer to another place. We ſhall only take notice here, that by certain aſſociations of ideas, and by frequent compariſons made in ſimilies and metaphors, and by other cauſes, ſome ina- *Additional ideas.*

BOOK I. nimate objects have obtained additional ideas of dignity, decency, sanctity; some appear as mean and despicable; and others are in a middle state of indifference. Our relish for imitation and observing resemblances has made all languages full of metaphors: and similitudes and allegories give no small pleasure in many compositions: hence we cloath many objects with additional ideas of qualities they are not naturally capable of; some of these ideas are great and venerable, others low and contemptible. Some attempt to explain the natural cause or occasion of laughter, a commotion of mind generally agreeable, of which all are susceptible, from a natural sense of the *ridiculous* in objects or events.

Association of ideas very necessary.

VIII. Before we pass to the dispositions of the will, we may observe a natural involuntary determination to associate or bind together all such perceptions as have often occurred together, or have made at once a strong impression on the mind, so that they shall still attend each other, when any object afterwards excites any one or more of them. As this is experienced in smaller matters, so it affects our apprehensions of good and evil natural and moral. When the strain of conversation and popular maxims have long represented certain actions or events as good, and others as evil; we find it difficult to break the association, even after our reason is convinced of the contrary. Thus certain actions are confusedly imagined honourable, others dishonourable; certain stations miserable, and others happy; as spectres are imagined in church-yards. Tho'

many miſeries and vices ſpring from this fountain, we may ſee the abſolute neceſſity of this determination. Without it we could have little uſe of memory, or recollection, or even of ſpeech. How tedious would it be to need a particular recollection, upon each word we hear or deſire to ſpeak, to find what words and ideas are joined by the cuſtom of the language? it muſt be as tedious a work as decyphering after we had found an alphabet. Whereas, now, the ſound and idea are ſo aſſociated, that the one ever is attended with the other. Nay, how is it we remember? when we are examined about a paſt event, the time, or place, ſome circumſtance, or perſon then preſent, is ſuggeſted in the queſtion, and theſe bring along with them the whole train of the aſſociated ideas. The ſubject of a debate is ſuggeſted; a man converſant in it finds, previous almoſt to volition, the principal reaſonings on both ſides ariſing in his mind. To this diſpoſition in a great meaſure is owing the power of education, which forms many aſſociations in our early years; and few have the patience or courage to examine, whether they are founded in nature, or in the weakneſs of our inſtructors. CHAP. I.

IX. Many of the natural determinations of the will are abundantly explained by ſuch as treat deſignedly upon that ſubject, and point out the natural occaſions of the ſeveral paſſions and affections. To theſe authors we may refer much of this ſubject. We conſidered, above, the ſtrong natural propenſity to action. We may alſo obſerve another determination, or law *The will and habits.*

BOOK I. of our nature, by which the frequent repetition of actions gives not only a facility in performing them, by encreasing our active powers, but makes the mind more prone to them for the future, or more uneasy when it is by violence restrained from them. And this is called an Habit. In our passive sensations the pleasures and pains are rather abated by frequent feelings: and yet the uneasiness under the want of pleasures is increased by our being long enured to them. If we find much detriment from habits of vice, equally great is the advantage of the habits of virtue. It is of general advantage to a rational species, that it thus can increase any of its powers as it chuses, and make them more stable and vigorous. It is still in our power, too, to wear out any habits, by abstaining from their acts, or resolutely acting in opposition to them. Could we acquire no habits, our powers must remain miserably weak, and all artificial action continue as uneasy as we found our first essays.

No habit or custom gives new ideas.

But all these associations, habits, customs, or prejudices, recommend objects to our liking, or raise aversions to them, under the notion of some quality or species perceivable by the senses we are naturally endued with, nor can they raise any new ideas. No sentiments therefore of approbation or condemnation, no liking or disliking, are sufficiently explained by attributing them to prejudice, custom, or education, or association of ideas; unless we can fully shew what these ideas or notions are, and to what sense they be-

long, under which theſe objects are approved or condemned, liked or diſliked. CHAP. 2.

Conjugal and parental affections.

X. At a certain age ariſes a new deſire between the ſexes, plainly deſtined for the continuance of our race; which, as it would be pernicious or uſeleſs in our firſt years, before we had acquired knowledge and experience ſufficient for the preſervation of offſpring, is wiſely poſtponed in the order of nature. This deſire in mankind does not terminate merely on ſenſual pleaſure, as in the brutes; nor is it in mankind only a blind impulſe, ſuch as excites the brutes, previouſly to experience of pleaſure. There is a natural liking of beauty as an indication of a temper and manners. A character is apprehended, and thence goodwill and eſteem ariſes, and a deſire of ſociety for life, with friendſhip and mutual love, and united intereſts. Thus theſe ſentiments and deſires, in mankind, always accompany the natural impulſe. They have alſo univerſally a deſire of offſpring, where no ſtronger inconſiſtent views reſtrain them.

Toward offſpring there is in man, as in other animals, a peculiar ſtrong affection, and a tender ſolicitude for their preſervation and happineſs. In mankind this affection continues during life, as parents may always do ſome good to their poſterity. It deſcends to grandchildren, and their children, almoſt undiminiſhed. In the brutes it is found where the young need aſſiſtance; where they don't, it is not found. It laſts till the young can ſupport themſelves, and then generally ceaſes. All this carries with it ma-

BOOK I. nifeſt evidences of deſign in the Author of Nature. Like affections, but weaker, are found generally to attend the tyes of blood among collaterals. Theſe tender affections are the ſprings of more than one half of the labours and cares of mankind: and, where there is any ability, they rouſe the mind to diligence and induſtry, and to things great and honourable. By means of them the heart is made more ſuſceptible of every tender kind and ſocial affection.

Men ſocial, and fit for civil ſociety.

XI. One can ſcarce deny to mankind a natural impulſe to ſociety with their fellows, as an immediate principle, when we ſee the like in many ſpecies of animals; nor ſhould we aſcribe all aſſociating to their indigence. Their other principles, their curioſity, communicativeneſs, deſire of action; their ſenſe of honour, their compaſſion, benevolence, gaiety, and the moral faculty, could have little or no exerciſe in ſolitude, and therefore might lead them to haunt together, even without an immediate or ultimate impulſe, or a ſenſe of their indigence. The tyes of blood would have the ſame effect, and have probably firſt united large numbers for mutual aſſiſtance and defence, upon a common apprehenſion of their indigence in ſolitude. When many were thus aſſociated, the ſuperior goodneſs, prudence, or courage of ſome, would naturally procure them a ſuperior eſteem and confidence from all around them. Controverſies would ariſe; the miſchief of deciding them by violence would ſoon appear. They would ſoon ſee the danger of divided counſels, either about

improving their condition, or common defence; tho' all agreed in the general end. The moſt eſteemed would ſoon be choſen *arbitrators* of their controverſies, and *directors* of the whole body in matters concerning their common intereſt; and, as their prudence ſuggeſted, laws and political inſtitutions would be eſtabliſhed. The reſt, finding the ſweets of good order, ſafety, and laws, would have a veneration for the ſociety, and its governors, and conſtitution. The finer ſpirits would feel patriotiſm and the love of a country in their breaſts: and all, in ſome meaſure, by bonds of acquaintance, and intercourſe of buſineſs, and the enjoyments of protection for themſelves and their fortunes, would acquire a love to the community and zeal for its intereſts. CHAP. 2.

XII. As the order, grandeur, regular diſpoſitions and motions, of the viſible world, muſt ſoon affect the mind with admiration; as the ſeveral claſſes of animals and vegetables diſplay in their whole frame exquiſite mechaniſm, and regular ſtructure, evidencing counſel, art, and contrivance for certain ends; men of genius and attention muſt ſoon diſcover ſome intelligent beings, one or more, preſiding in all this comely order and magnificence. The great and the beautiful ſtrikes the mind with veneration, and leads us to infer intelligence as reſiding in it, or directing it: a careful attention to the ſtructure of our own nature and its powers leads to the ſame concluſion. Our feeling moral ſentiments, our ſenſe of goodneſs and virtue, as well as of art and deſign; our experience of *Religion natural.*

BOOK I. ſome moral diſtribution within, by immediate happineſs or miſery conſtantly attending virtue and vice, and of a like diſtribution generally obtaining even in external things by a natural tendency, muſt ſuggeſt that there is a moral government in the world: and as men are prone to communicate their knowledge, inventions, conjectures, the notions of a Deity and providence muſt ſoon be diffuſed; and an eaſy exerciſe of reaſon would confirm the perſuaſion. Thus ſome devotion and piety would generally obtain, and therefore may juſtly be called natural to a rational ſyſtem. An early revelation and tradition generally anticipated human invention in this matter: but theſe alone could ſcarce have diffuſed the belief ſo univerſally, without the aids of obvious reaſons from ſtrong appearances in Nature. Notions of Deity and ſome ſort of worſhip have in fact as univerſally obtained among men, as living in ſociety, the uſe of ſpeech, or even propagating their kind; and thus may be counted as natural.

The ſeveral powers diſpoſitions or determinations above-mentioned are univerſally found in mankind, where ſome accident hath not rendered ſome individual monſtrous, or plainly maimed and deficient in a natural faculty. But, in the different individuals, theſe diſpoſitions are not in the ſame proportion as to ſtrength; one being prevalent in one, and another in another: and hence the great diverſity of characters. Yet, upon a proper occaſion, when there is no oppoſi-

tion from ſome ſtronger principle, each of theſe powers will exert itſelf, and have its effect.

The cauſes of vice.

XIII. Notwithſtanding that all theſe nobler powers we mentioned are natural to us, the cauſes of that vice and depravity of manners we obſerve, are pretty obvious. Not to ſay any thing of cauſes not diſcoverable by the light of nature, mankind ſpend ſeveral of their firſt years, where there is not a careful education, in the gratification of their ſenſual appetites, and in the exerciſe of ſome lower powers, which, by long indulgence, grow ſtronger: reflecting on moral notions, and the finer enjoyments, and comparing them with the lower, is a laborious exerciſe. The appetites and paſſions ariſe of themſelves, when their objects occur, as they do frequently: the checking, examining, and ballancing them, is a work of difficulty. Prejudices and groundleſs aſſociations of ideas are very incident to men of little attention. Our ſelfiſh paſſions early gain ſtrength by indulgence. Hence the general tenor of human life is an incoherent mixture of many ſocial, kind, innocent actions, and of many ſelfiſh, angry, ſenſual ones; as one or other of our natural diſpoſitions happens to be raiſed, and to be prevalent over others.

CHAP. III.

Concerning the Ultimate Determinations of the Will, and Benevolent Affections.

The ultimate determinations of the ſoul.

I. AFTER this long enumeration of the ſeveral ſenſes or powers of perception, by which a great multitude of objects may be the occaſion of pleaſure or pain, or of ſome ſorts of happineſs or miſery; and a like enumeration of many diſpoſitions of will, or determinations of deſire; human nature muſt appear a very complex and confuſed fabrick, unleſs we can diſcover ſome order and ſubordination among theſe powers, and thus diſcern which of them is naturally fit to govern. Of this we ſhall treat in ſome following chapters. In the firſt place the *Underſtanding*, or the power of reflecting, comparing, judging, makes us capable of diſcerning the tendencies of the ſeveral ſenſes, appetites, actions, gratifications, either to our own happineſs, or to that of others, and the comparative values of every object, every gratification. This power judges about the means or the ſubordinate ends: but about the ultimate ends there is no reaſoning. We proſecute them by ſome immediate diſpoſition or determination of ſoul, which in the order of action is always prior to all reaſoning; as no opinion or judgment can move to action, where there is no prior deſire of ſome end.

The falſe general determination alleged the only one.

Were there no other ultimate determination or deſire in the human ſoul than that of each one toward

his own happineſs; then calm * *ſelf-love* would be the ſole leading principle, plainly deſtined by Nature to govern and reſtrain all other affections, and keep them ſubſervient to its end; having reaſon for its miniſter or counſellor, to ſuggeſt the means. But the *end* would be conſtituted by that ultimate determination, without any reaſoning. CHAP. 3.

This is a favourite tenet of a great many authors, and pleaſes by its ſimplicity. But very different and contrary accounts are given, by theſe authors, of the private enjoyments or happineſs purſued in the offices we commonly repute virtuous. Some make the ſole motive to all offices or actions even the moſt honourable, the ſole end ultimately intended by them, to be ſome worldly advantage, ſome bodily pleaſures or the means of them. This was the tenet of the *Cyrenaicks*, and probably of the *Epicureans* too, and of ſome moderns. Others ſay, that we deſire the good of others, or of ſocieties, merely as the means of our own ſafety and proſperity; others, as the means of ſome ſubtiler pleaſures of our own by ſympathy with others in their happineſs: others make our end to be the pleaſures we enjoy in being honoured, or ſome rewards we expect for our ſervices, and theſe either from GOD, or men. *Various accounts of it.*

But there is ſtill an higher ſcheme; allowing indeed no other calm ſetled determination of ſoul but

* By *ſelf-love* we mean, one's *deſire of his own happineſs*, and this only. By a frequent uſe of the word *love*, for *eſteem*, ſome have imagined an univerſal *ſelf-eſteem*, or preference of our moral character and accompliſhments to thoſe of others, which is contrary to what the modeſt and ſelf-diffident continually experience.

BOOK I. that in each one toward his own happineſs; but granting that we have a *moral faculty*, and many particular kind affections truly diſintereſted, terminating upon the happineſs of others, and often operating when we have no reference of it in our minds to any enjoyment of our own. But, ſay they, "the ſole original "ſpring of all calm deliberate purpoſes of cultivating "theſe generous affections, and of gratifying them "in oppoſition to any ſelfiſh affections, is this; we ex- "perience the ſublimeſt joys of ſelf-approbation in "gratifying theſe generous motions; theſe joys are a "nobler happineſs than any other; and the deſire of "them, flowing from the *calm ſelfiſh determination*, "is the view of all deliberate purpoſes of virtue; tho' "the kind paſſions themſelves often hurry us into "friendly and generous actions without this thought."

This conſiſtent with many diſintereſted affections.

This laſt account gives a lovely repreſentation of human nature and its affections, and leaves a great deal of room for moſt of the generous virtues of life; but it does not pleaſe us with ſuch ſimplicity as the other ſchemes, which directly deduce every motion of the heart from *ſelf-love*. This is not to be reckoned among the ſelfiſh ſchemes, ſince it makes all the eminent virtues flow from diſintereſted affections, natural to the heart, however in our calmer hours they may be corroborated by the calm views and deſires of our own happineſs. But our buſineſs is to find the truth, let the ſchemes, or their authors, be claſſed as they will: and, for this purpoſe, 'tis neceſſary to conſider well, both theſe affections alledged to be diſinte-

rested, and the *moral faculty* by which we judge of all the motions of the *will*; that we may see, whether there be in the soul, as we alledged above, another *calm determination*, beside that one toward our own happiness; as well as many particular affections, terminating upon the good of others, as their immediate and ultimate object, without reference to private interest of any kind. CHAP. 3.

II. The *calm self-love*, or the determination of each individual toward his own happiness, is a motion of the *will* without any uneasy sensation attending it. But the several selfish desires, terminating on particular objects, are generally attended with some uneasy turbulent sensations in very different degrees: yet these sensations are different from the act of the will to which they are conjoined; and different too from the motives of desire. The motive is some good apprehended in an object or event, toward which good the desire tends; and, in consequence of desire, some uneasiness arises, till the good is obtained. To aversion, the *motive* is some evil apprehended or feared, and perhaps not yet felt. Uneasiness too attends the aversion, untill the evil is repelled. Prospects of the pleasures or powers attending opulence are the motives to the desire of wealth, and never the uneasy feelings attending the desire itself. These feelings are, in nature, subsequent to the desire. *In desires, the uneasiness differs from the motives.*

Again, when we obtain the thing desired; beside the pleasures to be obtained from this object, which were the motives of the desire, and often before we

BOOK I. enjoy them, there is one pleaſure immediatly ariſing from the ſucceſs, at leaſt in thoſe caſes where there was any difficulty in the purſuit, or fear of diſappointment. It would be abſurd to ſay that this joy in the ſucceſs was the motive to the deſire. We ſhould have no joy in the ſucceſs, nor could we have had any deſire, unleſs the proſpect of ſome other good had been the motive. This holds in all our deſires, benevolent or ſelfiſh, that there is ſome motive, ſome end intended, diſtinct from the joy of ſucceſs, or the removal of the pain of deſire; otherways all deſires would be the moſt fantaſtick things imaginable, equally ardent toward any trifle, as toward the greateſt good; ſince the joy of ſucceſs, and the removal of the uneaſineſs of deſire, would be alike in both ſorts of deſires. 'Tis trifling therefore to ſay that all deſires are ſelfiſh, becauſe by gratifying them we obtain the joy of ſucceſs, and free ourſelves from the uneaſy feelings of deſire.

Subordinate good-will is not virtue.

III. 'Tis owned by all, that many actions, beneficial to others, may directly ſpring from ſelfiſh deſires of rewards, of returns of good offices, of honour. One may ſerve others from fear of unjuſt violence, or of juſt puniſhment. Nay, from the deſire of our own happineſs we may have an inward undiſſembled deſire of another's happineſs, which we conceive to be the means of our own. Thus, one deſires the ſucceſs of a partner in managing the common ſtock; the proſperity of any country or ſociety upon which his fortunes depend; the advancement of a friend from

whom we expect promotion; the ſucceſs and good conduct of a pupil, which may redound to the honour of the maſter or tutor. Theſe real deſires of the welfare of others may all be ſubordinate to one's own ſelfiſh deſires. CHAP. 3.

Here 'tis agreed by all, that deſires of the welfare of others, ſubordinated to one's deſires of his own worldly advantages, without any other affection, have nothing virtuous in them. A change of outward circumſtances, without any change of temper, would raiſe deſires of the adverſity of others, in the ſame manner. The main queſtion is, whether the affections reputed benevolent are ſubordinated to ſome finer intereſts than worldly advantages, and ultimately terminate upon them: or, if there are not kind affections ultimately terminating on the good of others; and theſe conſtituted by nature, (either alone, or perhaps ſometimes corroborated by ſome views of intereſt,) the immediate cauſe of moral approbation. Now 'tis plain, *Whether kind affections are ultimate;*

IV. 1. That all hopes or fears from men, whether about wealth or poverty, honour or infamy, bodily pleaſure or pain, can only be motives to external actions or ſervices, and not to any inward good-will or deſire of their happineſs; ſince we all know that our internal affections are hid from others. External deportment alone can be the means of obtaining what we hope from them, or of avoiding what we fear. *they do not terminate upon rewards from men;*

2. As ſelf-love can make us deſire only what appears the means of our own happineſs, one can ſcarce *nor on thoſe from God, or from ſelf-approbation.*

BOOK I. alledge that even the ſubtileſt intereſts are the ſprings of real good-will to others. If one is aware of the high pleaſures of ſelf-approbation, ariſing upon conſciouſneſs of inward good-will and kind affections, or is convinced that the Deity will confer rewards upon men of ſuch tempers; theſe two motives may make one deſire to have that uſeful ſet of affections, in order to obtain happineſs. Now, could we by command of the will directly raiſe what affections we deſire, from theſe motives we would raiſe kind affections. But a temper or ſet of affections cannot thus be raiſed. As eſteem cannot be raiſed, by any act of the will, toward an object in which no excellence appears, nor fear where there is nothing formidable, nor anger where there is nothing hurtful, nor pity where there is no ſuffering, nor gratitude where there has been no evidence of prior benevolence; ſo neither can a mind wholly determined toward ſelfiſh good raiſe in itſelf kind affections, by a command of its will. The natural cauſe muſt be preſented before any affection can be raiſed.

How divine laws operate to make men virtuous.

If indeed our hearts are ſo conſtituted, as the aſſertors of diſintereſted affections alledge, that upon preſenting the ſtate of any ſenſitive beings to our calm thoughts, when no oppoſition of intereſts or evil diſpoſitions apprehended in them obſtruct the natural motion of our ſouls, a kind good-will naturally ariſes; then the motives of gaining the nobler pleaſures of ſelf-approbation, or rewards from God, will incline us to turn our calm attention to the ſtate of others; will

ſurmount little interfering intereſts, and remove even the obſtacles of anger *. The ſame motives will make us inquire alſo into all ſuch qualities excellencies or good offices of others as are the natural occaſions of the warmer and more endearing affections. And thus it is that the ſanctions of the divine laws can influence our affections. But,

3. From ſelf-love we deſire only the means of our own happineſs. Now the *actual happineſs of others* is neither the cauſe nor means of obtaining ſelf-approbation, nor rewards from God. Our hearts approve us, and God promiſes rewards to us, not becauſe others are in fact happy, but becauſe we have ſuch kind diſpoſitions, and act our parts well in their behalf, whether in the event they are happy or not. Our deſire therefore of the pleaſure of ſelf-approbation, or of divine rewards, can only make us deſire to have theſe affections, and to act a ſuitable part. But theſe affections cannot be directly raiſed by the will: and wherever they are, they plainly terminate upon the good of others, as the ultimate end intended by them; tho' in our previous conſultations with ourſelves, or deliberations about the inward culture of the mind, we may have reſolved, with a view to our own perfection

* This is the reference to our own higheſt and moſt noble enjoyments and intereſts, which we ſee made in ſome of the beſt writings of the antients, and in Lord *Shaftesbury*; "That, conſcious of the inward delights and dignity of *virtue* ſurpaſſing all other enjoyments, we reſolve to follow all the noble and generous motions of our hearts in oppoſition to the lower intereſts of this life." Not that they imagined we can raiſe any new affection, by command of the *will*, which nature had not planted and connected with its proper cauſes: nor that all generous affections have private good in view. This notion they oppoſed with the greateſt zeal and ſtrength of reaſon.

BOOK I. and ſublimeſt happineſs, to incourage all ſuch affections in ourſelves, and to turn our attention to all ſuch conſiderations as are naturally apt to raiſe them; and to deſpiſe all the mean interfering intereſts of this preſent world. Theſe generous affections often operate where there have been no ſuch previous deliberations and purpoſes of cultivating them; and where there have been ſuch purpoſes, ſtill the generous affection terminates and reſts upon its natural object, the good of others; and muſt have had its exiſtence in the ſoul previous to all deſires and intentions of cultivating it.

The affections do not ariſe immediatly upon our wiſhing to have them.

There is nothing ſtrange or unuſual in this that one ſhould want certain tender generous affections, of love, eſteem, gratitude, pity, repentance for offences; while yet he earneſtly wiſhes to have them. An inward temper and a ſet of affections do not ſtart up at once upon a wiſh or command. Men who have been careleſs about virtue and piety are often obſerved, upon approach of danger, and on other occaſions, heartily wiſhing, from ſelf-love or fear of puniſhment, that they had love and gratitude to God, warm charity and good-will to their neighbours, meekneſs and a forgiving temper, and ſorrow for their ſins; and yet they have a diſtreſſing conſciouſneſs that theſe diſpoſitions do not ariſe in them. In good men theſe affections operate without any intentions of intereſts, without views of ſelf-approbation, or future rewards.

Nay, are not ſome of theſe kind affections ſtrongeſt where we leaſt expect honour from men, rewards from

God, or even any conſiderable ſelf-approbation; as the conjugal and parental affections, friendſhip, and gratitude? However the want of them is much condemned, theſe affections are reputed but a lower kind of virtue, ſome of them ſcarce any virtue at all. CHAP. 3.

V. Some plead that our moſt generous affections are ſubordinate to private intereſt by means of *ſympathy*, which makes the pleaſures and pains, the happineſs or miſery of others, the conſtant cauſes of pleaſure or pain to ourſelves. We rejoice in ſeeing others happy, nay in knowing that they are happy tho' at a diſtance. And in like manner we have pain or ſorrow from their miſery. To obtain this pleaſure therefore and to avoid this pain, we have from ſelf-love, ſay they, an inward deſire of their happineſs, undiſſembled, tho' ſubordinate to our deſire of our own. But this ſympathy can never account for all kind affections, tho' it is no doubt a natural principle and a beautiful part of our conſtitution. Where it operates alone, it is uniformly proportioned to the diſtreſs or ſuffering beheld or imagined without regard to other circumſtances, whereas our generous affections are in very different degrees and proportions; we may have a weaker good-will to any perſon unknown; but how much ſtronger is the affection of gratitude, the love with eſteem toward a worthy character or intimate friend, the parental affection? This ſympathy, if it is the cauſe of all love, muſt be a very variable diſpoſition, increaſing upon benefits received, moral excellence obſerved, intimacies, and tyes of blood: for the inward

All kind affections are not from ſympathy.

BOOK I. good-will, the kind affection, is plainly increaſed by theſe cauſes.

Grant it naturally varied from theſe cauſes, yet this ſympathy could never account for that immediate ardour of love and good-will which breaks forth toward any character repreſented to us as eminent in moral excellence, before we have had any thoughts, or made any inquiries into his ſtate in point of happineſs or miſery. Suppoſe him in the remoteſt parts of the earth, or in ſome other planet. Sure we can know the intention of the ſoul in its purſuits or affections. Is our own future pleaſure in ſome ſympathetick joys the object upon which every kind affection and every friendly wiſh terminates? Does parental care, patriotiſm, even when it is deliberately ſacrificing life for its country, terminate upon ſome private joy of its own? when and where is it to be obtained? only a moment or two, before death is to carry us off from all human affairs, and few of us think of knowing the ſtate of our ſurvivors. Should God intimate to a brave man that his death is approaching next moment, and that he ſhould have no longer fellow-feeling with mortals or memory of them, but that he would grant his laſt wiſhes about his children, his friends, his country; would he not as ardently deſire their proſperity as in any former period of life, tho' his joyful ſympathetick imagination would ceaſe next moment? how will one account upon this ſcheme for thoſe anxieties, tender recommendations, advices, and ardent prayers of men a-dying for thoſe who were dear to them, tho'

they are perſuaded that they ſhall preſently be removed from this ſtate and know no more of human affairs? CHAP. 3.

Compaſſion not ſelfiſh.

Our compaſſion too toward the diſtreſſed, 'tis plain, terminates upon their relief, even when we have no attention to our own pain. Nor is the termination of any deſire merely upon the removal of the uneaſineſs which accompanies it. Thus tho' there may be in nature ſome connections of intereſt between us and the objects of our tender affections, yet the affection terminates on their good, is previous to this connexion, and is the cauſe of it. We therefore rejoice in the happineſs of our child, our friend, our country, becauſe we previouſly had an ultimate good-will to them. Nor do we therefore love them or wiſh them well becauſe we have obſerved that we would derive joy from their happineſs, and ſorrow from their miſery. Hence it is that, the ſtronger our previous love and eſteem was, the greater ſhall our joy be on account of their happineſs, and our ſorrow for their miſery.

Some affections entirely diſintereſted.

This may ſuffice to eſtabliſh that important point, that our nature is ſuſceptible of affections truly diſintereſted in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, and not directly ſubordinated to ſelf-love, or aiming at private intereſt of any kind. The tyes of blood, benefits received, moral excellence diſplayed, tho' we apprehend no advantage redounding to ourſelves from it, are the natural cauſes of theſe particular kind affections; many of them ariſe unmerited; all terminate on the good of others; and all of them often operate in the ſoul when it has no

BOOK I. views, or rational ground of hoping for any private advantage; nay when they are involving it in trouble and anxiety.

Calm affections and paſſions.

VI. As we obſerved formerly that the particular motions of the will toward private good are, either the calm ſtable affections, or turbulent paſſions; ſo are the particular motions of the generous kind: ſome of them are calm, ſedate, and ſteddy; aiming at the happineſs of their object, whether an individual or a ſociety, attended with no turbulent ſenſations, and only cauſing uneaſineſs when they are defeated in their intention; others are turbulent, and attended with uneaſy ſenſations. We may proceed further in this compariſon.

Univerſal benevolence.

As there is found in the human mind, when it recollects itſelf, a calm general determination toward perſonal happineſs of the higheſt kind it has any notion of; ſo we may find a like principle of a generous kind. When upon recollection we preſent to our minds the notion of the greateſt poſſible ſyſtem of ſenſitive beings, and the higheſt happineſs it can enjoy, there is alſo a calm determination to deſire it, abſtracting from any connection with or ſubſerviency to our private enjoyment. We ſhall find theſe two grand determinations, one toward our own greateſt happineſs, the other toward the greateſt general good, each independent on the other, each capable of ſuch ſtrength as to reſtrain all the particular affections of its kind, and keep them ſubordinate to itſelf.

Whether ſhould the ſelfiſh yield to

But here ariſes a new perplexity in this complex

ſtructure, where theſe two principles ſeem to draw different ways. Muſt the generous determination, and all its particular affections, yield to the ſelfiſh one, and be under its controll? muſt we indulge their kind motions ſo far as private intereſt admits and no further? or muſt the ſelfiſh yield to the generous? or can we ſuppoſe that in this complex ſyſtem there are two ultimate principles which may often oppoſe each other, without any umpire to reconcile their differences? or ſhall we deny any original calm determination toward a publick intereſt; allowing only a variety of particular ultimate kind affections; not indeed ariſing from ſelf-love, or directly aiming at private good as their natural termination, and yet in all our deliberate counſels about the general tenor of our conduct, ſubjected, in common with all the particular appetites and paſſions of the ſelfiſh kind, to the original impulſe in each one toward his own perfection and happineſs? This laſt ſeems to be the ſcheme of ſome excellent authors both antient and modern.

CHAP. 3. *the benevolent principle or not.*

To alledge here that, by our reaſon and reflection, we may ſee what was the intention of God the Author of our Nature in this whole fabrick of our affections; that he plainly intended the univerſal happineſs, and that of each individual, as far as it is conſiſtent with it; and that this intention ſhould be our rule: that we ſhould therefore reſtrain and controll, not only all ſelfiſh affections, but even all generous particular affections, within ſuch bounds as the univerſal intereſt requires: this is true in fact, but does not remove the

This determined by the moral ſenſe.

BOOK I. difficulty, unleſs we are firſt told from what determination of ſoul, from what motive, are we to comply with the divine intentions? if from a deſire of reward, then the ſelfiſh calm determination is the ſole ultimate principle of all deliberate counſels in life: if from a perception of his moral excellence, a deſire of imitating him, and from love and gratitude, then the deſire of moral excellence muſt be the ſupreme original determination. But this deſire of moral excellence, however an original principle, muſt preſuppoſe ſome antecedent determinations of the will as its object. And among theſe there muſt be ſome one in which the ſupreme moral excellence conſiſts, otherways our very ſenſe and deſire of moral excellence, ſince it may recommend many particular affections, which may interfere with each other, will again lead us into a new labyrinth of perplexity. The ſolution of theſe difficulties muſt be found by conſidering fully that *moral faculty* above-mentioned, to which, in the next place, we proceed; briefly touching at thoſe reaſons which ſhew this *moral faculty* to be *an original determination* or *ſenſe* in our nature, not capable of being referred to other powers of perception.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning the Moral Senſe, *or faculty of perceiving moral excellence, and its ſupreme objects.*

I. ALTHO' we have kind affections ultimately aiming at the good of others, the ſucceſs of which is joyful to us, yet our approbation of moral conduct is very different from liking it merely as the occaſion of pleaſure to ourſelves in gratifying theſe kind affections. As we do not approve all conduct which gives us this pleaſure, ſo we approve ſometimes ſuch conduct as does not give it; and our approbation of the good conduct which gives this pleaſure is not proportioned to the pleaſure it gives us. Thus many inventions, and much art and induſtry which does good to the perſons or country we love, is not approved as virtuous: we approve generous attempts tho' unſucceſsful; we approve the virtues of enemies, which may hurt the chief objects of our love. We equally approve the virtues or generous deſigns of good men in former ages toward their contemporaries, or in the remoteſt nations, toward their countrymen, for whom our affections are very faint and weak, as if the like were done to our friends, or country, the objects of our ſtrongeſt affections.

The notion of moral goodneſs is not giving us pleaſure by ſympathy;

Again---Tho' the approbation of moral excellence is a grateful action or ſenſation of the mind, 'tis plain the good approved is not this tendency to give us a

nor pleaſing our moral ſenſe.

BOOK I. grateful ſenſation. As, in approving a beautiful form, we refer the beauty to the object; we do not ſay that it is beautiful becauſe we reap ſome little pleaſure in viewing it, but we are pleaſed in viewing it becauſe it is antecedently beautiful. Thus, when we admire the virtue of another, the whole excellence, or that quality which by nature we are determined to approve, is conceived to be in that other; we are pleaſed in the contemplation becauſe the object is excellent, and the object is not judged to be therefore excellent becauſe it gives us pleaſure.

nor that of uſefulneſs to the agent;

II. Much leſs is it the approved ſpecies of virtue, that it is an affection or action which gives pleaſure to the agent. It always may indeed give him pleaſure upon reflection, by means of this moral faculty: but 'tis plainly *then* that we moſt admire the virtue of another when we attend to its labours, dangers, difficulties, pains; and have no thought of any preſent or future pleaſures of the agent.

or to the approver;

'Tis ſtrange that men ſhould be at a loſs to diſcern what form, or conception, or ſpecies it is, under which they approve eſteem or admire their own affections and conduct, or that of others; and diſapprove and condemn the contrary. One would think it manifeſt that the notion under which one approves virtue, is neither its tendency to obtain any benefit or reward to the agent or to the approver. The approver never expects a reward for the virtue of another; he approves where he ſees no intereſt of his own promoted: and he would leſs approve ſuch actions as are

beneficent, the more he conſidered them as advanta- CHAP. 4.
geous to the agent, and imagined him influenced by
the views of his own advantage. Actions are conceived
rewardable becauſe they are good, not good becauſe
they are to be rewarded. Both the ſpectator and the
agent value good actions the more in point of virtue,
the more expenſive or diſadvantageous they are to the
agent; and both will diſapprove as immoral ſome ac-
tions which the one will allure to by bribes, and the
other undertake; both conceiving them in this man-
ner advantageous.

Now, if direct explicite opinions of tendencies to *nor imaginations of advantage.*
the advantage of the approver or agent do not raiſe
moral approbation, much leſs can we ſuppoſe that any
confuſed imaginations, or vague aſſociations of ideas,
about ſuch advantages to the approver or the agent,
can be the form under which virtue is approved.

'Tis alſo obvious that the notion under which we
approve virtue is not its tendency to procure honour.
A proſpect of honour may be a motive to the agent,
at leaſt to external actions: but the tendency of an ac-
tion to procure honour cannot make another approve
it, who derives no honour from it. Our very deſire of
gaining honour, and the diſpoſition in ſpectators to
confer it, muſt preſuppoſe a moral ſenſe in both. And
any views an agent may have to obtain ſelf-approba-
tion muſt alſo preſuppoſe a moral ſenſe. We cannot
therefore ſay an action is judged good becauſe it gains
to the agent the pleaſure of ſelf-approbation; but it
gains to him this pleaſure becauſe it was antecedent-

BOOK I. ly good, or had that quality which by the conſtitution of this ſenſe we muſt approve. Our preſent queſtion is, what is that quality, and how perceived?

Not conformity to laws;

III. The primary notion under which we approve is not merely a *conformity to the divine will or laws.* We ſeriouſly inquire about the moral goodneſs, juſtice, holineſs, rectitude, of the Divine Nature itſelf, and likewiſe of his will or laws; theſe characters make up our common praiſes of them. They ſurely mean more than that *his will or laws are conformable to themſelves.* This we might aſcribe to an artful impure Demon. Conformity to his nature is not conformity to immenſity, eternity, omnipotence. 'Tis conformity to his goodneſs, holineſs, juſtice. Theſe moral perfections then muſt be previouſly known, or elſe the definition by *conformity to them* is uſeleſs.

nor conformity to truth.

Neither is the notion of moral goodneſs under which we approve it well explained by conformity of affections and actions to *truth, reaſon, true propoſitions, reaſon of things;* as in the common acceptation theſe characters agree to every object of the mind, about which it judges truly, animate or inanimate, virtuous or vicious. *Conformity to moral truth,* or true propoſitions about morals, equally belongs to virtue and vice; as the mind diſcerns truth about both; and, as every true propoſition is conformed to its object, ſo is the object to the propoſition. If 'tis ſaid that theſe moral truths intended are only ſuch as ſhew what actions are *good,* what we are *obliged to do,* what *ought to be done.* Theſe words mean no more than the

word moral goodneſs; and then the definition is no better than this, "the moral goodneſs of an action is its "conformity to ſuch true propoſitions as ſhew the "action to be good;" or, "good actions are ſuch a-"bout which 'tis true that *they are good*." CHAP. 4.

In general, all deſcriptions of moral goodneſs by conformity to reaſon if we examine them well, muſt lead us to ſome immediate original ſenſe or determination of our nature. All reaſons exciting to an action will lead us to ſome original affection or inſtinct of will; and all juſtifying reaſons, or ſuch as ſhew an action to be good, will at laſt lead us to ſome original ſenſe or power of perception.

In like manner all deſcriptions of it by *fitneſs, congruity, agreement*, muſt lead us to theſe original determinations. The fitneſs of means or ſubordinate ends, does not prove them to be good, unleſs the ultimate end be good. Now fitneſs of an end truly ultimate muſt be an abſurd expreſſion; as it is referred to nothing, or is fit for nothing further. All ultimate ends are ſetled by ſome of the original determinations of our nature.* *or fitneſs, congruity, &c.*

'Tis in vain here to alledge inſtruction, education, cuſtom, or aſſociation of ideas as the original of moral approbation. As theſe can give no new ſenſes, let us examine what the opinion or what the notion is upon which we approve, and to what ſenſe it belongs, whatever way the notion may have been conjoined, or whatever

* A compleat examination of theſe characters would call us off too much from the preſent deſign; we muſt therefore refer to *the illuſtrations on the moral ſenſe.*

BOOK I. have been the cauſes of our getting this opinion that ſuch a quality is inherent in or connected with the action? and this will lead us to an original principle.

There is a moral ſenſe.

IV. There is therefore, as each one by cloſe attention and reflection may convince himſelf, a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections, and actions conſequent upon them; or a natural ſenſe of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our other ſenſes or by reaſoning. When we call this determination a *ſenſe* or *inſtinct*, we are not ſuppoſing it of that low kind dependent on bodily organs, ſuch as even the brutes have. It may be a conſtant ſetled determination in the ſoul itſelf, as much as our powers of judging and reaſoning. And 'tis pretty plain that *reaſon* is only a ſubſervient power to our ultimate determinations either of perception or will. The ultimate end is ſetled by ſome ſenſe, and ſome determination of will: by ſome ſenſe we enjoy happineſs, and ſelf-love determines to it without reaſoning. Reaſon can only direct to the means; or compare two ends previouſly conſtituted by ſome other immediate powers.

This plainly analogous to other parts of nature.

In other animal-kinds each one has inſtincts toward its proper action, and has the higheſt enjoyment in following them, even with toil and ſome pain. Can we ſuppoſe mankind void of ſuch principles? as brutes ſeem not to reflect on their own temper and actions, or that of others, they may feel no more than preſent delight in following their impulſes. But in men, who can make their own tempers and conduct the ob-

jects of reflection, the analogy of nature would make one expect a ſenſe, a reliſh about them, as well as about other objects. To each of our powers we ſeem to have a correſponding taſte or ſenſe, recommending the proper uſe of it to the agent, and making him reliſh or value the like exerciſe of it by another. This we ſee as to the powers of voice, of imitation, deſigning, or machinery, motion, reaſoning; there is a ſenſe diſcerning and recommending the proper exerciſe of them. It would be anomalous in our ſtructure if we had no reliſh or taſte for powers and actions of yet greater importance; if a ſpecies of which each one is naturally capable of very contrary affections toward its fellows, and of conſequent actions, each one alſo requiring a conſtant intercourſe of actions with them, and dependant on them for his ſubſiſtence, had not an immediate reliſh for ſuch affections and actions as the intereſt of the ſyſtem requires. Shall an immediate ſenſe recommend the proper uſe of the inferior powers, and yet ſhall we allow no natural reliſh for that of the ſuperior? CHAP. 4.

V. As ſome others of our immediate perceptive powers are capable of culture and improvement, ſo is this moral ſenſe, without preſuppoſing any reference to a ſuperior power of reaſon to which their perceptions are to be referred. We once had pleaſure in the ſimple artleſs tunes of the vulgar. We indulge ourſelves in muſick; we meet with finer and more complex compoſitions. In theſe we find a pleaſure much higher, and begin to deſpiſe what formerly pleaſed us. *This ſenſe requires culture and improvement.*

BOOK I. A judge, from the motions of pity, gets many criminals acquitted: we approve this ſweet tenderneſs of heart. But we find that violence and outrages abound; the ſober, juſt, and induſtrious are plagued, and have no ſecurity. A more extenſive view of a publick intereſt ſhews ſome ſorts of pity to occaſion more extenſive miſery, than ariſes from a ſtrict execution of juſtice. Pity of itſelf never appears deformed; but a more extenſive affection, a love to ſociety, a zeal to promote general happineſs, is a more lovely principle, and the want of this renders a character deformed. This only ſhews, what we ſhall preſently confirm, that among the ſeveral affections approved there are many degrees: ſome much more lovely than others. 'Tis thus alone we correct any apparent diſorders in this *moral faculty*, even as we correct our reaſon itſelf. As we improve and correct a low taſte for harmony by enuring the ear to finer compoſitions; a low taſte for beauty, by preſenting the finer works, which yield an higher pleaſure; ſo we improve our *moral taſte* by preſenting larger ſyſtems to our mind, and more extenſive affections toward them; and thus finer objects are exhibited to the moral faculty, which it will approve; even when theſe affections oppoſe the effect of ſome narrower affections, which conſidered by themſelves would be truly lovely. No need here of reference to an higher power of perception, or to reaſon.

Is not our reaſon itſelf alſo often wrong, when we raſhly conclude from imperfect or partial evidence? muſt there be an higher power too to correct our rea-

ſon? no; preſenting more fully all the evidence on both ſides, by ſerious attention, or the beſt exerciſe of the reaſoning power, corrects the haſty judgment. Juſt ſo in the moral perceptions. CHAP. 4.

VI. This moral ſenſe from its very nature appears to be deſigned for regulating and controlling all our powers. This dignity and commanding nature we are immediatly conſcious of, as we are conſcious of the power itſelf. Nor can ſuch matters of immediate feeling be otherways proved but by appeals to our hearts. * It does not eſtimate the good it recommends as merely differing in degree, tho' of the ſame kind with other advantages recommended by other ſenſes, ſo as to allow us to practiſe ſmaller moral evils acknowledged to remain ſuch, in order to obtain ſome great advantages of other ſorts; or to omit what we judge in the preſent caſe to be our duty or morally good, that we may decline great evils of another ſort. But as we immediatly perceive the difference in kind, and that the dignity of enjoyment from fine poetry, painting, or from knowledge is ſuperior to the pleaſures of the palate, were they never ſo delicate; ſo we immediatly diſcern moral good to be ſuperior in kind and dignity to all others which are perceived by the other perceptive powers. *The moral ſenſe deſigned to govern our other powers.*

In all other grateful perceptions, the leſs we ſhall reliſh our ſtate, the greater ſacrifice we have made of

* Thus the Stoick in *Cicero de Fin.* l. iii. c. 10. *Bonum hoc, de quo agimus, eſt illud quidem plurimi aeſtimandum, ſed ea aeſtimatio genere valet, non magnitudine. —— Alia eſt aeſtimatio virtutis, quae genere, non creſcendo valet.*

BOOK I.

inferior enjoyments to the ſuperior; and our ſenſe of the ſuperior, after the firſt flutter of joy in our ſucceſs is over, is not a whit increaſed by any ſacrifice we have made to it: nay in the judgment of ſpectators, the ſuperior enjoyment, or our ſtate at leaſt, is generally counted the worſe on this account, and our conduct the leſs reliſhed. Thus in ſacrificing eaſe, or health, or pleaſure, to wealth, power, or even to the ingenious arts; their pleaſures gain no dignity by that means; and the conduct is not more alluring to others. But in moral good, the greater the neceſſary ſacrifice was which was made to it, the moral excellence increaſes the more, and is the more approved by the agent, more admired by ſpectators, and the more they are rouſed to imitation. By this ſenſe the heart can not only approve itſelf in ſacrificing every other gratification to moral goodneſs, but have the higheſt ſelf-enjoyment, and approbation of its own diſpoſition in doing ſo: which plainly ſhews this moral ſenſe to be naturally deſtined to command all the other powers.

The chief objects of approbation are kind affections.

VII. Let us next conſider the ſeveral powers or diſpoſitions approved or diſapproved by this faculty. And here 'tis plain that the primary objects of this faculty are the affections of the will, and that the ſeveral affections which are approved, tho' in very different degrees, yet all agree in one general character, of tendency to the happineſs of others, and to the moral perfection of the mind poſſeſſing them. No actions, however in fact beneficial to ſociety, are approved as virtuous if they are imagined to flow from no inward

good-will to any perſon, or from ſuch diſpoſitions as do not naturally ſuppoſe good-will in the agent, or at leaſt exclude the higheſt ſelfiſhneſs. The deſires of glory, or even of rewards in a future ſtate, were they ſuppoſed the ſole affections moving an agent in the moſt beneficial ſervices, without any love to God, eſteem of his moral excellencies, gratitude to him, or good-will to men, would not obtain our approbation as morally good diſpoſitions: and yet a firm belief of future happineſs to be obtained by Divine appointment, upon our doing beneficent actions, might be as ſteddy and effectual a cauſe of or motive to ſuch actions as any other. But mere deſire of one's own happineſs, without any love to God, or man, is never the object of approbation. This itſelf may ſhew us how diſtinct moral approbation is from a perſuaſion of the tendency of actions to the intereſt of the approver, ſince he might hope equally great advantages from ſuch a ſteddy intereſted diſpoſition to actions in fact beneficent, as from any kind affection.

This evident from experience.

That ſome ſort of benevolent affections, or ſome diſpoſitions imagined to be connected with them, are the natural objects of approbation; and the oppoſite affections, or the want of the kind ones, the objects of condemnation, will be plain from almoſt all our reaſonings in praiſing or cenſuring, applauding or condemning the characters and actions of mankind. We point out ſome kind or beneficent intention, or ſome beneficent purpoſes propoſed by the agent in what we praiſe, or would vindicate from cenſure. We ſhew

BOOK I. ſome detriment enſuing to others, either intended or known, or what eaſily might have been known by one who had any tender regard for the intereſts of others, as the evidence either of ill-nature in the agent, or ſuch ſelfiſhneſs, or ſuch ſelfiſh paſſions as over-power all kindneſs and humanity.

A decency and a dignity diſtinct from virtue.

VIII. There is a plain gradation in the objects of our approbation and condemnation, from the indifferent ſet of actions aſcending to the higheſt virtue, or deſcending to the loweſt vice. It is not eaſy to ſettle exactly the ſeveral intermediate ſteps in due order, but the higheſt and loweſt are manifeſt. The indifferent affections and actions are ſuch as purſue the innocent advantages of the agent without any detriment to ſociety, and yet without any reference made by the agent to any good of others. Such are the neceſſary and moderate gratifications of appetite, and many trifling actions. To explain the different degrees, we muſt obſerve, what was hinted at formerly, that beſide the moral approbation of virtue, there is alſo another reliſh or ſenſe of a certain dignity or decency in many diſpoſitions and actions not conceived as virtuous. Thus we value the purſuits of the ingenious arts, and of knowledge, nay even ſome bodily perfections, ſuch as ſtrength and agility, more than mere brutal ſenſuality. We in like manner value more in another activity, patience of labour, ſagacity, and ſpirit in buſineſs, provided they are not injurious, tho' we conceive them ſolely exerciſed for his own promotion to wealth and honour, than a lazy inactive indolence.

The calm desire of private good, tho' it is not approved as virtue, yet it is far from being condemned as vice. And none of the truly natural and selfish appetites and passions are of themselves condemned as evil, when they are within certain bounds, even tho' they are not referred by the agent to any publick interest. It was necessary for the general good that all such affections should be implanted in our species; and therefore it would have been utterly unnatural to have made them matter of disapprobation even while they were not hurtful. Nay, as these selfish affections are aiming at an end necessary to the general good, to wit the good of each individual, and as the abilities of gratifying them are powers which may be very usefully employed in subserviency to the most generous affections, it was highly proper and benign in the Author of Nature to invite us to the culture of these powers by an immediate relish for them wherever we observe them, in ourselves or in others; tho' this relish is plainly different from moral approbation.

CHAP. 4.

Qualities neither approved as virtue, nor condemned as vice.

We all have by consciousness and experience a notion of the human constitution, and of a certain proportion of affections requisite to an innocent character. The selfish affections are then only disapproved when we imagine them beyond that innocent proportion, so as to exclude or over-power the amiable affections, and engross the mind wholly to the purposes of selfishness, or even to obstruct the proper degree of the generous affections in the station and circumstances of the agent.

BOOK I.

Degrees of virtue; first some abilities and dispositions different from kind affections.

IX. But there is another set of dispositions and abilities still of a finer nature, tho' distinct from both the calm universal benevolence and the particular kind affections; which however are naturally connected with such affections, natural evidences of them, and plainly inconsistent with the highest sorts of selfishness and sensuality; and these seem immediate objects of the *moral sense*, tho' perhaps not the highest. They seem to be approved immediatly, even before we think of this connexion with disinterested affections, or imagine directly that the agent is referring them to beneficent purposes. Of these moral dispositions there are several sorts, all immediatly approved, unless the mind directly discerns that they are employed in vicious purposes. Thus is fortitude approved, as it imports that something moral is more valued than life, and as plainly inconsistent with the highest selfishness: if indeed it be seen employed in rapine, and merely selfish purposes, such as those of lust or avarice, it becomes the object of horror. Candour, and openness of mind, and sincerity, can scarce ever be unattended with a kind honest heart; as 'tis virtue and innocence alone which need no disguise. And these dispositions too are immediatly approved, perhaps before we think of this connexion; so is also a stedfast principle of veracity whenever we speak.

When veracity is approved.

I know not if CICERO's account of this be exact; "that we naturally desire knowledge, and are averse "to ignorance, and error, and being deceived; and "thence relish these dispositions which are the natu-

" ral means of knowledge, and the preſervatives a- CHAP. 4.
" gainſt deceptions." Veracity ſeems to be immediatly and ſtrongly approved, and that from our infancy; as we ſee the firſt natural impulſe of the young mind is to ſpeak truth, till by experiencing ſome inconveniencies it is taught to counteract the natural impulſe. One needs not mention here courteſy and good manners: they are the very dreſs of virtue, the direct profeſſion of kind affections, and are thus approved. As all theſe abilities and diſpoſitions are of great importance in life, highly beneficial to mankind when exerted in conſequence of kind affections, and are naturally connected with them, or exclude the oppoſite extreme, 'tis with the higheſt goodneſs and wiſdom that they are immediatly recommended to our approbation by the conſtitution of our *moral faculty*.

The reliſh and deſire of moral excellence.

But of all ſuch diſpoſitions of our nature, different from all our kind affections, none is ſo nearly connected with them, none ſo natural an evidence of them, none ſo immediatly and neceſſarily ſubſervient to them, as an acute moral ſenſe itſelf, a ſtrong deſire of moral excellence, with an high reliſh of it wherever it is obſerved. We do not call the power or ſenſe itſelf virtuous; but the having this ſenſe in an high degree naturally raiſes a ſtrong deſire of having all generous affections; it ſurmounts all the little obſtacles to them, and determines the mind to uſe all the natural means of raiſing them. Now, as the mind can make any of its own powers the object of its reflex contemplation, this high ſenſe of moral excellence is approved above

all other abilities. And the conſequent deſire of moral excellence, the conſequent ſtrong love, eſteem, and good-will to the perſons where it is found, are immediatly approved, as moſt amiable affections, and the higheſt virtues.

The degrees recited.

X. Having premiſed theſe conſiderations, we may obſerve the following degrees of approbation, as they ariſe above what is merely indifferent.

Certain abilities of dignity.

1. One may rank in the firſt ſtep, as the object of ſome ſort of eſteem or good-liking, the exerciſe even of thoſe more manly powers, which have no neceſſary or natural connexion with virtue, but ſhew a taſte above ſenſuality and the lower ſelfiſhneſs: ſuch as the purſuits of the ingenious arts, of the elegance of life, and ſpeculative ſciences. Every one ſees a dignity in theſe pleaſures, and muſt reliſh the deſires of them; and indeed they are far leſs oppoſite to virtue, or the publick intereſt, than keen taſtes or appetites of a lower kind.

2. 'Tis plain however, that our moral ſenſe puts a much higher value upon abilities and diſpoſitions immediatly connected with virtuous affections, and which exclude the worſt ſorts of ſelfiſhneſs. Thus candour, veracity, fortitude, and a ſtrong ſenſe of honour, have a moral eſtimation above other abilities.

Calm kind affections more approved than paſſions.

3. But to come to the more immediate objects of moral approbation, the kind affections themſelves; 'tis certain that, among affections of equal extent, we more approve the calm ſtable reſolute purpoſes of heart, than the turbulent and paſſionate. And that,

of affections in this reſpect alike, we more approve thoſe which are more extenſive, and leſs approve thoſe which are more confined. Thus, the ſtable conjugal and parental love, or the reſolute calm purpoſe of promoting the true happineſs of perſons thus related to us, is preferable to the turbulent paſſionate diſpoſitions of tenderneſs. And the love of a ſociety, a country, is more excellent than domeſtick affections. We ſee plainly the ſuperior dignity in theſe caſes from this, that, notwithſtanding the ſtruggle felt in our breaſts, and the oppoſition made by the paſſionate or more limited affections, yet, when we reſolutely follow the calm and extenſive notwithſtanding of this oppoſition, the ſoul in its calmeſt hours and moſt deliberate reflections approves of its own conduct; and ſcarce ever fails to approve the like conduct in others at once; as in the caſe of others its paſſions are not raiſed to give oppoſition. On the contrary, when we have yielded to the paſſion or the limited affection, in oppoſition to the calm or more extenſive principle, the ſoul upon reflection is diſſatisfied with itſelf, and at firſt view it condemns the like conduct in others.

CHAP. 4.

Extenſive more approved than the narrow.

That diſpoſition therefore which is moſt excellent, and naturally gains the higheſt moral approbation, is the calm, ſtable, univerſal good-will to all, or the moſt extenſive benevolence. And this ſeems the moſt diſtinct notion we can form of the moral excellency of the Deity.

The chief moral excellence, univerſal good-will,

Another diſpoſition inſeparable from this in men, and probably in all beings who are capable of ſuch ex-

and love of this affection.

BOOK I. tenſive affection, is the reliſh or approbation of this affection, and a naturally conſequent deſire of this moral excellence, and an eſteem and good-will of an higher kind to all in whom it is found. This love of moral excellence is alſo an high object of approbation, when we find it in ourſelves by reflection, or obſerve it in another. It is a pretty different affection from benevolence or the deſire of communicating happineſs; and is as it were in another order of affections; ſo that one cannot well determine whether it can be compared with the other. It ſeems co-ordinate, and the higheſt poſſible of that kind; never in oppoſition to benevolence, nay always conſpiring with and aſſiſting it. This deſire of moral excellence, and love to the mind where it reſides, with the conſequent acts of eſteem, veneration, truſt, and reſignation, are the eſſence of true piety toward God.

We never ſpeak of benevolence toward God; as that word carries with it ſome ſuppoſal of indigence, or want of ſome good, in the object. And yet, as we have benevolence toward a friend when he may need our aſſiſtance; ſo, the ſame emotion of ſoul, or the ſame diſpoſition toward him, ſhall remain when he is raiſed to the beſt ſtate we can wiſh; and it then exerts itſelf in congratulation, or rejoicing in his happineſs. In this manner may our ſouls be affected toward the Deity, without any ſuppoſition of his indigence, by the higheſt joy and complacence in his abſolute happineſs.

The degrees of this. XI. 'Tis eaſy to obſerve the like gradation from the

indifferent ſtate of the ſoul through the ſeveral degrees of moral turpitude. The firſt may be the want of theſe more reputable abilities; which indeed implies no evil affection, and yet plainly makes a character deſpicable, tho' not immoral. Thus we diſlike the imprudent conduct of any man with reſpect to his own intereſt, without thinking of any detriment to ariſe to ſociety from it. Thus negligence, raſhneſs, ſloth, indolence, are naturally diſliked, abſtracting from their effects upon ſociety. So is a mind inſenſible to the more manly pleaſures of arts and genius. When indeed imprudent conduct, in point of private intereſt, is conſidered alſo as affecting a publick, or ſome other perſons than the agent, whoſe intereſts he ought to have regarded, as it generally does; then it may be matter of high moral condemnation and remorſe: ſo may the meanneſs of our talents or abilities, when occaſioned by our immoderate ſloth and ſenſuality, and a defect of generous affections. CHAP. 4.

Several degrees recited.

1. The objects of the gentleſt moral diſapprobation or cenſure are thoſe caſes "where one in gratifying ſome lovely narrower affection has inadvertently omitted what would have moſt tended to the "publick good." Such is the promoting a good friend or benefactor in oppoſition to a competitor of ſuperior merit and abilities. The preferring, in ſuch caſes, a leſs worthy friend to one's ſelf, may be cenſured indeed as a want of due proportion among theſe lovely affections, when a more extenſive one yields to the more limited; but the moral beauty of ſome limited affecti-

BOOK I. ons is so great that we readily overlook some defects in the more extensive. The same is the case if one has served a friend at a trouble or expence to himself much above the value of the good he has done his friend; perhaps too incapacitating himself for some wiser services hereafter. Where indeed one preferred to himself a friend of equal merit, the publick interest is as well promoted this way, and a beautiful affection of friendship is displayed. And yet the contrary conduct, when there are no special circumstances pleading for a friend, could not be censured as immoral.

2. Other objects of lighter censure are those actions detrimental to the publick which a person is forced to do to avoid death torture or slavery; when yet the publick detriment is still greater than those evils he avoids. Here the agent may have no ill-will; nay may have many generous affections, tho' not of that heroick strength which the moral sense would recommend. The guilt is exceedingly extenuated by the greatness of the temptation, which few have sufficient strength of soul to resist. In order to retain the character of innocence, we expect, not only the absence of all malicious dispositions, but many good affections, and those too of an extensive nature; with much caution about the interests of others. The precise degrees cannot well be determined; nor is it necessary. But the stronger and the more extensive the generous affections are, so much the better is the temper; the lower they are, and the more that any opposite or narrower ones prevail against them, so much the temper is the worse.

'Tis our buſineſs to aim at the higheſt moral excel- CHAP. 4.
lence, and not content ourſelves with merely avoiding infamy or cenſure.

3. Another degree of vice are the ſudden paſſionate motions of anger, reſentment, and ill-will, upon provocation either falſely apprehended, or aggravated beyond any real ground. Such paſſions when they lead to injury are vicious, tho' not in the higheſt degree. When indeed by indulgence they turn into habitual rancour and ſettled malice or revenge, they form a moſt odious character.

4. A more deformed ſort of vice is when the ſelfiſh paſſions and ſenſual appetites lead men into like injuries. Theſe are worſe excuſes and weaker extenuations of guilt than the angry paſſions.

5. A degree more deformed is when calm ſelfiſhneſs raiſes deliberate purpoſes of injury known to be ſuch. In theſe caſes the moral faculty muſt be quite over-powered, and deprived of all its natural force in the ſoul, and ſo muſt all humanity. The like is the caſe when men from mere ſelfiſhneſs, without any grievous temptation, or without any motives of publick intereſt, counteract their moral ſentiments by falſehood, treachery, ingratitude, a neglect of honour, or low cowardice dreading to loſe ſome poſitive advantages, even while there is no ſuch evil impending as could much affect a brave and good man.

6. In this claſs, or rather in a worſe one, we muſt rank impiety, or the want of all due affections to the Deity, when he is known and conceived to be good.

BOOK I. Our moral faculty must be strangely asleep where the desire of knowing the Supreme Excellence is a-wanting, or love to it when it is known: or where there is no care to cultivate devout affections of gratitude where there have been the greatest benefits received, and where they are repeated every moment.

There is a disposition still worse, conceivable in the abstract, but scarce incident to mankind, or the creatures of a good Deity; a fixed unprovoked original malice, or a desire of the misery of others for itself, without any motives of interest.

The moral sense reduces all our powers into order.

XII. Without a distinct consideration of this moral faculty, a species endued with such a variety of senses, and of desires frequently interfering, must appear a complex confused fabrick, without any order or regular consistent design. By means of it, all is capable of harmony, and all its powers may conspire in one direction, and be consistent with each other. 'Tis already proved that we are capable of many generous affections ultimately terminating on the good of others, neither arising from any selfish view, nor terminating on private good. This moral faculty plainly shews that we are also capable of a calm settled universal benevolence, and that this is destined, as the supreme determination of the generous kind, to govern and controll our particular generous as well as selfish affections; as the heart must entirely approve its doing thus in its calmest reflections: even as in the order of selfish affections, our self-love, or our calm regard to the greatest private interest controlls our particu-

lar ſelfiſh paſſions; and the heart is ſatisfied in its doing ſo. CHAP. 4.

Calm ſelf-love not the ſupreme principle.

To acknowledge the ſeveral generous ultimate affections of a limited kind to be natural, and yet maintain that we have no general controlling principle but ſelf-love, which indulges or checks the generous affections as they conduce to, or oppoſe, our own nobleſt intereſt; ſometimes allowing theſe kind affections their full exerciſe, becauſe of that high enjoyment we expect to ourſelves in gratifying them; at other times checking them, when their gratification does not over-ballance the loſs we may ſuſtain by it; is a ſcheme which brings indeed all the powers of the mind into one direction by means of the reference made of them all to the calm deſire of our own happineſs, in our previous deliberations about our conduct: and it may be juſtly alledged that the Author of Nature has made a connexion in the event at laſt between our gratifying our generous affections, and our own higheſt intereſt. But the feelings of our heart, reaſon, and hiſtory, revolt againſt this account: which ſeems however to have been maintained by excellent authors and ſtrenuous defenders of the cauſe of virtue.

This connexion of our own higheſt intereſts with the gratifying our generous affections, in many caſes is imperceptible to the mind; and the kind heart acts from its generous impulſe, not thinking of its own intereſt. Nay all its own intereſts have ſometimes appeared to it as oppoſite to, and inconſiſtent with the generous part, in which it perſiſted. Now were there

BOOK I. no other calm original determination of ſoul but that toward one's own intereſt, that man muſt be approved intirely who ſteadily purſues his own happineſs, in oppoſition to all kind affections and all publick intereſt. That which is the ſole calm determination, muſt juſtify every action in conſequence of it, however oppoſite to particular kind affections. If it be ſaid "that 'tis a miſtake to imagine our intereſt oppoſite "to them while there is a good providence:" grant it to be a miſtake; this is only a defect of reaſoning: but that diſpoſition of mind muſt upon this ſcheme be approved which coolly ſacrifices the intereſt of the univerſe to its own intereſt. This is plainly contrary to the feelings of our hearts.

Another ultimate determination of will toward publick good.

Can that be deemed the ſole ultimate determination, the ſole ultimate end, which the mind in the exerciſe of its nobleſt powers can calmly reſolve, with inward approbation, deliberately to counteract? are there not inſtances of men who have voluntarily ſacrificed their lives, without thinking of any other ſtate of exiſtence, for the ſake of their friends or their country? does not every heart approve this temper and conduct, and admire it the more, the leſs preſumption there is of the love of glory and poſtumous fame, or of any ſublimer private intereſt mixing itſelf with the generous affection? does not the admiration riſe higher, the more deliberately ſuch reſolutions are formed and executed? all this is unqueſtionably true, and yet would be abſurd and impoſſible if ſelf-intereſt of any kind is the ſole ultimate termination of all

calm desire. There is therefore another ultimate determination which our souls are capable of, destined to be also an original spring of the calmest and most deliberate purposes of action; a desire of communicating happiness, an ultimate good-will, not referred to any private interest, and often operating without such reference. CHAP. 4.

Which the moral faculty shews destined to controll all others.

In those cases where some inconsistency appears between these two determinations, the moral faculty at once points out and recommends the glorious the amiable part; not by suggesting prospects of future interests of a sublime sort by pleasures of self-approbation, or of praise. It recommends the generous part by an immediate undefinable perception; it approves the kind ardour of the heart in the sacrificing even life itself, and that even in those who have no hopes of surviving, or no attention to a future life in another world. And thus, where the moral sense is in its full vigour, it makes the generous determination to publick happiness the supreme one in the soul, with that commanding power which it is naturally destined to exercise.

It must be obvious we are not speaking here of the ordinary condition of mankind, as if these calm determinations were generally exercised, and habitually controlled the particular passions; but of the condition our nature can be raised to by due culture; and of the principles which may and ought to operate, when by attention we present to our minds the objects or representations fit to excite them. Doubtless

BOOK I. ſome good men have exerciſed in life only the particular kind affections, and found a conſtant approbation of them, without either the moſt extenſive views of the whole ſyſtem, or the moſt univerſal benevolence. Scarce any of the vicious have ever conſidered wherein it is that their higheſt private happineſs conſiſts, and in conſequence of it exerted the calm rational ſelf-love; but merely follow inconſiderately the ſelfiſh appetites and affections. Much leſs have all good men made actual references of all private or generous affections to the extenſive benevolence, tho' the mind can make them; or bad men made references of all their affections to calm ſelf-love.

Comparing, reaſoning, laws, religion, ſtill neceſſary.

XIII. But as the ſelfiſh principles are very ſtrong, and by cuſtom, by early and frequent indulgences, and other cauſes, are raiſed in the greateſt part of men above their due proportion, while the generous principles are little cultivated, and the moral ſenſe often aſleep; our powers of reaſoning and comparing the ſeveral enjoyments which our nature is capable of, that we may diſcover which of them are of greateſt conſequence to our happineſs; our capacity, by reaſoning, of arriving to the knowledge of a *Governing Mind* preſiding in this world, and of a moral adminiſtration, are of the higheſt conſequence and neceſſity to preſerve our affections in a juſt order, and to corroborate our *moral faculty:* as by ſuch reaſoning and reflection we may diſcover a perfect conſiſtency of all the generous motions of the ſoul with private intereſt, and find out a certain tenor of life and action the moſt effectually ſub-

ſervient to both theſe determinations. This ſhall be the ſubject of ſome following chapters, after we ſhall have ſubjoined ſome further confirmation of theſe moral principles, from the ſenſe of honour; and obſerved the univerſality of both, and how far they ſeem uniform principles in our ſpecies. CHAP. 5.

CHAP. V.

The Senſe of Honour and Shame explained. The univerſal influence of the Moral Senſe, and that of Honour, and their uniformity.

I. IF we conſult our own feelings we muſt acknowledge that as there are certain affections and actions which we naturally approve, and eſteem, and praiſe, ſo there is an immediate grateful ſenſation felt when we are approved and praiſed by others, and generally a moſt uneaſy one when we are cenſured; without the expectation of any other advantages or diſadvantages which may thence accrue to us. A more diſtinct conſideration of this ſenſe of honour and ſhame will much confirm the preceding account of our *moral faculty*. *Senſe of honour an immediate principle.*

They who refer all the motions of the heart to private intereſt, and would reduce all our perceptive powers to a very ſmall number, by one artful reference or another, depart exceedingly from nature in their accounts of thoſe determinations about honour and ſhame, which are acknowledged to appear univerſally among men. *Abſtracted from private intereſt.*

BOOK I. They tell us "our honouring a man is merely reputing him useful to us either explicitely, and thus we "honour the generous and beneficent, with whom we "have intercourse, and by whose offices we are profited; or implicitely, and by some confused imaginations, and thus we honour *heroes* who lived in prior "ages, or remote nations, imagining they are our "contemporaries or countrymen; or thinking that "they would be very useful to us if we had intercourse "with them. And thus our esteem is only an opinion of a character or conduct as useful to us, and a "liking it on this account." And, say they, "we desire to be honoured, or reputed useful to others, not "from an immediate sensation, but because we know "that men are studious of serving such as they honour and repute useful to them; not indeed from "ultimate love to them, but as a further allurement "to continue thus useful; and we, in hopes of such "services from those to whom we are reputed useful, desire to obtain this reputation of being useful "to others." 'Tis a pain to dwell upon such schemes as contradict the immediate feelings of the heart so manifestly.

This proved by several reasons. Upon this scheme, the man who honours an agent, and the agent himself who approves his own conduct, must have notions of the same honoured action the most different imaginable. The honourer must only value it as tending to his ease, wealth, pleasure, safety; and the agent values it as the artful, and necessary, but disagreeable means of obtaining some remote advan-

tages from others, who will probably invite him to continue ſuch conduct by making him ſome returns of uſeful ſervices. But 'tis plain there are many tempers and actions uſeful to us, nay to a whole community, which we don't honour; ſuch as uſeful treachery, a ſelfiſh inventive induſtry in improving manufactures; a promiſcuous profuſeneſs. Nay we honour ſometimes what we conceive directly to be detrimental; as patriotiſm or courage, in a foreigner, or an enemy. Shall confuſed imaginations of uſefulneſs be regarded here, againſt the moſt direct opinions of detriment to ourſelves? Who finds theſe imaginations reſpecting his own intereſts, in reading antient hiſtories, or dramatick writers, when the ſoul is ſo ſtrongly moved with the ſeveral *moral forms?* CHAP. 5.

And then, ſurely, this notion of my own temper and conduct as beneficial to others can upon their ſcheme have nothing immediately grateful to me. Theſe cool uncertain proſpects of returns of advantage from the ſelfiſh arts of others can have nothing alluring amidſt certain expences, labours, wounds, and death? whence the ardour for a ſurviving fame? this is all monſtrous and unnatural. Is all our admiration, our high zeal for the brave, and merciful, and generous, and magnanimous, all our ambition and ardour for glory, this cool traffick, this artful barter of advantageous ſervices without an expreſs bargain? We appeal to every human heart in this matter; to the hearts of the young, who are moſt ardent in praiſing, and moſt delighted with praiſe; and have little felt thoſe artful

BOOK I.

mean designs of interest. Is all esteem and honour a mere cool opinion that from some actions and affections we shall reap some advantage? Is all the confounding sense of shame, and blushing, only a fear of some future uncertain losses, which we know not well what they shall be, or how they will befal us? Are not men conscious of their own designs in the pursuits of honour; of their own apprehensions in their avoiding of what is shameful; and of the occasion of their sorrow when they are ashamed? surely these artful views of our own interest could not be unknown to us.

This sense appears very early.

II. There is therefore an immediate sense of honour and shame, often operating where there are no such views of interest, and plainly presupposing a *moral sense*. It generally appears very early in life, before any considerable reasoning or reflection can settle well the notions of morality; and thus before we can judge for ourselves we are wisely and benignly subjected to the direction of others, are rewarded for our compliance by a most grateful sensation, and by a most uneasy one deterred from frowardness and obstinacy. The selfish accounts of this principle make all the ardour for glory the same base temper with that of a traitor or informer, who desires to appear useful to others in hopes of a reward. No better notion can they give of modesty, the sense of shame, the abhorrence of any imputation of moral turpitude, that *pudor* of the ROMANS, the finest stroke in a character.

We see this sense of *honour* admits several degrees in conformity to the *moral sense* on which it is founded. But first, in consequence of that natural desire or impulse toward the perfection of all our powers, and a sense of dignity and decency in some of them above others, we find a natural pleasure in discovering to others the perfection of any manly powers, and in being valued in that respect. Hence a taste for the ingenious arts of musick, sculpture, painting, and even for the manly diversions, is reputable. The grandeur and elegance of living, in dress, architecture, furniture, gardens, are in certain circumstances matter of glorying and of praise: much more so are the abilities yet higher, a strong genius in acquiring knowledge, the high lively imagination of the poet or orator. This last indeed plainly includes an high moral sense. CHAP. 5. *There are several degrees of the honourable and shameful.*

But to come directly to our sense of pleasure in obtaining moral approbation. All actions which proceed from any friendly or kind affection, and are not opposite to some more extensive one, are attended with assurance, and openness of behaviour, and we glory in them. The sensual passions, and ill-natured affections of anger, malice, envy, and even cool selfishness, we naturally conceal; and are ashamed of them.

III. One cannot well pass by that peculiar branch of modesty so conspicuous in all ages and nations, about venereal enjoyments. As there is a very violent appetite implanted for the most necessary purposes of the system, requiring however, in order to answer these *The modesty of the sexes natural.*

Book I. ends more effectually, a great deal of nice regulation, by our reaſon and conſideration of the common intereſt of ſociety. 'Tis with great wiſdom and goodneſs that ſuch an early check is provided for this appetite by a natural principle of modeſty. Children uninſtructed would not ſoon diſcover to us this modeſty, nor have they for ſome years a notion of the object or deſign of it, as the appetite does not ariſe in our firſt years. Should we whimſically ſuppoſe ſavages come to maturity in ſolitude, without theſe objects occurring to them which could excite ſocial affections or moral notions; in this unnatural ſtate ſome natural principles might not appear. But were they brought into ſociety, and had the actions and ſentiments of others preſented to them, their moral faculty, and their ſenſe of honour and ſhame, would ſoon diſcover themſelves; and particularly their natural modeſty of this peculiar kind would quickly appear. As they would approve all humanity and kindneſs, even when practiſed toward others, and abhor the contrary diſpoſitions, they would ſoon deſpiſe ſenſuality and ſelfiſhneſs. As ſoon as they knew how the race of mankind is preſerved, they would deſire marriage and offſpring; and when the occaſion of this natural modeſty was felt, and the intention of the appetite known, this natural check of ſhame would diſcover itſelf.

When the neceſſity of ſtrict marriage-laws for the aſcertaining to the fathers their own offſpring was once obſerved, new reaſons would appear for modeſt behaviour, and for creating an early habit of it in the

education of both ſexes. But, beſides, there ſeem to be ſeveral natural diſpoſitions and ſenſes peculiarly relative to this affair, diſtinct from the general ſhame of all immoderate ſelfiſhneſs, particularly that of modeſty, which begins at that period when the appetite which needs its controll ariſes, and ſeems to abate in old age along with the appetite. CHAP. 5.

IV. Having a natural capacity for moral notions, we may be aſhamed of actions without knowing the true reaſons why they are immoral. By education we may contract groundleſs prejudices, or opinions about the qualities perceivable by any of our ſenſes, as if they were inherent in objects where they are not. Thus we are prejudiced againſt meats we never taſted: but we could not be prejudiced on account of ſavour, or under that notion, if we had not the natural ſenſe. Thus it is always under ſome ſpecies recommended by the *moral faculty* that we praiſe or deſire to be praiſed, tho' we frequently have very imperfect views of the tendencies of actions, and of the affections from which they proceeded. *This ſenſe how affected by education.*

What we obſerved about the *moral faculty*, holds alſo in our ſenſe of honour, that we are highly delighted with the approbation of others, not only for the good affections themſelves, but for all thoſe abilities and diſpoſitions which are their natural concomitants, or which exclude the contrary affections. Thus we glory in fortitude, veracity, candour, openneſs of mind, and the deſire of honour itſelf; tho' the pleaſure of receiving praiſe is known to be ſo ſtrong, and there are

BOOK I. such ſuſpicions of our being envied for it, that men are averſe to let any impatience for this pleaſure appear, or to diſcover their high delight in it, leaſt it ſhould argue too much ſelfiſhneſs.

The moral ſenſe and that of honour affect all parts of life.

V. The force of the *moral ſenſe*, and that of *honour*, is diffuſed through all parts of life. The very luxury of the table derives its main charms from ſome mixture of moral enjoyments, from communicating pleaſures, and notions of ſomething honourable as well as elegant. How univerſally deſpicable is the character of one who in ſolitude purſues eagerly the pleaſures of the palate without ſociety or hoſpitality.

The chief pleaſures of hiſtory and poetry, and the powers of eloquence are derived from the ſame ſources. Hiſtory, as it repreſents the moral characters and fortunes of the great and of nations, is always exerciſing our *moral faculty*, and our ſocial feelings of the fortunes of others. Poetry entertains us in a way yet more affecting, by more ſtriking repreſentations of the ſame objects in fictitious characters, and moving our terror, and compaſſion, and moral admiration. The power of the orator conſiſts in moving our approbation or condemnation, and the enſuing affections of eſteem or indignation, by preſenting fully all the moral qualities of actions and characters, all the pityable circumſtances which may extenuate or excuſe, to engage our favour; or all the aggravating ones, to encreaſe our indignation; diſplaying all the high colours on both ſides, as he is either praiſing or making invectives.

The very arts of muſick, ſtatuary, and painting, beſide the natural pleaſures they convey by exact imitations, may receive an higher power and a ſtronger charm from ſomething *moral* inſinuated into the performances. CHAP. 5.

The chief beauties of countenance, and even of behaviour, ariſe * from indications of ſome ſweet affections, or morally eſteemable abilities, as it appears by almoſt all the epithets of commendation. 'Tis always ſome real or imagined indications of ſomething vicious which chiefly cauſes our diſlike, as we ſee from the qualities cenſured and condemned. Hence it is that ſuch deformity is † obſerved in the countenances of the angry, the envious, the proud, and the ſelfiſh; and ſo much alluring ſweetneſs in thoſe which diſplay the tender gentle and friendly affections.

We ſee how theſe moral indications affect the natural deſires between the ſexes. Could one attain to maturity without having any moral notions, which however ſcarce ever happened in one inſtance, except in ideots; he might be moved by this inſtinct as the brutes are. But we find that beauty raiſes firſt ſome favourable notions of an inward temper; and, if acquaintance confirms them, we feel an high eſteem and a deſire of mutual friendſhip. Thus we are admiring wit, good-nature, prudence, kindneſs, chaſtity, a command over the lower appetites, while the inſtinct is

* See *Inquiry* into *Beauty* &c. § vi.

† See *Cicero de Offic.* l. i. c. 29. *Appetitus qui longius evagantur — a quibus non modo animi perturbantur, verum etiam corpora. Licet ora ipſa cernere iratorum, aut eorum qui libidine aliqua, aut metu commoti ſunt, aut voluptate nimia geſtiunt* &c. and often in his other works.

BOOK I. alſo exciting to its natural purpoſe. Hence it is that this paſſion is often obſerved to make conſiderable improvements of the temper in ſeveral amiable virtues.

'Tis in like manner ſome *moral worth* apprehended, ſome juſtice or goodneſs of intention in perſons and cauſes, which occaſions moſt of that keen zeal for certain parties and factions, and thoſe ſtrong attachments to them, in people who have no hopes of thoſe advantages which the leaders of them may have in view.

Our intimacies not from intereſt.

To alledge that our * chuſing perſons of knowledge, courteſy, and good-nature for our intimates, and our avoiding the ignorant, the moroſe, or ſelfiſh, argues all our intimacies to ariſe from ſelfiſh views, is plainly unjuſt. 'Tis true the one ſort of companions are improving, pleaſant, obliging, ſafe; and the other uſeleſs, unpleaſant, dangerous. But are all friendſhips and intimacies mere grimace and hypocriſy? does one feel no inward eſteem of certain characters, and good-will to the perſons? does one only deſire his own improvement or pleaſure or gain, as when he hires a maſter to teach him a mechanick art, or a muſician to entertain him, or a labourer to do a piece of common work? do we only intend a fair outward appearance with our beſt friends, that we may not loſe theſe advantages? On the contrary does not every one feel an inward eſteem and good-will toward any virtuous acquaintances, which ſhall remain when we are ſeparated, and hope not to meet them again?

Were there no ſuch *moral ſenſe* and ſenſe of *honour*

* See *Hobbes*, *Bayle*, *Mandevil*, in many places, after *Rochefocault*.

in our conſtitution, were we as entirely *ſelfiſh* as ſome *refiners* alledge, human life would be quite different from what we feel every day, *a joyleſs, loveleſs, cold, ſullen ſtate of cunning and ſuſpicion.* CHAP. 5.

Things inſenſible are moſt real

'Tis worth our notice here that however by the early prejudices of the external ſenſes we are apt to imagine little reality in any thing which is not the object of one or other of them, and to conceive what is not thus ſenſible to be fictitious and imaginary; yet if we attend to the inward feelings of our hearts, the greateſt realities, our very happineſs and miſery, that dignity or worth in which alone we can have the moſt entire ſatisfaction with ourſelves, or for which we love, eſteem, and admire another, and count him excellent or happy, or chuſe him for a friend, are qualities entirely inſenſible, too noble and excellent to fall under the cognizance of theſe powers which are chiefly deſtined for the ſupport of the body.

Theſe ſenſes uniform.

VI. Many ſuſpect that no ſuch ſenſes can be natural, becauſe there are ſuch different and oppoſite notions of morality, among different nations. But granting that their reliſhes were different, that different men and nations approved and condemned actions upon different accounts, or under different notions; this only proves that their ſenſes are not uniform; and not that no ſuch principles are natural. Men's palates differ as much; but who thence denies a ſenſe of taſting to be natural?

But the uniformity is much greater in our *moral faculty* than in our palates. The different reaſons gi-

BOOK I. ven by different perſons for their approving or condemning will all lead us at laſt, when we examine them, into the ſame original ſpecies or notions of moral good and evil.

In approving or vindicating of actions, in all nations, men generally alledge ſome tendency to the happineſs of others, ſome kind intention more or leſs extenſive, ſome generous affections, or ſome diſpoſitions naturally connected with them. When we alleviate any imprudent conduct, we ſay, the agent intended well; did not foreſee the bad conſequence; or had ſuch provocation as might have tranſported even a kind temper, or a man of juſtice. When we inveigh againſt bad conduct, we ſhew that all the contrary affections or diſpoſitions were evidenced by it, ſuch as cruelty, wrath, immoderate ſelfiſhneſs, or a want of ſuch kind affections as we generally expect in our ſpecies. If we blame imprudent conduct, without this reference to evil affections, or to the want of the good ones, 'tis ſometimes from our good-will and pity toward the agent, with ſome contempt of his mean abilities, his ſloth, ſtupidity, or indolence. And yet how are we ſoftened by the thought that "the poor creature "intended no harm, or occaſioned none to others." This is often indeed a falſe excuſe, as the publick ſuffers by any one's making himſelf leſs capable of ſerving it, as well as his more peculiar friends.

The immediate object approved is generally the ſame.

Nay we ſhall find that men always approve upon ſome opinion, true or falſe, that an action has ſome of thoſe qualities or tendencies, which are the natural

objects of approbation. We may indeed often imagine without ground, that actions have good effects upon the publick, or that they flowed from good affections, or that they are required by the Deity and acceptable to him; and then under theſe appearances we approve them. 'Tis our reaſon which preſents a falſe notion or ſpecies to the *moral faculty*. The fault or error is in the opinion or underſtanding, and not in the *moral ſenſe*: what it approves is truly good; tho' the action may have no ſuch quality. We ſometimes chuſe and like, in point of intereſt, what is in event detrimental to ourſelves. No man thence concludes that we are not uniform in ſelf-love or liking of our own intereſt. Nor do like miſtakes about the moral qualities of actions prove either that we have no *moral ſenſe*, or that it is not uniformly conſtituted. The paſſions of ſpectators, as well as thoſe of agents, prevent a ma ure examination of the moral natures of thoſe actions which are ſubſervient to the deſigns of the paſſions; as luſt, rage, revenge, will hurry men into what a calm man would diſcern to be ruinous. But theſe things do not prove that men are diſſimilar to each other, either in their *moral faculty*, or their *ſelf-love*. CHAP. 5.

To prove that men have no *moral faculty*, or very diſſimilar ones; we muſt ſhew either that nations or great numbers of men hold all actions to be indifferent which don't appear to them to affect their own private intereſt; or that they are pleaſed with cruelty, treachery, ingratitude, unprovoked murders, and tortures, when not practiſed toward themſelves, juſt as

BOOK I. much as with their contraries: they ſhould in ſome nations be deemed as reputable and lovely as humanity, compaſſion, liberality, faith: the action of Sextus Tarquin, or Claudius the decemvir, ſhould be approved as much as that of Scipio with his Spaniſh captive. But ſuch nations have not yet been diſcovered to us, not even by the invention of the boldeſt traveller.

The cauſes of different approbations and cenſures, different notions of happineſs.

VII. The chief cauſes of different approbations are theſe three. 1. Different notions of happineſs and the means of promoting it. Nations unacquainted with the improvements which life receives from art and induſtry, may ſee no occaſion for incouraging them by ſecuring to each man a property in the fruits of his labours, while the bare neceſſaries of life are eaſily obtained. Nay they can ſee no harm in depriving men of their artificial acquiſitions, and ſtores beyond their preſent uſe, or of ſuperfluities tending to diſſolve them in pleaſure and ſloth: hence no evil may appear in theft. If any nation ſaw no uſe in the aſcertaining of their offspring to the fathers, or had no deſire of it; they might diſcern no moral evil in practices which more civilized nations ſee to be deſtructive to ſociety. But no nation has yet been found inſenſible to theſe matters.

The cauſes of barbarous laws.

In ſome civilized ſtates laws have obtained which we repute barbarous and impious. But look into the reaſons for them, or the notions under which they were approved, and we generally find ſome alledged tendency to ſome publick good. There may no doubt

be found ſome few inſtances where immoderate zeal for their own grandeur, or that of their nation, has made legiſlators enact unjuſt laws, without any moral ſpecies recommending them. This only proves that ſometimes a different principle may over-power our ſenſe of juſtice. But what fooliſh opinions have been received! what fantaſtick errors and diſſimilitudes have been obſerved in the admired power of reaſoning, allowed to be the characteriſtick of our ſpecies! Now almoſt all our diverſities in moral ſentiments, and oppoſite approbations, and condemnations, ariſe from oppoſite concluſions of reaſon about the effects of actions upon the publick, or the affections from which they flowed. The *moral ſenſe* ſeems ever to approve and condemn uniformly the ſame immediate objects, the ſame affections and diſpoſitions; tho' we reaſon very differently about the actions which evidence certain diſpoſitions or their contraries. And yet reaſon, in which all theſe errors happen is allowed to be the natural principle; and the *moral faculty* is not, becauſe of the diverſities of approbation; which yet ariſe chiefly from the diverſity of reaſonings. CHAP. 5.

2. A ſecond cauſe of different approbations are the larger or more confined ſyſtems which men regard in conſidering the tendencies of actions; ſome regarding only their own country and its intereſt, while the reſt of mankind are overlooked; and others, having yet narrower ſyſtems, only a party, ſect, or cabal. But if we enlarge our views with truth and juſtice, and obſerve the ſtructure of the human ſoul, pretty much *Different ſyſtems regarded.*

BOOK I.

the ſame in all nations; none of which wants multitudes of good men, endued with the ſame tender affections to kindred, friends, benefactors; with the ſame compaſſion for the diſtreſſed, the ſame admiration and love of eminent virtue, the ſame zealous concerns for their countries which we think ſo lovely among ourſelves; we muſt find a ſacred tye of nature binding us even to foreigners, and a ſenſe of that juſtice, mercy and good-will * which is due to all. To men of ſmall attention their own countrymen or partiſans are the only valuable part of mankind: every thing is juſt which advances their power, tho' it may hurt others. The different approbations here ariſe again from different opinions about a matter of fact. Were certain nations or ſects entirely impious, cruel, and fixed upon ſuch meaſures as would involve all men in eternal as well as temporal miſery, and poſſeſſed of ſuch arts of faſcination as no reaſonings could effectually withſtand; one could ſcarce blame any violent deſtruction made of ſuch monſters by fire or ſword. Under this very notion all perſecutors out of principle behold ſuch as they call hereticks; under it they raiſe a general abhorrence of them. The like notions many little ſects form of each other; and hence loſe the ſenſe of moral evil in their mutual hatreds and perſecution.

Different opinions about God's commands.

3. A third cauſe of different ſentiments about actions, as frequently occurring as any one, are the different opinions about what God has commanded.

* See this often inculcated in *Marc. Antonin.*

Men ſometimes from deſire of rewards, and fear of punishments, counteract their *moral ſenſe*, in obedience to what they conceive to be divine commands; as they may alſo from other ſelfiſh paſſions: they may have ſome confuſed notions of matters of duty and obligation, diſtinct from what their hearts would approve were the notions of divine commands removed. Habits and aſſociations of ideas affect men's minds in this matter. But where there are different opinions in different nations about the objects of the divine command, there are ſuch ſtrong *moral colours* or *forms* in obedience and diſobedience to God, that they muſt neceſſarily cauſe very different approbations and cenſures, even from the moſt uniformly conſtituted *moral faculties*. *God* is generally conceived to be good and wiſe, to be the author of our lives, and of all the good we enjoy. Obedience muſt be recommended to our approbation generally under the high ſpecies of gratitude, and love of moral excellence, as well as under the notion of advantageous to the publick: and diſobedience muſt appear cenſurable, under the contrary notions. Diſobedience therefore to what one believes *God* has commanded, from any views of ſecular advantages or ſenſual pleaſure, or the inveigling others into ſuch diſobedience, muſt appear groſsly ungrateful, ſenſual, ſelfiſh or cruel. Where different opinions about God's commands prevail, 'tis unavoidable that different approbations and cenſures muſt be obſerved in conſequence of theſe opinions, tho' the natural immediate objects of praiſe and cenſure were the CHAP. 5.

BOOK I. ſame to all men. This accounts for the different rites of worſhip, different notions of ſanctity and prophanity, and for the great abhorrence ſome nations may have of ſome practices in which others can diſcern no pernicious tendency, and repute indifferent, having no opinion of their being prohibited.

Different rites of religion and notions of impiety.

Theſe conſiderations account ſufficiently for the approbation of human ſacrifices and other monſtrous rites: tho' 'tis probable they have been often practiſed merely from fear, without moral approbation, by ſuch as ſcarce were perſuaded of the goodneſs of their gods: they likeways ſhew how inceſt and polygamy may be generally abhorred in ſome nations, where a few only can ſhow their pernicious conſequences; and yet be deemed lawful in other nations.

Errors often criminal.

Let no man hence imagine that ſuch actions flowing from falſe opinions about matters of fact, or about divine commands, are light matters, or ſmall blemiſhes in a character. Where the error ariſes from no evil affection, or no conſiderable defect of the good ones, the action may be very excuſable. But many of thoſe errors in opinion which affect our devotion toward the Deity, or our humanity toward our fellows, evidence very great defects in that love of moral excellence, in that juſt and amiable deſire of knowing, reverencing, and confiding in it, which is requiſite to a good character; or evidence great defects in humanity, at leaſt in the more extenſive and noble kinds of it. Where theſe principles are lively, they muſt excite men to great diligence and caution about their

duty and their practical concluſions: and conſequently muſt lead them to juſt ſentiments in the more important points, ſince ſufficient evidence is afforded in nature to the ſincere and attentive. No man can have ſufficient humanity of ſoul, and candour, who can believe that human ſacrifices, or the perſecution of his fellow-creatures about religious tenets which hurt not ſociety, can be duties acceptable to *God*. CHAP. 5.

VIII. Our having a *moral ſenſe* does not infer that we have innate complex ideas of the ſeveral actions; or innate opinions of their conſequences or effects upon ſociety: theſe we diſcover by obſervation and reaſoning, and we often make very oppoſite concluſions about them. The object of this ſenſe is not any external motion or action, but the inward affections and diſpoſitions, which by reaſoning we infer from the actions obſerved. Theſe immediate objects may be apprehended to be the ſame, where the external actions are very oppoſite. As inciſions and amputations may be made either from hatred, or from love; ſo love ſometimes moves to inflict painful chaſtiſements, and ſometimes to confer pleaſures, upon its object. And when men form different opinions of theſe affections in judging about the ſame actions, one ſhall praiſe what another cenſures. They ſhall form theſe different opinions about the affections from which actions proceeded, when they judge differently about their tendency to the good or the hurt of ſociety or of individuals. One whoſe attention is wholly or chiefly employed about ſome good tendencies of the actions, while he over- *No innate ideas ſuppoſed.*

BOOK I. looks their pernicious effects, ſhall imagine that they flowed from virtuous affections, and thus approve them: while a mind more attentive to their pernicious effects, infers the contrary affections to have been their ſpring, and condemns them.

Why it is neceſſary to conſider the connexion of virtue with intereſt.

Were nothing more requiſite in laying the foundation of *morals*, but the diſcovering in theory what affections and conduct are virtuous, and the objects of approbation, and what are vicious, the account now given of the conſtitution of our *moral faculty* would be ſufficient for that purpoſe; as it points out not only what is virtuous and vicious, but alſo ſhews the ſeveral degrees of theſe qualities in the ſeveral ſorts of affections and actions; and thus we might proceed to conſider more particularly the ſeveral offices of life, and to apply our power of reaſon to diſcover what partial affections, and actions conſequent upon them, are to be entirely approved, as beneficial to ſome parts of the ſyſtem, and perfectly conſiſtent with the general good; and what affections and actions, even of the beneficent kind, tho' they may be uſeful to a part, are pernicious to the general ſyſtem; and thus deduce the ſpecial laws of nature, from this *moral faculty* and the generous determination of ſoul. But as we have alſo a ſtrong determination toward private happineſs, with many particular ſelfiſh appetites and affections, and theſe often ſo violent as not immediately to ſubmit to the *moral power*, however we may be conſcious of its dignity, and of ſome conſiderable effect it has upon our happineſs or miſery; as ſtrong ſuſpici-

ons may often arise attended with great uneasiness, that in following the impulse of our kind affections and the *moral faculty* we are counteracting our interest, and abandoning what may be of more consequence to our happiness than either this self-approbation or the applauses of others; to establish well the foundations of morality, and to remove, as much as may be, all opposition arising from the selfish principles, that the mind may resolutely persist in the course which the *moral faculty* recommends, 'tis necessary to make a full comparison of all human enjoyments with each other, and thence discover in which of them our greatest happiness consists. CHAP. 5.

BOOK I. PART II.

An Inquiry into the Supreme Happiness of Mankind.

CHAP. VI.

How far the ſeveral Senſations, Appetites, Paſſions and Affections are in our power.

Wherein Happineſs conſiſts.

I. THE chief happineſs of any being muſt conſiſt in the full enjoyment of all the gratifications its nature deſires and is capable of; or if its nature admits of a great variety of pleaſures of different and ſometimes inconſiſtent kinds, ſome of them alſo higher and more durable than others, its ſupreme happineſs muſt conſiſt in the moſt conſtant enjoyment of the more intenſe and durable pleaſures, with as much of the lower gratifications as conſiſts with the full enjoyment of the higher. In like manner; if we cannot ward off all pain, and there be different kinds and degrees of it, we muſt ſecure ourſelves againſt the more intenſe and durable kinds, and the higher degrees of them; and that ſometimes by bearing the lower kinds or degrees, or by ſacrificing ſome ſmaller pleaſures, when 'tis neceſſary for this end.

To direct us in this conduct 'tis neceſſary to premiſe ſome diſtinct account in what manner we have power over our ſeveral affections and deſires, and how far any meditations or ſelf-diſcipline may affect our

very perceptions of good and evil, of happineſs or mi- CHAP. 6.
ſery, in the ſeveral objects.

How we have power over our deſires.

1. As the calm deſires and averſions of the ſoul naturally ariſe from our opinions of good or evil in their objects, ſo they are proportioned to the degrees of good or evil apprehended. We have power over the ſelfiſh deſires of any particular good only by means of the calm original determination toward the greateſt happineſs; and by the power of reaſoning and comparing, which may diſcover what are the values of the ſeveral objects of deſire. 'Tis by the correcting our opinions of their values that the ſeveral deſires are kept in their due proportion. 'Tis alſo by means of the other original determination toward publick happineſs of the moſt extenſive kind, and by a like exerciſe of reaſon in comparing the values of the objects deſired for others, that we can regulate the ſeveral kind affections and deſires: ſince where a greater good is diſcerned, the calm deſire of it is ſtronger than that toward a ſmaller inconſiſtent good, whether purſued for ourſelves or others.

Here too the *moral faculty* diſplays much of its power. As the ſeveral narrower affections may often interfere and oppoſe each other, or ſome of them be inconſiſtent with more extenſive affections to whole ſocieties, or to mankind; our *moral ſenſe* by its ſtronger and warmer approbation of the more extenſive, both points out the affection which ſhould prevail, and confirms this nobler affection by our natural deſire of *moral excellence*.

Book I.

How we have power over the paſſions.

The turbulent appetites and particular paſſions whether of the ſelfiſh or generous kind, are governed by the ſame means. They naturally ariſe on certain occaſions, and that often with great vehemence. To govern and reſtrain them an habit is neceſſary, which muſt be acquired by frequent recollection and diſcipline. While we are calm we muſt frequently attend to the danger of following precipitantly the firſt appearances of good or evil; we muſt recollect our former experiences in ourſelves, and our obſervations about others, how ſuperior and more laſting enjoyments have been loſt by our haſty indulgence of ſome preſſing appetite, or paſſion: how laſting miſery and remorſe has enſued upon ſome tranſient gratification: what ſhame, diſtreſs, and ſorrow have been the effects of ungoverned anger: what infamy and contempt men have incurred by exceſſive fear, or by their averſion to labour and painful application. We may thus raiſe an habitual ſuſpicion of unexamined appearances, and an habitual caution when we feel any turbulent paſſion ariſing. When the calm principles are thus confirmed by frequent meditation, and the force of the paſſions abated, then it is we obtain the true liberty and ſelf-command: the calm powers will retain and exerciſe that authority for which their natural dignity has fitted them, and our reaſon will be exerciſed in correcting all appearances of good and evil, and examining the true importance of the ſeveral objects of our appetites or paſſions.

Cauſes of falſe eſtimates of objects.

II. To this purpoſe 'tis neceſſary to obſerve the or-

dinary cauſes of our deception, and of our unjuſt eſtimation of objects: ſuch as, 1. The ſtrength of the impreſſions and keenneſs of the deſires raiſed by things preſent and ſenſible, beyond what the inſenſible or future objects preſented by the underſtanding and reflection can raiſe. Frequent meditation alone can remedy this evil. Our younger years are almoſt totally employed about the objects of ſenſe: few can bear the pains and energy of mind requiſite to fix the attention upon intellectual objects, and examine the feelings of the heart. Strength is acquired by thoſe powers which are moſt exerciſed. The recurring motions of the appetites annex confuſed notions of high felicity to their objects, which is confirmed by the intenſeneſs of ſome ſenſations while the appetite is keen. Few deliberately compare theſe enjoyments with others, or attend to the conſequences, to the ſhort duration of theſe ſenſations, and the enſuing ſatiety, ſhame and remorſe. And yet 'tis evident to our reaſon that the duration of any enjoyment is as much to be regarded as the intenſeneſs of the ſenſation; and that the enſuing ſtate of the mind when the brutal impulſe is ſated, is to be brought into the account as well as the tranſient gratification.

Preſence to the ſenſes.

2. Again---Allowing the imagination to dwell much upon ſome objects preſenting hopes of high pleaſure inflames our paſſions and byaſſes our judgments. Little indeed is hereby added to the enjoyment when we obtain it: nay our pleaſure is rather diminiſhed, as it ſeldom anſwers the previous expecta-

Indulging the imagination.

Book I. tion, and brings with it the air of disappointment. But by roving over all the pleasures and advantages of certain stations, certain pitches of wealth or power, our desires of them are made more violent, and our notions represent an happiness in them, much higher than we shall find it to be when we attain to them. And this uncorrected imagination never fails to increase the torment we shall find upon a disappointment.

Associations of ideas.

3. But no cause of immoderate desires, or unfair estimates is more frequent than some groundless associations of ideas, formed by instruction, or our usual conversation, annexing confused notions of happiness, and even of virtue, and moral perfection, or their contraries, to what has little affinity to them. Seldom are objects of desire presented to the mind as they are, without some disguise. Wealth and power are truly useful not only for the natural conveniencies or pleasures of life, but as a fund for good offices. But how many notions are there often likewise annexed of great abilities, wisdom, moral excellence, and of much higher joys than they can afford; which so intoxicate some men that they forget their natural purposes, begin to love them for themselves, affect the ostentation of them; and dread the lower stations as abject, miserable, and inconsistent with moral worth or honour. Some natural pleasures too by like associations are estimated far above their worth, and immoderate desires of them torment the soul.

Superstitious opinions.

4. Some perverse superstitions also, instilled by e-

ducation, cause groundless aversions to tenets and practices of the most innocent nature, by annexing to them notions of impiety, enmity to God, and obstinate wickedness of heart; while contrary tenets or practices, not a whit better, are made indications of piety, charity, holiness and zeal for the souls of men. Hence arises that rancour in the hearts of unwary zealots of all sorts against those who differ from them; and that persecuting spirit, with all the wrathful passions, which have been so long a reproach to human nature, and even to that religion which should inspire all love and meekness. CHAP. 6.

III. It is the more necessary to observe these several causes of the wrong estimations made of the objects of our desire, and of the several enjoyments of life, because scarce any of mankind can live without some solicitation or other from every one of these several sorts of enjoyments; nor can one hope to be wholly unexperienced in contrary evils. The pleasures and pains of the external senses are in some degree felt by all who have the natural powers, and must raise desires and aversions. The impulses of the appetites too are unavoidable: they recur after certain intervals, nor can their uneasy sensations be otherways prevented altogether, than by gratifying them with their natural objects. But, according to the benign order of nature, such gratifications as may prevent the pain of the appetites may very generally be obtained; and where some moral reason prevents the gratification, there are higher moral joys accompany- *All men feel the several original desires pleasures and pains.*

BOOK I. ing this abſtinence, which fully make up the loſs. Bodily pain ſeldom employs a great part of life; wiſe men find out many preſervatives, which are generally effectual; and when they are not, may obtain ſtrong conſolations and ſupports under it.

Other deſires more difficultly gratified than the appetites.

'Tis more difficult to gratify other moſt uneaſy deſires, ariſing from ſome opinions of great happineſs in certain enjoyments. Had we formed no ſuch opinions or confuſed notions, we had felt no miſery in the want of theſe enjoyments; which is not the caſe with the appetites. But when we can change theſe opinions, and rectify our confuſed imaginations, the deſires and their attendant uneaſineſſes ceaſe or abate. A greater ſhare of the miſery of life is chargeable on theſe deſires than upon the appetites. Of this kind are the deſires of wealth, power, the grandeur and elegance of living, and of fame; and our averſions to their oppoſites are of the ſame nature. Our affections to others, and our kind deſires, are affected by opinions in the ſame manner with our ſelfiſh ones. What we conceive as a great good we muſt warmly deſire for thoſe we love; we muſt be uneaſy upon any diſappointment.

The neceſſity of correcting our opinions and imaginations.

Now when theſe opinions are true and natural, we cannot alter them, nor would it be deſirable. Reaſon and reflection will confirm them. But many opinions and confuſed notions which raiſe our deſires are falſe and phantaſtick; and when they are corrected we are freed from much pain and anxiety. Some enjoyments are ſtill in our power, which too may be found to be

the higheſt. If this be true, it is our higheſt intereſt to be fully perſuaded of it; that our ſtrongeſt deſires may be raiſed toward ſuch things as may certainly be obtained, and can yield us the nobleſt enjoyments. CHAP. 6.

In general, the greater any good or evil is imagined, the ſtronger are our deſires and fears, the greater is our anxiety while the event is in ſuſpence, and the higher ſhall our ſorrows be upon diſappointment and our firſt tranſports upon ſucceſs: but where the previous imagination was falſe, this joy ſoon vaniſhes, and is ſucceeded by uneaſineſs: on the other hand, the ſorrow upon diſappointment may remain long and very intenſe, as the falſe imagination is not corrected by experience of the enjoyment. This ſhews the great importance of examining well all our notions about the objects of deſire or averſion. Thus we ſhould break off from ſenſual enjoyments, in our eſtimation of them, all theſe foreign notions of moral dignity, liberality, elegance, and good-nature, which diſpoſitions we may diſplay in a much wiſer and more virtuous manner, without expenſive luxurious tables or ſumptuous living. Theſe additional notions inflame the deſires of ſplendid opulence, and are a fund of perpetual anxiety.

IV. Ideas once firmly aſſociated in this manner give laſting uneaſineſs to the mind; and a full conviction of the underſtanding will not break the aſſociation, without long meditation and diſcipline. There are only confuſed imaginations, and not ſettled concluſions, or direct opinions, in the minds of the luxu- *Aſſociated ideas not eaſily ſeparated.*

BOOK I. rious, the miſer, the ambitious, the lover, repreſenting ſome wonderful excellence in their favourite objects proportioned to their eager deſires. But long indulgence and repeated acts of deſire, in a mind called off from other objects, the ſtrain of converſation, and the airs of countenance, and the very tone of voice of the men of the ſame turn with whom they have haunted, aſſociate high notions of felicity to the favourite gratification ſo firmly, that a long attention and reflection is neceſſary to rectify the confuſed imagination.

Juſt notions of virtue neceſſary to happineſs.

A full perſuaſion of the excellence and importance of virtue above all other enjoyments, provided we have juſt notions of it, muſt always be for our intereſt. The opinion will ſtand the teſt of the ſtricteſt inquiry, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter; and the enjoyment is in our power. But diſproportioned admirations of ſome ſorts of virtue of a limited nature, and of ſome inferior moral forms, ſuch as mere fortitude, zeal for truth, and for a particular ſyſtem of religious tenets, while the nobler forms of goodneſs of more extenſive good influence are overlooked, may lead men into very bad affections, and into horrid actions. No natural ſenſe or deſire is without its uſe, while our opinions are true: but when they are falſe, ſome of the beſt affections or ſenſes may be pernicious. Our *moral ſenſe* and kind affections lead us to condemn the evil, to oppoſe their deſigns; nay to wiſh their deſtruction when they are conceived to be unalterably ſet upon the ruin of others better than themſelves. Theſe ve-

ry principles, along with the anger and indignation naturally ariſing againſt what appears evil, may lead us into a ſettled rancour and hatred againſt great bodies of mankind thus falſely repreſented as wicked, and make us appear to them, as they appear to us, maliciouſly ſet upon the deſtruction of others. CHAP. 6.

Correcting our opinions abates many deſires.

When our opinions and imagination are corrected, the natural appetites and deſires will remain, and may be attended with ſome uneaſineſs; but the ſtrength of many will be abated and others will acquire more. The ſimpler gratifications of appetite, theſe of the eaſieſt purchaſe, may by good management be as ſatisfying, nay almoſt as joyful and exhilarating as any. The pleaſures of the imagination may be highly reliſhed, and yet no diſtreſs ariſe from the want of them. Much of this pleaſure is expoſed to all, and requires no property, ſuch as that ariſing from the exquiſite beauties of nature, and ſome of the beauties of art. Nor are even theſe either the ſole or the higheſt enjoyments.

The ſympathetick feelings unavoidable.

V. The ſympathetick pleaſures and pains in ſome degree or other muſt affect us; no management can prevent it. We muſt live in ſociety, and by the aid of others, whoſe happineſs, or miſery, whoſe pleaſures, or pains, we cannot avoid obſerving. Nay mankind univerſally feel the conjugal and parental affections; eminent goodneſs too, when it occurs, muſt excite ſtrong love and friendſhip. Thus we muſt experience the ſympathetick joys and ſorrows of the higher kinds. In this matter too we muſt watch carefully over our opinions and imagination, that our minds be not in-

BOOK I. flamed with vain desires about mean transitory or unnecessary goods for others, or oppressed with sorrow upon such evils befalling them as are small and tolerable. But unless we get the imaginations of our friends corrected, we shall still have occasion for sympathy. All misery is real to the sufferer while it lasts. Whoever imagines himself miserable, he is so in fact, while this imagination continues.

Where choice binds the tye of love, the previously examining well the character of the person, his opinions and notions of life, is of the highest consequence. In the stronger bonds of love with persons of just sentiments and corrected imaginations, we have a fair hazard for a large share of these higher social joys, with fewer intense pains; as the happiness of such persons is less uncertain or dependent on external accidents.

No necessary causes of ill-will.

As there are not in human nature any necessary causes of ultimate ill-will or malice, a calm mind considering well the tempers, sentiments, and real springs of action in others, will indeed find much matter of pity and regret, but little of anger, indignation or envy, and of settled ill-will none at all. And thus we may be pretty free from the uneasinesses and misery of the unkind affections and passions. Human nature is indeed chargeable with many weaknesses, rash opinions, immoderate desires of private interest, strong sensual appetites, keen attachments to narrow systems beyond their merit; and very subject to anger upon appearance of injury to themselves, or those they

love: but 'tis free from all ultimate unprovoked malice; much influenced by some moral species or other; and abounding with some sorts of kind affections. Many of their most censurable actions flow from some mistaken notion of duty, or are conceived by the agent to be innocent, and are the effects of some partial and naturally lovely affection, but raised above its proportion, while more extensive ones are asleep. CHAP. 6.

Moral forms universally affect mankind.

VI. As soon as one observes the affections of others or reflects on his own, the moral qualities must affect the mind. No education, habit, false opinions, or even affectation itself can prevent it. A Lucretius, an Hobbes, a Bayle, cannot shake off sentiments of gratitude, praise, and admiration of some moral forms; and of censure and detestation of others. This sense may be a sure fund of inward enjoyment to those who obey its suggestions. Our own temper and actions may be constant sources of joy upon reflection. But where partial notions of virtue and justice are rashly entertained, without extensive views and true opinions of the merit of persons and causes, the pursuit of some moral forms may occasion grievous distaste and remorse. False notions of virtue may be less lasting than other mistakes. Persons injured by them seldom fail to remonstrate; spectators not blinded by our passions and interest will shew their disgust. And thus our ill-grounded joy and self-approbation may soon give place to shame and remorse.

The sense of honour affects all.

The sense of honour too must occasion pleasure or pain, as the world about us happen to disclose their

BOOK I. sentiments of our conduct: and as we have not the opinions of others in our power, we cannot be sure of escaping all censure. But we can make a just estimate of men and of the value of their praises or censures, in proportion to their qualifications as judges of merit; and thus we may turn our ambition upon the praises of the wise and good. The approbation of our own hearts, and the approbation of *God*, give satisfactions of an higher nature than the praises of men can give. We can repress the desire of this lower enjoyment, when it proves inconsistent with the higher.

The desires of wealth and power universal.

VII. The desires also of wealth and power must affect the mind when it discerns their obvious usefulness to gratify every original desire. These pursuits in men of corrected minds may be easy and moderate, so that disappointment will not give great pain. But when the notions not only of external convenience and pleasure, and of a fund for good offices, but of all valuable ability, and moral dignity, and happiness are joined to wealth or power, and of all baseness and misery joined to poverty and the lower stations; when the natural use of these things is overlooked, and the mind is constantly intent upon further advancement, anxiety and impatience must imbitter and poison every enjoyment of life.

How fantastick desires arise.

When the mind has been diverted from its natural pursuits and enjoyments, fantastick ones must succeed. When through indolence and aversion to application men despair of success in matters naturally honourable; when any accidents have called off their

minds from the affections natural to our kind, toward offspring, kindred, and a country; the desires of some sort of eminence, and of amusement and pleasure, in an incapacity for all valuable business, must set them upon any pursuits, which have got reputation among their fellows of like sloth, incapacity, or depravation, under some confused notions of genteelity, liberality, sociableness, or elegance. How else shall one account for years spent by young people of easy fortunes in hunting, gaming, drinking, sauntering, and the silly chat and ceremonies of the places of rendezvous for gayety and amusement. CHAP. 6.

Many enjoyments opposite and inconsistent.

VIII. Now it is obvious our nature is incapable of the highest pleasures of all kinds at once, or of pursuing them together. There are manifest inconsistencies among them, and the means of obtaining them. An high relish for one kind is inconsistent with a taste for some others. Sensuality and indolence are plainly opposite to all the higher active enjoyments. The pursuits of knowledge and the ingenious arts are opposite to avarice, sensuality, and to some sorts of ambition: so are the pursuits of virtue. Nay the highest enjoyments of some kinds are much increased by consciousness of our having sacrificed other inferior pursuits and enjoyments to them, as those of virtue and honour.

Few enjoyments are certain.

'Tis equally manifest that in our present state, one cannot constantly secure to himself any one enjoyment dependent on external things, which are all subject to innumerable accidents. The noble enjoyments of

BOOK I. piety, of which hereafter, and thoſe of virtue, may be ſtable and independent on fortune. But a virtuous temper, whatever ſure enjoyment it may afford upon reflection, ever carries a man forth beyond himſelf, toward a publick good, or ſome intereſts of others; and theſe depend not on our power. There's great pain in the diſappointment of virtuous deſigns, tho' the temper be ever approved. In this, as in all other things, we depend on providence, which, as it gave us at firſt all our perceptive powers, and their objects, ſo it diſpoſes of them, and particularly of the happineſs or miſery of others, the object on which the virtuous affections terminate. This ſufficiently ſhews that the Deity muſt, for this reaſon, as well as many others, be the ſupreme object of our higheſt happineſs: ſince we can never be ſecure, nor can we enjoy true ſerenity and tranquillity of mind, without a firm perſuaſion that his goodneſs, wiſdom, and omnipotence are continually employed in ſecuring the felicity of the objects of our nobleſt affections.

No ſolid tranquillity without religion.

It would not be improper to conſider here the plain evidence for the exiſtence of God and his moral perfections; not only as a firm perſuaſion of theſe points is an high matter of duty, but as the Deity and his providence are the foundations of our tranquillity and higheſt happineſs. But as the moſt perſuaſive arguments on ſome of theſe points are derived from the very conſtitution of human nature, and that *moral adminiſtration* we feel within ourſelves, that ſtructure of our ſouls deſtined to recommend all thoſe kind and

generous affections which reſemble the moral perfections of God; we ſhall poſtpone the ſentiments and duties of piety to be conſidered afterwards as the higheſt perfection of happineſs, as well as of moral excellence. CHAP. 6.

IX. As to other enjoyments which are uncertain; tho' pure unmixed happineſs is not attainable, yet our endeavours are not uſeleſs. We hinted already that having had high previous expectations, tho' it may increaſe the firſt tranſports of ſucceſs, when the preceeding anxiety is removed; yet rather leſſens the ſubſequent enjoyment, and ſtill embitters diſappointments, and makes misfortunes, in their own nature light, become unſupportable: ſo having our notions lower about theſe uncertain objects, and our deſires moderate, rather encreaſes our ſtable ſenſe of pleaſure in the object obtained, and abates the ſenſe of diſappointment. *How our endeavours have ſome effect.*

Thus the temperate, the ſober, the chaſte, the humble, have ſenſes as acute at leaſt as others, and enjoy all the good in ſenſual objects, and in honour. Abſtinence and reſtraint, when virtue requires, vitiates no ſenſe or appetite. Moderation in proſperity, temperance, humility, and modeſty, low notions of happineſs in ſenſual objects, prevent no ſenſe of pleaſure in advantages obtained. Men of this turn have their reaſon calm and active to procure the gratifications they deſire, and to find out other preferable enjoyments when they are diſappointed. In this uncertain world their proſperity and ſucceſs is as joyful as

BOOK I. that of others. And then under misfortunes,

Si quis, quae multa vides diſcrimine tali,
*Si quis in adverſum rapiat caſuſve, deuſve,**

A lively ſenſe of the inſtability of human affairs very uſeful.

(And ſure ſuch diſappointments are as incident to the inflamed admirers of external things as to others) the difference is manifeſt. The one had other funds of happineſs: he foreſaw ſuch accidents; the loſs to him is tolerable. To the other; *he is deprived of his gods; and do you ask what aileth him?* So neceſſary is frequent conſideration of the uncertainty of human affairs; the accidents we are ſubject to; and the proper reſorts, and ſprings of relief, and the other enjoyments which may ſtill be in our power. This abates no ſolid joy in proſperity, but breaks vain aſſociations, and corrects the imagination; gives ſtrength of mind, and freedom from that terror and conſternation which diſtracts the unprepared mind, and deprives it of the good remaining in its power.

CHAP. VII.

A Compariſon of the ſeveral Sorts of ENJOYMENT, *and the oppoſite Sorts of* UNEASINESS, *to find their Importance to* HAPPINESS.

TO diſcover wherein our true happineſs conſiſts we muſt compare the ſeveral enjoyments of life, and the ſeveral kinds of miſery, that we may diſcern what enjoyments are to be parted with, or what uneaſineſs

* *Virg. Aeneid.* ix. verſ. 210.

to be endured, in order to obtain the higheſt and moſt beatifick ſatisfactions, and to avoid the moſt diſtreſſing ſufferings. CHAP. 7.

Enjoyments valuable by their dignity and duration.

As to pleaſures of the ſame kind, 'tis manifeſt their values are in a joint proportion of their intenſeneſs and duration. In eſtimating the duration, we not only regard the conſtancy of the object, or its remaining in our power, and the duration of the ſenſations it affords, but the conſtancy of our fancy or reliſh: for when this changes it puts an end to the enjoyment.

In comparing pleaſures of different kinds, the value is as the duration and dignity of the kind jointly. We have an immediate ſenſe of a * dignity, a perfection, or beatifick quality in ſome kinds, which no intenſeneſs of the lower kinds can equal, were they alſo as laſting as we could wiſh. No intenſeneſs or duration of any external ſenſation gives it a dignity or worth equal to that of the improvement of the ſoul by knowledge, or the ingenious arts; and much leſs is it equal to that of virtuous affections and actions. We never heſitate in judging thus about the happineſs or perfection of others, where the impetuous cravings of appetites and paſſions do not corrupt our judgments, as they do often in our own caſe. By this intimate feeling of dignity, enjoyments and exerciſes of ſome kinds, tho' not of the higheſt degree of thoſe kinds, are incomparably more excellent and beatifick than the moſt intenſe and laſting enjoyments of the lower kinds. Nor is duration of ſuch importance to ſome higher

* See above chap. iv. § 10.

Book I. kinds, as it is to the lower. The exercise of virtue for a short period, provided it be not succeeded by something vicious, is of incomparably greater value than the most lasting sensual pleasures. Nothing destroys the excellence and perfection of the state but a contrary quality of the same kind defacing the former character. The peculiar happiness of the virtuous man is not so much abated by pain, or an early death, as that of the sensualist; tho' his complex state which is made up of all his enjoyments and sufferings of every kind is in some degree affected by them*. Nor is it a view of private sublime pleasures in frequent future reflections which recommends virtue to the soul. We feel an impulse, an ardour toward perfection, toward affections and actions of dignity, and feel their immediate excellence, abstracting from such views of future pleasures of long duration. Tho' no doubt these pleasures, which are as sure as our existence, are to be regarded in our estimation of the importance of virtue to our happiness.

Now if we denote by intenseness, in a more general meaning, the degree in which any perceptions or enjoyments are beatifick, then their comparative values are in a compound proportion of their intenseness and duration. But to retain always in view the grand differences of the kinds, and to prevent any imaginations, that the intenser sensations of the lower kinds

* The Stoicks have run into extravagance on this head. See *Cicero de Fin.* l. iii. c. 10. *Haec de quibus dixi non fiunt temporis productione majora.—non intelligunt valetudinis aestimationem spatio indicari; virtutis, opportunitate.*

with ſufficient duration may compleat our happineſs; it may be more convenient to eſtimate enjoyments by their dignity and duration: dignity denoting the excellence of the kind, when thoſe of different kinds are compared; and the intenſeneſs of the ſenſations, when we compare thoſe of the ſame kind. CHAP. 7.

The different taſtes of men.

II. Tho' the ſeveral original powers above-mentioned are natural to all men, yet through habit, aſſociated ideas, education, or opinion, ſome generally purſue enjoyments of one kind; and ſhew a diſregard of others, which are highly valued by men of a different turn. Some are much given to ſenſuality; others to more ingenious pleaſures; others purſue wealth and power; others moral and ſocial enjoyments, and honour. Wealth and power have ſome few faithful votaries adoring them for themſelves: but the more numerous worſhipers adore them only as miniſtring ſpirits, or mediators with ſome ſuperior divinities, as *pleaſure*, *honour*, *beneficence*.

Theſe muſt be examined.

Thus different men have different taſtes. What one admires as the ſupreme enjoyments, another may deſpiſe. Muſt we not examine theſe taſtes? Are all perſons, all orders of beings equally happy if each obtains the enjoyments reſpectively moſt reliſhed? At this rate the meaneſt brute or inſect may be as happy as the wiſeſt hero, patriot, or friend can be. What may make a brute as happy as that low order is capable of being, may be but deſpicable to an order endued with finer perceptive powers, and a nobler ſort of deſires. Beings of theſe higher orders are immedi-

BOOK I. ately conſcious of the ſuperior dignity and importance to happineſs in their peculiar enjoyments, of which lower orders are incapable. Nature has thus diſtinguiſhed the different orders by different perceptive powers, ſo that the ſame objects will not be ſufficient for happineſs to all; nor have all equal happineſs when each can gratify all the deſires and ſenſes he has.

The ſuperior orders in this world probably experience all the ſenſations of the lower orders, and can judge of them. But the inferior do not experience the enjoyments of the ſuperior. Nay in the ſeveral ſtages of life each one finds different taſtes and deſires. We are conſcious in our ſtate of mature years that the happineſs of our friends, our families, or our country are incomparably nobler objects of our purſuit, and adminiſter proportionably a nobler pleaſure than the toys which once abundantly entertained us when we had experienced nothing better. God has aſſigned to each order, and to the ſeveral ſtages of life in the ſame perſon, their peculiar powers and taſtes. Each one is as happy when its taſte is gratified as it can then be. But we are immediately conſcious that one gratification is more excellent than another, when we have experienced both. And then our reaſon and obſervation enables us to compare the effects, and conſequences, and duration. One may be tranſitory, and the occaſion of great ſubſequent miſery, tho' for the preſent the enjoyment be intenſe: another may be laſting, ſafe, and ſucceeded by no ſatiety, ſhame, diſguſt, or remorſe.

Superior beings by diviner faculties and fuller knowledge may, without experience of all ſorts, immediately diſcern what are the nobleſt. They may have ſome intuitive knowledge of perfection, and ſome ſtandard of it, which may make the experience of ſome lower ſorts uſeleſs to them. But of mankind theſe certainly are the beſt judges who have full experience, with their taſtes or ſenſes and appetites in a natural vigorous ſtate. Now it never was alledged that ſocial affections, the admiration of moral excellence, the deſire of eſteem, with their attendant and guardian temperance, the purſuits of knowledge, or a natural activity, impaired any ſenſe or appetite. This is often charged with great juſtice upon luxury, and ſurfeiting, and indolence. The higheſt ſenſual enjoyments may be experienced by thoſe who employ both mind and body vigorouſly in ſocial virtuous offices, and allow all the natural appetites to recur in their due ſeaſons. Such certainly are the beſt judges of all enjoyments. Thus according to the maxim often inculcated by Ariſtotle, "The good man is the true judge "and ſtandard of every thing." CHAP. 7. *What men are the beſt judges.*

But it may juſtly be queſtioned, whether men much devoted to ſenſual pleaſures, to thoſe of the imagination, or to wealth and power, are ſufficiently prepared to judge in this queſtion. Such purſuits indeed are ſeldom continued long without ſome notion of their innocence, nay of ſome duty or moral obligation. Habits ſometimes deface natural characters and powers. Men of vicious habits have ſmall experience *The vicious ſeldom can judge well.*

BOOK I. of the generous affections, ſocial joys, and the delights of true impartial uniform goodneſs. Bad habits weaken ſocial feelings, and the reliſh of virtue. And yet even ſuch men on ſome occaſions give a ſtrong teſtimony to the cauſe of virtue.

III. Having premiſed theſe things we may firſt compare the ſeveral ſorts of enjoyment in point of dignity and duration; and in like manner their oppoſites, ſufferings. And then compare a little the ſeveral tempers or characters in point of inward ſatisfaction.

Senſual pleaſures are the meaneſt.

The pleaſures of the external ſenſes, are of two claſſes; thoſe of the palate, and thoſe betwixt the ſexes. Both theſe we call ſenſual.

Theſe of the palate.

The pleaſures of the palate how grateful ſoever they may be to children, muſt appear the meaneſt and moſt deſpicable enjoyments to all men of reflection who have experienced any others. The uneaſineſs felt when the body needs ſupport may be pretty intenſe; as 'tis wiſely contrived, to engage us to take neceſſary care of the body. The allaying this pain may give a ſtrong ſenſation of pleaſure at firſt. But the proper pleaſure of taſte, the poſitive enjoyment, muſt be deſpicable to all who are above the order of brutes. The differences in point of pleaſure among the ſeveral kinds of food is ſo ſmall, that the keenneſs of appetite is allowed to make a much greater. The moſt exquiſite cookery can ſcarce give ſuch high ſenſation of this kind to a ſatisfied appetite, tho' it be not ſurfeited; as the plaineſt fare will give to a brisk appetite after abſtinence and exerciſe; even altho'

there was no pain, inconſiſtent with mirth and gayety, to be allayed. When therefore the allaying ſo gentle an uneaſineſs cauſes more pleaſure than any exquiſite ſavours without it, the poſitive pleaſure muſt be very inconſiderable. The preventing of appetite, or the increaſing or prolonging it by incentives of any kind, are vain efforts for pleaſure; ſo are all arts, except exerciſe and abſtinence, till the natural appetite returns. The greateſt Epicures have acknowledged this when buſineſs or diverſions have caſually led them to make the experiment. CHAP. 7.

Reaſons of miſtakes, a mixture of moral pleaſures.

Men would univerſally agree in this point, were not theſe pleaſures generally blended with others of very different natures. Not only nice oeconomy, art, and elegance in fine ſervices and grandeur of apartments, but even moral qualities, liberality, communication of pleaſure, friendſhip, and meriting well from others, are joined in our imaginations. Strip ſenſuality of all theſe borrowed charms, and view it naked and alone as mere pleaſing the palate in ſolitude, and it is ſhameful and deſpicable to all.

Imagine a life ſpent in this enjoyment without interruption, and that, contrary to the preſent order of nature, the appetite ſtill remained; but that there was no ſocial enjoyment or affection, no finer perceptions, or exerciſe of the intellectual powers; this ſtate is below that of many brutes. Their appetites allow intervals for ſome pleaſures of a ſocial nature, and for action; and when thus employed, they ſhew an higher joy than in feeding.

BOOK I. The duration too of these sensations is inconsiderable. Such indeed is the bounty of *God*, that the means of allaying the cravings of appetite may be easily procured; and thus by good management we may all frequently enjoy almost the highest pleasures of this kind. But the appetite is soon satisfied, and recurs not till after long intervals. Artificial incentives may raise an unnatural craving, but the allaying of this gives little pleasure. 'Tis a real depravation and sickness; and, when long continued, turns to such bodily indisposition as must stop all enjoyments. Where grandeur and variety are affected, the fancy grows capricious and inconstant, and the objects uncertain. The humour may grow too expensive for our fortunes, and increase, while the means of gratification are diminished.

The duration small.

The same true of animal appetites.

Many of the same considerations depreciate the other species of sensual pleasure, which much depends upon the allaying the uneasy craving of a brutal impulse, as the positive good is of itself mean and inconsiderable. Conceive the sensation alone, without love or esteem of any moral qualities, or the thought of communicating pleasure, and of being beloved; it would not equal the delights which some of the finer brute beasts seem plainly conscious of. And then this enjoyment is the most transitory of all. Indulgence, and variety, and incentives, bring upon the mind a miserable craving; an impatient ardour; an incapacity of self-government, and of all valuable improvement; a wretched slavery, which strips the mind of all

candour, integrity, and ſenſe of honour. Add to this the capriciouſneſs of fancy, the torments of diſappointment, which ſuch wandering diſſolute deſires muſt be expoſed to; and that after the tranſient ſenſation, there can ſcarce remain any thing agreeable, to one who has not loſt all manly ſenſe of good. The reflection on any paſt ſenſual enjoyments gives no ſenſe of any merit or worth, no ground of ſelf-eſteem, or ſcarce any ſort of joy except from the low hopes of repeating the ſame, which may a little revive the appetite after intervals. The remembrance is no ſupport under any calamity, chagrin, pain, provocation or ſorrow, or any inward diſturbance of mind, or outward misfortune. The very nature of theſe ſenſations we call ſenſual, and the inward ſentiments of our hearts about them, abundantly declare that the ſupreme happineſs of human nature muſt conſiſt in very different enjoyments of a more noble and durable nature. CHAP. 7.

Objections removed from the practice of the diſſolute.

IV. 'Tis often occurring, on the other hand, that we ſee multitudes who prefer ſuch pleaſures to all others, and make the purſuits of ſenſuality the buſineſs of their lives; and that therefore the bent of the mind is naturally toward them; and their power ſuperior to our *moral ſenſe*, and to the generous affections.

To remove this cauſe of ſuſpicion; let us recollect that the conſtant purſuits of ſenſuality are ſeldom ever obſerved without an opinion of their innocence. Our *moral faculty*, our ſympathetick ſenſe, and our kind affections are ſeldom ſet in oppoſition to them, or combat with them, in the minds of men much de-

BOOK I. voted to ſenſuality. Where without this notion of innocence men are hurried into ſenſual enjoyments by impetuous appetites, the ſtate is miſerable and full of abject remorſe after the tranſient gratifications. The profeſſedly diſſolute have ſome ſpecious reaſons by which they are deluded into a perſuaſion of the innocence of their purſuits.

Nay ſome moral notions, ſuch as communication of pleaſure, love, friendſhip, meriting well, and being beloved, make the main charm even in ſenſual enjoyments. This is manifeſt in the luxury and intemperance of ſuch as are not ſunk below the beaſts, and univerſally deſpiſed. It holds too in the unchaſte paſſions: and hence ſome notions of moral excellencies, good nature, friendlineſs, ſweetneſs of temper, wit, and obligingneſs recommend their objects. But on the other hand; ſuch as by generous affections, and love of moral excellence and honour, are led into a virtuous courſe, avowedly deſpiſe ſenſual enjoyments; nor does any confuſed imaginations of them, or hopes even of immunity from labour and pain recommend it to their choice. The external evils, toil, expence, and hardſhips are known and deſpiſed as well as the allurements of eaſe and pleaſure: the moral forms by their own proper power are ſuperior to them. In the voluptuous, the *moral ſenſe* is ſeldom conquered; the enjoyments ſeem innocent, or at leaſt the guilt is ſo diminiſhed by the ſophiſtry of the paſſions, that 'tis only the ſmalleſt moral evil which ſeems to be incurred for the higheſt ſenſual good; and the weakeſt ef-

forts of the moral kind overcome by the ſtrongeſt of ſenſuality; and often, even by the aſſiſtance of ſome miſtaken moral ſpecies. CHAP. 7.

The ſenſual enjoyments conſiſtent with virtue as high as any.

It is here likewiſe proper to obſerve that all ſenſual gratifications are not oppoſite to moral enjoyments. There is a moderate indulgence perfectly innocent, ſufficient to allay the uneaſineſs of appetite; which too by wiſe oeconomy may frequently be as high as any ſort of ſenſual enjoyments, and even ſubſervient to the moral. The temperate, and ſuch as, after proper ſelf-government in coelibacy, have made a wiſe choice in marriage, may have as high ſenſual enjoyments as any. In recommending of virtue we need not ſuppoſe it oppoſite to all gratifications of ſenſe; tho' its power in our hearts ſhould be maintained ſo high that it may be able to controll all the appetites which by accident may oppoſe it. Its gentle ſway generally allows ſuch gratifications as may be the higheſt of the kind; or where it does not, it makes abundant compenſation for the loſs, by the joyful approbation of ſuch abſtinence and ſelf-government. What rich compenſation is made by the joyful approbation one muſt feel of fidelity, friendſhip, and meriting well, and by the returns of a conſtant affection from a worthy heart, for the want of the irregular, ſhameful, perplexing, joyleſs paſſions and indulgences, with perſons of no moral worth or ſtedfaſtneſs of affection.

The pleaſures of knowledge and the ingenious arts ſuperior to the ſenſual in dignity.

V. We come next to conſider the pleaſures of the imagination in the grandeur and elegance of living, and the perceptions of beauty and harmony, to which we

BOOK I. may add thoſe of the ingenious arts, and knowledge. Here there is no brutal uneaſy previous appetite, the ſating of which might enhance the pleaſure; and yet one may immediately find that theſe are enjoyments ſuperior to the ſenſual, and more recommended by the conſtitution of our nature. When the cravings of appetite are grown painful, one will readily quit theſe pleaſures till the pain is removed; eſpecially when there are no apprehenſions of our not being at liberty of ſpeedily returning to them. But the beholding beautiful forms, the curious works of art, or the more exquiſite works of nature; the entertainments of harmony, of imitation in the ingenious arts; the diſcovering of the immutable relations and proportions of the objects of the pure intellect and reaſon, give enjoyments in dignity far ſuperior to any thing ſenſual, where the ſenſual are conſidered alone without borrowed charms of an higher nature. Theſe more manly pleaſures are more ſuited to our nature; and are always more eſteemed and approved when we are judging of the purſuits of others.

They are alſo ſuperior in duration.

Theſe pleaſures too far ſurpaſs the ſenſual likewiſe in duration. They can employ a great part of life without ſatiety or cloying, as their pleaſure is ſo much poſitive enjoyment independent upon the allaying of any previous uneaſy ſenſations. They are the proper exerciſes of the ſoul, where none of the higher ſocial offices, or thoſe of rational piety claim its activity. They partake of its laſting nature, and are not tranſitory, as all enjoyments are which are merely ſubſervi-

ent to the periſhing body. Thus, as often as the more important offices of virtue allow any intervals, our time is agreeably and honourably employed in hiſtory natural or civil, in geometry, aſtronomy, poetry, painting, and muſick, or ſuch entertainments as ingenious arts afford. And ſome of the ſweeteſt enjoyments of this ſort require no property, nor need we ever want the objects. If familiarity abates the pleaſure of the more obvious beauties of nature, their more exquiſite inward ſtructures may give new delights, and the ſtores of nature are inexhauſtible. CHAP. 7.

Such objects of theſe taſtes as require property are more uncertain, and the purſuit of them more ſolicitous and anxious, and the fancy more inconſtant, as long poſſeſſion abates the reliſh. The imagination here needs ſtrict reins, that it may not run out into exceſſive admiration by aſſociated notions of moral dignity, and liberality; and thus involve us in innumerable vexatious purſuits of what is not eſſential to happineſs.

Sympathetick feelings very intenſe.

VI. Pleaſures of the ſympathetick kind ariſing from the fortunes of others are proportioned to the ſtrength of the kind affections we have for them. Our nature is exceedingly ſuſceptible of theſe affections; eſpecially the ſtronger ſorts of them toward offspring, parents, kinſmen, benefactors, or eminently worthy characters; toward ſects, parties, countries. They furniſh the far greater part of the buſineſs, and of the happineſs or miſery of life.

Compare theſe with others: Conſider the joy of

BOOK I. heart upon any conſiderable proſperity, or any eminent virtue of one whom we heartily love, of a child, a brother, a friend: upon any glory or advantage to our party, or country; to any honourable cauſe we have eſpouſed, or any admired character; or upon their eſcaping any imminent danger. Where there is an hearty affection theſe joys are incomparably ſuperior to any of the former. What pleaſure of ſenſe or imagination would we not forego to obtain theſe events? Some ecſtacies of joy upon the eſcaping of great imminent perſonal dangers have been too violent for nature, and have proved fatal: we have more* inſtances of ſympathetick joys which proved alſo unſupportable and fatal. And if ſome tempers cannot bear life after ſome misfortunes befallen themſelves; more inſtances are found of ſuch as throw it away upon the misfortunes of others. The enjoyments muſt be very high which can ſweeten all the toil and labour about offspring and friends, even in common characters. Having affluence of all things deſired for one's ſelf, abates very little of the diligence of mankind.

And may be of long duration.

Theſe pleaſures endure as long as the perſon continues to be beloved and to be proſperous. New ſucceſſes of our own, or of our friend, raiſe greater commotions at firſt than advantages long poſſeſſed. But while the affection continues, the ſenſe remains; and the ſympathetick pleaſure never cloys. Where indeed affections are founded upon wrong ſentiments of the

* See two inſtances in Livy upon the defeat at Thraſymen, l. xxii. c. 7. See on this ſubject *Cicero de Fin.* l. v. c. 24.

merit of perſons, or cauſes, they can have no ſtabili- CHAP. 7.
ty, and the ſympathetick joy may be loſt, and ſucceed-
ed by diſguſt and indignation. But the chief cauſe of
inſtability in this branch of happineſs is the uncertain-
ty of the fortunes of thoſe we love; for their miſery
muſt occaſion the moſt ſevere diſtreſs. In this we
wholly depend on providence.

Belief of providence the ſole ſecurity.

All that we can do to ſecure any fund of joys of this kind is to examine well the merit of perſons, and cauſes, and by theſe means to turn our ſtronger affections toward the ſuperior merit of men of true goodneſs and correct imaginations, whoſe happineſs is leſs inconſtant than that of others; to have a firm perſuaſion of the wiſdom and goodneſs of providence, and to cultivate the moſt extenſive affections. The ſtronger our univerſal good-will is, if our joys be ſo much the higher upon the general proſperity, the greater alſo ſhall our regret be upon apprehended general miſery. But what makes this affection ever ſafe in all events, and a fund of ſuperior joy, is a firm perſuaſion of a good Providence governing the univerſe for the beſt, amidſt all the apparent evils and diſorders. Of this more hereafter.

Moral enjoyments are among the higheſt in our nature.

VII. The fourth claſs of enjoyments are the *moral*, ariſing from the conſciouſneſs of good affections and actions. Theſe joys are different from the ſympathetick, which may ariſe from that happineſs of others to which our affections and actions contributed nothing. But our affections and actions themſelves, abſtracting from the ſtate of others, cannot be indiffe-

Book I. rent to us when we attend to them. When we find our whole soul kind and benign, we must have a joyful approbation; and a further and higher joy arises from exerting these affections in wise beneficent offices. These joys we find the highest and most important both in respect of dignity and duration.

In regard of dignity. How much inferior are the highest sensual pleasures, or even those of the imagination, or speculative knowledge, to the stable joy of conscious goodness of heart; and to that high approbation one feels of himself in any important offices for the good of his country, or his friend; and to the joyful thought of meriting well of mankind, and deserving their applauses? The kind affections alone sit easy in the heart; there is an inward complacence in them, and we joyfully entertain them for life.* But our nature is fitted for more than unactive affection. An high happiness arises from the exerting our powers; and the nobler the power is, the more beatifick is its exercise: when the virtuous efforts are successful, there is such an assemblage of pure joys from conscious goodness, sympathy with others, and the expected love and approbation of all, especially the complacency of our Maker, as far surpasses all other enjoyments. If we should fail of success, we may want the sympathetick joy, and may be touched with compassion: but the other sources of joy remain: the moral enjoyments can sweeten these distresses from the misfortunes of the person or cause espoused; which without the consciousness of our hav-

* This is often justly observed by Aristotle and Cicero.

ing acted our part well, muſt have been much more intolerable. CHAP. 7.

Theſe pleaſures are moſt durable.

The fancy here is not inconſiſtent. Our taſte for virtue increaſes by exerciſe; and habits make it ſtill more pleaſant. The remembrance is ever delightful, and makes the enjoyment laſting, where there have been juſt notions of virtue, and of the merit of perſons and cauſes. One end propoſed in the creating different orders of beings, and ordaining the different ſtates of thoſe of the ſame ſpecies, ſome more, ſome leſs perfect, is probably this, that the nobler minds ſhould never want opportunities for the joyful exerciſe of their good diſpoſitions toward the inferior either in perfection or in fortune. Theſe joys too are ſeated above the power of fortune while men retain ſoundneſs of mind. A low ſtation, and a hard condition of life, or external diſadvantages may prevent our doing the moſt important ſervices to others in external things; but can neither hinder the ſound inward affections of heart, nor a courſe of action ſuited to our abilities; and this is the higheſt virtue.

Juſt notions of virtue neceſſary.

Unexamined admirations of ſome partial moral forms, and ſome narrow affections, without true notions of merit in perſons and cauſes, may lead us into ſuch conduct as upon better information may be matter of ſhame and remorſe. But where by cloſe reflection we have attained juſt notions of virtue and merit, and of the effectual means of doing good, virtuous action, as it is the natural purpoſe of a rational and

BOOK I. ſocial ſpecies, ſo it is their higheſt happineſs, and always in their power.

Among theſe moral enjoyments, the joys of religion and devotion toward God well deſerve to be particularly remarked, which in the claſs of moral enjoyments are the higheſt of all. But as theſe enjoyments are of a pretty different nature from the reſt of the moral ones, they ſhall be conſidered apart hereafter, for reaſons above-mentioned; and we ſhall ſhew their high importance to a ſtable and ſublime happineſs above all others.

Pleaſures of honour very intenſe.

IX. The pleaſures of honour from the approbation, eſteem, and gratitude of others as they naturally enſue upon virtue, ſo when they are founded on it, are among the moſt grateful feelings of the ſoul. Theſe joys of honour and virtue and the ſympathetick joys are naturally connected, nor need we minutely compare them; as the ſame conduct is naturally ſubſervient to them all: and where they concur, no words can expreſs the happineſs enjoyed. The ſympathetick feelings may be more intenſe in ſome tender affectionate hearts: active ſpirits in publick ſtations may be more affected with conſcious virtue and merited glory. But where the three are united, with a firm perſuaſion of a good *God* approving our temper, and enſuring the univerſal order and happineſs, our ſtate muſt come neareſt to *that joy unſpeakable and full of glory*, which we hope for as the perfect conſummation of the rational nature.

And of great duration.

True glory is alſo durable, not like the ſenſual enjoyments, which paſs like the ſhadow of a cloud leaving no trace behind them. The approbation and eſteem of others, when founded on virtue, may probably continue during life, and ſurvive us: and the approbation of God ſhall be everlaſting. The purſuits of extenſive fame for eminent abilities and virtues may indeed be ſubject to diſappointment, and be full of labour and liable to exceſs. Ordinary virtues, or even the higheſt virtues in the low ſtations will not obtain the extenſive applauſes of nations. But a wiſe and virtuous man may generally obtain ſuch honour either in a narrower or larger ſphere as may give great joy. And a good heart, perſuaded of a good providence obſerving all things, is ſure of the approbation of the beſt judge, and that to eternity.

The pleaſures of mirth are on the ſide of virtue.

X. Among ſuch ſolemn ſubjects the pleaſures of mirth and gayety muſt be of ſmall account. And yet even children deſpiſe ſenſuality in compariſon of them: and ſenſual enjoyments borrow from them many of their charms, without which they would be deſpicable and ſhameful. They are an agreeable ſeaſoning to other enjoyments, and ſome relief from the fatigues of ſerious buſineſs. The nobler joys are grave, ſevere, and ſolemn. But human life muſt have relaxations. Now whatever value we put upon mirth and gayety it muſt be caſt into the ſide of virtue: ſince that mind is always beſt diſpoſed for the reception of all chearfulneſs and pleaſantry where all is kind and eaſy; free from anger, ill-will, envy, or remorſe. Theſe pleaſures

BOOK I. are always ſocial, and fly ſolitude. They are beſt cheriſhed amidſt love, good-nature, and mutual eſteem.

Wealth and power are more beneficial to the virtuous than to the..

As wealth and power are not immediately pleaſant, but the means of obtaining pleaſures: their importance to happineſs muſt be in proportion to that of the enjoyments to which they are referred by the poſſeſſor. The virtuous man therefore who refers them to generous and virtuous purpoſes, has a much nobler enjoyment of them than thoſe who refer them to the pleaſures of the imagination, or the elegance of life; and yet this is a finer reference than that to ſenſuality. Where through confuſed imaginations they are not directly referred to their natural purpoſes, but purſued for themſelves, avarice and ambition become wretched inſatiable cravings, hateful to all mankind; and the poſſeſſions become joyleſs to the perſon who obtains them.

Ill-natured gratifications mean, and not durable.

XI. As to ſome other pretended enjoyments in gratifying the paſſions of anger, malice, envy, revenge: 'tis certain there is no ſmall ſenſe of joy in theſe gratifications, where the paſſions were intenſe. But then 'tis obvious, that as good-will, love, eſteem, gratitude, and every kind affection are natural and original pleaſures ſitting eaſy in the mind; ſo the happineſs of any innocent perſon obſerved is the occaſion of pure unmixed joy, not ariſing from the allaying any previous pain. If the perſon has been in miſery, and thus has raiſed our compaſſion: his being relieved adds alſo another joy from ſtopping our ſympathetick pain. But the miſery of another is naturally uneaſy to the ob-

ſerver: it muſt then be by ſome accident that it ever becomes grateful: by ſome previous anger, or envy; ſome injury apprehended, or ſome oppoſition to the intereſts of ſome perſon beloved. CHAP. 7.

Such paſſions not uſeleſs in our conſtitution.

Theſe paſſions of the unkind ſort are not uſeleſs parts in our conſtitution. Upon apprehenſion of injury or damage done to us, or to thoſe we love, anger naturally ariſes to rouſe us for defence. When perſons we do not eſteem are preferred to thoſe of higher merit, an honeſt concern and indignation ariſes. A like indignation ariſes againſt all ſuch as appear groſsly immoral. Indulgence may make theſe paſſions ſtrong and habitual. The feelings attending them are original uneaſineſs and torment; to which however it was reaſonable for the general good that we ſhould be in ſome degree ſubjected on certain occaſions, as we are to bodily pain. The ſweeteſt tempers have experienced ſome ſhort fits of them, and have felt how uneaſy theſe moments paſs. Where ſuch paſſions are high and laſting, degenerating into rancour and ſtated malice and envy, the miſery muſt be very great: no wonder then that the removal of it ſhould give at firſt a conſiderable pleaſure. The miſery is removed by the ſufferings of the perſon hated or envied. But this turbulent joy, even while it laſts, is not to be compared with the ſweet ſympathetick joys, the ſenſe of merited love and eſteem, or the ſelf-approbation of forgiving, where no publick intereſt requires puniſhing. And then this ill-natured joy ſoon ceaſes after the paſſion is ſated, as the miſery of the moſt hated object cannot

BOOK I. pleaſe us long; nor is it ever the object of approbation, either in ourſelves or others, upon reflection; nay 'tis generally ſucceeded by remorſe, regret, and ſorrow. The calm mind can have no pleaſure in the miſery of another, tho' it may acquieſce in ſuch ſufferings as a publick intereſt requires. We cannot wiſh to prolong vengeance but upon ſome notion of repeated acts of unrelenting wickedneſs; or from ſome remains of the preceeding fear with which we were tormented. And this ſhews one reaſon why "the brave are not "cruel." The pleaſures then of this ill-natured kind are to the calm joys of humanity, as the ſlaking the burning thirſt of a fever, or the ſating a gnawing diſeaſed ſtomach, to the enjoyment of grateful food with an healthy and vigorous appetite.

Our moral judgments of actions and enjoyments in proportion to their tendency to the general good.

XII. We may obſerve concerning theſe ſeveral enjoyments, that with the moſt benign counſel our minds are ſo conſtituted that we value them upon calm reflection in proportion to their importance to the happineſs of the whole ſyſtem. Theſe which only regard the ſafety and animal gratifications of the individual are felt to be the meaneſt; ſuch as may be of more extenſive uſe, and incite men to be ſerviceable to others, are naturally more eſteemed, and that in different degrees according to their extent. Thus we value more the pleaſures of the ingenious arts, and ſuch exerciſes of body or mind as may naturally be uſeful to many. The partial narrow affections are lovely and joyful; but ſtill the more ſtable and calm and extenſive, as they are more uſeful, are alſo more

joyful both in the exerciſe, and in the remembrance, where there has been any tolerable attention and reflection. We ſee then that the *moral faculty* moſt approves and recommends ſuch diſpoſitions as tend moſt to the general good, and at the ſame time ſuch as may give the nobleſt enjoyments to the agent upon reflection. And thus the two *grand determinations* of our nature, by a thorough conſideration of our conſtitution, may appear perfectly conſiſtent, and be generally gratified by the ſame means. The ſame concluſion will be confirmed by a compariſon of the ſeveral ſorts of pain. CHAP. 7.

XIII. We come next to compare the ſeveral ſorts of uneaſineſs, or pain. And firſt it immediately occurs, that the ſeveral ſorts of pain are not in the exact proportion of the pleaſures of theſe ſenſes. Mere bodily pleaſure is the loweſt and leaſt intenſe, and yet bodily pain may be very violent. But we cannot thence conclude that it may be the greateſt poſſible miſery, as ſome have maintained. In pain, as in pleaſure, the kind is to be regarded as well as the intenſeneſs. The preſervation of the body required this ſtrong connection with the ſoul, and that the ſenſations indicating its ſufferings ſhould be very ſtrong; ſuch as ſometimes wholly to occupy the weaker minds, making them incapable of any attention to other things. But the ſoul finds that it cannot approve the ſacrificing its duty to the avoiding of any bodily pain; and that moral evil is ſtill ſomething worſe. Some kinds of pain have a quality contrary to that dignity

The ſeveral ſorts of pain compared.

Bodily pain not the higheſt.

BOOK I.

we mentioned, which makes them the cauſes of greater miſery than any bodily pain, how intenſe ſoever it may be. This debaſes not the worth of the perſon; nor cauſes ſuch an abject ſtate of miſery, as the conſciouſneſs of the more odious moral evils, which occaſion remorſe, and ſelf-abhorrence. We raſhly conclude otherways from ſeeing perſons of ordinary virtue breaking all tyes of affection, duty, and honour, to avoid tortures; and betraying their friends and country under ſuch temptations.

The cauſes of miſtake in this matter.

But in ſuch caſes the higheſt bodily pain is compared with ſome lower ſympathetick pain, in ſome weaker bonds of affection, or with ſome lower moral ſpecies; whereas the higheſt of both ſorts ſhould be compared to find their importance. One who has no high ſenſe of virtue betrays his friend, or country, in ſome point not conceived abſolutely neceſſary to their ſafety, nor certainly involving them in ruin by the diſcovery of it; whereas his tortures are preſent and unavoidable any other way. The caſes ſhould be put of men of high virtue, where the point to be extorted would be certain unavoidable ruin to their friends, or country. Brave men in ſuch caſes have endured all tortures; and ſuch as cannot, yet feel they have acted wrong, and diſapprove their own choice of incurring moral evil rather than the higheſt pain. There is a fine machinery of nature here; that men of ſmall reflection who may conceive tortures as the greateſt evil, yet ſome way expect it as natural conduct, and highly approve it, that men ſhould ſacrifice what they

take to be their higheſt private intereſt, by ſuffering the greateſt miſery, for a publick good. This confirms what we ſaid above of a calm determination toward a publick good without any reference to the private intereſt of the agent, how ſublime ſoever; and that this determination ſhould controll all others in our nature. CHAP. 7.

In the more common caſes, how often do parents, friends, patriots, endure the higheſt ſufferings to free others from the like? The direct ſenſe of hunger, toils, wounds, and bodily pain, is lighter than the ſympathetick with the like ſufferings of others. And in parental affection there is ſeldom any view to duty, honour, or compenſation. Some crimes are ſo horrid that many ordinary characters would endure tortures rather than commit them; and freely expoſe their lives to avoid the imputation of them.

What caſes are proper and what not.

In the caſes where duty yields to torture; the private evil is preſent, certain and ſenſible: the publick detriment abſent, uncertain, and otherways perhaps avoidable. The moral turpitude is extenuated by the greatneſs of the temptation, and the effort of the *moral faculty* is thus made more languid. Where virtue conquers pain, the pain appears in its full ſtrength; but is over-powered, by the generous affection, or the abhorrence of what is baſe. Put both ſenſations in their full ſtrength without alleviation. Whether would one chuſe to commit the worſt crimes without ſuch extenuating neceſſity, or to be in the condition of one

tortured with the gout or ſtone, as ſeverely as any tyrant could torture him?

Put caſes, as in ſome antient fables; that, upon ſuch falſe information as nothing but a faulty, paſſionate, impetuous, and cruel temper could have entertained, one had tortured to death a perſon unknown, who is afterwards found to have been his tender parent, his dutiful ſon, or his generous friend, or affectionate brother; what bodily pain could equal the remorſe and ſympathetick ſorrow which muſt ariſe? and yet here the guilt is alleviated by ignorance. When men have thrown away their own lives from remorſe, the crimes have generally flowed from ignorance, inadvertence, or ſome furious paſſion; all which are ſome alleviation of guilt. What muſt the torment have been had men knowingly, and unprovoked, committed the like crimes, and ſoon after recovered a ſenſe of virtue? But 'tis hard to find inſtances of ſuch guilt; as our nature is ſcarce capable of it, or if it is, the *moral ſenſe* is irrecoverable.

Take the ſympathetick ſenſe alone. Where is the great difference, in point of miſery, between enduring tortures, and beholding the tortures of a beloved or only child, or of a tender parent; or beholding them ſubjected to ſomething more ignominious? *Would to God I had dyed for thee,* is no feigned wiſh on ſuch occaſions.

In conſidering the ſtate of ſuch as are dear to us, moral evil appears always ſuperior to bodily pain.

Who could wiſh a ſon or friend to be rather ſunk irrecoverably in all vice and baſeneſs of ſoul, but free from pain, and abounding with ſenſual pleaſures; than expoſed to the greateſt tortures in ſome act of heroiſm, with a lively ſenſe of integrity and ſelf-eſteem, and the ſympathetick joys in the proſperity of every intereſt that is dear to him? CHAP. 7.

The natural ſtrength of the human mind in reſiſting pain would appear much greater, were it not for the terrors of death which generally attend the ſeverer kinds of it. Remove this fear, and the ſoul can bear it much eaſier. In ſome diverſions, and in the accidents which attend them, where there is no fear of any thing fatal, men without dejection of mind, nay ſometimes with gayety, can bear very acute pain, and deſpiſe it.*

Bodily pain may be very laſting.

Pain in the extremities of the body may be very laſting. But all bodily pain differs in this from moral feelings, that it leaves no ſenſe of evil when the uneaſy ſenſation ceaſes. The reflection on it is rather pleaſant than uneaſy, when there is no fear of its returning. The ſoul is often bettered by it, as experience gives it more ſtrength and fortitude. Where pain was endured in any honourable cauſe, it always remains matter of joy and glorying.

By the imagination we receive more pleaſure than pain.

XIV. Our higher ſenſes by which we receive the pleaſures of the imagination, admit far leſs pain than pleaſure, if the mind is under good diſcipline. Bodily deformity or diſtortion may be very uneaſy to the per-

* On this ſubject many noble ſentiments are to be found in *Cicero's Tuſculan.* l. ii.

BOOK I. ſon who is ſo unfortunate; and ſo may meanneſs, or the want of the decencies and elegancies of life, to ſuch as have high deſires and notions of happineſs in ſuch things. But there is no uneaſy craving, as in the appetites, previous to theſe imaginations of great good in the objects; and the correcting of theſe imaginations may remove all the pain, eſpecially where nobler enjoyments compenſate the want of theſe pleaſures. And then beauty, harmony, and ingenious works of art, and true imitation of every kind, without any property in the external objects, give pretty high poſitive pleaſures; whereas the deformity of external objects, diſſonance, bad imitations, or rude works of art, give no other pain than that trifling ſort from a diſappointment of expectation in a matter of no neceſſity in life. Knowledge is attended with exquiſite pleaſure; but the want of it only occaſions pain where there is an high deſire and admiration of it, or a fear of ſhame for the want of it. The uneaſineſs even to an inflamed imagination from the want of the grandeur and elegance of life is generally lighter than bodily pain, or the ſympathetick, or the ſenſe of moral turpitude and infamy; and 'tis wiſe and juſt that it ſhould be ſo, as theſe other ſenſes are intended to guard mankind againſt evils more pernicious to the ſyſtem. If men expoſe ſometimes their friends, families, and country, to many evils by immoderate expences on grandeur and elegance; the diſtant miſeries of others are unexpected, or not attended to: there are hopes of new friends, of ſupport, of profitable employments by the

friendſhip of the great, the approaching evils are not apprehended, and the guilt is unobſerved. CHAP. 7.

XV. The ſympathetick, and moral pain of remorſe, and infamy, are the higheſt our nature admits, as their oppoſite joys are the higheſt: they can make life quite intolerable. The miſery of one beloved, while it continues and is attended to, is inceſſant pain to the obſerver. When it ceaſes by death, the painful remembrance long ſurvives in an affectionate heart; till buſineſs diverts the thoughts, or deep reflection ſuggeſts conſolations. The ſure refuge in ſuch caſes is to a good providence, and that future happineſs provided for all worthy objects of kind affections. *The ſympathetick and moral pains the higheſt of all.*

'Tis vain to alledge that all ſympathy carries with it pleaſure ſuperior to the pain. We ſhould not then incline to change the ſtate of the object. 'Tis true we are prone to run to ſpectacles of miſery, and are fond of tragedies: and yet miſery alone obſerved is the cauſe of miſery only. But there is a natural impulſe, implanted for the kindeſt reaſons, forcing us to ſuch ſpectacles of miſery, which generally brings relief to the ſufferers. And we can reſtrain this impulſe where we foreſee that it can do no good. Let none be ſurpriſed at ſuch impulſes where no pleaſure is in view, or any removal of our own pain: do not we obſerve after the death of a dear friend, when we can ſerve him no more, nor enjoy any ſympathetick pleaſures with him, the tormenting thoughts of his dying agonies and groans are for many weeks, and months, and years recurring to our minds. Our many efforts to *Why we are prone to tragical ſights.*

BOOK I. baniſh the painful uſeleſs thoughts are long ineffectual. When theſe efforts are repeated frequently and vigorouſly, they may at laſt baniſh them; but when we intermit our watch they return again and torment us. Can that ſenſation have ſuperior pleaſure which upon reflection we ſhun to retain, and guard againſt as a torment; which in tenderer conſtitutions turns into bodily ſickneſs?

The delights in tragedy.

In tragedy there is a lively imitation of manners, of heroick virtues, ſtruggling againſt fortune; and noble ſentiments and affections are expreſſed. Our ſympathetick feelings indeed of every kind are exerciſed; and compaſſion and terror are gently raiſed upon diſtreſſes which we know are feigned. Can one ſay that terror has ſuperior pleaſure in it; and yet we ſometimes court ſuch ſtories as terrify ourſelves. But when the imitations by ſculpture, painting, and muſick, pleaſe us ſo much that we can bear toil and hunger, in prolonging the entertainment; what wonder is it that ſuch noble imitations of manners delight us, notwithſtanding the gentle uneaſineſs of ſympathy with imaginary ſufferings? what pleaſure is there in an infirmary or lazar-houſe, and in hearing real groans, where there is abundant matter of compaſſion, but without ſuch virtues diſcovered? ſhould one forget that the diſtreſſes in tragedy are feigned, his pain will increaſe; but the lovely virtues and noble ſentiments affect the mind with the higher pleaſure.

Remorſe the greateſt and moſt laſting torment.

Remorſe may be the higheſt torment, and make life and all its enjoyments hateful. 'Tis not like ex-

ternal ſenſations referred to a body, a material ſyſtem, indicating its diſorders, but not abating that inward worth for which a man eſteems himſelf or his friend. We ſeem conſcious that the body is not the *perſon*, the *ſelf* we eſteem; and that its diſorders or decays of any kind do not abate the excellence or worth of a rational active being. Moral evil we feel to be the immediate baſeneſs of this *ſelf*. It makes our inmoſt nature odious and diſtaſteful to ourſelves, and to all who know it. CHAP. 7.

Theſe feelings are not tranſitory; the remembrance is always tormenting. They * are leſs acute while the unſated paſſion continues impetuous: their violence appears when the crime is committed. They gnaw the ſoul a long time, nor ceaſe unleſs habit brings on a ſtupor on this power, and men become abandoned to every thing that is bad. And even here any conſiderable adverſity or danger, which checks a while the vicious paſſions, may revive the *moral principle*, and renew the torment.

XVI. Infamy and reproach when they juſtly befal us, are a great miſery. But when we unjuſtly ſuffer this way, while our own hearts approve our conduct, the ſuffering is much lighter, and we may have many ſtrong ſupports under it. The evil in this latter caſe is leſs durable; as the truth often breaks out beyond expectation. The omniſcient God knows we are in- *Infamy a great miſery.*

* *Quum ſcelus admittunt ſupereſt conſtantia. Quid fas Atque nefas, tandem incipiunt ſentire, peractis Criminibus.* Juv. Sat. 13.

BOOK I. jured, and the wiſer part of men with whom we have to do will ſooner or later diſcern our innocenec, and we are ſure of their compaſſionate regards. Reproach however is generally a greater evil and more afflicting than moſt of the bodily pains, and may be pretty laſting. It over-balances all ſenſual pleaſures with ſuch as are not abandoned: to repel it many would ſacrifice their all, and many have hazarded even life itſelf.

After this impartial enquiry into our ſeveral ſorts of pleaſures and pains, how unnatural muſt that account of the ſupreme good and evil given by the old Cyrenaicks and Epicureans, and by ſome moderns likewiſe, appear, which places the origin of both in the bodily ſenſations, and refers both ultimately to them.

CHAP. VIII.

A Compariſon of the ſeveral TEMPERS *and* CHARACTERS, *in point of* HAPPINESS, *or* MISERY.

THE grounds of ſuſpecting a great oppoſition between one's private intereſt and the indulging of the ſocial affections in all generous offices of virtue, may be pretty well removed by what is already ſaid of the high enjoyments of the ſympathetick and moral kinds. But the unreaſonableneſs of all ſuch ſuſpicions will further appear by conſidering which of the ſeveral ſets of affections conſtituting the various characters of men, are of themſelves the ſweeteſt enjoyment, the moſt eaſy and ſerene ſtate of mind.

CHAP. 8.

As all the ſenſes and affections above-mentioned are parts of our inward fabrick, ſo each of them have their natural uſe either to the animal itſelf, or to the ſyſtem of which it is a part. Moral goodneſs indeed conſiſts principally in the ſocial and kind affections carrying us out beyond ourſelves. But there is a natural ſubſerviency of the private or ſelfiſh affections, while they are kept within certain bounds, not only to the good of the individual, but to that of the ſyſtem; nor is any one compleat in his kind without them. And as the happineſs of a ſyſtem reſults from that of the individuals, 'tis neceſſary to it, that each one have the ſelfiſh affections in that degree which his beſt ſtate requires, conſiſtently with his moſt effectual ſervices to the publick.

All our affections are uſeful in the ſyſtem.

The moſt benign and wiſe conſtitution of a rational ſyſtem is that in which the degree of ſelfiſh affection moſt uſeful to the individual is conſiſtent with the intereſt of the ſyſtem; and where the degree of generous affections moſt uſeful to the ſyſtem is ordinarily conſiſtent with or ſubſervient to the greateſt happineſs of the individual. A mean low ſpecies may indeed be wholly ſubjected to the intereſts of a ſuperior ſpecies, and have affections ſolely calculated for theſe higher intereſts. But in the more noble ſyſtems it would be a blemiſh if in fact there was an eſtabliſhed inconſiſtence between the two grand ends to each rational being, perſonal enjoyment and publick happineſs, and in conſequence, an irreconcilable variance between the affections deſtined for the purſuit of them.

The beſt conſtitution of a ſpecies.

BOOK I. None of our affections can be called abſolutely evil, in every degree; and yet a certain high degree, beyond the proportion of the reſt, even in ſome of our generous affections, may be vicious, or at leaſt a great imperfection, detrimental both to the individual and the ſyſtem. At the ſame time the greateſt ſtrength of any one kind is not of itſelf neceſſarily evil: nay it may be innocent, if the other affections have a ſtrength proportioned to this kind, and to the dignity of their ſeveral natures, and of the purpoſes for which they were implanted. But where the mind is not capacious enough to contain this high degree of other affections, any one of the ſelfiſh, and many of the generous, may be exceſſive. The calm extenſive good-will, the deſire of moral excellence, the love of God, and reſignation to his will, can never exceed: as they exclude not any partial good affection as far as it is uſeful, nor any juſt regard to private good. But the more confined affections even of the generous ſort may exceed their due proportion, and exclude or over-power other affections of a better ſort: as we often ſee in parental love, pity, party-zeal, *&c.* The moral turpitude conſiſts, not in the ſtrength of theſe affections, but in the weakneſs of the more extenſive ones in proportion to their dignity and ſuperior uſe.

No natural affection abſolutely evil.

Vicious in want of proportion.

'Tis ſtill more evident that the ſelfiſh affections may be exceſſive and vicious. But it ought alſo to be obſerved that there may be a degree of them too low and defective with reſpect to the intention of nature. If a creature expoſed to dangers, and yet neither ar-

med by nature or art, were fearleſs, and had no concern for its own ſafety in its ſervices to others; we do not count this temper vicious, but 'tis manifeſtly imperfect, hurtful to the individual, and uſeleſs to the ſyſtem. In the lower orders we diſcern the wiſe oeconomy of nature giving courage to the males along with their ſuperior ſtrength or armour, and denying it to the females, unleſs where the defence of their young requires it. Strong ſocial paſſions, little ſelf-regard, with ardent deſires of honour, in men of very ſmall abilities, would be an exceſs on one hand, or a defect on the other. The ſame generous ardours in men of great abilities, with proportional caution, would be uſeful and well proportioned: ſuch ſocial affections and reliſhes for ſome fine enjoyments of the imagination, as ſit eaſy in ſome characters, and exclude no duties of life, might to others occaſion uſeleſs miſery, and ſtarve all their other parts or faculties. CHAP. 8.

Affections toward ſocial and moral enjoyments are the moſt advantageous;

II. Now as we ſhewed the ſocial and moral enjoyments, with thoſe of honour, to be the higheſt; we ſhall briefly ſhew that the affections purſuing thoſe objects with which theſe enjoyments are connected, when they are all kept in due proportion to their dignity and uſe in the ſyſtem, are the moſt advantageous and eaſy to the individual; and that the ſelfiſh affections when they are too ſtrong and inconſiſtent with the generous, are hurtful to the individual.

they are capable of the greateſt ſtrength.

Our nature is ſuſceptible of ſuch ardour toward moral and ſocial enjoyments as generally to be able to ſurmount all other deſires, and make men deſpiſe all

Book I. bodily pleasure or pain. We see instances not only among the civilized, or where notions of virtue are strengthened by a finer education, but even among rude barbarians and robbers. From a point of honour, from gratitude, from zeal to a clan, or resentment of wrongs done to it, they can joyfully embrace all hardships, and defy death and torments.

Moral disturbance destroys all pleasure.

On the other hand, place one amidst the greatest affluence of sensual enjoyments, but let him feel some social or moral disturbance from some distress of his friend, some danger to his party, or to his character from the imputation of cowardice, or treachery; sensual pleasures become nauseous, and wounds, and death appear little to him. He scorns one who tells him, "that befall his party, his friend, his character, "what will, he may still enjoy his sensual affluence." He finds within himself superior springs of action, which are likewise superior sources of happiness, or misery.

Since then these social and moral enjoyments are the highest; that taste, those affections, and that course of action which tends to procure a constant train of such enjoyments, and secure us from their contraries, must be the natural means of the chief happiness, and preservatives from the deepest misery. Now these highest enjoyments are either these very affections and suitable actions, or the natural concomitants or consequences of them.

Social affections the most joyful.

Have we felt the state of mind under lively affections of love, good-will, bounty, gratitude, congratula-

tion? What when we have acted vigorouſly and ſucceſsfully from ſuch affections; ſerved a friend, relieved the diſtreſſed, turned ſorrows into joy and gratitude, preſerved a country, and made multitudes ſafe and happy? The ſenſe of every man tells him this ſtate is preferable to all others. The vicious themſelves, who ſeem wholly devoted to ſenſuality, yet are not void of ſuch affections and ſentiments. They have their friendſhips, their points of honour, and engagements to parties, how raſh or capricious ſoever. Some delights of this kind, ſome ſocial affections, and imperfect virtues are their higheſt enjoyments: 'tis * the general voice of nature that where theſe pleaſures are excluded there is no happineſs. And as ſenſuality cannot ſufficiently employ or gratify human nature, affections of a contrary ſort, ſullenneſs, moroſeneſs, ſuſpicion, and envy muſt ariſe, which are both immediate miſery, and the fruitful ſources of it, wherever the ſocial affections are ſuppreſſed. CHAP. 8.

Tho' the tendency of the ſocial affections is to prevent miſery, and thus prevent ſympathetick ſorrows; yet when this cannot be effected we muſt neceſſarily feel ſome degree of uneaſineſs of this generous ſort. Here we ſhould have recourſe to ſome higher conſiderations, of the wiſdom and goodneſs of the Divine Providence, of the duty and the moral excellence of an entire reſignation to the ſupreme wiſdom and goodneſs, and of the firm grounds of hope thence ariſing, that ſuch evils as our beſt efforts cannot prevent, are

But require belief and truſt in Providence.

* *Cicero de Amicit.* l. 23. and often elſewhere.

BOOK I. deſtined by our univerſal Parent for the beſt purpoſes. Upon leſs preſumptions than theſe our ſympathetick ſufferings are often alleviated; when we have probable hopes that what at preſent moves our compaſſion is ſubſervient to ſome ſuperior future intereſt of thoſe we love. This truſt and reſignation, with hope, upon a firm perſuaſion of the divine goodneſs, ſhould be maintained by frequent meditation in ſuch ſtrength and vigour as to controll all narrower affections, and ſupport the ſoul under the ſocial diſtreſſes occaſioned by them. Of this hereafter.

Reſtraining the ſocial affections immoral and hurtful.

To root out or abate the ſocial affections, if it would prevent or abate our ſocial ſorrows, muſt alſo deſtroy or abate proportionably all our ſocial and moſt of our moral joys. The abatement of even the narrower affections is rather a detriment to the human character. The moſt natural and perfect ſtate which our minds at preſent ſeem capable of, is that where all the natural affections, deſires and ſenſes are preſerved vigorous, in proportion to the dignity of the object they purſue; ſo that the inferior are ſtill kept under the reſtraint of the ſuperior, and never allowed to defeat the end for which God intended them; or to controll either of the two grand determinations of our ſouls toward the happineſs and perfection of the individual, and that of the ſyſtem.

All the natural affections uneaſy.

III. The ſeveral unkind affections and paſſions, 'tis plain, are originally uneaſy. Nature clearly ſhows that they ſhould not be the ordinary ſtate of the mind. The very degrees of them which are innocent, nay neceſ-

ſary to the ſyſtem, are attended with uneaſy ſenſations, and little approbation can for any length of time accompany them. Such is anger, even in that degree which is neceſſary for defending ourſelves or our friends, and repelling injuries: ſuch is that deliberate reſentment againſt the inſolent and injurious, which aims at no more puniſhment than the ſafety of ſociety requires: ſuch that honeſt indignation againſt men advanced far above their merit. Theſe all are uneaſy affections; and there is little lovely in them. The ſame is true of that ſelfiſh deſire of being ſuperior to others, or the emulation or ſtrong deſire of eminence in ſome valuable qualities. This affection may be innocent, and is an uſeful ſpur to ſome tempers; but 'tis generally uneaſy; and there is no moral beauty which the heart can calmly approve of this fondneſs of ſurpaſſing upon compariſon. CHAP. 8.

Beſide the uneaſineſs which attends theſe paſſions, 'tis plain they naturally tend to make ſuch changes upon their objects, as ſhall put an end to themſelves, and raiſe contrary motions of regret and pity; when the objects are ſo depreſſed that we ceaſe to fear evil from them, or are brought into an hearty repentance for any thing in them vicious or injurious: whereas the kind affections which we conſtantly approve, aim at ſuch ends as remain delightful, and prolong and ſtrengthen the affections. Good-will, and pity, aim at the happineſs of their objects, and this, when obtained, is matter of permanent delight to the agent: and ſuch offices done to worthy objects increaſe our love *And only tranſient emotions.*

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to them. This ſhews that the former ſet of affections are deſtined by nature to be only tranſient occaſional emotions; but the latter to be the ſtable permanent diſpoſitions of ſoul.

Thoſe not abſolutely evil in all degrees.

We have ſtated names for the exceſſes of theſe unkind paſſions, or when they ariſe without juſt or proportional cauſes, and are habitual; to wit, *malice*, *revenge*, *envy*, *ambition* or *pride*. But we have no ſuch ſettled names for the innocent degrees. Hence ſome have too raſhly imagined that ſome of our natural paſſions are abſolutely evil in all degrees.

But theſe unkind paſſions, thus uneaſy even while innocent, were implanted partly for the intereſt of the individual, and partly for that of the ſyſtem. As the external ſenſes by grateful perceptions point out the ſafe ſtate of the body, and the ordinary enjoyments, to the individual; and rouſe him on the other hand by uneaſy ſenſations occaſionally, to ward off what is deſtructive: ſo the *moral faculty* in a like ſubſerviency to the publick, recommends to the agent, and to every obſerver too, by a grateful approbation, all kind affections and actions; and on the other hand by an uneaſy reluctance and remorſe deters the agent from ſuch affections as are pernicious to the ſyſtem; and by the uneaſy impulſes of anger and indignation rouſes every obſerver to oppoſe his deſigns.

Not [illegible] permanent diſpoſitions.

Theſe paſſions of anger, reſentment and indignation even while they are innocent, or uſeful, are uneaſy: and this, as well as the foregoing obſervation, ſhews that they never were deſtined to be the ordi-

nary permanent diſpoſitions of the ſoul: they ſhould only ariſe occaſionally, when ſomething pernicious to the individual or the ſyſtem muſt be repelled. They are a ſort of ungrateful medicines for diſorders, and not the natural food: they were implanted to repell injuries, and ſo far only as they are thus employed can they be deemed innocent. Now as a ſenſe or appetite is depraved in an individual, which loaths its natural food, or craves what is not nouriſhing; as the organs of feeling muſt be diſordered and ſickly when they are pained with the ſalutary air, or neceſſary cloathing; ſurely that temper of mind muſt be as much depraved, where anger ariſes without hurt or injury received; or averſion and hatred, where there is no moral evil in the object; or envy upon the ſucceſs of merit; or ill-will toward any innocent part of a ſyſtem formed for, and preſerved by, a ſocial life, and an intercourſe of good offices. CHAP. 8.

'Tis therefore our intereſt to examine well the merit of perſons and cauſes, and to keep a ſtrict rein over the unkind paſſions, which are uneaſy while innocent; and ſo apt to exceed, that even in their moderate degrees they look ſo like ſomething evil that they are little approved. The calmer affections of the ſoul toward the good either of the individual or the ſyſtem, are more generally effectual than the turbulent paſſions, whatever uſe theſe paſſions may have in minds not enured to reflection. 'Tis deſireable therefore to have our lives committed to theſe ſafer conductors, and to have an habitual caution againſt all violent

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commotions of the unkind ſort, as what are frequently dangerous.

Imperfections incident to our kind affections of two ſorts;

IV. If the ſocial affections are in themſelves and their conſequents the nobleſt enjoyments, 'tis plain the calm and extenſive are the beſt of that kind, when they are in their full vigour, and enjoy their natural authority to direct or reſtrain the ſeveral narrower affections.

Two imperfections are incident to our kind affections; one when they extend only to a part, and yet without any bad diſpoſitions toward any other part; the other is, where in the courſe of the operation of ſtrong kind partial affections towards ſome, unkind and miſchievous affections are apt to be excited towards others.

not of full extent,

In the firſt caſe, Men of ſmaller reflection may never form that moſt diffuſed calm purpoſe or deſire of good to all, which is the higheſt moral excellence; and yet have friendly diſpoſitions as far as their views and ſphere of action extend, without ill-will to any. This temper is very excellent, nor can more be expected from the generality of mankind: nor is more needful; as very few can have power to do the moſt extenſive ſervices. 'Tis no unjuſt partiality, when men generally follow the ſtronger tyes of nature, or bonds of gratitude, or the motions of hearty eſteem toward their worthy friends; provided they neglect no ſuch offices as occur toward others, and can reſtrain theſe narrower affections when oppoſite to any more extenſive intereſt which they diſcover.

The dangerous partiality is when there are ſtrong affections to a few, without any regards to other parts of the ſyſtem equally valuable which are within the compaſs of our knowledge and ſphere of action; or, perhaps, malicious diſpoſitions toward them without natural cauſes, or quite beyond the proportion of them, or any ſubſerviency to a publick intereſt. Theſe ſocial tho' partial affections are often occaſions of pleaſure; but the averſions may create as great uneaſineſs. When the kind affections are thus capriciouſly placed, there is little merit in them; they muſt be inconſtant, and the ſelf-approbation muſt vaniſh upon reflection. The object now admired may preſently be diſliked, and abhorred, by the ſame capriciouſneſs which made it agreeable. In theſe partial affections there is leſs participation of joy; and what merit is in love without a proportioned cauſe? what ſatisfaction in returns of love from favourites injudiciouſly choſen? whereas the univerſal good-will, and even the limited affections upon natural cauſes, which exclude no juſt affection toward others, muſt be full of joy, and give the conſciouſneſs of meriting well from all; as ſuch affections are ſubſervient to the good of all. CHAP. 8. *or unjuſtly partial.*

The unjuſt averſions from an erroneous conſcience and falſe notions of religion and virtue formed by ſuperſtition and wrong education, muſt lead into innumerable inconſiſtences. If men do not baniſh all reflection there muſt be grievous remorſe and inward diſpleaſure: a bigot, a perſecutor, a robber, with a ſort of conſcience of duty to his party or his ſyſtem *Danger of ill-grounded averſions.*

BOOK I. of opinions, oppoſing natural compaſſion and the plaineſt dictates of juſtice, can have but poor narrow ſatisfactions. What are ſervices to a party or cauſe where we have no juſt perſuaſion of its worth, and in oppoſition to the intereſt of many others? What in pleaſing a Demon of whoſe moral perfections we can have no juſt or conſiſtent notion? The ſtruggles muſt be terrible between all the principles of humanity and this falſe conſcience. Reflection muſt ever raiſe torturing ſuſpicions that all is wrong. All ſtable ſatisfaction muſt be loſt; or they muſt baniſh reaſon and inquiry.

Upon a falſe point of honour one kills a friend. Compaſſion and remorſe immediately ſucceed. In perſecution too, or cruelty from any party-zeal, may not the remonſtrances of the ſufferers, the talk of the world, or of the perſecuted party, raiſe inward horrors and remorſe, where they are often boldly denied? What is it to offend multitudes, and to be abhorred by them? How hard is it to juſtify any conduct oppoſite to humanity? What may our condition be in cooler years, when our preſent ambition and party-ſpirit may abate, and we ſhall ſee our conduct to have been full of guilt and cruelty toward the innocent; and offenſive to God and all wiſe men? A good mind will never think it can be too cautious againſt any ſuch ſuperſtitions, or party-prejudices, as may imbitter it againſt any of its fellow creatures.

The ſelfiſh paſſions when too ſtrong are miſerable.

V. We next conſider the temper where any or all the ſelfiſh paſſions are too violent. They are chiefly

theſe, the *love* of *life*, and of *ſenſual pleaſure*, the *deſire* of *intereſt*, or of the means of pleaſure and the conveniencies of life, *deſire* of *power*, of *glory*, and *eaſe*. CHAP. 8.

Of all theſe there is a moderate degree, conſiſtent with ſocial affections in their full ſtrength. But, as we ſhewed above, that the good, the happineſs aimed at by them, is inferior to that ariſing from the ſocial affections; they ought therefore to yield to them and to the purſuits of virtue. When they are beyond their proportion they are called *cowardice* or puſilanimity, *luxury* or voluptuouſneſs, *avarice*, *ambition*, *vanity*, *ſloth*.

Love of life beyond a certain degree is a great unhappineſs. Life in many caſes is not worth retaining; and to preſerve it on certain terms may be too dear a purchaſe. Death doubtleſs in many circumſtances becomes an event earneſtly to be longed for by the perſon himſelf; and others may wiſh for it as a joyful releaſe to their deareſt friends, whilſt they ſtudiouſly decline what others ſee is eligible. The love of life makes ſome act againſt their own intereſt as enemies to themſelves. The dread of death often defeats its own end, betraying to dangers inſtead of repelling them, and taking away that preſence of mind which in the courageous finds out the means of ſafety. *Thus love of life.*

The very paſſion itſelf is miſery; to feel cowardice and to be haunted with perpetual horrors. None live free from danger. The moſt athletick conſtitutions are not ſecured againſt acute diſtempers. The dread of death will poiſon all parts of life and all enjoyments,

Book I. even in the moſt fortunate circumſtances: it will force men on ſome occaſions into the meaneſt conduct, and make the heart ſuch a wretched ſight that we ſhall never endure to look into it; when for life, which is an uncertain enjoyment at beſt, and muſt be parted with at laſt, we have loſt every thing generous and amiable which could make it worth retaining.

High ſenſuality is miſerable.

VI. The paſſions of ſenſuality, as we ſhewed above, purſue the meaneſt enjoyments, and where they engroſs the man they make the moſt deſpicable character. There is nothing in the enjoyments which we can like upon reflection. Nay it requires a long habit to reſtrain a natural ſenſe of ſhame when we are keenly ſet upon ſuch gratifications. Moral ideas muſt be joined in our imaginations to make the indulgence appear reputable, and to avoid the uneaſy checks of that * *natural modeſty* which is deſigned to reſtrain theſe mean deſires.

Where paſſions of this ſort are immoderate, the effects are moſt pernicious. They impair the health of body and mind; and exclude all manly improvement: the waſte of time, the effeminacy, and ſloth, and a thouſand diſorderly paſſions, break the natural ſtrength of the ſoul, and the reins of ſelf-government. The detriment to ſociety from the extravagancies of the amorous kind; the bitter miſeries occaſioned in the deareſt relations of life; the diſtreſs and infamy this

* *Humilium appetituum moderator pudor*, is the pretty expreſſion of Cicero. The word is indeed often taken more extenſively for our *moral ſenſe*; and αἰδὼς is uſed in the ſame extent by the Greeks.

treacherous love expoſes its object to, muſt be obvi- CHAP. 8.
ous to the ſlighteſt attention; and muſt give the moſt
bitter remorſe, where any ſenſe of virtue or humanity
remains; not to mention the waſte this paſſion makes
in the honeſty, ingenuity, and modeſty of our nature.
Muſt it not then be contrary to our intereſt to have
ſuch paſſions violent?

Avarice a wretched paſſion.

VII. As wealth may be uſeful in gratifying any of our deſires, may promote the good of the individual, or be a fund for offices of humanity, 'tis no wonder that it is very generally purſued by ſuch as extend their views beyond the preſent moment. A moderate deſire of it is innocent, and wiſe, and ſubſervient to the beſt purpoſes: and the poſſeſſion is moſt joyful to ſuch as refer it to the purpoſes of humanity and virtue. But when the deſire is violent, and referred only to ſelfiſh purpoſes; or, by ſome confuſed notions of dignity and power, terminating almoſt only upon mere increaſe of poſſeſſions; the temper is as wretched as it is unreaſonable, more oppreſſive to the heart where it reſides than it can be to its neighbours. The natural deſires are eaſily ſatisfied. Frugality and temperance with ſmall expence may equal in pleaſure the higheſt luxury. The thirſt for wealth without reference to pleaſure or offices of liberality, is an eager, inſatiable, reſtleſs, joyleſs craving. Such as entertain high proſpects of dignity and happineſs ſecured to their poſterity by their acquiſitions, frequently by their example and inſtruction root out as far as they can every joyful and honourable diſpoſition out of their minds; and when

BOOK I. the ungainly leſſon has not its effect, the deformed example preſented to their poſterity tempts them into the oppoſite extreme: and the hope of lazy opulence and luxury quenches all ardour for improvement in the honourable arts of life, and encourages every diſſolute inclination.

Ambition is miſerable. The ſame things may be ſaid of the deſires of power and of glory. A moderate degree is innocent and uſeful; but when they grow too violent they are reſtleſs and uneaſy to the individual, and often pernicious to ſociety, and generally break through the moſt ſacred tyes of duty and humanity, and ruin every good diſpoſition of heart. To deſire reputation for integrity and moral worth is natural to every good temper; and it excites men to be what they deſire to be reputed, which is the ſhorteſt way to true glory. Nay the deſire of eminence in valuable abilities, while it is moderate, is uſeful in our conſtitution and innocent. But it may grow ſo violent as to be a perpetual torment, and the ſource of the vileſt and moſt wretched paſſions. All ſuperior merit will then raiſe envy, and ill-will, and an humour of detraction. The mind will grow reſtleſs, violent, jealous, captious, eaſily provoked, incapable of bearing the leaſt neglect, uneaſy to all, and diſliked by all. No paſſion can more defeat its end than vanity; as nothing is more odious and contemptible than arrogance, nothing more lovely than its oppoſite, modeſty and humility.

Sloth and indolence miſerable. VIII. The moſt oppoſite temper to ambition is the love of eaſe. This too while moderate is innocent and

uſeful, as the deſire of ſleep when one is weary. But when it turns to habitual ſloth, not yielding to the ſocial affections, and declining all laborious offices, it muſt deſtroy all true worth, all ſocial enjoyment, ſenſe of merit, and hopes of eſteem. The languid ſickly ſtate of a body uncapable of exerciſe appears in the complexion and weak appetites; a worſe diſorder ſeizes the mind that wants its natural exerciſe in the ſocial offices of life. It muſt have tedious hours, be ſuſpicious of contempt, jealous, and impotent in every paſſion. The effects upon intereſt are obvious. The indolent are expoſed to all inconvenience and perplexity in their buſineſs; wanting to themſelves in every thing, and deprived of the aid of others, as they have merited none from them, and diſcourage all aſſiſtance by their own inactivity.

Thus the exceſſes of the ſelfiſh paſſions are certain miſery. They make up the character called *ſelfiſh*, which is deſpicable and deprived of all the nobler joys of life. The temper as it is ſhameful runs into ſubtilty of conduct, and a feigned behaviour; loſes its natural ingenuity and candour, and contracts diſtruſt, ſuſpicion and envy. An intereſt ſeparate from our fellows is more and more formed every day, and the ſocial motions ſuppreſſed. At laſt the temper becomes compleatly wretched and hateful.

Monſtrous paſſions whence ariſing.

IX. Some extraordinary and rare inſtances of moſt immoderate exceſſes of theſe ſelfiſh paſſions are in common ſpeech properly enough termed monſtrous and unnatural, but ſeem to have theſe epithets given

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them by ſome authors, as if they were of a diſtinct kind; ſuch as when men ſeem to delight in torments, or to have an unprovoked deſire of inſulting, or petulancy, unnatural luſts, enormous pride, tyranny and miſanthropy. Theſe are only exceſſes of ſome paſſions naturally implanted, but raiſed to a prodigious degree without a juſt cauſe, upon ſome falſe opinions or confuſed imaginations, and by long indulgence and frequent irritation. Every one ſees this to be the caſe in monſtrous luſts, where the natural paſſion is grown ungovernable; and caprice and curioſity oft make men try all kinds of indulgences.

Tyranny.

In the ſame manner, when the temper from natural conſtitution and other cauſes happens to be ſavage and moroſe, and where the mind has been long irritated and galled by oppoſition or ſome apprehended injuries, and no thorough reflection intervenes to ſtop the growth of the paſſion, ſurprizing rancour and cruelty may appear. One may eaſily ſuggeſt to himſelf, how long continued ſelf-flattery and ambition, without any check from reflection, and the frequent anger ariſing from the oppoſitions which ambitious ſpirits generally meet with; and the conſtant cauſes of ſuſpicion which their own conduct muſt afford, may make that horrid temper of jealouſy, rage, cruelty, and oppreſſion of every thing free and virtuous, which reigns in tyrants.

Petulancy and inſolence.

Conſider the affectation of liberty, the anger at thoſe reſtraints which the diſſolute meet with from the laws of civilized ſocieties, the abhorrence they ex-

pect from their ſoberer fellow-citizens, and the oſten- CHAP. 8.
tation of fortitude; and they will account for that ſur-
prizing petulancy we meet with in ſome characters.

Savage cruelty.

Civilized nations of great humanity, from falſe conceptions of the ſpirit and tempers of the reſt of mankind, and from ſome abſurd notions of dignity and pre-eminence in themſelves, have thought them fit only to be ſlaves: ſome have found ſuch entertainment from the ſurprizing efforts of art and courage, that inſenſible to the miſery which was every moment obvious to their ſight, they accounted it a ſpectacle of high delight, to behold gladiators putting each other to death. We all know the notions entertained by the vulgar concerning all hereticks; we know the pride of ſchoolmen and many eccleſiaſticks; how it galls their inſolent vanity that any man ſhould aſſume to himſelf to be wiſer than they in tenets of religion by differing from them. When this inſolent pride is long indulged by the enjoyment of power and popular veneration, it grows prodigious; and, it may explain how ſuch men, and their implicite votaries, can behold with joy the moſt horrid tortures of men truly innocent, but dreſſed up in all the forms of impiety, and wickedneſs. 'Tis needleſs to explain the original of other monſtrous diſpoſitions.

As we ſhewed already the miſery which attends the ſmaller exceſſes of theſe ſelfiſh and ill-natured paſſions; 'tis plain the more monſtrous exceſſes muſt be ſtill greater miſery.

We have hitherto conſidered what affections of

BOOK I. mind and what temper toward the enjoyments of this world, or toward our fellow-creatures, are the natural fources of the higheſt enjoyment. There remains another object of affection to every rational mind to be fully conſidered, and which, from what already hath often occurred in our former inquiry, muſt be of the greateſt importance to our happineſs, viz. the *Deity*, the *Mind* which preſides in the univerſe: and then we ſhall have in view the fources of all the enjoyments our nature is capable of. Our *moral faculty* too finds here its ſupreme object; as it naturally determines the mind to eſteem and reverence all moral excellence, and perceives a duty and moral excellence in ſuch veneration, and in the affections which enſue upon it.

CHAP. IX.

The DUTIES *toward* GOD; *and firſt, of juſt Sentiments concerning his* NATURE.

OUR inquiries on this ſubject are reduced to two heads; firſt, What are the ſentiments concerning the *Divine Nature?* And then, what are the affections and worſhip ſuited to theſe ſentiments, and what enjoyment or happineſs they afford to the human mind?

Juſt ſentiments, and firſt that there is a Deity.

Previous to our forming juſt ſentiments concerning the Deity there muſt be a perſuaſion of his exiſtence. The world has ever agreed that there muſt

be ſome ſuperior *Mind*, or *Minds*, endued with knowledge and great power, preſiding over human affairs. Tradition no doubt from race to race has contributed ſomething to diffuſe this perſuaſion. The experience of evil from unknown cauſes, the fear of them, and the deſire of ſome further aids againſt them when all viſible powers have failed, may have excited ſome to this enquiry: the natural enthuſiaſm and admiration ariſing when we behold the great and beautiful works of nature has raiſed the curioſity of others to inquire into the cauſe: and this probably has been the moſt general motive: but the certainty of any tenet depends not on the motives of inquiry into it, but on the validity of the proofs; and its dignity depends upon its importance to happineſs. Vanity or avarice may have excited ſome to the ſtudy of Geometry; no man on this account will deſpiſe the ſcience, or count it leſs certain or uſeful in life. We ſhall only point out briefly the heads of argument on this ſubject. The whole of natural knowledge or natural hiſtory, is a collection of evidence on this affair. CHAP. 9.

II. Whitherſoever we turn our eyes or our thoughts, there occur as great evidences of deſign, intention, art, and power, as our imagination can conceive. The moſt ſtupendous orbs, the greateſt maſſes, moving in conſtant order, with great rapidity: forces and powers exerted every where, in worlds as large as this habitation of men: an univerſe large beyond imagination and all our powers of obſervation. But as far as we can make obſervations, manifeſt footſteps of *Proofs from the ſtructure of the world.*

BOOK I. contrivance and regular design appear in the most exquisite fitness of parts for their several uses, and in mutual connexions and dependances of things very distant in place. The earth, were it alone, would be a stupid mass, inactive and useless; but it is enlivened by the sun: and 'tis impregnated with innumerable seeds, which by warmth and moisture, and the other nutritive principles in the earth and air, extend and unfold their wondrous beautiful parts, and break forth in innumerable regular forms of different orders, from the lowest moss, to the stately oak: and these generally fitted for the nourishment or other conveniences of superior orders of beings, endued with powers of motion, of sense, of reason.

From the structures of animal bodies;

The animal bodies again display new wonders of art, in their innumerable kinds, by the curious structures of their numerous parts, bones, muscles, membranes, nerves, veins, arteries. This wondrous structure appearing, not in a few instances, but in every one of the innumerable individuals of each species; similar to each other in their structures, and endued with the several powers and instincts of the kind, for their preservation and the continuance of the species. What nice organs to distinguish, receive, grind, swallow, and digest their food; and to diffuse the nourishment to all their parts! what a variety and nice structure of organs for spontaneous motions, subservient to their pleasure, support, or defence!

And their propagation.

As all plants produce their curious seeds, many of them with proper mechanism to be dispersed by the

winds into their proper places: ſo animals are endued with inſtincts for the ſame purpoſe, a new form ariſes of the ſame kind with the parent-animal; and, where 'tis neceſſary, a ſalutary juice is prepared in the breaſts or teats of the parent for its nouriſhment: the young has an inſtinct to apply to the proper ſource of its ſupport, and nouriſhment: and the parent by a like inſtinct is prone to ſupply it. A fond care continues in the parent while the young needs protection, and the parent can be of uſe to it; and ceaſes when it is of no further uſe. And, that nothing may appear ſuperfluous or ill deſigned, where the young of certain kinds needs no ſuch food or protection from the parent, no ſuch juices are prepared, no ſuch inſtinct is implanted; as is the caſe with ſome kinds of *fiſh*, and *inſects*. CHAP. 9.

III. The earth and all its beauties depend on the ſun. 'Tis placed at the moſt convenient diſtance: a conſiderably nearer, or more diſtant ſituation, would make it a leſs convenient habitation. The eyes of animals are fitted to the degree of light, and to their proper occupations, with the moſt admirable art; ſtronger light would be painful and pernicious, and fainter would be inconvenient. Their lungs, their ears, their blood, are ſuited to the ſurrounding air, its weight, and ordinary motions. This yielding, preſſing, ſalutary fluid, is the means of life, of breathing, of circulation of blood, of voice to communicate deſires and ſentiments, and of gratifying their taſte for harmony. *Connexion of the ſun and atmoſphere with the earth and animal bodies.*

Land animals continually need freſh water. Such

BOOK I. is the extent of the ocean, itſelf alſo full of inhabitants ſuited to that element, ſuch the heat of the ſun, that vaſt quantities of vapours diſencumbered of their ſalts are daily raiſed, and float in the air, till grown too denſe they deſcend in fructifying ſhowers; or, meeting with hills or mountains in their motion, are condenſed and ſupply fountains and rivers, which after carrying water to great tracts of land, are again diſcharged into the ocean. Thus all is full of power, activity and regular motion, wiſely and exquiſitely adapted to the uſes of the living and ſenſible parts of the creation.

No art of men or other viſible agents the cauſe of theſe things.

IV. The ſeveral claſſes of plants, and animals, owe nothing of this wondrous ſtructure to any wiſdom of their own or their parents; no art of theirs contrived the material frame, or the inward fabrick of their powers and inſtincts, or the conveniencies of their habitation. This immenſe power and wiſdom muſt reſide ſomewhere elſe; in ſome other being. Were the world ſuppoſed eternal, the argument is the ſame. The effects, the evidences of wiſdom, were upon that ſuppoſition in all times. In all times therefore wiſdom and power ſuperior to human exiſted in ſome other being. If this admirable frame had a beginning, the evidence is more manifeſt.

Two ſorts of actions, with, or without deſign.

Men have ſome power, and make ſome changes: we can exert our force in making them two ways; one in which we have no intention of any particular form or effect; as when we throw careleſly any materials out of our hands; another, when we deſign ſome end, intend

ſome form, and direct motions for that purpoſe. By the former manner of action ſcarce ever ariſes any thing regular, uniform, or wiſely adapted to any purpoſe: by the other it is that we produce things regular and well adapted. Now the forms of nature in general, the changes and ſucceſſive appearances in the new plants and animals, are manifeſtly of this later ſort, regular, uniform, curiouſly adapted, and ſimilar; and hence we juſtly conclude an original deſigning wiſdom and power. CHAP. 9. *All nature ſhews deſign.*

Had we any evidence that the power or art which modified theſe materials reſided in themſelves, we ſhould not perhaps recur to a prior cauſe. But whence that correſpondence, connexion, and ſimilarity? whence the mutual dependences of the ſeveral ſpecies, and of their individuals, on each other, and of all of them upon the earth, the atmoſphere, and the ſun? whence this adapted habitation? There muſt have preceded a concert among the ſeveral intelligences of the parts, or there muſt have been one preſiding Intelligence. We have no evidence for ſuch wiſdom in the parts themſelves as could have contrived their conſtitutions: and therefore muſt conclude that there is a ſuperior *all-ruling Mind.*

This *Mind* muſt itſelf be *firſt* and *original* in nature; nor is there any room for the queſtion, from what cauſe did it proceed? The order of nature ſhews that wiſdom and power have always exiſted ſomewhere; unleſs at ſome period exiſtence could commence without a prior cauſe; or a being void of all power, thought, *This not reſident in the material world.*

BOOK I. and wisdom, could at a certain period, without the aid of any powerful or wise being, start into power or wisdom; or a being void of all power or wisdom could convey these perfections to others; all which suppositions are absurd. Since then there is evidence for original intelligence and power, as high as we could have upon a supposition that it existed, where shall we conclude it resides? Whether in this vast material system is there one intelligence or counsel enlivening and moving the whole, and modifying some parts of itself into particular intelligences for certain ends, and still governing them from certain affections toward them, and toward the whole; which was the notion of some Stoicks, who zealously taught many duties of piety and humanity? or does it reside in a spirit, a being simple and uncompounded, distinct from all divisible, changeable, or moveable substance; which was the notion of the Platonists? The grand duties of piety, the foundations of our hopes, and the motives to virtue, subsist on either scheme; but that of the Stoicks is loaded with unsurmountable objections of a metaphysical kind.

The moral dispositions of the original Mind.

V. When the existence of original boundless art and power is ascertained, the next point is the moral character, or the dispositions of will toward other beings capable of happiness or misery; which must be the foundation of all piety, and all joy in religion.

That it is benevolent, as this imports pure perfection.

Here first, if we can any way reason concerning the *original Nature* from what we feel in our own, or from any of our notions of excellency or perfection, we

must conceive in a *Deity* some *perceptive power* analogous to our *moral sense*, by which he may have self-approbation in certain affections and actions rather than the contrary. Such a *power* must bring a large addition of happiness, and that of the noblest sort, along with it; and, in an omnipotent Mind, cannot be inconsistent with any other perfection or source of enjoyment. The ultimate determinations or affections of the *Divine Being*, which can be approved by himself, must either be *that* toward his own happiness; or a desire of the greatest universal happiness; or a desire of universal misery. The desire of his own happiness cannot be the sole ultimate desire or determination; because the desire of the happiness of other beings distinct from himself would be another source of sublime pure happiness, distinct from the former, but perfectly consistent with it, in a mind which always has it in its power to gratify this desire to the utmost, without obstructing any other source of happiness. The approbation and delight in this kind determination must be quite excluded from the *Divine Mind*, if there is no such original determination in it. And 'tis inconceivable that the *original Mind* can want any source of pure enjoyment or happiness, consistent with every other sort of excellence, while yet in other beings formed by the counsels of that which is original we experience such sources of happiness. CHAP. 9.

No ultimate desire of the misery of others.

The ultimate desire of universal misery cannot be supposed the determination approved in the Divine Mind, nor can any such affection be conceived as ori-

BOOK I. ginal and essential; since there can be no original sense or power of perception corresponding to it in the *Divine Mind*. The *Deity* must have powers perceptive of happiness immediately. But in *that* which is *original* and *omnipotent* there can be no sense of misery, nor any idea of it, but what is suggested by his knowledge of the perceptive powers he has granted to his limited creatures, and the laws of sensation to which he has subjected them. *That* cannot be supposed the object of an original desire, the idea of which is not perceived by some original faculty of perception immediately suggesting it.

Besides, all malevolent dispositions of will, as they seem to carry along with them some uneasiness and misery to the mind where they reside, so they naturally tend to destroy their objects, and thus to destroy themselves. A resolute malice must ever be uneasy while its object subsists; and can only find rest by an entire removal of it, upon which the affection also ceases. Anger tends to inflict such misery on its object as must at last produce entire repentance, and thus remove the moral evil or turpitude which raised the wrathful indignation; or to bring the object so low that all opposition of interest must cease, and, along with it, the passion raised by it. Envy has the same tendency, and when its purpose is accomplished must in like manner cease. Whereas all the benevolent dispositions are in their own nature everlasting, producing happiness, and delighted with its continuance. Pity tends to remove the misery of its object; and thus

its own attendant pain is removed; but the love and good-will remain unabated by this change. 'Tis evident therefore that malevolent diſpoſitions cannot be conceived as *original* in that *Mind* which is omnipotent, the ſource of all, and the ſovereign diſpoſer of all: but original good-will, and propenſity to communicate happineſs muſt be its eſſential permanent immutable diſpoſition. CHAP. 9.

To ſuppoſe a determination toward the univerſal miſery of others to be *original* in the Divine *Mind* is alſo entirely inconſiſtent with the conſtitution of all his rational creatures, in whom no ſuch determination is found; and with that great degree of happineſs we experience in life. *Omnipotence* ſure would have effectually gratified its deſires, by the higheſt univerſal miſery.

We find in ourſelves that all the ill-will we are capable of ariſes from our weakneſs, when we apprehend ſome damage or injury received, or dread it for the future; or find ſome oppoſition to our intereſt, or to the intereſts of thoſe we wiſh well to: in that which is *original*, *omnipotent*, and the *cauſe* of all exiſtence, there can neither be weakneſs, nor indigence, nor an oppoſition of its intereſts to thoſe of its workmanſhip. If theſe more abſtract reaſonings do not ſatisfy, let us conſider others more obvious from the effects of the Divine counſel and power.

VI. In judging of the deſign of any mechaniſm, where we tolerably underſtand it, we can always diſcern the *natural intention*, the *proper end* or *effect* of the *Proofs of goodneſs from the effects of Divine Power.*

BOOK I. contrivance; and diſtinguiſh it from events which may caſually enſue, or be the neceſſary attendants or conſequents of it, tho' they are no part of the end aimed at by the contriver. The fineſt ſtatue may hurt one, by falling on him: the moſt regular and convenient houſe, muſt obſtruct the inhabitant's proſpect of the heavens and the earth, more than a field does; and muſt put him to ſome trouble and expence in ſupporting it. By the moſt benign and wiſely contrived courſe of the ſun ſome ſevere weather muſt happen in ſome places. Some evils may be ſo eſſentially connected with the means of the ſupreme good, that *Omnipotence* cannot make it attainable to ſome beings, without them. Such evils therefore muſt exiſt in a world contrived by perfect Goodneſs. The goodneſs therefore of the author of a ſyſtem, in which ſome evils appear, may be ſufficiently proved, if the natural deſign of the ſtructure appears to be good and benign, and the evils only ſuch as muſt enſue upon laws well calculated for ſuperior good. This reaſoning will be exceedingly confirmed if we find a great ſuperiority of pleaſure, of happineſs, actually enjoyed by means of the conſtitution and laws eſtabliſhed in nature. Creatures who have no immediate intuition of the Creator, nor a compleat knowledge of the whole plan and all its parts, can expect no better evidence; nor ſhould they deſire it.

If the deſign appears good and the effect a ſuperiority of happineſs.

The whole contrivance good.

Now all the curious mechaniſm obſerved, has conſervation of life, pleaſure, happineſs, in ſome ſpecies or other, for its natural end. The external ſenſes of

animals recommend things ſalutary, and reject what is deſtructive: and the finer powers of perception in like manner recommend to every one what is beneficial to the ſyſtem, as well as to the individual; and naturally raiſe averſion to what is pernicious. The whole inward conſtitution of the affections and *moral faculty* above explained, is obviouſly contrived for the univerſal good, and therefore we only hint at it in this place. Some kinds of animals are plainly ſubordinated to ſome others, and the powers and inſtincts of the ſuperior ſpecies may be deſtructive to the inferior; but they are the means of good to the ſpecies in which they reſide. The effects of them on the inferior is indeed the depriving ſome of them ſooner of their exiſtence; but not in a worſe manner than they muſt have loſt it however in a natural death: nay the ſuddenneſs of the violent death, to a creature of no fore-thought, makes it preferable to the tedious ſort we call natural. And many of ſuch low kinds muſt have periſhed as early by want of ſuſtenance, had not nature provided other cauſes more gentle than famine. An *original malicious being* would have exerciſed its art in proper engines of torture, in parts formed for no other purpoſes, in appetites and ſenſes leading ordinarily to what would be uſeleſs or pernicious, even in a moderate degree; in impatient ardours for what gave no pleaſure or uſe; in excreſcences uſeleſs for life or action, but burdenſome and tormenting; and in affections pernicious to ſociety, approved by a perverſe taſte.

BOOK I.

Observe all nature as far as our knowledge extends; we find the contrivance good. The objections of the *Epicureans*, and of some *moderns*, arose from their ignorance. The alledged blemishes are now known to be either the unavoidable attendants or consequents of a structure and of laws subservient to advantages which quite over-ballance these inconveniences; or sometimes the direct and natural means of obtaining these advantages. The vast ocean, often reputed barren, we find is a necessary reservoir of water for the use of all land animals; itself also peopled with its own tribes, and richly furnished for their subsistence, from which too men derive a great support. The mountains are partly useful for pasture, for fruits, and grain; and partly for procuring rain, fountains, rivers. Storms arise from such causes as are most necessary for life, the exhalation of vapours by the sun, and their motion in the air. The care, attention, and labour, incumbent on men for their support, invigorate both the soul and the body: without them the earth becomes a barren forrest, but by them becomes a joyful copious habitation: and they are the natural causes of health and sagacity. 'Tis every way our advantage that we have no such slothful paradise as the poets feigned in the golden age.*

Contrary appearances are from ignorance.

VI. But tho' it be granted that the contrivance naturally tends to good, yet if God be omnipotent, say

Why an omnipotent God permits any evil.

* Compare the censures of Lucretius on the structure of the earth lib. v. from line 195 to 236, with our present discoveries in Natural Philosophy upon these subjects. His brother-poet Virgil, beautifully defends Providence upon the laborious condition of mankind, 1 Georg. line 120 to 145.

ſome authors, " why are we made of ſuch poor ma- CHAP. 9.
" terials, that we are often oppreſſed with pain during
" life; often tormented by our own paſſions, and by
" the injuries of others? Our frame too at laſt de-
" cays, and we yield our places with great pain to our
" ſucceſſors of the ſame ſpecies. Why are we of ſuch
" frail materials? why this ſucceſſion of generations?
" why are our minds ſo imperfect either as to know-
" ledge or virtue? might we not have had too greater
" ſtrength of underſtanding, and a better proportion
" among our affections?"

Different orders neceſſary in the beſt ſyſtem.

In anſwer to theſe arduous queſtions let us conſi-
der, what is highly probable, that the beſt poſſible
conſtitution of an immenſe ſyſtem of perceptive be-
ings may neceſſarily require a diverſity of orders, ſome
higher in perfection and happineſs, and ſome lower.
There may be abundant enjoyments to ſome orders
of beings without ſocial action. But this we are ſure
of from experience, that there are orders of beings
pretty high in the ſcale, whoſe ſupreme enjoyments
conſiſt in kind affections, and in exerting their powers
in good offices from theſe affections. Nay 'tis impoſ-
ſible for us to conceive an higher ſort of enjoyment.
The conſciouſneſs of good-will to others tho' inactive,
is highly delightful; but there is ſtill a ſuperior joy in
exerting this diſpoſition in beneficent actions. What
if this be the ſupreme enjoyment in nature, as our
minds ſeem to feel it is? This muſt be excluded out
of nature in a great meaſure, unleſs there be imperfec-
tion, indigence, pain, and even moral evil in nature.

BOOK I. There may be a ſocial congratulation and eſteem among well-diſpoſed happy beings, in a ſtate of inactive joy, without any difficulties. But there can be no place for action where there is no evil.

Experience of evil gives an higher ſenſe of good, and exerciſes virtue.

Not to mention, what is obvious among men, that our ſenſe of many high enjoyments, both natural and moral, is exceedingly heightened by our having obſerved or experienced many of the contrary evils. The whole life of virtue among men, which we ſhewed to be the chief enjoyment, is a combat with evils natural or moral. No place can be for liberality where there is no indigence; or for fortitude where there is no danger; or for temperance where there are not lower appetites and paſſions; or for mercy and forgiveneſs, or friendly admonitions and counſels, and long-ſuffering, and requital of evil with good, where a ſpecies is incapable of moral evil. Such lovely offices, the remembrance of which muſt be eternally delightful, muſt be excluded; or ſome moral evils muſt exiſt. Nay what patience, reſignation, and truſt in God can be exerciſed in a ſyſtem where miſery cannot exiſt? If then the higheſt enjoyments we can conceive are fit to be introduced into the univerſe, ſome evils muſt come along with them. Nay what ſhall we conceive the life of the higheſt orders, if there were none inferior to them; no good to be done, no kind offices, no evils to be warded off, or good formerly wanting to be communicated? Can we conceive any thing more bleſſed, or delightful to the *Deity*, than communicating of good to indigent creatures in different orders? And

muſt not the higheſt goodneſs move him to furniſh to the ſeveral higher orders opportunities for ſuch divine exerciſes and enjoyments, by creating alſo orders inferior to them, and granting different degrees of abilities and perfection to the ſeveral individuals of the ſame ſpecies, that thus they may exerciſe their good affections in beneficent offices?

Perfect goodneſs muſt make all orders in which good is ſuperior.

If thus the moſt perfect goodneſs would determine the Author of Nature to create different orders of beings, and ſome of them ſubject to many evils and imperfections; the ſame goodneſs muſt require that this plan of creation be continued down to the loweſt ſpecies in which a ſuperiority of good to the evils in its lot can be preſerved, while the creation of ſuch inferior ſpecies obſtructs not the exiſtence of as many of the ſuperior, as the moſt perfect univerſe can admit. The lot therefore of great imperfection muſt fall ſomewhere: mankind can no more juſtly complain that they were not in an higher order, than the brutes that they were not made men.

This confirmed by experience.

Don't we ſee this confirmed in experience? We have no ground to believe that this earth could nouriſh an higher order than mankind. A globe of this kind may be neceſſary in the ſyſtem: it muſt have ſuch inhabitants or be deſolate. Beſides all the men it could maintain, there yet is room for other lower orders ſubordinate and ſubſervient to their ſubſiſtence. We find all places peopled with ſuch orders of life and ſenſe as they can ſupport; the inferior occupying what is not fit for the ſuperior, or what is neglected by them. In

BOOK I. like manner, let us aſcend to higher orders: there may be as many ſuch as the beſt ſyſtem of the univerſe admits; and yet in this great *houſe of our father there are many manſions* unfit for the higher orders, but too good to be deſolate; and they are occupied by men, and lower animals. This was their place, or they muſt not have exiſted in the ſyſtem. This earth perhaps could not furniſh bodies uncapable of decay, and as this decay comes on, we loſe our keen appetites and ſenſes of the goods of life. The ſcene cloys; we quit it, and give place to new ſpectators, whoſe livelier ſenſes and appetites and more vigorous powers make it a greater bleſſing to them.

Strict laws of ſenſation neceſſary.

VII. But men will make further complaints. "Why "theſe harſh laws of ſenſation, ſubjecting us to ſuch "acute pains, to ſuch ſympathetick ſorrows, and re"morſe? why ſuch furious paſſions?" and cannot an "*omnipreſent infinite Power* interpoſe, beyond the "common courſe of nature, in behalf of the inno"cent, the virtuous? no variety of buſineſs can fatigue "or diſtract the *Deity*."

But in reply to all this: 'Tis abſolutely neceſſary for the preſervation of life that deſtructive impreſſions from without, and indiſpoſitions from within, ſhould occaſion pain to animals. Were it not ſo, how few would in any keen purſuits guard againſt precipices, wounds, burning, bruiſes, or hurtful abſtinence from food. How could we be apprized of diſorders, or guard againſt what might increaſe them? This law is abſolutely neceſſary to men of maturity and know-

ledge; and how much more ſo to the young and imprudent? Nor can we complain of the law as conſtituting too acute ſenſations, ſince they do not univerſally obtain their end. The experience of the gout, and ſtone, and fevers, and racking ſores, does not reſtrain all men from the vices which expoſed them to theſe torments.* CHAP. 9.

Can we more juſtly repine at other laws ſubjecting us to compaſſion and remorſe? are they not the kind admonitions and exhortations of the *Univerſal Parent*, delivered with ſome auſterity, to reſtrain us from what may hurt us or our brethren, and excite us to aſſiſt them; or natural chaſtiſements when we have been deficient in our duty to any part of this family. *So are all ſocial and moral feelings.*

VIII. As to the ſtopping of theſe laws in favour of the innocent who by means of them are now expoſed to many calamities, as by ſtorms, fires, ſhipwrecks, the ruins of buildings, which make no diſtinctions; let us conſider that the conſtant ſtopping or ſuſpending the general laws when they would occaſion any evil not ſubſervient immediately to ſome preſent and ſuperior good; or the governing the world by a variety of diſſimilar wills, and not by uniform rules or laws; *The laws ſhould not be ſtopped.*

* One would think this common reaſoning abundantly clear and certain; but Θερσιτης δ' ἐτὶ μῦνος ἀμετροεπὴς ἐκόλωα. Mr. Bayle in his *Reponſe a un Provincial* ch. 77. tells us, "That we might have "had an ordinary ſenſation of pleaſure "when all was well; and that a ſenſible "abatement of this pleaſure might have "ſufficiently intimated to us our danger:" Whereas we find that much ſtronger intimations and motives from the acuteſt pains, do not always deter from luxury and intemperance; or give ſufficient caution even to the aged. And what will deter the raſh and young? This abatement he talks of might indeed be ſufficient if men were ſuch triflers as to mind nothing but that ſenſation he ſuppoſes.

BOOK I. would immediately ſuperſede all contrivance or forethought of men, and all prudent action. There could be no room for projecting any kind offices to others, or concerting any ſchemes for our own intereſt, ſince we could find no conſtant or natural means for executing them.* Nay all ſuch ſolicitudes would be uſeleſs and vain, as there neither would be any proper means, nor any need of action; ſince we ſhould find that all evil was prevented, and good obtained, without our activity. Thus all active virtue muſt be excluded.

They cannot be ſuſpended when evils enſue, and obtain when 'tis otherways.

Or ſhall the laws obtain whenever the effect is innocent or uſeful, but always be ſuſpended when it is pernicious? This would make all human activity vain. No good man would be faint or weary with faſting, or labour; or be cold when he was naked. No occaſion for any aſſiſtance or good-offices to a good man. Nay our very pleaſures would loſe a great deal of their reliſh, which partly ariſes from experience of pain. Reſt is only grateful after wearineſs; and food has the beſt ſavour after hunger. And all active virtues muſt be ſuperſeded as entirely ſuperfluous.

All ſuch ſuſpenſion [illegible]

Or ſhall the laws only then be ſuſpended when God foreſees that no good ſhall ariſe from theſe evils which

* To make this more obvious. Were there no fixed laws, no man would attempt to move. Motion would not follow his will, or not in that way he intended; or it would fail in as many inſtances as it ſucceeded. We could not depend on the promiſes of others, nor hope for the ſucceſs of any labours. Food would often ceaſe to nouriſh; nor would the want of it occaſion pain or death. Bodies would not perſiſt in their ſtates of reſt, or motion; nor their parts cohere. None would build, plant, ſow, or provide rayment. If the world remained, yet we could diſcern no order in it. Poiſons would nouriſh; and wounds ſometimes give us pleaſure.

enſue upon them, but take place when good is to a- CHAP. 9.
riſe from them? This may be ſo in fact, tho' we do not diſcern the good that may ariſe from ſuch evils. But do they want that the laws ſhould be ſtopped when ſome preſent viſible ſuperior good does not ariſe from the evils they occaſion? that ſickneſs or pain befalling infants or other innocents ſhould be prevented, whenever God foreſees that none will, or none can, by any virtuous office relieve them? "Many e- "vils, ſay they, occaſion no exerciſes of virtue either "by the ſufferer, or by others. Many injuries do not "exerciſe the virtues of patience, reſignation, or for- "giveneſs, but draw after them bitter reſentments, "and a long train of miſchiefs. The laws of nature "might in theſe caſes be ſuſpended, and take place "in others."

But again, if the courſe of nature were ſtill obſerved to alter in favour of ſuch whom none aſſiſted, all ſuccour would be ſuperfluous. Men would continue in theſe ſins of omiſſion, that *this grace might abound.* The good would ever be expoſed to injuries and ſufferings; for to ſuch they would give occaſion for exerciſing patience, reſignation, and forgiveneſs; but the obſtinate, the haughty, and the proud muſt remain ſecure. And why ſhould men ſtudy to govern their paſſions, when the worſt of them, they would ſee, could do no harm.

Or ſhall the courſe of nature take its full effect in bringing evils on the wicked, but always alter in favour of the good? Even ſo, all care about the good would

BOOK I. be fooliſh, and the moſt delightful virtues would be ſuperfluous. Again, the happineſs of the virtuous is often much connected with that of others. Muſt all their families, friends, and countries be protected? At this rate what ſhall we call the order of nature, the knowledge of which can direct our actions? The deviation muſt be as common as the ordinary courſe. And then there would remain no exerciſe for the patience of the virtuous, their reſignation, fortitude, ſacrificing their intereſts to *God*, and the *Publick*, when they were thus made impaſſible, and inacceſſible to the ſtrokes of fortune.

In fine, if it was worthy of a *good God* to create an order of beings whoſe chief enjoyments ſhould conſiſt in the vigour and activity of kind affections, and moral pleaſures, there muſt be different orders of beings: the world muſt be governed by general laws univerſally obtaining: and many particular evils, natural and moral, muſt be permitted.

IX. Now as the ſole foundation of the moſt plauſible ſcheme of two independent principles, the one *evil* and *malicious*, and the other *good*, is the mixture we obſerve of evil and good in this world: ſince we have abundantly proved that there muſt be ſuch a mixture intended by the moſt perfect Goodneſs, that ſuppoſition muſt be without any rational foundation. Did we obſerve ſome beings perfectly good, and others perfectly evil, there might be ſome preſumption for two oppoſite principles: or did we diſcover any laws plainly deſtined for miſchief alone, and others deſtined

for good; this too would be another preſumption. But that *two Minds*, with oppoſite intentions, ſhould always unite and conſpire in a mixed ſyſtem is inconceivable. Now the whole of natural knowledge ſhews us the contrary of theſe preſumptions: no ſpecies is conſtituted abſolutely evil: no law obtains which is not deſigned for ſuperior good. For this we muſt refer to all the antient and modern obſervations on the conſtitution of nature. CHAP. 9.

Oppoſite intentions in *two cauſes* of equal art and power could have no effect. They could have no motive to unite in forming a world: ſince each would know that the art and power of the other would introduce as much of what was offenſive to him, as his own art or power could effect of what was agreeable. *No effect from two oppoſite principles.*

Upon this ſuppoſition ſhould we not plainly obſerve malicious mechaniſm in the works of nature, as frequently as we obſerve what is kind and uſeful. But nothing of this ſort occurs. No malice, original, ſedate, and unprovoked appears in the works of nature; but on many occaſions we ſee kindneſs gratuitous and unmerited, in the tender relations of life, in the eſteem of virtuous characters by which we have not been profited, and in compaſſion toward the unknown. No original or natural joy in miſery, it never pleaſes without ſome previous notion of great moral evil in the ſufferer, or of ſome oppoſition to our intereſt. No *moral faculty* is obſerved approving what is hurtful to the publick; but in all rational agents we find a contrary one, which immediately approves all kindneſs,

BOOK I. and humanity, and beneficence. Sure the art of a malicious principle muſt have exerted itſelf in ſome original mechaniſm deſtined for miſchief.

Good ſuperior in life.

X. But granting the mechaniſm to be univerſally good; yet if there appeared a prepollency of miſery in this world, as ſome good men in their melancholy declamations have alledged, it would ſtill leave ſome uneaſy ſuſpicions in the mind. This preſent ſtate is the only fund of our evidence, independent of revelation, from which we conclude about other worlds, or future ſtates. If miſery is ſuperior here, 'tis true that even in that caſe, the *Deity* might be perfectly good, as this miſery of a part might be neceſſary for ſome ſuperior good in the univerſe: but then we ſhould not have full evidence for his goodneſs from the effects of it. The caſe however is otherways. Happineſs is far ſuperior to miſery, even in this preſent world; and this compleats all the evidence we could expect, or require.

Natural good ſuperior in the whole.

First as to natural good: How frequent are the pleaſures of ſenſe, and the gratifications of appetite; and

Pleaſures of ſenſe.

how rare the acute ſenſations of pain? ſeldom do they employ many months in a life of ſeventy or eighty years: the weaker bodies who have a larger ſhare of it, are not the hundredth part of mankind. If bodily pleaſure is of a low tranſitory nature, ſo is bodily pain: when the ſenſation is paſt, and we apprehend no returns of it, all the evil is gone; and it begins to yield pleaſant reflections. Conſider the frequent returns of our pleaſures, and their duration will appear incom-

parably greater; and they are pretty near as intenſe in their kind, as any pain we are commonly expoſed to. Such as are well experienced in both are not terrified from ſome high ſenſual enjoyments by the danger of pain enſuing. To ballance the acuter pains, which are rare, let us conſider the frequent recurrence of very high pleaſures. If many periſh early in life, the pain they feel is probably neither ſo intenſe, or laſting, as that felt by men in full ſtrength; nor is it increaſed by fears and anxiety. CHAP. 9.

Of imagination and ſympathy.

The pleaſures of the imagination, and of knowledge, are pretty much a clear ſtock of good, with ſmall deductions, * as there is ſcarce any pain properly oppoſite to them: and the pains of ſympathy are over-ballanced, by the more laſting joys upon the relief of the diſtreſſed, and upon the proſperity of ſuch as we love: not to mention the joyful approbation of the temper itſelf; the joyful hopes, under a good providence, for all worthy objects of our affection: and this pain we ſee plainly is a neceſſary precaution in providence, to engage us to promote the happineſs of others, and defend them from evil.

The difficulty as to moral good and evil.

The difficulty ſeems greater as to moral evil. But a perſon wholly devoid of all virtue is as rare as one free from all vice. For the very kindeſt purpoſes, God has indeed planted a very high ſtandard of virtue in our hearts. We expect univerſal innocence, and a long courſe of good-offices, to denote a character as good: but two or three remarkably vicious actions make it

* See above ch. vii. § 14.

Book I. odious. Fraud, theft, violence, ingratitude, lewdneſs, in a few inſtances, ruin a character almoſt irreparably; tho' the reſt of life be innocent, and tho' theſe actions were committed under great temptations, or flowed from no evil intention, but from ſome ſelfiſh paſſion or eager appetite, or from even ſome lovely partial tenderneſs, ſuch as that to a family. There are few in whoſe lives we will not find an hundred actions not only innocent, but flowing from ſome lovely affection, for one flowing from any ill-natured intention. Parental love, friendſhips, gratitude, zeal for parties and countries, along with the natural appetites, and deſires of the means of ſelf-preſervation, are the common ſprings of human action. And ſeldom do their vices proceed from any thing elſe than theſe principles grown perhaps too ſtrong to be reſtrained by ſome nobler or more extenſive affections, or by a regard to the rules which are requiſite for the good of ſociety. We have indeed a ſtandard of virtue ſet up in our hearts, which we cannot keep up to: and thus are all conſcious of guilt in the ſight of God. And yet the lower virtues are ſo frequent, that human life is generally not only a ſafe ſtate, but very agreeable.

This circumſtance in our conſtitution, that the ſtandard of moral good is ſet ſo high, tho' it is apt to give the mind an unfavourable impreſſion of our ſpecies as very corrupt, is yet very neceſſary and uſeful, as it is a ſtrong reſtraint from every thing injurious or vicious, and a powerful ſpur to a continual advancement in perfection. Indeed without ſuch a ſtandard

we could not have any idea of perfection, nor could there be any formed intention in the human mind to make progreſs in virtue. But when we ſee ſo few on whom it has its full effect, even of thoſe who live to mature age, it ſeems to carry no faint intimation, that either we once were in a higher ſtate of perfection, or that ſuch a ſtate is ſtill before us. Unleſs we be deſtined for ſuch a ſtate, the planting ſuch a ſtandard muſt have the ſame unaccountable appearance, as the laying up of great magazines, and trains of artillery, where no military operations were intended. CHAP. 9.

An appeal to men's hearts.

XI. To confirm this prevalence of good in life, let us conſider, that men can certainly tell what they would deſire upon any poſſible ſuppoſition, as well as in matters which actually befall them. Imagine a medicine diſcovered, which without pain would caſt both ſoul and body into an everlaſting ſleep, or ſtop all thought or exiſtence for ever. In old age perhaps, or under ſome ſore diſeaſes, ſome few might chuſe to uſe this medicine, to eſcape from all evil by the loſs of all good; but not one in a thouſand: and the few who would, have enjoyed many years during which life was eligible, for the months in which they would chuſe annihilation. Many of them have had their ſhare of life; they ſhould be ready to leave it, as a ſatisfied gueſt leaves a plentiful table. What altho' at laſt death ſhould for a few months become eligible to every one, after an agreeable life for many years? If the judgments of the young, while all the ſenſes, appetites and paſſions are vigorous, and joyful hopes inflame the ima-

Book I. gination, may overvalue the good of life: the judgments of the aged may be equally partial on the other ſide, when all the powers are become languid, and the memory of pleaſures almoſt effaced. Men in the middle of life, who ſee the condition of it, who remember the joys of youth, feel their preſent ſtate, and obſerve in others the condition of old age, are certainly the beſt judges. Not one in a thouſand would quit all he enjoys, to avoid all he fears. 'Tis high ingratitude in men to pique themſelves upon depreciating all the gifts of God, and aggravating all the evils of our lot. Should Mercury come at their requeſts, when they have fretfully thrown down their burthens, as in the old fable, they would ſoon intreat him, not to take down their ſouls to Lethe, but to help them to take up their loads again.

The evils of mankind. In theſe debates ſome recite all the wickedneſs and miſery they have ſeen, read, or heard related: wars, murders, piracies, aſſaſſinations, ſacking of cities, ravaging of countries, military executions, maſſacres, cruſado's, acts of faith in the holy inquiſition: all the frauds and villanies detected in courts of juſtice: all the corruption, falſhood, diſſimulation, ingratitude, treacherous undermining, and calumny, and lewdneſs, in palaces; as if theſe were the common employments of mankind; or as if a large portion of mankind were concerned in ſuch things by their ſtations. Priſons, and hoſpitals, the abodes of the criminal and diſeaſed, were never ſo populous as the cities where they ſtand: they ſcarce ever contained the thouſandth part of a-

ny ſtate. Milton's deſcription of the infirmary, in his viſion, muſt move the hardeſt heart: but who will eſtimate the health of a people from an infirmary. A monſtrous plant or animal is long expoſed to view in the repoſitories of the curious: the rarity makes the view entertain us, and makes us fond to talk about it. But millions of regular compleat forms exiſt for one monſter; they are ſo common that they raiſe no attention or admiration. We retain a lively remembrance of any grievous ſickneſs or danger we eſcaped, of any horrid calamity, or villany: our ſouls are pierced with wars, ſlaughter, maſſacres, plagues; forgetting the vaſtly ſuperior numbers which eſcape all theſe evils, and enjoy the common peaceful condition of life. The ſufferers in theſe calamities ſeldom endure more pain than what attends a natural death; and they make not a fortieth part of mankind. Scarce five hundred thouſand of our countrymen have periſhed by theſe calamities, in any century of the Britiſh hiſtory: and forty times that number, in the worſt of times, have eſcaped them. CHAP. 9.

Compaſſion the cauſe of our miſtaken reaſonings.

'Tis that lovely natural compaſſion which makes us ſo deeply feel theſe great calamities and remember them. We wiſh well to all, and deſire an happy ſtate of the univerſe, from a yet finer principle; and deeply regret every contrary appearance, even when we have no fears about ourſelves. Theſe lovely principles in our conſtitution ſhould plead more ſtrongly in our hearts for the goodneſs of the *all-ruling Mind*, than thoſe appearances of evil, were they as great as a

Book I. melancholy eloquence often paints them, could plead for the contrary.

Hiſtories give us a view only of a ſmall part of life.

While hiſtories relate wars, ſeditions, maſſacres, and the corruptions and intrigues of courts, they are ſilent about thoſe vaſtly ſuperior numbers who in ſafe obſcurity, are virtuouſly or innocently employed in the natural buſineſs and enjoyments of mankind. We read the actions of the great, of men expoſed to all the temptations of avarice and ambition, raiſed above the common lot of honeſt labour and induſtry, with minds often corrupted from their infancy by the elevation of their fortunes, and all their paſſions inflamed by flattery and luxury. The ſocial joyful innocent employments of the bulk of mankind are no ſubjects of hiſtory; nor even the ordinary regular adminiſtration of a ſtate in the protection of a people and the execution of juſtice. Hiſtories dwell upon the critical times, the ſickneſſes of ſtates, the parties, and factions, and their contentions; revolutions, and foreign wars, and their cauſes. Theſe dangers, their cauſes, and the remedies applied, muſt be recorded for the uſe of future ages; and their rarity, in compariſon of the natural buſineſs of ſocial life, makes them more entertaining. Thus authors in medicine relate not the agreeable enjoyments and exerciſes of health. The cauſes, ſymptoms, and prognoſticks of diſorders, their critical turns, and the effects of different medicines applied, are the proper ſubjects of their diſſertations.

Lower conditions as happy as the higher.

Men placed in the higher conditions of life, enured to eaſe and ſoftneſs, may imagine the laborious ſtate

of the lower, to be a miſerable ſlavery, becauſe it would be ſo to them were they reduced to it with their preſent habits of ſoul and body. But in the lower conditions, ſtrength of body, keen appetites, ſweet intervals of reſt, moderate deſires, and plain fare, make up all their wants in point of ſenſual pleaſure. And the kind affections, mutual love, ſocial joys, friendſhips, parental and filial duties, moral enjoyments, and even ſome honour, in a narrower circle, have place in the lower conditions as well as the higher; and all theſe affections generally more ſincere. CHAP. 9.

XII. How ſhall a being too imperfect to comprehend the whole adminiſtration of this univerſe in all its parts, and all its duration, with all the connexions of the ſeveral parts, judge concerning the preſiding *Mind*, and his intentions? We ſee particular evils ſometimes neceſſary to ſuperior good, and therefore benignly ordered to exiſt. We ſee alſo ſome pleaſures and advantages occaſioning ſuperior evils. There may therefore be other like connexions and tendencies on both ſides unknown to us. We cannot therefore pronounce of any event that it is either abſolutely good, or abſolutely evil, in the whole. How does a wiſe and dutiful child judge of its parent's affections? Or how does one in mature years judge of the intention of his phyſician when he is a ſtranger to his art? The child is ſometimes reſtrained in its pleaſures, chaſtiſed, confined to laborious exerciſes or ſtudies; the patient receives nauſeous potions, and feels painful operations. But the child finds the general tenor to be kind; ma- *How men of imperfect views can judge of the whole.*

Book I. ny pleaſures and conveniences ſupplied; and a conſtant protection and ſupport afforded; it has found the advantages ariſing on ſome occaſions from reſtraint and diſcipline; it finds its powers, its knowledge, and its temper improved. The patient has found health ſometimes the effect of nauſeous medicines. 'Tis juſt thus in nature. Order, peace, health, joy, pleaſure, are ſtill prevalent in this great family, ſuperior to all the evils we obſerve. Human life is univerſally eligible, tho' it is an unmixed ſtate to none: we can have no ſuch preſumptions of any intereſt of the Supreme Mind oppoſite to that of his creatures, as may lye againſt the intentions of the beſt of men. Should we not then uſe that equity in our concluſions about the *Deity*, that is due to our fellows, notwithſtanding a few oppoſite appearances.

If God be good he is perfectly good.

XIII. Since then the whole contrivance of nature, directly intended for good, and the prevalence of happineſs in conſequence of it, proves the *original Mind* to be benevolent; wherever there is any real goodneſs, a greater happineſs muſt be more deſired than a leſs; and where there is ſufficient power, the deſire ſhall be accompliſhed. If God be omnipotent and wiſe, all is well: the beſt order obtains in the whole: no evil is permitted which is not neceſſary for ſuperior good, or the neceſſary attendant and conſequent upon what is ordered with the moſt benign intention for the greateſt perfection and happineſs of the univerſe.

Unreaſonable to demand the particular purpoſes of all evils.

'Tis arrogant to demand a particular account how each evil is neceſſary or ſubſervient to ſome ſuperior

good. In the beſt poſſible ſcheme many things muſt be inexplicable to imperfect knowledge. The ends and connexions muſt be hid, as ſome ſteps in the oeconomy of the parent, or the practice of the phyſician muſt be dark to the child, or the patient. 'Tis enough that we diſcern the natural end to be good in all the mechaniſm of nature which we underſtand; that happineſs is prevalent, and our ſtate very eligible. All new diſcoveries increaſe our evidence by ſhewing the wiſe purpoſes of what before ſeemed an imperfection. A candid mind muſt conclude the ſame to be the caſe of parts whoſe uſes are yet unknown. The very anxieties of men about this grand point, help to confirm it, as they ſhew the natural determination of the ſoul to wiſh all well in the univerſe; one of the cleareſt footſteps of our benevolent Creator imprinted in our own hearts. This truth muſt be acceptable to all, where vanity, affectation of ſingularity and of eminent penetration, or an humour of contradiction, hath not engroſſed the heart.

The hopes of a future ſtate univerſal.

XIV. Add to all this, that the prevalent goodneſs obſerved in the adminiſtration of nature leads to an hope which at once removes all objections, that of a future ſtate of eternal exiſtence to all minds capable of moral ſentiments, of enquiring about the order of the whole, of anxiety about it, of knowing its author, or of any fore-thought about exiſtence after death. The powers of thought and reflection, as they extend to all times paſt and future, and to the ſtate of others as well as our own, and are accompanied with exten-

BOOK I. five affections and a *moral faculty*, make all orders of being endued with them capable of incomparably greater happineſs or miſery than any of the brutal kinds. If the duration of men is to be eternal, and an happy immortality obtained by theſe very means which are moſt beatifick to us in this life; the evils of theſe few years during our mortal ſtate are not worthy of regard; they are not once to be compared with the happineſs to enſue.

No proofs of the contrary.

The ſoul ſeems diſtinct from matter.

The boldeſt Epicurean never attempted direct proof that a future ſtate is impoſſible. Many have believed it who conceived the ſoul to be material. Mankind in all ages and nations have hoped for it, without any prejudice of ſenſe in its favour. The opinion is natural to mankind, and what their Creator has deſigned they ſhould entertain. 'Tis confirmed not a little by arguments which ſhew the ſubject of thought, reaſon, and affections not to be a diviſible ſyſtem of diſtinct ſubſtances, as every part of matter is. The ſimplicity and unity of conſciouſneſs could not reſult from modes diſperſed and inherent in an aggregate of different bodies in diſtinct places.* Nor is the activity of the ſoul conſiſtent with the paſſiveneſs of matter. We feel our happineſs or miſery, and the dignity and perfection, or their contraries, for which we eſteem or diſlike ourſelves or others, to be qualities quite inſen-

* This argument from our conſciouſneſs of the unity of the perceiver and agent, in all that multitude of ſenſations, judgments, affections, deſires, is well urged by Ariſtotle *de Anima*. l. i. and by Dr. Sam. Clarke. See alſo Mr. Baxter's ingenious book on this ſubject.

ſible, no way related to the body or its parts, or affected by any changes befalling the body. CHAP. 9.

The nature of our perception confirms it.

The nature and order of our perceptions ſhew this diſtinction. Firſt, *external ſenſations* preſent forms quite diſtinct from this *ſelf*, and no further related to it than that they are perceived. Their changes to the better or the worſe affect not nor alter the ſtate of the perceiver. A ſecond ſet of perceptions approaches a little nearer, thoſe of *bodily pleaſure* and *pain*. The ſtate of the perceiving *ſelf* is affected by them, and made eaſy or uneaſy. But *nature* orders in a way quite inexplicable, that theſe perceptions are connected with parts of the body, or the ſpaces which they once occupied: and the accident is naturally conceived as affecting the body, and not altering the dignity of the ſoul. Let *Anatomiſts* talk of motions propagated by nerves to the brain, or to ſome gland the ſeat of the ſoul: when the finger is cut, as ſure as pain is felt at all, 'tis felt in the finger, or in the ſpace where the finger was. *Nature* declares the event to be an accident to the body, not deſtroying or abating the excellence of the perceiver: not even when the ſenſations indicate ſuch accidents as muſt ſoon deſtroy the body altogether. Nay ſome ſuch ſenſations of pain increaſe rather the perſonal dignity; and ſome ſenſations of pleaſure abate it. But there is a third ſort of perceptions, when we are conſcious of knowledge, goodneſs, faith, integrity, friendlineſs, contempt of ſenſual pleaſures, publick ſpirit. Theſe we feel to be the immediate qualities of this *ſelf*, the perſonal ex-

BOOK I. cellencies in which all its true dignity consists, as its baseness would consist in the contrary dispositions. We know these qualities, and their names, as well as we do the sensible ones: we feel that these have no relation to the body, or its parts, dimensions, spaces, figures. * *Nature* thus intimates to us a spirit distinct from the body over which it presides, in regulating its motions, as clearly as it intimates the difference of our bodies from external objects. Nay it intimates a greater difference, or disparity of substance; as all the qualities of the soul are quite disparate and of a different kind from those of matter: and 'tis only by their qualities that substances are known.

Direct proofs of a future state.

XV. *God* declares by the constitution of nature, by the *moral faculty* he has given us, that he espouses the cause of virtue and of the universal happiness. Virtue in many instances is born down and defeated in this world. In such events our best dispositions give us much sorrow for others, and virtue sometimes exposes to the greatest external evils. From the goodness of *God* we must hope for some compensation to the worthy and unfortunate; and that the injurious and oppressive shall find cause to repent of their contradicting the will of a *good Deity*. There is no defect of power in *God;* no envy or ill-nature. Shall beings of such noble powers, so far advanced in the perfections *God* approves, with such desires and hopes of immortality, be frustrated in their most honourable hopes? Hopes necessary to their compleat enjoyment

* This reasoning frequently occurs in Plato. See 1 *Alcibiades*.

of virtue in this world, since without them they could have little joy, in this uncertainty of human affairs, either from their own state, or from that of the dearest and worthiest objects of all their best affections. Shall a plan of an universe so admirable in other respects want that further part which would make all compleat? What altho' *God* could not be charged with cruelty or injustice upon this supposition, since he has made virtue itself the chief happiness, and vice the supreme misery? Shall we expect no more from the *original omnipotent Goodness* than what we count a poor degree of virtue in a man, the doing only that good which is necessary to avoid the imputation of injustice? How far is this surpassed by the overflowing goodness of some worthy men? And how unlike to the conduct of that *liberal hand* that *satisfieth the desires of every thing that lives?* CHAP. 9.

If there are in the universe any rational agents capable of defection from their integrity, spectators of human affairs, who need motives to perseverance from the sanctions of laws: if such beings discern the external prosperity of the wicked, when their stupified consciences are insensible of remorse, and they live in affluence of all the pleasures they relish, and in a moment go down to the grave free from all future punishment; how must this encourage any imperfect spectator in his vices? Must not such impunity of transgressors destroy the authority and influence of the divine laws? The minds of a nobler relish see indeed that the vicious have lost the supreme enjoyments of

BOOK I. life; but the vicious have no taſte for them, nor regret for the want of them, and wallow in what they reliſh. Can ſuch unfelt puniſhments anſwer the wiſe ends of government, the correcting and reforming even of thoſe who are depraved in a great degree? How little effect can they have, if men need dread nothing further?

Should one behold a building not yet finiſhed, the ſeveral parts ſhewing exquiſite art, yet ſtill wanting a further part to make all compleat and convenient, room left for this part, and even ſome indications of this further building intended; would not a candid ſpectator conclude that this further part was alſo in the plan of the architect, tho' ſome reaſons retarded the execution of it? This is the caſe in the moral world. The ſtructure is exquiſite, but not compleat: we ſee ſpace for further building, and indications of the deſign in the deſires and hopes of all ages and nations, in our natural ſenſe of juſtice, and in our moſt noble and extenſive affections about the ſtate of others, and of the univerſe; and ſhall we not confide and hope in the art, the goodneſs, the inexhauſtible wealth of the *great Architect*.

We have dwelt long on this head, rather pointing out the ſources of evidence than diſplaying it fully, becauſe the aſcertaining the goodneſs of *God* is the grand foundation of our happineſs and the main pillar of virtue. We ſhall briefly touch at his other attributes, leaſt any miſtakes about them ſhould abate that high veneration and admiration due to his excellency.

XVI. First all the reasons which prove any thinking being to be a distinct substance from matter, prove that *God* is a spirit, and is not the great material mass of this universe; as all the proofs of his existence are proofs of original thought, wisdom, consciousness, activity, affection; powers quite inconsistent with the nature of matter. By calling him a spirit we do not mean that he must be a substance of the same species or kind with the human soul, and only greater. Tho' all thinking beings differ in kind from all matter, yet there may be innumerable orders or kinds of spirits, with essential differences from each other, from that lowest spirit of life, which is in the meanest animal, to the *infinite Deity*.

CHAP. 9. *The other attributes of God. A spirit.*

Again, what is *original* and *uncaused* cannot be conceived as limited in its nature, either by its own choice, or by the will of any prior cause, to any particular finite degree of perfection, or to those of one kind, while it wants others. No possible reason or cause can be assigned for some sorts or degrees rather than others. We see from the effects, that the original perfections are high beyond imagination: and there was no prior will or choice of any being to confine it to one species or degree. This leads us to conceive an original boundless ocean of all excellency and perfection, from which all limited perfections have been derived.

Infinite.

The same thoughts lead us to conceive the *original Being* as one, and uncompounded of distinct be-

And One.

BOOK I. ings or parts. No poſſible reaſon or cauſe for plurality, for one number of *original beings*, rather than any other. No evidence for more, from any effects or appearances which *one original Cauſe* cannot account for. Nay all the appearances of connexion, mutual dependencies of parts, and ſimilarity of ſtructure, in thoſe which are very remote from each other, lead us to unity of *deſign* and *power*. This ſhews ſufficiently the vanity of *Polytheiſm*, if any ever believed a plurality of *original beings*. The wiſer *Heathens* had a different *Polytheiſm; and that of the vulgar aroſe* from low conceptions of the *Deities* as weak and imperfect, ſubject to diſtraction and confuſion by a multitude of cares, or by an extenſive providence, and like men, embaraſſed when they undertake too much. *One almighty and omniſcient Being* can preſide eaſily over all, without toil or confuſion.

Omnipreſent. The continual power exerted in all parts of the univerſe, and the unlimited nature of the *original Being*, leads us to conceive him poſſeſt of ſuch *omnipreſence* and *immenſity* as is requiſite to univerſal knowledge and action. And *that* which is *original* muſt be eternal.

God rules all by his providence. XVI. From power, wiſdom, and goodneſs we infer that *God* exerciſes an univerſal providence. To a Being endued with theſe perfections the ſtate of an univerſe of ſo many creatures capable of happineſs or miſery cannot be indifferent. Goodneſs muſt excite him to exert his power and wiſdom in governing all for

the beſt purpoſes, the univerſal happineſs. Nor can we conceive any exerciſe of his powers more worthy of *God*, or more delightful to him. CHAP. 9.

Goodneſs the ſpring of creation.

What other motive to create, but a deſire to communicate perfection and happineſs? *God* cannot be conceived as ultimately ſtudious of glory from creatures infinitely below himſelf. And all deſire of glory muſt preſuppoſe that ſomething is previouſly diſcerned as excellent, that ſome determination of his nature, or ſome affection, is eſſentially the object of his approbation: and what other determination can we ſuppoſe the object of his higheſt approbation than perfect goodneſs, ever diſpoſing him to communicate happineſs. This determination muſt move him to diſplay his own excellencies to his rational creatures by his works, that thus he may be the ſource of the higheſt happineſs to them, the nobleſt object of their contemplation and veneration, of their love, eſteem, hope, and ſecure confidence, and the beſt pattern for their imitation. *God* diſplays his perfections to make his creatures happy in the knowledge and love of them; and not to derive new happineſs to himſelf from their praiſes, or admiration.

The holineſs of the Deity.

The *wiſdom* and *goodneſs* of *God* ſhew us his moral purity or holineſs. As he is independent, almighty, and wiſe, he cannot be indigent: he can have no private ends oppoſite to the univerſal good; nor has he any low appetites or paſſions. Theſe are all the incitements to moral evil which we can conceive. In *God* none of them can have place, nothing contrary to

BOOK I. that univerſal goodneſs in which he muſt have the higheſt complacence.

The juſtice of God

His conduct toward his creatures muſt be ſuch as goodneſs and wiſdom ſuggeſt. His laws muſt be good and juſt, adapted to the intereſt and perfection of the whole. No unworthy favourites ſhall find in him a partial tenderneſs inconſiſtent with the general good or the ſacred authority of his laws: no private views ſhall ſtop the execution of their ſanctions, while the general intereſt, and the ſupporting the majeſty of theſe laws require it. 'Tis no injuſt partiality that the lot of ſome ſhould have many advantages above that of others. This, we ſhewed above, the beſt order and harmony of the whole may require. Theſe are the natural notions of juſtice in a *moral governor*. 'Tis a branch of goodneſs conjoined to wiſdom, which muſt determine the *governor* to ſuch conduct as may ſupport the authority and influence of his laws for the general good.

CHAP. X.

The AFFECTIONS, DUTY, *and* WORSHIP, *to be exerciſed toward the* DEITY.

I. IN the conſideration of the ſeveral enjoyments of our nature we ſhewed the frequent occaſion men muſt have for recourſe to the Divine Providence, for the ſecurity of their enjoyments, and a ſtable tranquillity of mind, under the adverſities of this life which may befall ourſelves, or the objects of our tendereſt affections. We eſtabliſhed in the preceeding chapter that grand foundation of our happineſs, the exiſtence, and moral perfections of *God*, and his providence. It remains to be conſidered what affections and duty are incumbent on us toward the *Deity* thus abundantly made known to every attentive mind. *What affections are ſuited to the Divine Perfections.*

In this matter, as much as any, our *moral faculty* is of the higheſt uſe. It not only points out the affections ſuited to theſe perfections, but ſacredly recommends and enjoins them as abſolutely neceſſary to a good character; and as much condemns the want of them, as of any affections toward our fellow-creatures. Nay points them out as of more ſacred obligation. The *moral faculty* itſelf ſeems that peculiar part of our nature moſt adapted to promote this correſpondence of every rational mind with the great Source of our being and of all perfection, as it immediately approves all moral excellence, and determines *This known by the* moral ſenſe.

BOOK I.

the ſoul to the love of it, and approves this love as the greateſt excellence of mind; which too is the moſt uſeful in the ſyſtem, ſince the admiration and love of moral perfection is a natural incitement to all good offices.

Worſhip is internal, or external.

The worſhip ſuited to the Divine Attributes is either internal, or external: the former in the ſentiments and affections of the ſoul; the later in the natural expreſſions of them.

What is due to the natural perfections.

Our duty in reſpect of the natural attributes of *God* is to entertain and cultivate, by frequent meditation, the higheſt admiration of that immenſely great *original Being*, from which all others are derived; and to reſtrain all low imaginations which might diminiſh our veneration; all conceptions of the *Deity* as limited, corporeal, reſembling any brutal or human form, or confined within certain places: all which ſeem inconſiſtent with his infinite power and perfection, and his original uncauſed exiſtence.

The affections due to the moral perfections; Love, eſteem, veneration.

II. Due attention to the moral attributes muſt excite the higheſt poſſible eſteem, and love, and gratitude. Extenſive ſtable goodneſs is the immediate object of approbation, love, and eſteem. Wiſdom and power joined to it, raiſe love, eſteem, and admiration to the higheſt. They muſt excite the moſt zealous ſtudy to pleaſe, the greateſt caution againſt offending, and give the higheſt ſatisfaction in the conſciouſneſs of conformity to the will of a Being poſſeſſed of ſuch excellencies. When we are conſcious of having offended him, they muſt fill our ſouls, not only with

fears of punishment, but with inward remorse, ingenuous shame, and sorrow, and desire of reformation. CHAP. 10.

These divine perfections firmly believed, beget trust and resignation, and entire submission to every thing ordered by Providence, from a firm persuasion that all is ordered for the best, for the greatest universal interest, and for that of every good man. Extensive goodness must desire the best state of the whole; omniscience must discover the means; and omnipotence can execute them. Every thing becomes acceptable in the place where *God* orders, or permits it; not indeed always for itself, yet upon implicit trust or faith that it is necessary for the purposes of infinite goodness and wisdom. We know that the benign intentions of the *Deity* are partly to be executed by the active virtues of good men; and that in these virtues a great share of their supreme perfection and happiness consists. Our dependence therefore upon the Divine Power and Goodness will retard no kind and virtuous purposes of ours, but rather invigorate and support us with joyful hopes of success. The same resignation and trust we exercise for ourselves, and our own interests, we shall also exercise for all who are dear to us by any virtuous bonds, for every honourable cause in which we or others are engaged; that it shall be prosperous in this life, or tend to the future glory and happiness of those who have espoused it. *Trust and resignation.*

III. Just apprehensions of the creation and providence of *God* must raise the highest resentments of gratitude, must repress all vanity in his sight, all con- *Gratitude and humility before God, and pity toward our fellows.*

BOOK I.

tempt of others, and beget true humility. All the good we enjoy, all the pleasures of sense, all the delights of beauty and harmony, are so many favours conferred on us by *God*. To his power we owe our very being, we owe these objects, and the senses by which we enjoy them. If we interpose our activity in improving the objects, or cultivating our own relish, it was *God* who gave us all our powers, all our art or sagacity, and furnished us opportunities for such pleasant exercise, and so agreeably rewards it. All the joys we feel in mutual love, all the advantages we receive from the aids of our fellows, are owing to *God*, who contrived that frame of soul for man, gave him such affections, and made him susceptible of whatever can be the object of love in him. He gave to all animal kinds, human or brutal, their powers, senses, instincts, affections. He bound together the souls of men with these tender and social bonds which are the springs of all good offices. The external advantages we procure to each other by our active virtues, *God* could have immediately conferred by his power without any action of ours; but, such was his goodness, he chose that we should enjoy some share of that divine and honourable pleasure of doing good to others; and, by the exercise of our kind affections and by our *moral faculty*, we do partake of it. The joys we feel in being honoured by our fellows are also his gift to us; by his implanting this sense of moral excellence, and that natural delight we perceive in the approbation and esteem of others.

All the good natural or moral which we enjoy is due to him.

All the pleaſures of knowledge, all the effects of art and contrivance, are owing to him, who *taught us more than the beaſts of the field, and made us wiſer than the fowls of heaven*; to him we owe that we can diſcern the beauty and kind intention and wiſdom of his works, and thus adore the footſteps of his wiſdom and goodneſs; that we can diſcern moral beauty, the affections and conduct which are acceptable to him, and moſt reſemble the Divine Beauty; that we can diſcover his perfections, and imitate them; and that we can give ſecure tranquillity to our ſouls by an entire confidence in them, and reſignation to his providence. By the reaſon he gave us he converſes with us, aſſures us of his good-will, gives us the moſt friendly admonitions; and, by the affections of eſteem, love, and gratitude he has implanted, calls us to a ſtate of friendſhip with himſelf. Thus all our happineſs and excellency is from his bounty. *Not unto us, Lord, not unto us, but to thy name be the praiſe.*

The exerciſe of theſe affections neceſſary to us, not to God.

IV. 'Tis vainly alledged, "that theſe devout affec- "tions are vain or uſeleſs becauſe *God* needs them "not, nor do they increaſe his happineſs." They are the chief enjoyments of rational ſouls, their higheſt joy in proſperity, and ſweeteſt refuge in adverſity. The rational heart cannot approve itſelf if it wants them; if it prefers them not to its chiefeſt joys. Without love, friendſhip, gratitude, life is inſipid. Theſe affections, when mutual, are the more joyful the more excellent the objects are. What ſtable and tranſporting

BOOK I. joy must arise from living with an habitual sense of the Divine Presence, with the highest love, admiration, and gratitude, and justly persuaded of being approved and beloved and protected by him who is infinitely perfect and omnipotent.

Without this confidence in *God*, what can we call secure? Our bodies and all external things are obviously uncertain: so is the prosperity of our friends, of all the objects of our generous affections. Their very virtues, tho' among the most stable things of life, are not secured against change. Some accidents can disturb their reason and their virtue. 'Tis only the soul resigned to *God*, with firm trust in his perfections, that can promise to itself in the whole every thing happy and honourable at last.

In every good temper certain affections must arise upon their natural occasions, whether they can affect the state of the object or not. Tho' we were fully aware of our own impotence, or want of opportunity to do good offices, or make returns, a temper must be odious which had no love and esteem of great excellency, no gratitude for great benefits. Thus joy must arise in a good heart upon the prosperity of one beloved, tho' we cannot add to it; and sorrow upon his adversity, tho' we cannot remove or alleviate it. The want of such affections, where there are such strong natural causes presented, must argue a depravity of soul which we cannot avoid abhorring upon reflection. These affections are as it were the natural attrac-

tion of the Divinity upon our ſouls, and of every ex- CHAP. 10.
cellence which reſembles him in his works; and every pure ſoul feels its force.

Nay, without lively apprehenſions of the Divine Providence, and continual reſignation to his will, with a joyful confidence in his goodneſs, which are the main acts of devotion, our nobleſt affections muſt expoſe us to grievous ſympathetick ſorrows in this uncertain world. But a firm perſuaſion of an omnipotent, omniſcient, and moſt benign univerſal parent, diſpoſing of all in this ſyſtem for the very beſt; determined to ſecure happineſs in the whole to the virtuous, whatever evils may befal them in this life; and permitting no further evil than what the moſt perfect conſtitution requires, or neceſſarily brings along with it; a perſuaſion of all this, with like extenſive affections in our ſouls, muſt afford the ſtrongeſt conſolation in all our tender ſorrows, and bring our hearts either chearfully to embrace, or at leaſt calmly to acquieſce in whatever is ordered or permitted by ſovereign wiſdom and goodneſs. If our friends or favourites are at preſent unfortunate: this the very beſt polity in this grand ſtate required: many more of our brethren and fellow-citizens, of as great virtue, are ſtill happy. They have their dear friends rejoicing with them; their affections are as tender and lovely; their virtues are as valuable, as thoſe in our ſet of friends. If ours are in diſtreſs and ſorrow, others with equal tenderneſs and virtue are rejoicing. One generation paſſeth, and another comes; and the univerſe remains for ever; and ever as fruitful

No ſtable tranquillity or happineſs without them.

BOOK I. in virtue, joy and felicity. Nay from the ſhort period we know, we cannot conclude about the future miſeries of ſuch as are now unfortunate. We know not what the ever-during courſe of ages may bring to thoſe very perſons whoſe misfortunes or vices we are bewailing. The thoughts of a future eternity, under a good *God*, make all things appear ſerene, and joyful, and glorious.

Plan of life encreaſe all virtue and joy.

A conſtant regard to *God* in all our actions and enjoyments, will give a new beauty to every virtue, by making it an act of gratitude and love to him: and increaſe our pleaſure in every enjoyment, as it will appear an evidence of his goodneſs: it will give a diviner purity and ſimplicity of heart, to conceive all our virtuous diſpoſitions as implanted by *God* in our hearts, and all our beneficent offices as our proper work, and the natural duties of that ſtation we hold in his univerſe, and the ſervices we owe to this nobler country. Our minds ſhall be called off from the lower views of honours, or returns from men, and from all contempt or pride toward our fellows who ſhare not equally in his goodneſs: our little paſſions and reſentments ſhall be ſuppreſſed in his preſence. Our hearts will chiefly regard his approbation, our aims ſhall be obtained when we act the part aſſigned us faithfully and gratefully to our great Creator, let others act as they pleaſe toward us. The miſtakes, imperfections, provocations, calumnies, injuries, or ingratitude of others we ſhall look upon as matters preſented to us by providence for the exerciſe of the virtues *God* has

endued us with, by which we may more approve our CHAP. 10.
ſelves to his penetrating eye, and to the inward ſenſe of our own hearts, than by the eaſier offices of virtue where it has nothing to diſcourage or oppoſe it.

Thus as the calm and moſt extenſive determination of the ſoul toward the univerſal happineſs can have no other center of reſt and joy than the original independent omnipotent Goodneſs; ſo without the knowledge of it, and the moſt ardent love and reſignation to it, the ſoul cannot attain to its own moſt ſtable and higheſt perfection and excellence: nor can our *moral faculty*, naturally delighting in moral excellence, obtain any other compleat object upon which it can be fully exerciſed, than that Being which is abſolutely perfect, and originally poſſeſt of all excellence, and the ſource of all ſuch excellencies in others.

IV. External worſhip is the natural expreſſion of theſe devout ſentiments and affections. The obvious reaſons for it are theſe; the exerciſe and expreſſion of all ſentiments and affections makes their impreſſions deeper, and ſtrengthens them in the ſoul. Again; gratitude, love and eſteem, are affections which decline concealment when they are lively; we are naturally prone to expreſs them, even tho' they give no new happineſs to their object. 'Tis plainly our duty to promote virtue and happineſs among others: our worſhipping in ſociety, our recounting thankfully *God*'s benefits, our explaining his nature and perfections, our expreſſing our admiration, eſteem, gratitude, and love, preſents to the minds of others the proper

The reaſons for external worſhip.

BOOK I. motives of like affections; and by a contagion, obſervable in all our paſſions, naturally tends to raiſe them in others. Piety thus diffuſed in a ſociety, is the ſtrongeſt reſtraint from evil; and adds new force to every ſocial diſpoſition, to every engagement to good offices.

The natural expreſſions of devotion.

The natural expreſſions are, inſtructing others in the perfections of *God*, and the nature of piety and virtue, the great end of his laws; praiſes, thankſgivings, acknowledgements of his providence as the ſpring of all good by prayers, and expreſſions of truſt and reſignation; confeſſion of our ſins and imperfections; and imploring his pardon, and future aids for our amendment. We may add ſolemn invocation of him as the witneſs and avenger of any falſhood in our aſſertions or promiſes, wherever it may be requiſite to ſettle ſome important right of our fellows, or to give them confidence in our fidelity.

All duty regards our improvement in virtue and perfection.

V. Our praiſe, admiration, or thanks, add nothing to the Divine felicity; our confeſſion gives no new information; our importunity alters not his purpoſes from what he had formerly determined as beſt. Our ſwearing makes him no more attentive, or diſpoſed to execute juſtice, nor gives it any new right to puniſh. Theſe acts of adoration, praiſe, thankſgiving, confeſſion, prayer, increaſe our own piety, love, and gratitude, our abhorrence of moral evil, and our deſires of what is truly good, and our reſignation to his will. When we have lively diſpoſitions of this kind, we are beſt prepared to improve all temporal bleſſings, and may hope for them according to the gracious tenor

of Divine Providence. Invocations of *God* by oaths, in a religious manner, and on important occaſions, muſt imprint the deepeſt ſenſe of our obligations to fidelity, and of the crime of falſhood; and thus give the greateſt ſecurity we can give, by words, to our fellow-creatures. The effect of all theſe acts is upon ourſelves, and not upon the *Deity*, or his purpoſes, which have been originally fixed upon a thorough foreſight of all the changes which could happen in our moral diſpoſitions, which themſelves alſo are a part of the objects of his eternal counſels and power. CHAP. 10.

The influence of religion on human ſociety.

'Tis a needleſs inquiry whether a ſociety of *Atheiſts* could ſubſiſt? or whether their ſtate would be better or worſe than that of men poſſeſſed with ſome wicked ſuperſtition? True religion plainly increaſes the happineſs both of individuals and of ſocieties. Remove all religion, and you remove ſome of the ſtrongeſt bonds, ſome of the nobleſt motives, to fidelity and vigour in all ſocial offices. 'Tis plain too that ſome ſyſtems of religious tenets, where much wicked ſuperſtition makes a part, may contain many noble precepts, rules, and motives, which have their good effects upon the minds of ſuch as are not concerned in executing the purpoſes of the ſuperſtition. Thus many of the beſt moral precepts, and the doctrine of future rewards appointed for virtue, are retained in Popery, and excite many to the moſt virtuous offices, whilſt others by the ſuperſtitious political tenets, deſtined for the aggrandiſing of the eccleſiaſticks, and the enſlaving of

BOOK I. the ſouls and bodies of the reſt of mankind, are excited to the moſt horrid cruelties.

'Tis of no importance to determine whether ſuch ſuperſtitions have worſe effects than *Atheiſm*. They may, as to men in certain ſtations; tho' they hurt not the reſt conſiderably. The experiment of a ſociety of *Atheiſts* has never yet been made. Grant that the effects of ſome ſuperſtitions were worſe than thoſe of *Atheiſm:* this is rather honourable to religion. The beſt ſtate of religion is incomparably happier than any condition of *Atheiſm;* and the corruptions of the beſt things may be moſt pernicious. A ſurfeit of nouriſhing food, may be more dangerous than that of food leſs nouriſhing: ſpoiled wines are more dangerous than bad water. 'Tis the buſineſs of rational minds to take all the bleſſings of a true religion, and guard againſt any corruption of it, without ſearching out what motives might remain to ſome ſorts of virtues under the joyleſs wretched thought that the univerſe is under no providence, but left to chance, or as blind and undeſigning neceſſity; if religion, when depraved, does great miſchief; a pure and good religion is a powerful engine of much good.

CHAP. XI.

The CONCLUSION *of this* BOOK, *shewing the* WAY *to the* SUPREME HAPPINESS *of our* NATURE.

The sum of human happiness.

HAVING thus considered the several sources of happiness our nature is capable of; and, upon a full comparison, found that the noblest and most lasting enjoyments are such as arise from our own affections and actions, and not the passive sensations we receive from those external things which affect the body: having also compared the several sort of affections and actions, whether exerted toward our fellows in narrower or more extended systems, or toward the *Deity*, whose nature and grand intention in the administration of the universe we have also endeavoured to discover: and having found that, as our *moral faculty* plainly approves in an higher degree, all the more extensive affections toward our fellows than it approves the more confined affections or passions; that these extensive affections are also more noble sources of enjoyment; and that our love of moral excellence; our knowledge, veneration, and love of the Deity, conceived as perfectly good and wise and powerful, and the fountain of all good; and an entire resignation to his will and providence is the source of our sublimest happiness, the grand foundation of all our tranquillity or security as to any other object of the most honourable desires: 'tis plain our supreme and compleat

BOOK I. happineſs, according to the univerſal doctrine of the wiſeſt men in all ages,† muſt conſiſt in the compleat exerciſe of theſe nobler virtues, eſpecially that entire love and reſignation to *God*, and of all the inferior virtues which do not interfere with the ſuperior: and in the enjoyment of ſuch external proſperity as we can, conſiſtently with virtue, obtain.

The moral ſenſe and the two calm determinations, conſpire in recommending Juſtice,

II. The courſe of life therefore, pointed out to us immediately by our *moral ſenſe*, and confirmed by all juſt conſideration of our true intereſt, muſt be the very ſame which the *generous calm determination* would recommend, a conſtant ſtudy to promote the moſt univerſal happineſs in our power, by doing all good offices as we have opportunity which interfere with no more extenſive intereſt of the ſyſtem; preferring always the more extenſive and important offices to thoſe of leſs extent and importance; and cautiouſly abſtaining from whatever may occaſion any unneceſſary miſery in this ſyſtem. This is the cardinal virtue of *juſtice* which the antients make the ſupreme one, to which the reſt are all ſubſervient. It may include even our duties toward *God*.

and temperance.

As ſenſual enjoyments are the meaneſt and moſt tranſitory, the deſires of which, by the impetuous force of ſome of our brutal paſſions, frequently ſeduce men from the courſe of virtue, it muſt be of high importance to be fully convinced of their meanneſs, and to acquire an habit of ſelf-command, a power over theſe lower appetites in the manner we explained when we

† This is Ariſtotle's definition, Ενεργεια κατ' αρετην αρετην ἐν βιῳ τελειῳ.

conſidered the nature of theſe enjoyments. 'Tis equally neceſſary by cloſe reflection to make a juſt eſtimate of other more elegant enjoyments of the imagination, that, as they are far inferior to moral and ſocial enjoyments, they may yield to them in our choice where they interfere. This is the virtue of *temperance*. CHAP. II.

A juſt eſtimation of the value of this life, and of the ſeveral ſorts of evil we are expoſed to, muſt be equally neceſſary. If moral evils, and ſome ſympathetick ſufferings are worſe than any external ones, and can make life ſhameful and miſerable amidſt all affluence of other things, as we ſhewed above; if at beſt, life is but an uncertain poſſeſſion we muſt ſoon loſe; we ſhall ſee ſomething that is more to be dreaded than death, and many juſt reaſons why it may on certain occaſions be our intereſt to incur the danger of it. Were death an entire end of all thought it would indeed put an end to all good, but ſurely no evil could enſue. *and fortitude.*

——— *num triſte videtur*
Quicquam? nonne omni ſomno ſecurior extat.

But if we are to exiſt after death under a good Providence, what a glorious foundation is this for *fortitude* in every honourable cauſe? what ſtrength of mind muſt that hope give to every good man upon apprehenſions of death, or any of the evils which lead to it? This is the third cardinal virtue.

Prudence is that habit of attention to the nature of the ſeveral objects which may ſollicit our deſires, engaging us to a thorough inquiry into their impor- *Prudence prerequiſite to virtue of all ſorts.*

BOOK I. tance, in themſelves and their conſequences, either to the greateſt private happineſs of the individual, or to that of the ſyſtem. This virtue is ſome way prerequiſite to the proper exerciſe of the other three, and is generally firſt mentioned in order; tho' *juſtice* is the ſupreme one to which all the reſt are ſubſervient. We leave it to more practical treatiſes to dilate upon theſe things. The proper conſiderations, and the means of acquiring theſe four habits of virtue muſt be evident from what is ſaid above concerning the comparative values of the ſeveral ſorts of good and evil, and concerning the ſupreme enjoyments of our nature.

Miſtakes. III. Many are diſcouraged from a vigorous culture of their minds for the reception of all virtues by a raſh prejudice. We are dazzled with the conſpicuous glories of ſome great ſucceſsful actions in higher ſtations; we can allow ſuch virtues to be the nobleſt enjoyments; but they are placed ſo high that few have acceſs to them. Nay perſons in higher ſtations often deſpair when their power is not abſolute. The humours, follies, or corrupt views of others obſtruct all their good intentions. They are freted with ſuch diſappointments, and quit the purſuits of virtue, deſponding of any valuable enjoyment attending it.

To arm the ſoul againſt this prejudice, we ſhould remember that the reality and perfection of virtue, and the inward ſatisfaction of it too, to a calm mind, depends not on external ſucceſs, but upon the inward temper of ſoul. Perſiſting under theſe doubts about the ſucceſs or glory, in the publick offices of virtue;

or if we are excluded from them, in all the lower private offices; in a conſtant ſweetneſs of deportment in obſcurity, and a conſtant reſignation to the *ſupreme Mind;* embracing chearfully the lot appointed for us, repreſſing every envious motion, and every repining thought againſt providence, reſolving to go ſtedfaſtly on in the path pointed out to us by *God* and nature, till our mortal part fall down to that earth from whence it ſprung; muſt appear rather more noble and heroick to the *All-ſearching Eye*, and to the judgment of every wiſe man, than the more glittering virtues of a proſperous fortune. In theſe there is leſs purity and ſimplicity diſcovered, ſince the alluring views of glory and worldly intereſts may have had a large ſhare in the affections, or been the principal motives to the agent. CHAP. II.

When we deſpair of glory, and even of executing all the good we intend, 'tis a ſublime exerciſe to the ſoul to perſiſt in acting the rational and ſocial part as it can; diſcharging its duty well, and committing the reſt to *God*. Who can tell what greater good might be attainable if all good men thus exerted their powers even under great uncertainties of ſucceſs, and great dangers of miſrepreſentations and obloquy? Or how much worſe ſhould all matters proceed, if all good men deſponded and grew remiſs under ſuch apprehenſions? If virtue appears more glorious by ſurmounting external dangers and obſtacles, is not its glory equally increaſed by ſurmounting theſe inward diſcouragements, and perſiſting without the aids of glory or

BOOK I. applauſe, conquering even the ingratitude of thoſe it ſerves, ſatisfied with the ſilent teſtimony of our hearts, and the hopes of Divine approbation. Thus the moſt heroick excellence, and its conſequent happineſs and inward joy, may be attained under the worſt circumſtances of fortune: nor is any ſtation of life excluded from the enjoyment of the ſupreme good.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

BOOK II.

Containing a Deduction of the more ſpecial LAWS *of* NATURE, *and Duties of Life, previous to Civil Government, and other adventitious States.*

CHAP. I.

The Circumſtances which increaſe or diminiſh the MORAL GOOD, *or* EVIL *of Actions.*

HAVING ſhewed, in the former book, that the courſe of life which GOD and NATURE recommends to us as moſt lovely and moſt conducive to the true happineſs of the agent, is that which is intended for the general good of mankind in the wiſeſt manner that our reaſon and obſervation can ſuggeſt; we proceed, in this book, to enquire more particularly into the proper means of promoting the happineſs of mankind by our actions, which is the ſame thing with inquiring into the more ſpecial laws of nature. And this we ſhall endeavour to do firſt abſtracting from thoſe adventitious ſtates or relations which human inſtitutions or actions have conſtituted, conſidering only that relation which *nature* hath conſtituted among all. But it may be neceſſary here to premiſe ſome account of many complex notions of moral qualities, the underſtanding of which ſeems prerequiſite to the doctrine of the particular laws of nature. This ſhall be the ſubject of this and the two following chapters.

BOOK II. I. The ground of all imputation * of actions as virtuous or vitious is, "that they flow from ſome affection in the agent, and thus are evidences of his temper and affections." Virtue, as it was proved in the former book, conſiſts primarily in the affections. The higheſt kind of it is the calm and fixed principle of good-will to the greateſt ſyſtem; and love, eſteem, gratitude, and reſignation to *God*, upon a full perſuaſion of his moral perfections, and a conſtant prevalent deſire of making ſtill further progreſs toward that moral perfection of which we perceive ourſelves to be capable. The lower kinds, are the particular kind affections and paſſions purſuing the good of particular ſocieties, or individuals, conſiſtently with the general good. This, one would think, could ſcarce be matter of debate among Chriſtians, after the ſum of the law delivered to us, † viz. *Loving God* and *our neighbour*. If virtue be not placed in the affections, but in ſome other faculty different from the will, as *reaſon* or *intellect*, then love is to be called an act of the underſtanding, contrary to all language.

The ground of imputation, that actions flow from and diſcover the affections.

Qualities and circumſtances neceſſary to the morality of actions.

II. From this deſcription 'tis eaſy to find what circumſtances affect the morality of actions, or omiſſions, increaſing or diminiſhing the moral good, or evil, in them; or making actions good, which otherways had been evil; or evil, which otherways had been good.

Liberty.

Firſt. 'Tis manifeſt that whatever action, or rather event, happened not in conſequence of one's will, ei-

* *Imputation* is one of the *voces mediae*, tho' more commonly uſed in charging men with guilt. † Matth. xii. 30, 31.

ther at preſent, or in ſome prior time, cannot be imputed as either good, or evil. Nor can any omiſſion or abſtaining from action be imputed as good, or evil, to him who could not have performed it by any efforts, and knew this impoſſibility. Such events or omiſſions can evidence no affection, either good, or bad. Events, however, are then only called *neceſſary* with reſpect to an agent, which he could not prevent tho' he ſeriouſly deſired it; not ſuch as, through his ſtrong averſions or habits, he cannot avoid deſiring. Thoſe only are called *impoſſible*, which no efforts of his can accompliſh by any means. We call any thing poſſible, which one who heartily deſires it, can get accompliſhed, whether by his own power, or by any aid of others which he can obtain.* CHAP. I.

Neceſſary events, not moral.

Theſe alone are the neceſſary and wholly unimputable events † which neither any preſent deſire or action of ours can prevent, nor could they have been prevented by any prior diligence or care which we ought to have had about ſuch matters. Such events as prior fore-thought and care could have prevented, tho' they be now unavoidable, are in ſome meaſure voluntary ‡ and imputable; whether they happen from free agency, or from natural inanimate cauſes. Thus if one by negligence in his office ſuffers banks or mounds to decay, when a ſtorm comes he cannot prevent the inundation; and yet it is juſtly counted voluntary and imputable to him.

* This explains the common maxim, *Impoſſibilium et neceſſariorum nulla eſt imputatio.* † *Involuntaria et in ſe, et in ſua cauſa.* ‡ *Involuntaria in ſe, ſed non in ſua cauſa.*

BOOK II.

nor the omission of impossibles.

So the omissions of actions now impossible are justly imputed, when they might have been possible, had that previous diligence been exerted which becomes a good man. A slothful profuse man cannot now discharge his debts, yet as a prior course of prudent oeconomy would have prevented this injury to his creditors, the non-payment is imputable. In these cases, indeed, the unavoidable event or omission, contrary to present strong inclination, shews no present evil affection. But the former negligence, which made one incapable of doing justice, argues a prior culpable defect of good dispositions. And 'tis here that the guilt properly lyes. Two persons may be equally criminal in the sight of God, and their own consciences, when the events of their conduct are very different. Suppose equal negligence in both, and that both become insolvent, but one by an unexpected inheritance discharges his debts; the other, tho' equally inclined, remains incapable of it. They are equally criminal, tho' one by accident does no wrong in the event to his creditors.

What effects and consequents imputable.

III. No distant effects or consequents of actions or omissions, affect their morality, if they could not have been foreseen by that diligence and caution we expect from good men; for then they are no indications of the temper of the agent. For the same reason any prosperous effects which were not intended, do not increase the moral goodness of an action; but an evil action is made worse by all the evil consequents, which would have appeared to a man of such caution as good

affections would naturally raiſe, tho' the agent did not actually foreſee them. They do not indeed prove any direct evil intention; but there are other forms of moral evil. The very want of a proper degree of good affections is morally evil. One ſtudious of the publick good will be cautious and inquiſitive about the effects of his actions; the inquiſitive will diſcover ſuch effects as are diſcoverable by their ſagacity. He then who is ignorant of ſuch effects, tho' he had no direct evil intention, betrays a culpable weakneſs of the good affections. CHAP. I.

In judging of the moral characters of ſuch as have not had any conſiderable reformation made in their affections, 'tis not of conſequence whether the guilt be evidenced by ſome preſent action, or omiſſion; or by ſome preceeding one equally criminal. That aphoriſm therefore is juſt, that "an action can be made "virtuous only by ſuch good conſequents as are actu- "ally intended for themſelves: but may be made vi- "cious by any evil conſequences which a good and "honeſt mind could have foreſeen as probably en- "ſuing."

But good conſequents intended then only prove an action to be good, when the ſum of them over-ballance all the evil ones which could have been foreſeen, and when the good conſequents could not be obtained without theſe evils. If the caſe is otherways, they may extenuate the guilt, but do not juſtify the action. On the other hand, evil conſequents foreſeen, but not deſired for themſelves, do not always make an action

BOOK II. evil. 'Tis only in such cases where they over-ballance all the good effects to which this action is subservient, and for which it was intended: and where this overballance might have been foreseen, or when the good effect could have been obtained without these evils.

By consequents of an action we understand not only the direct and natural effects, or what the agent is the proper cause of: but all these events too which ensue upon it, and had not happened had the action been omitted. A good man regards whatever he foresees may ensue through the mistakes, follies, or vices of others; and avoids what he foresees will occasion vicious actions, or unreasonable offences, in others, * tho' otherways it might have been innocent: unless the good effects, not otherways to be obtained, overballance these particular evils.†

Ignorance and error, invincible, or invincible, of such actions in certain degrees.

IV. Ignorance of the tendency or effects of actions, affects their morality differently, according to the different causes of the ignorance or error, and the difficulty, greater or less, of coming to the knowledge of the truth. If the ignorance or error be absolutely invincible by any present, or any prior diligence, evil consequents thus unknown cannot be imputed, as they can shew no evil affection, nor any defect in good affections. If that degree of caution which we expect in like affairs from the best men could not surmount the ignorance tho' the utmost possible caution might, we still count it morally invincible, and wholly excusing from guilt, except in cases where all men know that

* Rom. xiv. 21. † Matth. x. 34, 5

the utmoſt caution is incumbent on them. But where the ordinary caution of a good mind would have foreſeen ſuch conſequents, then the ignorance argues a defect of good affections, is vincible, and tho' it may alleviate the guilt, it does not wholly take it away. CHAP. I.

Ignorance and error may be at preſent invincible and involuntary, and yet prior diligence might have prevented them; or it may be invincible and involuntary every way.* The latter only takes away all imputation: the former, ſhews that there is no direct evil intention at preſent, but it may evidence a prior want of good affections, and thus be juſtly culpable.

But as direct evil intention, or inſenſibility of the evil we plainly ſee we are doing to others, are much more odious tempers than mere inadvertence, or the want of ſuch warm affections as would raiſe accurate attention; all ignorance not directly affected or deſired is ſome alleviation of guilt; and that in different degrees, according as the effects were more or leſs obvious. The eaſier the diſcovery was, the leſs does the ignorance alleviate the guilt.

Ignorance of the law or the fact.

Ignorance may either be about the effects of the action, or the true intent and meaning of laws. The ſame maxims hold about both. Only, ſince wiſe legiſlators take care ſo to publiſh their laws that the ſubjects may always know them by proper diligence, ignorance of the law cannot be deemed abſolutely invincible. If any laws are abſolutely undiſcoverable

* *Involuntaria in ſe, ſed non in ſua cauſa.* or, *Involuntaria et in ſe, et in ſuâ cauſa.*

BOOK II. by the ſubjects, they are not laws given to them; their not obeying them cannot be culpable.*

Conſcience what. V. The queſtions about vincible ignorance, and conſciences erroneous, or doubtful, are only difficult through ambiguity of words. Conſcience ſometimes denotes the *moral faculty* itſelf: ſometimes "the judg-"ment of the underſtanding concerning the ſprings "and effects of actions upon which the *moral ſenſe* "approves, or condemns them." And when we have got certain maxims and rules concerning the conduct which is virtuous, or vicious, and conceive them to be, as they truly are, the laws given to us by *God* the author of nature and of all our powers; or when we are perſuaded that other divine laws are revealed to us in a different manner, then conſcience may be defined to be "Our judgment concerning actions com-"pared with the *law*."

How an erroneous conſcience excuſes, or exte-nuates. Now firſt, "A perſon purpoſing to act virtuouſ-"ly, and yet by miſtake imagining that action to have "a good tendency, and to be conformable to the law, "which is of a contrary nature in reality, will certain-"ly during his error follow his conſcience: ſince no "man in an error knows that he errs." The obſervers only can make the queſtion, whether 'tis better for him to follow his conſcience, or counteract it? And this cannot in all caſes be anſwered the ſame way.

2. "He who follows the erroneous judgment of "his mind in doing what he believes to be good, at "preſent evidences a good diſpoſition: and acting a-

* *Ignorantia juris, ignorantia facti.*

" gainſt his judgment, during his error, muſt evidence CHAP. I.
" ſome vicious diſpoſition; ſuch as neglect of more ex-
" tenſive good, or of the lawgiver." This holds in general true as to all men who are firmly perſuaded of the goodneſs of *God* and his laws. As we all cenſure a man who from any narrower affection of a lovely ſort ſhould counteract the views of the more extenſive affections; the ſame way we muſt cenſure the counteracting ſuch commands of God, as we believe are calculated for the moſt extenſive happineſs, tho' the agent has been excited to it by ſome humane and lovely affections of the narrower ſort; which, however, in all caſes alleviate the guilt.

But when there is no ſuch ſettled apprehenſion of *God*, or his laws, as perfectly benevolent; and only a notion of high private intereſt in obedience, and great private danger to ourſelves from diſobedience, with a confuſed notion of duty or obligation to obey; if ſome very tender humane diſpoſitions of heart ſhould lead one to diſobey ſome ſevere and cruel orders imagined to come from the *Deity;* whatever convulſions he might feel in his own heart by the ſtruggles between two ſuch oppoſite principles, a judicious ſpectator could ſcarce condemn the counteracting ſuch a conſcience from principles of humanity: for example, if one who believed it his duty to perſecute hereticks to death, yet were reſtrained by compaſſion to his fellow-creatures.

3. "The falling into ſuch vincible errors, ſo oppoſite *All errors are not innocent.*
" to the humane diſpoſitions of the ſoul, in matters ſo

BOOK II. "deeply affecting the intereſts of our fellows as that of "perſecution, and ſome others, muſt argue great prior "guilt and deficiency of good affections." And therefore, during the error, whether one follows his conſcience, or not, we have ſome evidence of a bad temper. If he follows it, his prior negligence is very culpable: if he does not, and yet believes the command to have been given by a good God for the general intereſt, his prior negligence is culpable as in the other caſe, and now he ſuperadds the guilt of omitting his duty to *God*, and the general intereſt. But where one has no notions of the Divine Goodneſs, and the benign tendency of his laws, counteracting the imagined law may be leſs odious, if it be from a lovely humane diſpoſition.

4. When the conſcience is doubtful, the ſafeſt way is to defer acting till further inquiry be made, unleſs ſome general potent reaſon urges to a ſpeedy determination. Caſes happen in which 'tis plainly better to do either of the two actions, about the preference of which we are doubting, than to omit both; and there may be no time for delays. In ſuch caſes we muſt fix upon one or t'other, according to ſuperior probability of its importance. If theſe probabilities are equal, we muſt do what firſt occurs.

The duty of ſuch as err. What is the duty then of one in an error? or what conduct will be entirely approved? 'Tis plain the error already has evidenced a prior culpable negligence. The only conduct which now ſhall gain entire approbation again is correcting the error by a new unpreju-

diced inquiry. The erroneous, during their error, do not see this to be their duty; but 'tis the only way to set all right again. And this shews the great advantage of modesty and diffidence as to our own understandings; and the danger of self-confidence and bigotry. CHAP. I.

The degree of diligence requisite in a good man, cannot be precisely determined. We naturally expect very different degrees from different capacities, stations, opportunities. Aristotle* well observes, that "many points in *morals*, when applied to individual cases, cannot be exactly determined; but good men "know them by a sort of sensation: the good experienced man is thus the last measure of all things." This holds in general: "the greater the diligence and "caution about our duty is, the character is so much "the better; and the less the diligence and caution "is, so much the worse is the character, when other "circumstances are equal."

* *Nicom.* l. iii. c. 4. and l. ii. c. ult. and l. vi. c. 11. and often in the *Magna Moralia*, particularly l. ii. c. 10. Hence the *arbitrium viri probi*, with the *Civilians*.

CHAP. II.

General Rules of judging about the Morality *of* Actions, *from the Affections exciting to them, or oppoſing them.*

Altho' men cannot accurately judge about the degrees of virtue, or vice, in the actions of others, becauſe their inward ſprings are unknown: yet ſome general rules may be abundantly certain and uſeful in our judging about ourſelves. And we have no great occaſion to make application of them to others, which muſt be extremely uncertain.

General rules about the importance of actions.

1. Where kind affections alone are the ſprings of action, the good effected by any agent is as the ſtrength of theſe affections and his ability jointly. The ſtrength of affection therefore is directly as the good effected, and inverſely as the abilities; or, in plainer terms, when the good done by two perſons is equal, while their abilities are unequal, he ſhews the better heart, whoſe abilities were ſmaller.

How views of private intereſt affect the morality of actions.

2. Where men are alſo excited by views of private intereſt, the effect of theſe ſelfiſh deſires is to be deducted, and the remainder ſhews the effect of the virtuous diſpoſition. Where motives of private intereſt diſſuaded from ſome good action performed, the virtue appears the higher by ſurmounting theſe motives.

3. In like manner we compute the moral turpitude of unkind or baſely ſelfiſh affections leading us to injury. The ſtrength of them is directly as the evil effected, and inverſely as the abilities. That is, where

equal miſchiefs are done by two, who had it in their power to do more, in gratification of their evil affections, he ſhews the worſe temper, who had the ſmaller power but exerted it further.

The ſame circumſtances affect evil actions.

4. When private intereſts excite to hurtful actions, the effect of the ſelfiſh deſires is not the ſame way to be deducted to find the pure effect of ſome inclination wholly vicious. We ſeldom can have any ſuch inclinations. The moral evils of men generally flow from the immoderate degrees of ſome ſelfiſh affections, which in a moderate degree would be innocent; and the very want of high degrees of ſome good affections is vicious. This deduction can only be made where the exciting ſelfiſh motive was the avoiding ſome great ſufferings terrible even to very good minds; and ſuch temptations much extenuate the guilt. Where great intereſts known to the agent diſſuaded from the evil action, indeed the guilt is exceedingly aggravated, as the depravity of temper ſurmounts theſe intereſts, as well as all ſenſe of duty and generous affection.

The kind of the affections to be regarded.

II. But in comparing actions and characters we not only regard the ſtrength of the exciting affection, but the kind of it, ſince, as we obſerved above, our *moral ſenſe*, by the wiſe conſtitution of *God*, more approves ſuch affections as are moſt uſeful and efficacious for the publick intereſt. It immediately approves the calm ſedate good-will either to particular ſocieties, or individuals, more than the turbulent paſſions of the generous ſort; and of the calm affections moſt approves the moſt extenſive. And thus tho' the effects

BOOK II. of two actions were equal, that one is more approved which flowed from a calm ſettled principle of kindneſs, than another from ſome turbulent paſſion. The ſuperior excellency of theſe calm diſpoſitions is allowed on all hands; and ſhews men what temper nature recommends to their culture, by all the power we have over our affections; and what reſtraints ſhould be laid upon the leſs extenſive affections, whether calm or paſſionate, that they may never defeat the purpoſes of the moſt extenſive and excellent diſpoſitions of the ſoul. Here we ſee alſo the reaſon why no great virtue is imagined in our kindneſs to our offſpring, kindred, or even benefactors. Strong particular paſſions naturally ariſe toward perſons ſo related to us, whether we have any of the more extenſive affections lively in our breaſts or not: and few characters are ſo depraved as to be void of theſe natural affections. The want of them indeed, for reaſons preſently to be mentioned, would argue a temper depraved in the moſt odious degree.

Hard to fix preciſe degrees of obligation.

III. When promoting the publick good is oppoſite to the agent's worldly intereſt, 'tis hard to fix a preciſe degree of good affection requiſite merely to avoid a bad character, or obtain that of bare innocence. One may be called in one ſenſe innocent who never hurts others in purſuit of his own intereſt. But notwithſtanding this he may be a bad man, if he contributes little to a publick intereſt. God has ſet in our hearts, if we would attend to it, a very high ſtandard of neceſſary goodneſs, and we muſt be diſpleaſed with

ourſelves when we omit any office, how burdenſome or hurtful ſoever to ourſelves, which in the whole would increaſe the publick happineſs after all its conſequents are conſidered. In our common eſtimations of characters and actions we do not judge ſo rigidly, nor can one eaſily tell preciſely how far one muſt ſacrifice his private intereſts to the publick, to avoid a bad character. The extremes of virtue and vice are abundantly known; but intermediate degrees are leſs diſcernible from each other when they approach very near, as in colours ſhaded into each other. The following maxims ſeem pretty probable, or certain; CHAP. 2.

Several general rules.

1. That affections of equal degrees of extent or ſtrength are not expected from perſons of unequal circumſtances and opportunities, tho' originally of equal tempers. More is demanded from ſuch as have had inſtruction, leiſure for meditation, and acceſs to better ſtations.

2. Such offices as are uſeful to others, and of no expence or labour to the agent, are juſtly expected from all toward all who need them. They are but low evidences of virtue, but refuſing them is very hateful, and ſhews a temper void of humanity.

3. Nay we univerſally condemn the refuſal of ſuch ſmaller expences or trouble as can ſcarce diſturb the happineſs of life, when it is neceſſary for any important advantage even to a ſtranger.

4. The greater the expence or trouble is one ſubmits to for the benefit of others, it muſt be to others the greater evidence of his virtue.

BOOK II. 5. The ſmaller the advantages are for the ſake of which one does what is detrimental to the publick, or declines any uſeful ſervices, the worſe we muſt conclude his character.

How narrower affections ſhould yield to more extenſive.

The ſame difficulties may appear in determining preciſely how far the narrower affections in particular caſes ſhould yield to the more extenſive; or how far the intereſts of families, kindred, benefactors, friends, our party, or country, ſhould be ſacrificed to more extenſive intereſts, to avoid a bad character or the charge of guilt. A calm mind, ſolicitous about its own conduct, will blame every defect of that moſt perfect moral order, which requires ſacrificing all narrower intereſts to the more extenſive. But there is ſomething ſo beautiful and ſo engaging in many narrower affections of the ſoul, that we judge leſs rigidly of the conduct of men who from ſuch lovely principles neglect the higheſt perfection. And as it is but a ſmall degree of attention and diſcernment, which can be reaſonably expected from men of lower ſtations and capacities, much encumbred by procuring to themſelves and their immediate dependents the neceſſaries of life, nature is far from leading us to pronounce the character bad, which does not in all caſes adhere to the moſt exact rules of perfection. But withal the attentive reflecting mind cannot but ſee the faireſt mark ſet up by *God* in his heart, a clear idea of perfection. The nearer he can come to it, ſo much the better and more excellent he is. Nor was it the Divine intention that we ſhould ſatisfy ourſelves by merely avoiding ſuch

conduct as is matter of infamy. Two general maxims are abundantly obvious in these cases. CHAP. 2.

1. First, that to maintain the calm and most extensive affection toward the universal happiness the strongest principle of the soul, able to controll all narrower affections when there is any opposition; and the sacrificing all narrower interests to the most extensive, while yet every tender affection in the several relations of life is preserved in as great strength as the just subordination of it to the superior will admit; is the highest perfection of human virtue.

2. And yet when some of these narrower kind affections exceed their proportion, and overcome the more extensive, the moral deformity is alleviated in proportion to the moral beauty of that narrower affection by which the more extensive is overpowered. Thus 'tis more excusable if we do what is hurtful to the most general interest, from zeal for our country, for a whole people; than if the same had been done for aggrandizing a party, a cabal, or a family. And any of those tender affections extenuate the guilt more than any merely selfish principle could have done, such as avarice, ambition, sensuality.

IV. The greater part of mankind, by the necessary avocations of life, are incapable of very extensive designs, and want opportunities and abilities for such services. But we have this just presumption, that by serving innocently any valuable part of a system, we do good to the whole. The lives therefore of many of the most virtuous are justly employed in serving

The ordinary virtues from the narrower causes of love.

BOOK II. such particular persons, or smaller societies, who are more peculiarly recommended to them by the very order of nature. *Nature* constitutes many particular attachments and proper causes of loving some more than others. Some of these causes are of a generous kind, but in different degrees. Such as the *conjugal* and *parental relations*, and the other *tyes* of *blood; benefits conferred*, which excite a generous gratitude, tho' we expect no more; *eminent virtues* observed; and the very relation of *countrymen*. Of the selfish sort are, a *profitable intercourse of offices, dependence for future preferment, or other favours*. All these are natural causes not only of keener passions, but of a stronger calm good-will in most of men. On the other hand, tho', to a man of just reflection, there can be no natural cause of any calm ultimate ill-will, yet to the greater part of mankind there are natural causes of the unkind passions, anger, indignation, envy, and aversion; some wholly selfish, such as *private injuries* received, *opposition* to our interest; others of a generous kind, such as *moral evil* observed, *injuries done to the publick, or to friends*, unreasonable *promotion*, to the exclusion of more worthy men.

General rules of computing.

Now a temper is certainly so much the better, the more susceptible it is of all sweet affections upon smaller causes, especially those of the generous kind, provided it entertains proportionally warmer affections where greater causes appear; and the less susceptible it is of unkind passions upon any causes, especially the selfish. The temper must be very good which retains

good-will, where many occurrences would readily baniſh it from the heart: and that temper muſt be very bad, where love cannot be kindled by the natural cauſes. CHAP. 2.

In general, the ſtronger the merit or the natural cauſes of love there are in any perſon, our want of love to him muſt evidence the greater depravation: and any low degree below the proportion of the merit, muſt evidence the ſmaller virtue. A temper where any thing virtuous remains muſt be warmed by eminent virtues, or by great benefits conferred. And ſince there muſt appear in the *Deity* all the higheſt cauſes of love, when one with tolerable attention contemplates him as the author of all good natural and moral, as the ſupreme moral excellence, as the great benefactor of all; the want of the higheſt love to him muſt evidence the greateſt moral deformity in any rational mind to whom his perfections are diſcovered.

V. Theſe principles lead to ſome more ſpecial concluſions. 1. Defect of power, of opportunities, of the means of external good offices, without any fault of ours, will not exclude us from the moſt heroick virtue.* This maxim is the moſt joyful to a good heart. *More ſpecial concluſions.*

2. No diſappointment of any wiſe and good attempt, by external force, or accidents which one could not foreſee, can diminiſh the virtue: nor do unexpected or unintended good conſequents increaſe it, † or diminiſh the guilt of a bad action. In human affairs men muſt follow probabilities. If the probable good

* See concluſion of book i. † B. ii. c. 1.

Book II. effects intended, which could not be obtained in a safer way, surpass all the ill effects we could foresee, the action is good, altho' superior evil consequents ensue beyond probability.

3. Prospects of private advantage then only abate the moral beauty of an action, when 'tis known by the agent, or justly presumed by others, that without this selfish motive the agent would not have done so much good.

4. Motives of private interest diminish the guilt of an evil action undertaken from them, only in proportion as they would in such cases affect a virtuous mind. The passions raised by the greatest natural evils impending or threatened, more occupy and ingross the mind than any desires of positive good to be obtained. And hence it is that when a person through fear of death, tortures, or slavery, threatened to himself, or those who are dear to him, or from some high provocation to anger, does what brings superior detriment to society, the guilt is much more extenuated, than if he had been induced to the same conduct by the highest bribes. And resisting the former temptation would show a nobler strength of virtue than resisting the latter, or any inducements of sensuality.* In general, the greater the vice is in any action we are tempted to by motives of interest, the less is the virtue evidenced by our abstaining from it: and the smaller the vice is to which we have such strong

* See Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. l. iii. c. ult. and Antonin. l. ii. c. 10.

temptations, the virtue of reſiſting them is the * greater, provided we have proportionally firmer reſolutions againſt the greater vices. Some crimes are ſo very odious that few amongſt the moſt corrupt order of men can be brought to commit them. CHAP. 2.

5. The temper is the more depraved the greater the motives to goodneſs are which it counteracts. He who ſins againſt a known law ſhews a worſe mind, by ſurmounting the ſtrong motives to obedience from the ſanctions, and other circumſtances to be mentioned hereafter, than one who does the ſame action without any knowledge of the law.

6. Offices of no trouble or expence do not prove an high virtue in the agent, tho' declining them ſhews great depravity, as there are no motives of intereſt againſt them.

7. Common offices done to perſons of great merit in whom there are high cauſes of love, are no evidences of great virtue in the agent. He has little virtue who ſhews no more zeal for a friend, a benefactor, a man of eminent virtue, than another will do from ſmaller bonds of affection. And yet the neglecting any friendly ſervices due to ſuch high virtues or merit, is more vicious than omitting offices of general humanity where there were no ſuch high claims.

8. When one cannot at once do offices of both ſorts, and other circumſtances are equal, we ſhould follow the ſtronger tyes of nature and the higher cauſes of love. Thus we ſhould rather do ſervices to a

* Thus 'tis a good rule of perfection, to *abſtain from the very appearance of evil.*

BOOK II. parent, a benefactor, a kinſman, a man of eminent virtue, than to a ſtranger. As *God* conſtituted theſe ſpecial bonds for the wiſeſt purpoſes, 'tis for the general good that, when other circumſtances are equal, theſe ſtronger bonds ſhould engage our ſervices rather than the weaker. The omiſſion of the other offices, now inconſiſtent with the more ſacred ones, is altogether innocent.

9. When only equal good is done by perſons of equal abilities, from whom more might reaſonably have been expected, one acting from mere humanity, the other from additional motives of divine laws and promiſes propoſed by revelation; we have better evidence of a good temper in the former. Our good actions ſhould riſe in proportion to the ſtronger motives propoſed, * to ſhew an equally good temper.

10. Yet as the true aim of virtue is to promote the publick good, and not the pleaſing one's ſelf with high notions of his own virtue; every good man muſt deſire to preſent to his mind all theſe motives which can further prompt him to good offices, and make him ſteady and reſolute againſt all difficulties. He muſt deſire the firmeſt perſuaſion that virtue is his trueſt intereſt; that *God* will eſpouſe his cauſe by making the virtuous happy either in this life, or the next. Settling theſe points firmly in our minds, and frequently reflecting on them to obtain conſtancy and vigour in a courſe of virtue, ſuperior to all temptations of ſecular intereſt, ſhews the trueſt benevolence:

* Matth. v. 20. Luke vi. 32,——35.

and the rejecting such considerations would shew a wrong temper, negligent of the natural means of fortifying all kind dispositions, and of removing all impediments out of their way. Such will be most constant and vigorous in all good offices, who have the strongest motives to them, and have removed all opinions of any opposite valuable interests. Now such are they only who believe and often reflect upon the Divine Providence as protecting the virtuous, and ensuring their happiness; who raise an habitual love, esteem, and gratitude to *God*, which strongly co-operate with all our generous affections to our fellows. A like effect, in a lower degree, arises from a just observation on human affairs, that a course of virtue is the most probable way of obtaining outward peace and prosperity, as it never fails to create inward peace and joy. But all this is no proof that one's own happiness of any kind is the only thing he ultimately intends in his virtuous offices. CHAP. 2.

VI. But as the affections of men are sometimes discovered by the actions of others to which they contributed, 'tis plain any good office of another, to which we have designedly contributed from any good affection, may be imputed in some degree to our honour. And where we have contributed to any bad action of another by acting or omitting contrary to our duty, it may be imputed also as our fault; but in very different degrees, as circumstances may be very different. *How the actions of others are imputed.*

1. As they who exhort, advise, or direct others in virtue shew a good disposition, and share in the honourable *This in various degrees.*

BOOK II. imputation; ſo the adviſers of wickedneſs are alike guilty whether their advice has been followed or not. But bad advice may in many inſtances abate the guilt of the perſon who perpetrates the wickedneſs. Human courts indeed ſeldom puniſh for mere advice, where there was no power or authority in the adviſer; and where no ſhare of the profit by any injury came to him, he is not made lyable to compenſation of the damage. 'Tis hard to find what effect ſuch general advices may have had on the agent, who without them might have acted the very ſame part.

2. In many caſes the adviſing, exhorting, or congratulating another in any wicked deſign may not ſhew ſuch depravation as the execution of it, as many things occur in the execution to diſſuade the undertaker, and make him relent, which do not occur to the adviſer or congratulator; ſuch as ſtronger feelings of compaſſion and remorſe, and views of puniſhment, and even preſent danger. The ſurmounting all theſe motives which affect men more deeply in the execution, may ſhew a greater depravity in the executer. On the other hand, when the adviſer or applauder has no ſuch motives of intereſt, or of eſcaping from ſome great danger, no ſuch violent paſſions moving him, and yet adviſes or applauds others in miſchief; the executer who performs it from theſe ſtrong motives may not be ſo entirely debaſed, ſo void of moral feelings, as the adviſer and applauder.

3. He who of his own pure motion commits a crime, ſhews a worſe diſpoſition than one who under com-

mand of a ſuperior, and threatened with ſevere puniſhment if he declines obedience, executes a like action with inward reluctance. Where the hurt to others from his obeying the command is much leſs than the evil he had incurred had he diſobeyed, his obedience may be perfectly innocent, eſpecially if he is ready to compenſate the damage done to others for his own ſafety; and the only guilt will be chargeable on the commander. In general, the perſons veſted with authority or power, are the principal cauſes of what is executed by their command: the ſubject is often innocent; and where he cannot be wholly juſtified, the guilt is extenuated by the temptation. Nay the ſtrong importunities of friends are ſome extenuation. CHAP. 2.

4. But whatever is done in conſequence of the command of our will or of our choice, which affects the happineſs or miſery of others, whatever were our motives, is ſtill a moral and imputable action, as it is ſome indication of our affections. The fear of great evil threatened may, as other pleas of neceſſity, make that innocent, in ſome caſes, which without that neceſſity had been criminal; ſuch as delivering money or arms to robbers that our lives may be preſerved; throwing our own or other men's goods over-board in a ſtorm, are imputed as innocent actions, nay matters of duty. And even where the publick detriment enſuing is greater than that we eſcape from by the action, the guilt, tho' not quite removed, is much extenuated. Still ſuch actions are moral, and imputable as morally good or evil.

CHAP. III.

The general Notions of Rights, *and* Laws, *explained; with their Diviſions.*

Right and wrong in action.

I. FROM the conſtitution of our *moral faculty* above-explained, we have our notions of **right*, and *wrong*, as characters of affections and actions. The affections approved as right, are either univerſal good-will and love of moral excellence, or ſuch particular kind affections as are conſiſtent with theſe. The actions approved as *right*, are ſuch as are wiſely intended either for the general good, or ſuch good of ſome particular ſociety or individual as is conſiſtent with it. The contrary affections and actions are *wrong*.

Goodneſs material and formal

An action is called *materially good* when in fact it tends to the intereſt of the ſyſtem, as far as we can judge of its tendency; or to the good of ſome part conſiſtent with that of the ſyſtem, whatever were the affections of the agent. An action is *formally good*, when it flowed from good affections in a juſt proportion. A good man deliberating † which of ſeveral actions propoſed he ſhall chuſe, regards and compares the *material goodneſs* of them, and then is determined by his moral ſenſe invariably preferring that which appears moſt conducive to the happineſs and virtue of mankind. But in judging of his ‡ paſt actions he con-

* This is the *rectum*, as diſtinct from the *jus*, of which preſently: the *jus* enſues upon the *rectum*. † *Conſcientia antecedens*. ‡ *Conſcientia ſubſequens*.

ſiders chiefly the affections they flowed from abſtracting from their effects. Actions materially good may flow from motives void of all virtue. And actions truly virtuous or formally good may by accident, in the event, turn to the publick detriment.

The notion of rights;

Our notion of *right* as a moral quality competent to ſome perſon, as when we ſay one has a *right* to ſuch things, is a much more complex conception. Whatever action we would deem either as virtuous or innocent were it done by the agent in certain circumſtances, we ſay he has a *right* to do it. Whatever one ſo poſſeſſes and enjoys in certain circumſtances, that we would deem it a wrong action in any other to diſturb or interrupt his poſſeſſion, we ſay 'tis *his right*, or he has a *right* to enjoy and poſſeſs it. Whatever demand one has upon another in ſuch circumſtances that we would deem it wrong conduct in that other not to comply with it, we ſay one has a *right* to what is thus demanded. Or we may ſay more briefly, a man hath a *right* to do, poſſeſs, or demand any thing, † "when "his acting, poſſeſſing, or obtaining from another in "theſe circumſtances tends to the good of ſociety, or "to the intereſt of the individual conſiſtently with "the rights of others and the general good of ſociety, "and obſtructing him would have the contrary tendency."

not always referred to a publick good.

II. The *righteouſneſs* or goodneſs of actions is not

† This is the ſame with the common definition, *Facultas lege conceſſa ad aliquid agendum, habendum, aut ab altero conſequendum*; ſince the end of the law of nature is the general good.

Book II. indeed the same notion with *their tendency to universal happiness*, or flowing from the desire of it. This latter is the highest species of the former. Our *moral sense* has also other immediate objects of approbation, many narrower affections, which we must immediately approve without thinking of their tendency to the interest of a system. In like manner we immediately condemn many unkind passions and actions, without considering their distant effects upon society. When one by innocent industry and some kind affections procures for himself and those he loves the means of ease and pleasure, every good spectator is pleased that he should enjoy them, and must condemn the disturbing his possession and enjoyment immediately, without thinking of the effects of such injustice upon a community. Indeed if any grand interest of a community requires his being deprived of some part of his acquisitions, then we see a superior moral form; a publick interest, which a good mind must more regard: and a more extensive affection, appearing more lovely than the narrower, justifies the mind in controlling it. The former approbation was equally immediate; but this latter is of an higher kind, to which the former is naturally * subordinate.

Nay, as in fact it is for the good of the system that every desire and sense natural to us, even those of the lowest kinds, should be gratified as far as their gratification is consistent with the nobler enjoyments, and in a just subordination to them; there seems a natural

* See B. i. c. 4.

notion of *right* to attend them all. We think we have a right to gratify them, as ſoon as we form moral notions, until we diſcover ſome oppoſition between theſe lower ones, and ſome principle we naturally feel to be ſuperior to them. This very ſenſe of right ſeems the foundation of that ſenſe of liberty, that claim we all naturally inſiſt upon to act according to our own inclination in gratifying any deſire, until we ſee the inconſiſtence of its gratification with ſome ſuperior principles. The ſeveral appetites no doubt operate in us before we have any moral notions, purſuing their ſeveral gratifications. But after moral notions are obtained, we aſſume to ourſelves, and, where our paſſions are not raiſed, we allow a right to others to gratify any deſire which is not apprehended oppoſite to ſome higher natural principle: and not only look upon it as a damage or hurt when we are hindered without this reaſon, but deem it immoral and ill-natured in one who aſſumes a power to obſtruct us. We condemn the man who ſhould by violence, without the juſt cauſe, obſtruct the enjoyments of a third perſon with whom we are not concerned. †

CHAP. 3.

But, altho' private *juſtice, veracity, openneſs of mind, compaſſion*, are immediately approved, without reference to a ſyſtem; yet we muſt not imagine that any of theſe principles are deſtined to controll or limit

None can be valid againſt the publick intereſt.

† This ſeems the intention of *Grotius de J. B. et P.* l. i. c. 2. § i. where he deduces the notion of right from theſe two; firſt, the *initia naturae*, or the natural deſires, which do not alone conſtitute right, till we examine alſo the other, which is the *convenientia cum natura rationali et ſociali*; uſing the phraſes of the Stoicks, tho' not preciſely in their meaning.

Book II. that regard to the moſt extenſive good which we ſhewed to be the nobleſt principle of our nature. The moſt extenſive affection has a dignity ſufficient to juſtify the contracting any other diſpoſition: whereas no moral agent can upon cloſe reflection approve himſelf in adhering to any ſpecial rule, or following any other diſpoſition of his nature, when he diſcerns, upon the beſt evidence he can have, that doing ſo is contrary to the univerſal intereſt or the moſt extenſive happineſs of the ſyſtem in the whole of its effects.

The cauſes of miſtakes.

When ſome ingenious and good men conceive ſome other independent or unſubordinated notion of † juſtice in puniſhing, they ſeem to have derived it from the feelings and impulſes of a natural paſſion, a generous indignation or anger ariſing againſt groſſer crimes. But this paſſion, however wiſely implanted, muſt be under the controll of an higher principle. Its ſole impulſe is to inflict evil on thoſe whoſe vices have excited it. This paſſion, and pity too, tho' both are lovely, muſt often be reſtrained by wiſe magiſtrates,

† There is a miſtake in an argument on this head in an excellent book, Biſhop Butler's Analogy. "Ill-deſert, or merit-"ing puniſhment, muſt be another notion "than this that the ſufferings of ſuch tend "to the publick good; becauſe the ſuffe-"rings of innocent perſons may ſome-"times tend to the publick good; and in "ſuch caſes, 'tis juſt to ſubject them to "ſuch ſufferings: and yet here there is no "ill-deſert." All men grant that under *ill-deſert* one other notion is involved than the *tendency of ſufferings to the publick good*, viz. the notion of ſome *moral evil* preceeding. But where moral evil has preceded, what elſe can juſtify puniſhing, but ſhewing that puniſhing, in ſuch caſes, tends to ſome publick good? One tendency to publick good in puniſhing where guilt preceeded juſtifies the puniſhment. Another tendency to publick good in a different way juſtifies the ſubjecting innocent perſons to ſufferings. This rather proves that there is no other ultimate meaſure of juſtice than ſome tendency or other to this end; tho' anger moves us to puniſh without this conſideration.

parents, guardians. Nay were it poſſible to root out all theſe paſſions, and ſubſtitute in their place a ſtrong calm regard to the moſt extenſive good, ever preſent to the mind, and ever awake to diſcern the ſeveral duties of life ſubſervient to this general end, ſo much the better would theſe duties be performed. Superior orders of beings may want theſe paſſions altogether. CHAP. 3.

III. Rights, according as they are more or leſs neceſſary to be maintained and obſerved in ſociety, are divided into perfect, and imperfect. Every proper right is ſome way conducive to the publick intereſt, and is founded upon ſome ſuch tendency. The obſerving and fulfilling every proper right of others is matter of conſcience, neceſſary to obtain the approbation of *God*, and our own hearts. But ſome of them are of ſuch a nature that the intereſt of ſociety requires they ſhould ever be maintained and fulfilled to all who have them, and that even by methods of force, where gentler meaſures prove ineffectual; theſe are called *perfect rights;* ſuch as every innocent man has to his life; to a good name; to the integrity and ſoundneſs of his body; to the acquiſitions of his honeſt induſtry; to act according to his own choice within the limits of the law of nature: this right we call natural liberty, of which liberty of conſcience is not only an eſſential but an unalienable branch. Theſe rights ſhould be maintained to all men, when no more general intereſt of mankind requires any abridgement of them. Society cannot ſubſiſt unleſs theſe rights are *Rights perfect, and imperfect;*

BOOK II. ſacred. No individual can be happy where ſuch rights of his are promiſcuouſly violated.

both create a correſponding obligation.

Other rights as truly ſacred in the ſight of *God*, and our own conſciences, yet are of ſuch a nature, that for ſome remote reaſons of publick utility, they muſt not be aſſerted by violence or compulſion, but left to the goodneſs of other men's hearts. Theſe are the *imperfect rights*. The regarding and fulfilling them to every one who has them is of great advantage and ornament to human life, and the violating or declining to fulfil them to others, in many caſes may be as criminal in the ſight of *God* as the violation of perfect rights: but as they are not of ſuch abſolute neceſſity to the ſubſiſtence of ſociety among men, and there are the moſt obvious reaſons why they ſhould be left to men's honour and conſcience, they are not matter of compulſion. Such are the rights of the indigent to relief from the wealthy: the rights of all men to offices of no trouble or expence: the rights of friends and benefactors to friendly and grateful returns: the right of every good man to ſuch ſervices as are to him of much greater importance than any ſmall trouble or loſs they occaſion to men in ſplendid ſtations or fortunes.

Imperfect rights not matter of compulſion.

To make all theſe rights of ſo delicate a nature matters of compulſion, eſpecially when it is ſo hard to determine the ſeveral claims of men, and the nice degrees of them, about which there muſt be great diverſity of ſentiment, would furniſh matter of eternal contention and war: and were they made matters of

compulsion, there would remain no proper opportunity for good men to discover their goodness to others, and engage their esteem and gratitude. The most artfully selfish, for fear of compulsion, would be the readiest to fulfil these rights were the measures of them once determined. Nothing too would be left to choice or natural liberty. CHAP. 3.

External rights.

There remains a third species, but rather a shadow of right than any thing deserving that honourable name, which we call an *external right*; in the use of which no man can be approved by *God*, or his own heart, upon reflection. "When doing, enjoying, or "demanding from others is really detrimental to the "publick, and contrary to the sacred obligations of "humanity, gratitude, friendship, or such like; and yet "for some remote reasons 'tis for the interest of society "not to deny men this faculty, but on the contrary "in some instances to confirm it." 'Tis thus the uncharitable miser has this shadow of right even to that share of his possessions which he should have employed in offices of humanity, charity, or gratitude; or to recal money unseasonably or cruelly from an industrious sponsable debtor; to demand performance of too severe and unequal covenants, while no law prohibits them. Many such like claims are introduced by civil laws in the cases of wills, successions to the intestate, and contracts, where the equitable and humane part may be very different from the legal claim. This external appearance of right is all that remains when any duty of gratitude, friendship, or humanity re-

BOOK II. quires our receding from what otherways would have been a perfect right.

What rights may be oppoſite.

Now as no action, enjoyment, or demand, and its contrary, can be alike uſeful to ſociety, ſo nature has in no inſtance conſtituted proper rights oppoſite the one to the other: imperfect rights of humanity may be oppoſite to external rights; but as neither the former, nor the latter, entitle one to uſe force with a good conſcience, war can never be really juſt on both ſides. Any obligation in conſcience to comply with external ſhadows of right which others may have, can ariſe only from prudence with regard to our own intereſt, or from ſome remote views of the detriment that may in ſome caſes redound to ſociety from oppoſing them, and not from any ſenſe of duty toward the perſon who inſiſts on them in oppoſition to humanity.

Juſtice of laws of ſeveral ſorts.

There is a like diviſion of the juſtice of laws. Some ſyſtems of them are called juſt, only in this ſenſe, "that they require only what is of high neceſſity for "every peaceful ſtate, and prohibit all that is neceſ-"ſarily everſive of good order and polity, yet without "a nice regard to promote the nobler virtues, and to "prohibit all actions of a bad tendency, when they "are not abſolutely pernicious." In ſuch ſtates actions are legally juſt which violate none of theſe neceſſary laws, and men have legal rights to do whatever the laws permit, tho' often contrary not only to humanity, but to what a finer inſtitution would make neceſſary. Sometimes a good legiſlator is conſtrained

to give no better laws, from the bad diſpoſitions of his ſubjects which would bear no better.* In another meaning of the word, that ſyſtem of laws only would be called juſt, "where every thing is decreed in the "wiſeſt manner for the beſt order in ſociety, and pro- "moting the greateſt virtue and happineſs among in- "dividuals." In the former ſenſe only can the Jewiſh ſyſtem be called juſt, while it permitted polygamy, divorces at pleaſure, and execution of juſtice on murderers and all man-ſlayers by private perſons the neareſt kinſmen of the deceaſed; and contained a very burdenſome ritual inſtitution of worſhip. CHAP. 3.

IV. Our rights are either *alienable*, or *unalienable*. The former are known by theſe two characters jointly, that the tranſlation of them to others can be made effectually, and that ſome intereſt of ſociety, or individuals conſiſtently with it, may frequently require ſuch tranſlations. Thus our right to our goods and labours is naturally alienable. But where either the tranſlation cannot be made with any effect, or where no good in human life requires it, the right is unalienable, and cannot be juſtly claimed by any other but the perſon originally poſſeſſing it. Thus no man can really change his ſentiments, judgments, and inward affections, at the pleaſure of another; nor can it tend to any good to make him profeſs what is con- *Rights alienable, or not.*

* This is probably the moſt uſeful explication of the diſtinction of Civilians of the *jus naturale* into the *primarium* and *ſecundarium*: the former unalterable, and the later variable according to the prudence of civilized nations. To call the one ſelf-evident, and the other not, is trifling: a juſt concluſion is as ſure as the premiſes. See Grot. l. c. 1, 2.

BOOK II. trary to his heart. The right of private judgment is therefore unalienable.

The degrees from imperfect to perfect, innumerable.

V. By dividing rights into the two classes of perfect, and imperfect; we do not intimate that all those of either class are of the same importance or necessity; that the guilt of violating all perfect rights, is equal; or that the violating all imperfect rights is equally criminal. There is plainly a gradation from the weakest claim of humanity, to the highest perfect right, by innumerable steps. Every worthy man, tho' not in distress, has a claim upon the great and opulent for any good office in their way for improving his condition, when none of greater merit, or greater indigence, has an interfering claim. This is among the lowest imperfect rights or claims. A good man in distress has an higher claim. One who has done eminent publick services has an higher still: one who had done singular services of an honourable kind to men now in power has a stronger claim upon them, especially if he is fallen into distress. All these we call imperfect rights. The greater the merit and natural causes of love there are in the person who has these claims, the nearer also they approach to perfect rights. A worthy man in distress has an imperfect claim to the necessaries of life upon all who can relieve him, but on his children his claim is almost perfect, not only for a bare support, but for such conveniencies of life suited to the parent's station as they can afford without distressing themselves. The sense of an honest man, practised in the affairs of life,

must determine these points more precisely in particular cases. CHAP. 3.

Upon what their strength depends.

In general, rights are the more sacred the greater their importance is to the publick good, the greater the evils are which ensue upon violating them, the less the trouble or expence is of observing them, the greater the merit or causes of love are in the persons who have them. And the stronger the claim is, so much the greater is the crime of opposing it; and the smaller is the degree of virtue in complying with it.

On the other hand, the less the detriment is which ensues upon violating a right, the greater the trouble or expence is of fulfilling or complying with it, the smaller the merit of the person is, the right is so much the weaker: but then the more virtue is evidenced by regarding it, provided there be a proportionably higher regard to the higher claims of others; and the moral turpitude of neglecting it is so much the less. Small virtue is shewn by paying a just debt, by abstaining from outrages and violence, by common returns of good offices where we have been highly obliged, by common duty to a worthy parent in distress: but the conduct contrary to such sacred claims would be most detestable. Offices of singular generosity to a worthy man who has no special claim upon us, are greater evidences of a good temper (if we shew a proportionably higher ardour of goodness where there is equal merit and peculiar claims upon us) than offices equally beneficent toward a kinsman, or great benefactor.

BOOK II.

VI. To each right there corresponds an *obligation*, perfect or imperfect, as the right is. The term obligation is both complex and ambiguous. We primarily say one is obliged to an action "when he must "find from the constitution of human nature that he "and every attentive observer must disapprove the "omission of it as morally evil." The word is sometimes taken for "a strong motive of interest consti-"tuted by the will of some potent *superior* to engage "us to act as he requires." In the former meaning, obligation is founded on our moral faculty; in the latter, it seems to abstract from it. But in describing the *superior* who can constitute obligation, we not only include sufficient force or power, but also a just right to govern; and this justice or right will lead us again to our *moral faculty*. Through this ambiguity † ingenious men have contradicted each other with keenness; some asserting an obligation antecedent to all views of interest, or laws; others deriving the original source of all obligation from the law or will of an omnipotent Being. This leads us to consider the general doctrine of laws, and the foundation of the right of governing rational agents, to which corresponds their obligation to obedience.

Right, and obligation, relative.

Indications of the Divine Will.

VII. As we shewed in the former book that we all have sufficient indications of the existence and providence of *God*, and that he is the author of all our natural powers and dispositions, our reason, our *moral faculty*, and our affections; we can by just reflection

† See Leibnitz's censure on Puffendorf and Barbeyrac's defence of him.

alſo plainly diſcern what courſe of action this conſti- CHAP. 3.
tution of our nature recommends both to our appro-
bation as morally excellent, and to our election in point of intereſt. We muſt therefore ſee the intention of the *God* of Nature in all this, and cannot but look upon all theſe concluſions of juſt reaſoning and reflection as ſo many indications to us of the will of *God* concerning our conduct. When we have arrived at this perſuaſion, theſe practical concluſions receive new enforcements upon our hearts, both from our *moral faculty*, and from our intereſt.

The right of the Deity to govern all.

As *God* is juſtly conceived a being of perfect good-
neſs and wiſdom, and the greateſt benefactor to man-
kind, our hearts muſt be diſpoſed by the ſtrongeſt ſentiments of gratitude to comply with all the indications of his will, and muſt feel the ſtrongeſt diſapprobation of all diſobedience. His moral excellence muſt add ſtrength to theſe feelings of gratitude and make a deeper ſenſe of the duty incumbent on us to obey him, as it ſhews that what he enjoins muſt be conducive to the univerſal intereſt. Theſe practical concluſions therefore from the conſtitution of our nature do not ſuggeſt mere matters of private intereſt, or finer taſte, which we are at liberty either to follow as the means of more delicate enjoyment, or to counteract, if we pleaſe to content ourſelves with another ſort of enjoyments. They are enforced as matters of ſacred obligation by the very feelings of our hearts, and a neglect of them muſt be diſapproved in the higheſt manner, and be matter of deep remorſe under the odi-

BOOK II. ous form of ingratitude, and counteracting the universal intereſt. Thus it is that we are ſenſible of our moral obligation to obey the will of *God*. The divine perfections which ſuggeſt theſe ſentiments are his moral attributes, and the benefits he has beſtowed on mankind.

founded on wiſdom and goodneſs.

For as it muſt tend to the univerſal good that a being of perfect wiſdom and goodneſs ſhould ſuperintend human affairs, aſſuming to himſelf to govern their actions, and to declare his pleaſure about them; ſo it muſt undoubtedly tend to the univerſal good that all rational creatures obey his will. This ſhews his right of moral government. For the ultimate notion of right is *that which tends to the univerſal good;* and when one's acting in a certain manner has this tendency, he has a right thus to act.† The proper foundation of right here is infinite goodneſs and wiſdom. The benefits conferred on us by *God*, ſuperadd a new enforcement to our obligation by the ſenſe of gratitude, and our natural abhorrence of ingratitude. But benefits alone, are not a proper foundation of right, as they will not prove that the power aſſumed tends to the univerſal good or is conſiſtent with it, however they ſuggeſt an amiable motive to obedience.

confirmed by his omnipotence.

But as the Deity is alſo omnipotent, and can make happy or miſerable as he pleaſes, this attribute ſuggeſts to us, not a proper foundation of right, but a ſtrong motive of intereſt to obey his will, and a qua-

† Theſe are the *fundamenta poteſtatis ſive imperii*. Power is rather the *conditio ſine qua non*.

lity very neceſſary to execute effectually the right of government aſſumed. The right itſelf is founded on his wiſdom and goodneſs, which ſhew that his aſſuming of power by giving laws and annexing ſanctions will conduce to the greateſt good. And if this good cannot be obtained when the laws have no influence on the ſubjects, nor can they have influence upon minds any way depraved, if they find that the ſanctions are not executed; 'tis plain from the ſame perfections, that 'tis right, or the *Deity* has a right, to execute ſuch ſanctions as are thus neceſſary; which his power always enables him to do. CHAP. 3.

But as no man can give ſuch evidence as ſhall ſatisfy his fellows of his ſuperior goodneſs and wiſdom, and remove ſuſpicions of his weakneſs and intereſted views; as there is no acknowledged criterion of ſuperior wiſdom for governing; and multitudes at once would pretend to it; as there is no aſſurance can be given of good intentions, to which the worſt might by hypocritical ſervices pretend; and as a people cannot be happy while their intereſts precariouſly depend on perſons of ſuſpected goodneſs or wiſdom; theſe qualities cannot be, among men, the natural foundations of power; nor can it ſerve the general intereſt that they ſhould be deemed ſufficient to conſtitute ſuch a right of governing, or of compelling others to obedience. Some extraordinary caſes may be excepted. *Human power not thus founded.*

VIII. As a law is "a declaration made by him who "has a right to govern, what actions he requires, or for- *Laws defined.*

BOOK II. " bids, for the publick good; and what motives of in-
" tereſt he has conſtituted to excite to the actions re-
" quired, and deter from thoſe prohibited." It contains theſe two parts, the *precept*, ſhewing the actions required, or prohibited; and the *ſanction*, ſhewing the rewards to enſue upon obedience, or the evils to be inflicted upon the diſobedient. The precept muſt always be expreſſed, but the ſanction may be underſtood as reſerved diſcretionary to the governor.

Practical dictates of reaſon are divine laws.

This notion of a law ſhews how juſtly the practical concluſions of right reaſon from the order of nature conſtituted by *God*, and laid open to our obſervation, are called *laws of nature*, and *laws of God;* as they are clear declarations of his will about our conduct. And all the private advantages, internal or external, which we can foreſee as probably enſuing upon our complyance, from the conſtitution of our own nature, or that of others, or of the world around us, are ſo many ſanctions of rewards: and all the evils in like manner to be expected from our non-obſervance of theſe concluſions, are ſanctions of puniſhment, declared or promulgated by the ſame means which declare the precepts.

The ſole uſe of words, or writing, in laws, is to diſcover the will of the governor. In poſitive laws it muſt by ſuch means be diſcovered. But there is another and primary way by which God diſcovers his will concerning our conduct, and likeways propoſes the moſt intereſting motives, even by the conſtitution of nature, and the powers of reaſon, and moral perception,

which he has given to mankind, and thus reveals a law with its ſanctions, as effectually as by words, or writing; and in a manner more noble and divine.* CHAP. 3.

Laws natural and poſitive in two ſenſes.

IX. Laws are divided into *natural*, and *poſitive*: But theſe two terms are uſed in very different meanings. Sometimes the diviſion is taken from the *different manners of promulgation;* and then by *natural laws* are underſtood the moral determinations of the heart and the concluſions of right reaſon from theſe determinations and other obſervations of nature; and by *poſitive laws*, ſuch as are promulgated in words or writing, whatever the matter of them be.

Laws neceſſary, or not neceſſary.

Others take the diviſion expreſſed by theſe words from the diverſity of the *matter of laws;* as ſome laws declare the natural direct and neceſſary means of ſupporting the dignity of human nature and promoting the publick good; ſo that either oppoſite or different laws could not be equally uſeful, nay would be pernicious to ſociety: theſe they call *natural:* ſuch are all the laws of juſtice and humanity. Other laws have indeed in intention ſome good end, and with a view to it require certain means, but theſe are not always the ſole, or the neceſſary, or preferable means. The ſame good end may be obtained by different means, and theſe equally convenient or effectual, and yet it may be neceſſary for the good of a ſociety that a certain ſet of means be agreed upon for all. Nay, certain inſtitutions make ſome practices uſeful which in their own nature were of no uſe. Thus ſome rites

* On this ſubject ſee Dr. Cumberland *de Leg. Nat. Prolegom. et* c. i.

BOOK II. of religion, in their own nature of no importance, yet, by being inſtituted in memory of ſome great events, the frequent remembrance of which muſt increaſe grateful, pious, or humane diſpoſitions, may become very uſeful to mankind.

The wiſe ends of poſitive laws.

The moſt frequent occaſions for poſitive laws are where the ſame good ends may be obtained different ways, but 'tis requiſite that ſome one way be fixed for all in a certain diſtrict. Thus neither can ſocial worſhip be performed, nor courts of juſtice be kept, unleſs times and places are determined: and yet 'tis ſeldom found that any one time is fitter than another for any natural reaſon. In like manner, in the execution of juſtice there are different forms of proceſs, different penalties for crimes, different times for executions. 'Tis convenient all theſe points ſhould be known and ſettled for a whole ſociety; and yet no one of the poſſible determinations can be ſaid to be abſolutely beſt, ſo that the ſmalleſt variation would make it worſe.

They are uſeleſs or arbitrary.

Poſitive laws are quite different from what we call arbitrary or imperious, ſuch as are enacted merely from oſtentation of power, without ſubſerviency to the publick intereſt.

To the obligation of a law promulgation is neceſſary; not that every ſubject ſhould actually know it; but that every one have it in his power, by ſuch diligence as he is capable of, to attain to the knowledge of it. The penalties of laws may be juſtly exacted, where the laws have not been actually known, when

the ſubject is culpably ignorant, and might have known them by ſuch diligence as a good man in his circumſtances would have uſed. But the ignorance of ſome laws of more difficult diſcovery may be very excuſable in ſome men becauſe of many avocations, and low abilities, or opportunities, which yet may be very culpable in others placed in more advantageous circumſtances. CHAP. 3.

X. As the laws of nature comprehend not merely the original moral determinations of the mind, but likeways the practical concluſions made by the reaſoning and reflection of men upon the conſtitution of nature, ſhewing what conduct is worthy and tends to publick good, there needs be little controverſy about their perfection, as all muſt own that the reaſon even of the moſt ingenious and moſt improved is ſtill imperfect. And that it may be very poſſible that a ſuperior being could ſee a certain rule of conduct to be conducive to the publick good, which none of human race could ever have diſcovered to be uſeful: and as to the bulk of mankind, they may indeed eaſily diſcover the general and moſt neceſſary rules, but they ſeldom can find out or even apprehend well the reaſons upon which ſome of the more ſpecial laws which yet have a ſubſtantial foundation in nature are built. If one by the ſyſtem of the laws of nature means the very conſtitutions of nature itſelf, or the objective evidence laid before rational beings in the whole; this no doubt is perfect: but its perfection does not ſuperſede the uſefulneſs of the revelation of laws. *How the law of nature is perfect.*

BOOK II. to mankind by words or writing, or of the discoveries of the wiser human legislators or moralists, or of precepts positive as to their matter: since so few of mankind can attain any great knowledge of this constitution, and none can pretend to understand it compleatly.

Its imperfection no ground to censure providence.

We should not censure providence on account of this imperfection, for reasons * mentioned above, any more than we censure it for our small bodily strength, or the shortness of our lives. If we use our powers and opportunities well, the condition of human life in this world will be in the main an agreeable and happy state; and yet by divine revelation, or even by accurate reasonings of wise men, much may be discovered for the improvement of this life; and many fine institutions contrived, the reasons for which neither any one in the ruder nations, nor the populace in the more civilized, shall ever apprehend.

All laws should aim at some good.

But this holds in general, that all wise and just laws have some tendency to the general happiness, or to the good of some part of the system subservient to and consistent with the general good. The moral good in obedience consists in either a direct intention of this good end proposed by the law, whether we know it fully ourselves, or implicitly trust to the goodness of the legislator; or in some grateful affection toward the legislator: where obedience flows only from fear of punishment, or hope of reward, it has no moral excellency, tho' in some cases it may be innocent.

* B. i. c. 9. § 12.

CHAP. 3.

How the law of nature is immutable.

XI. Precepts of the law of nature, or theſe practical obſervations, are deemed immutable and eternal, becauſe ſome rules, or rather the diſpoſitions which gave origin to them, and in which they are founded, muſt always tend to the general good, and the contrary to the general detriment, in ſuch a ſyſtem of creatures as we are. But we muſt not imagine that all the ſpecial precepts of the law of nature are thus immutable as they are commonly enunciated univerſally. If we make the precepts immutable, we muſt allow many exceptions as parts of the precept, or underſtand the precept as holding only generally in ordinary caſes. As the precept is indeed no more than a concluſion from obſervation of what ſort of conduct is ordinarily uſeful to ſociety; ſome ſingular caſes may happen in which departing from the ordinary rule may be more for the general intereſt than following it. And ſome wiſe human inſtitutions may take away or limit ſome rights which formerly were ſacredly confirmed to each individual by the law of nature. Before civil polity each one had a right by private violence when gentler methods were ineffectual, of obtaining reparation of wrong from the author of it. But in civil polity private individuals ceaſe to have a right to uſe thoſe means. In like manner civil laws juſtly limit our uſe of our own property, and take ſome ſhare of it for publick exigences, whereas previouſly to ſome political inſtitution the general law of nature allowed to each one the full uſe of all his own acquiſitions, and the right of diſpoſing of them at

Book II. pleaſure. Singular caſes of neceſſity are alſo juſtly deemed exceptions from the ordinary laws. 'Tis injurious ordinarily to uſe the property of another without his conſent; but an innocent man when he cannot otherways ſave his life in his flying from an unjuſt enemy, does no wrong by taking the horſe of another when he cannot wait for the owner's conſent.

The two fundamental precepts of "loving God, "and promoting the univerſal happineſs," admit of no exceptions; nay in the latter precept are founded all the exceptions from the ſpecial laws of nature; all the rights of receding, in caſes of ſingular neceſſity, from the ordinary rules; and all the limitations of our rights by any wiſe inſtitutions: ſince all theſe are juſtified by their tendency in certain caſes, and upon certain ſuppoſitions, to a ſuperior good of the ſyſtem than would enſue from following the ordinary rule.

XII. Some intricate controverſies ariſe among moraliſts and ſchoolmen, from not obſerving ſufficiently the difference between theſe practical obſervations we call laws of nature, and the laws declared in words and writing by legiſlators, divine, or human. They may be prevented by the following remarks.

Equity what. 1. As by * equity, they underſtand, a "correction "of any defect in the law by too great or too ſmall extent of its expreſſion," when it is juſtly interpreted according to the true intention of the legiſlator, extended as far as the reaſon of it extends, and not extended to caſes where the reaſon of the law does not

* The ἐπιείκεια of Ariſtotle and the ſchoolmen.

hold; there is no room for this ſort of equity as diſtinct from the letter in the law of nature; as the law is not declared to us by words, in which alone there can be too ſmall or great univerſality. Whatever right reaſon ſhews to be humane and equitable in conduct, is a part of the law of nature. CHAP. 3.

The doctrine of Diſpenſation aroſe from the Canon Law.

2. The whole doctrine of *diſpenſations* was introduced by the *canoniſts*, after many capricious, imprudent, and unneceſſary laws were impoſed upon the Chriſtian world, with the worſt deſigns, and yet it was often found neceſſary to free men from the obligation of them. By *diſpenſation* is underſtood "ſome "act of the legiſlator exempting certain perſons from "the obligation of laws which extended to them as "well as others:" and always imports ſome abatement or derogation from a law.

Diſpenſation, ambiguous.

3. The word *diſpenſation* is very ambiguous; and there are different kinds of it. *Diſpenſation* may be given either from the ſanction, after the law is violated, or from the precept, previouſly to any violation of the law. A diſpenſation from the ſanction is "exempting a perſon from the legal puniſhment who "has incurred it by violating the law; or the abating "or altering of the puniſhment." Now, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, there are ſome very ſtrong reaſons why a power of ſuch diſpenſation ſhould be lodged ſomewhere in every ſtate, when the publick intereſt may require ſuch diſpenſations: and, in like manner, as to ſuch puniſhments as may naturally enſue, and be ordinarily neceſſary for the general good upon the vio-

BOOK II. lation of the laws of nature, it may be perfectly wise and benign that *God*, the great ruler of the world, should sometimes mercifully interpose and prevent these sufferings when the true end of them can be otherways obtained. But as we cannot conceive any such laws limiting *God* himself as may limit even the supreme magistrates of states, nor are any such particular punishments specified by the laws of nature invariably as may be by human laws, there can be little occasion for debating about the divine right of dispensing with the sanctions of the laws of nature.

Previous dispensation from just laws must be evil.

4. As to previous dispensations from the precepts of laws, if the law itself be wise in all its extent, the previous dispensing with any violation of it must appear unjust and imprudent in any governor. And 'tis plain that no permission or command of any person can alter the moral nature of our affections so as to make the love of God, and our neighbour, become evil; or any contrary affections become good: nor can any permission or command alter the moral nature of the external actions which flow from these affections. No man could approve any such permissions or commands, nor can they ever be given by a good *God*. Some confused notions of the divine right of dominion or sovereignty have led some authors into such sentiments, as if a divine command could justify unkind or inhumane affections, and actions consequent upon them tending to the general detriment of the system. But if one would consult the feelings of his heart, and examine well the original notion of right in

action, or the right of governing, as distinct from mere superior force, he would see such tenets to be contradictory to themselves. CHAP. 3.

5. As to external actions required, where nothing is in words prescribed about the affections, the certain command of a being who we are persuaded is possessed of perfect goodness and wisdom, may justly make us conclude that such enjoined actions, contrary to the present external appearances, may truly tend to superior good in the whole, and occasion no prepollent evil: when the evidence for the goodness of the enjoiner, and for this fact that he is the author of this injunction, is so great as to surpass sufficiently the contrary presumption from the external appearances of a bad tendency in the actions commanded. This case can scarce be called a dispensation from the laws of nature, since the agent is acting according to the law, what he believes is tending to good, tho' his opinion about this tendency is founded upon the testimony of another, and not upon his own knowledge.

What dispensation may be vindicated.

6. If by dispensation be understood only "a granting external impunity to actions really evil, or contrary to those rules of right reason which shew the most perfect and virtuous course of actions;" human lawgivers must often grant such external impunity, as we shall see hereafter. And 'tis alledged that many such permissions are in the *Mosaick Law*, which may be justified from the circumstances of that people and of the neighbouring nations: since a more ri-

Book II. gidly virtuous inſtitution would have made them revolt altogether from the worſhip of the true *God*. But then ſuch a grant of external impunity does not remove or abate the moral turpitude of the actions in ſuch men as know their pernicious tendency, or their contrariety to the moſt perfect and virtuous inſtitutions. By ſuch permiſſions however, and the general practice enſuing, the populace may be made generally leſs attentive to any bad tendency of ſuch actions, and ſecure about it, ſo that the guilt may be much extenuated by the ignorance prevailing, which in ſome of the loweſt orders of men may become almoſt invincible. But ſince the guilt is not entirely removed by ſuch permiſſions, they are not what the Schoolmen and Canoniſts generally underſtand by diſpenſations from the law of nature, which they ſuppoſe makes the actions in conſequence of them perfectly innocent.

Miſtakes about diſpenſations.

7. Nor do theſe caſes come up to the common notion of diſpenſation when a ſuperior acting according to the powers veſted in him by the law diſpoſes in an unuſual manner of things committed to his diſpoſal; or when the goods of the ſubjects, who have a right to them valid againſt their fellows, but not valid by law againſt their ſovereign, are diſpoſed of by the ſovereign according to the powers veſted in him by the law, and transferred from one to another. Or when the prince impowers others to do in his name what he has a right to do by what officers he pleaſes, tho' it would have been criminal in any ſubject without his prince's commiſſion to have done ſuch ac-

tions. What is commanded by any one in conſequence of the powers conſtituted to him by the law, and executed accordingly, can ſcarce be ſaid to be done by virtue of a diſpenſing from the law. A debtor is bound by the law to make payment: but a remiſſion or releaſe from the creditor frees him from this obligation. We ſhould not therefore ſay that every creditor has a power of diſpenſing with the laws of nature. The more acute Schoolmen, upon theſe conſiderations, do not allow the extraordinary commands given to Moſes and Joſhua to be diſpenſations from the laws of nature. But 'tis needleſs to debate about words. If the law itſelf be wiſe and juſt in all the extent in which it is expreſſed, no act of any ſuperior can make the counteracting it innocent or lovely. But moſt of the ſpecial laws of nature are not to be expreſſed in words ſtrictly univerſal, without the exception of many caſes; particularly that of God's exerting his rightful dominion. CHAP. 3.

Diſpenſations therefore, according to the full intention of the Canoniſts, are only to be made with laws either capricious or imprudent, or too univerſally expreſſed without mentioning the reaſonable and juſt exceptions, which ought to have been inſerted in the very laws themſelves. In the laws of nature there can be no place for them, ſince the ſame reaſon and obſervation which diſcovers the ordinary general rule, diſcovers alſo all the exceptions, which are therefore parts of the law. *What is commonly meant by them.*

Having premiſed this general doctrine about the

BOOK II. morality of actions, rights and laws, we proceed to the more special consideration of the rights and duties of mankind, and the special laws of nature; and that first, as they are constituted by nature itself previously to adventitious states and relations introduced by human institution and contrivance, and then as they arise and are founded in some adventitious relation or institution.

CHAP. IV.

The different STATES *of* MEN. *The State of* LIBERTY *not a State of* WAR. *The Way that private* RIGHTS *are known. The Necessity of a* SOCIAL LIFE.

What is a moral state.

WHEN we speak of the different states of men, by a *state* we do not mean any transient condition a man may be in for a little time, nor any obligation he may be under to one or two transient acts, but "a permanent condition including a long series "of rights and obligations." The conditions men may be in as to sickness or health, beauty or deformity, or any other circumstances which are considered in the other arts, are foreign to our purpose. The moral states of men alway include a series of moral obligations, and rights.

The state of natural liberty not a state of war.

I. In the first state constituted by nature itself we must discern abundantly from the doctrine of the preceeding book that there are many sacred rights com-

petent to men, and many obligations incumbent on each one toward his fellows. The whole ſyſtem of the mind, eſpecially our *moral faculty*, ſhews that we are under natural bonds of beneficence and humanity toward all, and under many more ſpecial tyes to ſome of our fellows, binding us to many ſervices of an higher kind, than what the reſt can claim: nor need we other proofs here that this firſt ſtate founded by nature is ſo far from being that of war and enmity, that it is a ſtate where we are all obliged by the natural feelings of our hearts, and by many tender affections, to innocence and beneficence toward all: and that war is one of the accidental ſtates ariſing ſolely from injury, when we or ſome of our fellows have counteracted the dictates of their nature. CHAP. 4.

'Tis true that in this ſtate of liberty where there are no civil laws with a viſible power to execute their ſanctions, men will often do injurious actions contrary to the laws of their nature; and the reſentments of the ſufferers will produce wars and violence. But this proves nothing as to the true nature of that ſtate, ſince all the laws and obligations of that ſtate enjoin peace and juſtice and beneficence. In civil ſocieties many diſobey the law, by theft and violence, but we do not thence conclude that a political ſtate is a ſtate of war among men thus united.

'Tis alſo true that the natural paſſions and appetites of men will frequently lead them into mutual injuries. But then the laws of this ſtate are not derived from theſe principles alone. There are ſuperior

Frequent injuries do not prove it.

BOOK II. powers naturally fitted to controll them, particularly that *moral faculty* which points out the rights and obligations of this ſtate, and ſhews how far any appetite or paſſion can be indulged conſiſtently with the inward approbation of our ſouls, and what indulgences muſt be matter of remorſe, ſelf-abhorrence, and ſhame. We are alſo endued with reaſon which clearly points out even our external intereſts in this matter, and ſhews that we cannot probably gratify even our ſelfiſh deſires, except by an innocent and friendly deportment toward others. Theſe powers ſuggeſt the rules or laws of this ſtate of liberty, and all ſtates are denominated from what the laws and obligations of them enjoin or require, and not from ſuch conduct as the paſſions of men may hurry them into contrary to the laws of thoſe ſtates.

Contradictions in that ſcheme.

The authors of this moſt unnatural ſcheme never fail to contradict their own doctrine, by owning and arguing that that rational faculty, which they allow we are naturally endued with for the conduct of life, will ſoon ſhew that this univerſal war of all with all muſt be the moſt deſtructive imaginable; and that it is to be ſhunned by every one as ſoon as he can; and that reaſon will alſo ſhew ſome obvious rules of conduct proper to preſerve or reſtore peace to mankind with all its bleſſings. Surely then that conduct which the natural principles of mankind ſhew to be moſt neceſſary and moſt obviouſly eligible to every one, ſhould be deemed the natural conduct in this ſtate, and not what a brutal thoughtleſs appetite may hurry one in-

to while the governing principles of his nature are a- CHAP. 4.
ſleep, or unexerciſed.

'Tis alſo a fooliſh abuſe of words to call a ſtate of abſolute ſolitude a *natural* ſtate to mankind, ſince in this condition neither could any of mankind come into being, or continue in it a few days without a miraculous interpoſition.

II. This ſtate of natural liberty obtains among thoſe who have no common ſuperior or magiſtrate, and are only ſubject to *God*, and the law of nature. 'Tis no fictitious ſtate; it always exiſted and muſt exiſt among men, unleſs the whole earth ſhould become one empire. The parental power of the firſt parents of mankind muſt ſoon have expired when their children came to maturity, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter, or at leaſt when the parents died. This ſtate of liberty probably continued a long time among the ſeveral heads of families before civil governments were conſtituted. And 'tis not improbable that it yet ſubſiſts in ſome ruder parts of the world. Nay it ſtill muſt ſubſiſt among the ſeveral independent ſtates with reſpect to each other, and among the ſubjects of different ſtates who may happen to meet in the ocean, or in lands where no civil power is conſtituted. The laws of nature are the laws of this ſtate, whether they be confirmed by civil power or not: and 'tis the main purpoſe of civil laws and their ſanctions, to reſtrain men more effectually by viſible puniſhments from the violation of them. The ſame reaſons which juſtify the greater part of our civil laws, ſhew the obligations of men to obſerve

The ſtate of liberty always ſubſiſts.

BOOK II. them as laws of nature abſtracting from any motives from ſecular authority.

Rights are thoſe of individuals, of ſocieties, or of all mankind.

III. As men are ſaid to "have rights to do, poſſeſs, "or demand from others whatſoever the happineſs of "the individual requires and the publick intereſt of "mankind permits that they ſhould be allowed to do, "poſſeſs, or obtain from others;" and all rights and obligations are founded in ſome tendency either to the general happineſs, or to that of individuals conſiſtently with the general good, which muſt reſult from the happineſs of individuals; rights may be divided, according to the ſubject or perſons in whom they reſide or to whom they belong, and for whoſe good they are immediately conſtituted, into thoſe of individuals, thoſe of particular ſocieties or corporations, and thoſe in general belonging to all mankind as a ſyſtem. The firſt ſort are conſtituted immediately for the behoof of individuals, by the law of nature; the ſecond for the common intereſt of a corporation or ſtate, tho' not more immediately for any one member of it than another; in the third ſort of rights neither any one individual, or any one corporation, may be more concerned than another, and yet it may be for the general intereſt of mankind that ſuch rights be aſſerted and maintained. And each of theſe three claſſes may be either perfect, or imperfect, according as they are more or leſs neceſſary to be maintained for the publick intereſt, and of ſuch a nature as to admit of compulſion and violence in the defence or proſecution of them; or, on the other hand, ſuch as muſt be left to each

one's conſcience and ſenſe of duty: this diviſion we explained above.

How private rights are known.

IV. The private rights of individuals are obviouſly intimated to us in the conſtitution of our nature, by theſe two circumſtances, jointly; firſt, natural deſires and ſenſes pointing out the gratifications we are fitted to receive as parts of that happineſs the author of our nature has intended for us, and ſecondly, by the powers of reaſon and reflection which can diſcover how far the gratification of our natural deſires is conſiſtent with the finer principles in our conſtitution, which, as we ſhewed above, are deſtined to govern and controll all our particular deſires. Theſe principles ſhew the limits to be put, not only to the ſelfiſh deſires aiming at the private happineſs of the agent, but to the ſeveral narrower generous affections, and the gratifications which they purſue; and plainly diſcover that the grand end of our being is indeed the promoting the moſt univerſal happineſs, but that our heart at the ſame time may approve our conduct not only in acts of particular beneficence toward perſons eſpecially dear to us in ſome of the nearer relations, while this beneficence does not interfere with more extenſive intereſts; but alſo in the purſuit of all private gratifications which are conſiſtent with theſe intereſts, and do not engroſs the mind or contract it too much within itſelf.

The natural appetites and deſires firſt intimate the matters of private right, but we can ſeldom juſtify to ourſelves a compliance with their intimations till we

BOOK II. have conſidered whether the gratification to which we are prompted be conſiſtent with the deſigns of the more noble parts of our conſtitution, which are the grand objects of the ſoul's approbation, aiming at a more extenſive or the univerſal happineſs. Indeed in many of the objects of our deſires, this conſiſtency is ſo obvious, or there is ſo little preſumption of any oppoſition, that we are convinced of our right to them at once without much reflection on more extenſive intereſts; nay in many caſes we ſeem to have an immediate ſenſe of right along with the natural deſire, and a ſenſe of moral evil in any oppoſition given to us by others, as we at once apprehend the neceſſity of certain gratifications to our having any tolerable enjoyment of life; and we muſt abhor as cruel and inhuman any oppoſition given to us, or to others, in theſe gratifications, where we do not ſee ſuch oppoſition to be neceſſary for ſome more extenſive intereſt.

The neceſſity of great caution on this ſubject.

But as the chief dangers to our manners ariſe from the vehemence of our ſelfiſh appetites and paſſions, which often break through theſe reſtraints from the finer principles in our conſtitution regarding a publick intereſt, it may be of advantage to ſatisfy the mind on every ſide of the juſtice of theſe reſtraints, and to ſhew that its own intereſt of every kind conſpires to recommend this ſubjection of the *ſelfiſh*, to the *generous* and *ſocial principles*. Our *moral faculty* above-explained ſhews both the juſtice and beauty of ſuch ſubjection; and ſhews a very ſublime internal intereſt in the inward delight and approbation of our

hearts. Our reaſon by diſcovering to us the moral government of the *Deity*, and his perfections, preſents further motives to preſerve this ſubordination, both of the generous and intereſted kind: and a juſt conſideration of the circumſtances of mankind with reſpect to external things, will afford alſo new motives of ſecular intereſt to that ſame external conduct which theſe ſublimer principles excite us to, as we ſhall endeavour briefly to explain. CHAP. 4.

V. In the firſt place, 'tis obvious that for the ſupport of human life, to allay the painful cravings of the appetites, and to afford any of thoſe agreeable external enjoyments which our nature is capable of, a great many external things are requiſite; ſuch as food, cloathing, habitations, many utenſils, and various furniture, which cannot be obtained without a great deal of art and labour, and the friendly aids of our fellows.

Solitude miſerable and indigent.

Again, 'tis plain that a man in abſolute ſolitude, tho' he were of mature ſtrength, and fully inſtructed in all our arts of life, could ſcarcely procure to himſelf the bare neceſſaries of life, even in the beſt ſoils or climates; much leſs could he procure any grateful conveniencies. One uninſtructed in the arts of life, tho' he had full ſtrength, would be ſtill more incapable of ſubſiſting in ſolitude: and it would be abſolutely impoſſible, without a miracle, that one could ſubſiſt in this condition from his infancy. And ſuppoſe that food, raiment, ſhelter, and the means of ſenſual pleaſure, were ſupplied by a miracle; yet a life in ſo-

Book II. litude must be full of fears and dangers. Suppose farther all these dangers removed; yet in solitude there could be no exercise for many of the natural powers and instincts of our species; no love, or social joys, or communication of pleasure, or esteem, or mirth. The contrary dispositions of soul must grow upon a man in this unnatural state, a sullen melancholy, and discontent, which must make life intolerable. This subject is abundantly explained by almost all authors upon the law of nature.

The mutual aids of a few in a small family, may procure most of the necessaries of life, and diminish dangers, and afford room for some social joys as well as finer pleasures. The same advantages could still be obtained more effectually and copiously by the mutual assistance of a few such families living in one neighbourhood, as they could execute more operose designs for the common good of all; and would furnish more joyful exercises of our social dispositions.

The advantages of society.

Nay 'tis well known that the produce of the labours of any given number, twenty, for instance, in providing the necessaries or conveniences of life, shall be much greater by assigning to one, a certain sort of work of one kind, in which he will soon acquire skill and dexterity, and to another assigning work of a different kind, than if each one of the twenty were obliged to employ himself, by turns, in all the different sorts of labour requisite for his subsistence, without sufficient dexterity in any. In the former method each procures a great quantity of goods of one kind, and

can exchange a part of it for ſuch goods obtained by the labours of others as he ſhall ſtand in need of. One grows expert in tillage, another in paſture and breeding cattle, a third in maſonry, a fourth in the chace, a fifth in iron-works, a ſixth in the arts of the loom, and ſo on throughout the reſt. Thus all are ſupplied by means of barter with the works of complete artiſts. In the other method ſcarce any one could be dextrous and skilful in any one ſort of labour. CHAP. 4.

The advantages of large ſocieties.

Again ſome works of the higheſt uſe to multitudes can be effectually executed by the joint labours of many, which the ſeparate labours of the ſame number could never have executed. The joint force of many can repel dangers ariſing from ſavage beaſts or bands of robbers, which might have been fatal to many individuals were they ſeparately to encounter them. The joint labours of twenty men will cultivate foreſts, or drain marſhes, for farms to each one, and provide houſes for habitation, and incloſures for their flocks, much ſooner than the ſeparate labours of the ſame number. By concert, and alternate relief, they can keep a perpetual watch, which without concert they could not accompliſh.

Larger aſſociations may further enlarge our means of enjoyment, and give more extenſive and delightful exerciſe to our powers of every kind. The inventions, experience, and arts of multitudes are communicated; knowledge is increaſed, and ſocial affections more diffuſed. Larger ſocieties have force to execute greater deſigns of more laſting and extenſive ad-

BOOK II. vantage.* These considerations abundantly shew the necessity of living in society, and obtaining the aid of our fellows, for our very subsistence; and the great convenience of larger associations of men for the improvement of life, and the increase of all our enjoyments.

Good offices must be mutual, and much self-government.

But 'tis obvious that we cannot expect the friendly aids of our fellows, without, on our part, we be ready to good offices, and restrain all the selfish passions which may arise upon any interfering interests so that they shall not be injurious to others. Much thought and caution is requisite to find out such rules of conduct in society as shall most effectually secure the general interest, and promote peace and a mutual good understanding. Whatever generous principles there are in our nature, yet they are not alone, there are likeways many angry passions to which we are subject upon apprehension of injury intended, or executed; and all these powers by which men can so effectually give mutual aid, and do good offices, may be also employed, upon provocation, to the detriment of their fellows. Provoking of others by injury must generally be imprudent conduct in point of self-interest, as well as matter of remorse and self-condemnation. No man can be tolerably assured that his force or art shall be superior to that of those who may be roused to oppose him; multitudes conceive a just indignation against any unjust violence, and are

* See this whole subject beautifully explained in the second book of *Cicero de Officiis*.

thence prone to repel it. And they are further rouſed by pity for the ſufferer and juſt apprehenſions that ſuch miſchiefs unreſtrained may ſoon affect themſelves. How dangerous then muſt it be to rouſe ſuch indignation by any acts of injuſtice toward any of our fellows? CHAP. 4.

A ſtrong motive from the dangers of violence.

Nature has alſo preſented to us all a very ſtrong motive to abſtain from injuries, and to reſtrain all the extravagancies of the ſelfiſh paſſions from the delicacy and weakneſs of our frame. Tho' mankind have no powers which can properly be called engines of miſchief, ſince ſuch as can hurt others can alſo be employed in kind ſocial offices; and as all the governing principles of nature rather excite to good offices, all our powers are juſtly deemed to be naturally deſtined for promoting ſocial happineſs; yet 'tis plain our efforts in hurting others, where we intend it heartily, can more probably be ſucceſsful and effectual, than our deſigns to ſecure the happineſs of others, according to a common maxim, that "few have ſufficient talents to do much good, but very mean ones "may do much miſchief." We are of a very delicate texture; our eaſe and happineſs not only requires a right diſpoſition of a great many nice bodily organs which can eaſily be put out of order, but a great many external objects and conveniencies of which we may eaſily be deprived; and the eaſe of our minds requires the proſperity of many other perſons who are dear to us, whoſe texture is as delicate as our own, and expoſed to be diſordered by any malicious efforts

Book II. of our fellows. To our complete eaſe and happineſs the proſperous concurrence of a great many things is requiſite: whereas we may be heartily diſturbed by any thing unproſperous in one or two of theſe circumſtances: and 'tis very often in the power of our fellows to create to us this diſturbance, tho' they cannot ſo effectually ſecure our happineſs when they deſire it.

This infirm uncertain condition of our external happineſs muſt powerfully move us to cultivate peace and good-will in ſociety, and to ſhun all offence and provocation of others; ſince we hazard more by incurring the hatred of others than we can probably hope to gain. Tho' the forces of men are unequal, yet art can ſupply the defects of force; and an obſtinate reſolution can ſupply the defects of both, ſo as to deprive an adverſary of life and all his other enjoyments, as well as of the advantage he aimed at by the provoking injury. Thus when men are not forced into violence for their own defence, peace and juſtice are ſtill eligible to the powerful and artful as well as to others; ſince they know not what univerſal indignation may be raiſed by any thing injurious, from the *moral ſenſe* of mankind, from ſympathy with the ſufferer, and apprehenſions of their own future dangers: and a friendly juſt kind deportment, as it naturally engages the good-will, the eſteem, and good offices of others, is the only probable method of obtaining ſecurity, and all the external advantages and pleaſures of life.

CHAP. V.

The Private RIGHTS *of* MEN; *first such as are called* NATURAL; *and the natural Equality of Men.*

I. PRIVATE rights of individuals according to their different originals are either *natural* or *adventitious*. The *natural* are such as each one has from the constitution of nature itself without the intervention of any human contrivance, institution, compact, or deed. The *adventitious* arise from some human institution, compact, or action. *Rights natural and adventitious.*

The following natural rights of each individual seem of the perfect sort. 1. A right to life, and to that perfection of body which nature has given, belongs to every man as man, while no important publick interest requires his being exposed to death, or wounds. This right is violated by unjust assaults, maiming, or murthering. The connate desire of life and self-preservation intimates to every one this right, as does also our immediate sense of moral evil in all cruelty occasioning unnecessary pain, or abatement of happiness to any of our fellows; not to mention the dismal air of the human countenance occasioned by grievous pain, or death, the beholding of which must move every human heart with pity and terror, and abhorrence of the voluntary cause of such unnecessary sufferings. *The natural rights to life, and safety.*

2. As nature has implanted in each man a desire of his own happiness, and many tender affections to- *To liberty of action.*

BOOK II. ward others in some nearer relations of life, and granted to each one some understanding and active powers, with a natural impulse to exercise them for the purposes of these natural affections; 'tis plain each one has a natural right to exert his powers, according to his own judgment and inclination, for these purposes, in all such industry, labour, or amusements, as are not hurtful to others in their persons or goods, while no more publick interests necessarily requires his labours, or requires that his actions should be under the direction of others. This right we call *natural liberty*. Every man has a sense of this right, and a sense of the evil of cruelty in interrupting this joyful liberty of others, without necessity for some more general good. Those who judge well about their own innocent interests will use their liberty virtuously and honourably; such as have less wisdom will employ it in meaner pursuits, and perhaps in what may be justly censured as vicious. And yet while they are not injurious to others, and while no wise human institution has for the publick good subjected them to the controll of magistrates or laws, the sense of natural liberty is so strong, and the loss of it so deeply resented by human nature, that it would generally create more misery to deprive men of it because of their imprudence, than what is to be feared from their imprudent use of it. The weakest of mankind are not so void of forethought but that it would occasion to them exquisite distress, and sink their souls into an abject sorrow, or kindle all the passions of resentment, to deprive them

of their natural liberty, and ſubject their actions, and all intereſts dear to them, to the pleaſure of others about whoſe ſuperior wiſdom and good intentions they were not thoroughly ſatisfied. Let men inſtruct, teach, and convince their fellows as far as they can about the proper uſe of their natural powers, or perſuade them to ſubmit voluntarily to ſome wiſe plans of civil power where their important intereſts ſhall be ſecured. But till this be done, men muſt enjoy their natural liberty as long as they are not injurious, and while no great publick intereſt requires ſome reſtriction of it. CHAP. 5.

This right of natural liberty is not only ſuggeſted by the ſelfiſh parts of our conſtitution, but by many generous affections, and by our *moral ſenſe*, which repreſents our own voluntary actions as the grand dignity and perfection of our nature.

3. A like natural right every intelligent being has about his own opinions, ſpeculative or practical, to judge according to the evidence that appears to him. This right appears from the very conſtitution of the rational mind which can aſſent or diſſent ſolely according to the evidence preſented, and naturally deſires knowledge. The ſame conſiderations ſhew this right to be unalienable: it cannot be ſubjected to the will of another: tho' where there is a previous judgment formed concerning the ſuperior wiſdom of another, or his infallibility, the opinion of this other, to a weak mind, may become ſufficient evidence. As to opinions about the Deity, religion, and virtue, this *Private judgment.*

BOOK II. right is further confirmed by all the nobleſt deſires of the ſoul: as there can be no virtue, but rather impiety in not adhering to the opinions we think juſt, and in profeſſing the contrary. Such as judge truly in theſe matters, act virtuouſly: and as for weak men, who form falſe opinions, it may do good to inſtruct and convince them of the truth if we can; but to compel them to profeſs contrary to their opinions, or to act what they believe to be vicious, or impious in religion, muſt always be unjuſt, as no intereſt of ſociety can require it, and ſuch profeſſion and action muſt be ſinful to thoſe who believe it to be ſo. If any falſe opinions of a religious or moral nature tend to diſturb the peace or ſafety of ſociety, or render men incapable of ſuch duties of ſubjects as are requiſite for the publick ſafety, it may be juſt to oblige thoſe who embrace them to give ſufficient ſecurity for their conduct, * and to defray the charge of employing others to perform their duties for them; or to remove themſelves from this ſtate with their effects, and make way for better ſubjects, where the ſtate cannot otherways be ſafe.

Right over one's own life.

4. As *God*, by the ſeveral affections and the moral faculty he has given us, has ſhewed the true ends and purpoſes of human life and all our powers; promoting the univerſal happineſs, and, as far as is conſiſtent with it, our own private happineſs, and that of ſuch as are dear to us; in conformity to his own gracious purpo-

* This reſembles the *actio de damno infecto*, which is no diminution of the right of property.

ſes; we muſt diſcern not only a right that each one has over his own life to expoſe it to even the greateſt dangers when 'tis neceſſary for theſe purpoſes, but that it is frequently the moſt honourable and lovely thing we can do, and what we are ſacredly obliged to out of duty to *God* and our fellow-creatures. Mankind have often a right to demand this ſervice from us, tho' we had no proſpect of eſcaping. A brave man has a right to act ſuch a part, and the publick intereſt has this claim upon him, from the conſtitution of nature, previouſly to any political conſtitutions, or any compacts in this affair. Magiſtrates have a right to compel men to ſuch perilous ſervices, becauſe they were antecedently good and right: and they are the more glorious, the more voluntarily they are undertaken. CHAP. 5.

About theſe caſes where the publick intereſt may require the hazarding life, expoſing ourſelves to certain death, men muſt judge, by impartially comparing probabilities, as we judge about all human affairs where abſolute certainty is ſeldom attainable. If we have no right over our lives for the publick intereſt, we cannot juſtly expoſe them to danger; what one has no moral power over, he cannot ſubject to contingencies. "*God* has indeed placed us in life as ſoldiers in "certain ſtations, which we are to maintain till we are "recalled," according to the fine ſentiment of Socrates, or Pythagoras. But we muſt diſcharge the duties of theſe ſtations at all hazards. Our ſole buſineſs is not to prolong life on any terms. As our reaſon and *moral faculty* ſhew us our ſtation and its duties, the

BOOK II. ſame powers muſt ſhew us when we are recalled, what the duties of life are, when it is to be expoſed even to the greateſt dangers; when the publick intereſt requires, then it is that our *Commander* recalls us by the ſame voice which intimated to us our ſtation and its duties.

A right to uſe what is common.

5. Each one has a natural right to the uſe of ſuch things as are in their nature fitted for the common uſe of all; (of which hereafter:) and has a like right, by any innocent means, to acquire property in ſuch goods as are fit for occupation and property, and have not been occupied by others. The natural deſires of mankind, both of the ſelfiſh and ſocial kind, ſhew this right. And 'tis plainly cruel and unjuſt to hinder any innocent acquiſitions of another: when indeed ſome acquiſitions would endanger the liberty, independency, or ſafety of his neighbours, they have a right either to prevent ſuch acquiſitions, or to oblige him who makes them to give ſufficient ſecurity for the ſafety of others.

Right to ſociety with others.

6. For the like reaſons every innocent perſon has a natural right to enter into an intercourſe of innocent offices or commerce with all who incline to deal with him. 'Tis injurious in any third perſon to interfere, or confine his or their choice, when he has not acquired ſome right to direct their actions.

To the character of innocence.

7. As we all have a ſtrong natural deſire of eſteem, and the greateſt averſion to infamy, every man has a natural right to the ſimple character of probity and honeſty, and of diſpoſitions fit for a ſocial life, until he has forfeited this right by an oppoſite conduct.

To marriage.

8. From the natural and ſtrong deſires of marriage

and offspring we may discern the natural right each one has to enter into the matrimonial relation with any one who consents, and is not in this matter subjected to the controll of others, or under a prior contract. In this matter, as much as any, an opinion of happiness and a mutual good liking is necessary to the happiness of the parties, and compulsion must create misery. CHAP. 5.

That all these rights are of the perfect sort, must appear from the great misery which would ensue from the violation of them to the person thus injured; and a general violation of them must break off all friendly society among men.

II. *The natural equality of men* consists chiefly in this, that these natural rights belong equally to all: this is the thing intended by the natural equality, let the term be proper or improper. Every one is a part of that great system, whose greatest interest is intended by all the laws of *God* and nature. These laws prohibit the greatest or wisest of mankind to inflict any misery on the meanest, or to deprive them of any of their natural rights, or innocent acquisitions, when no publick interest requires it. These laws confirm in the same manner to all their rights natural or acquired, to the weak and simple their small acquisitions, as well as their large ones to the strong and artful. The same access to adventitious rights is open, and the same means appointed for all who can use them. If great occupation and much labour employed, intitles the vigorous and active to great possessions; the weak and indolent have an e- *Natural equality of men.*

BOOK II. qually ſacred right to the ſmall poſſeſſions they occupy and improve. There is *equality in right*, how different ſoever the objects may be: that *jus aequum* in which the Romans placed true freedom.

Not naturally unequal.

Men differ much from each other in wiſdom, virtue, beauty, and ſtrength: but the loweſt of them, who have the uſe of reaſon, differ in this from the brutes, that by fore-thought and reflection they are capable of incomparably greater happineſs or miſery. Scarce any man can be happy who ſees that all his enjoyments are precarious, and depending on the will of others of whoſe kind intentions he can have no aſſurance. All men have ſtrong deſires of liberty and property, have notions of right, and ſtrong natural impulſes to marriage, families, and offſpring, and earneſt deſires of their ſafety. 'Tis true the generality may be convinced that ſome few are much ſuperior to them in valuable abilities: this finer part of the ſpecies have imperfect rights to ſuperior ſervices from the reſt: they are pointed out by nature as the fitteſt to be intruſted with the management of the common affairs of ſociety, in ſuch plans of power as ſatisfy the community that its common intereſts ſhall be faithfully conſulted. But without this ſatisfaction given, permanent power aſſumed by force over the fortunes of others muſt generally tend to the miſery of the whole. Mere promiſes or profeſſions give no ſecurity. The darkeſt and moſt dangerous tyrants may make the faireſt ſhews till they are ſettled in power. We muſt therefore conclude, that no endowments,

natural or acquired, can give a perfect right to assume power over others, without their consent. CHAP. 5.

III. This is intended against the doctrine of Aristotle, and some others of the antients, "that some "men are naturally slaves, of low genius but great "bodily strength for labour: and others by nature "masters of finer and wiser spirits, but weaker bodies: "that the former are by nature destined to be sub-"ject to the later, as the work-beasts are subjected to "men. That the inhabitants of certain countries, "particularly Greece, are universally of finer spirits, "and destined to command; and that the rest of the "world are fitted for slavery. That by this subordi-"nation of the more stupid and imprudent to the "wise and ingenious, the universal interest of the sys-"tem is best promoted, as that of the animal system is "promoted by the power of the rational species over "the irrational." *Aristotle's doctrine considered.*

The power of education is surprizing! this author in these justly admired books of politicks is a zealous asserter of liberty, and has seen the finest and most humane reasons for all the more equitable plans of civil power. He lived in that singular century, in which Greece indeed produced more great and ingenious men than perhaps the world ever beheld at once: but had he lived to our times, he would have known, that this beloved country, for sixteen centuries, hath seldom produced any thing eminent in virtue, polity, arts, or arms; while great genii were often arising in the nations he had adjudged to slavery and barbarity.

Is it not abundantly known by experience, that

BOOK II. such as have a less fortunate capacity for the ingenious arts, yet often surpass the ingenious in sagacity, prudence, justice, and firmness of mind, and all those abilities which fit a man for governing well. And then 'tis often found that men of less genius for arts, or policy, may have the loveliest turn of temper for all the sweet social virtues in private life, and the most delicate sense of liberty. Are such amiable characters to be less esteemed, or their interests and inward satisfaction less regarded, or subjected to the pleasure of the artful and ambitious? The natural sense of justice and humanity abhors the thought.

Had providence intended that some men should have had a perfect right to govern the rest without their consent, we should have had as visible undisputed marks distinguishing these rulers from others as clearly as the human shape distinguishes men from beasts. Some nations would be found void of care, of fore-thought, of love of liberty, of notions of right of property, or storing up for futurity, without any wisdom or opinion of their own wisdom, or desires of knowledge; and perfectly easy in drudging for others, and holding all things precariously while they had present supplies; never disputing about the wisdom of their rulers, or having any suspicions or fore-boding fears about their intentions. But where do we find any such tempers in the human shape?

Wisdom gives no right to power.

Superior wisdom or penetration of understanding, were all convinced of it, cannot give a right to govern, since it may be employed by a selfish corrupt temper to the worst purposes, even the general misery of the

community. Goodneſs muſt be aſcertained too before the ſubjects can have any ſatisfaction or happineſs under a dominion founded in will. Now 'tis impoſſible with reſpect to man to give aſſurance of the ſtable goodneſs of intention. The worſt will pretend to it till they are ſettled in power. Nay do not the moſt ignorant ſometimes ſincerely judge themſelves to be wiſer than their neighbours, and fitter for governing? and how ſeldom would men of ſuperior abilities agree about the perſons moſt eminent in the arts of government. To found therefore a right of governing others upon a ſuperiority of abilities, without any conſent of the ſubject, muſt raiſe eternal controverſies which force alone can decide. CHAP. 5.

IV. As to thoſe natural rights which are of the imperfect ſort, almoſt all the eminent and lovely virtues of life are employed in obſerving and fulfilling them. We may preſent to men a view of their duties by conſidering them as fulfilling ſome private rights of the perſons to whom they are performed which are neceſſary to their happineſs, as a right, perfect or imperfect, correſponds to every obligation or duty. But moſt of theſe duties are recommended by ſtill a nobler moral ſpecies, viz. the love of virtue itſelf, and the dignity there is naturally felt in exerciſing every amiable tender humane diſpoſition toward our fellows; for, as was obſerved above, the fulfilling perfect rights rather ſhews only the abſence of iniquity, whereas all the honourable virtues and duties of life rather correſpond to the rights called imperfect; and the ſoul *Imperfect natural rights.*

BOOK II. must feel as sacred a moral obligation to these duties on many occasions, and as great a turpitude in omitting them, as in direct acts of injustice against the perfect rights of others.

To offices of no trouble or expence.

These imperfect rights are, 1. A right each man has to all those useful offices from his fellows which cost them no trouble or expence.† 'Tis horridly inhuman to refuse them.

To offices of some expence.

2. Any man has an imperfect right to such offices, even of some trouble or expence, as are necessary to relieve him from some great distress or calamity incomparably greater than any little trouble or expence requisite for his relief. 'Tis often very inhuman to decline such trouble or expence, and that in proportion to the greatness of the sufferer's distress.

In several degrees.

3. Men of eminent virtue have still a more sacred claim to more important good offices, and every virtuous heart is sensible of a deeper obligation to such offices, even where one has received no previous favours from them. Such men have a right to be received into the more near attachments or friendship of the virtuous, and to their good offices in promoting them to the higher stations, where they may do more publick good by the exercise of their virtues. To this we are obliged by the more extensive virtuous affections which regard the publick interest.

To social worship.

4. Every person disposed to piety, and willing to improve in it, has a like right to be admitted into any religious society or institution, that he may improve

† *Officia innoxiae utilitatis.*

by the inſtructions and devotions of the ſociety; provided that he does not forfeit this right by any impious or immoral tenets or practices, which make it opprobrious to the ſociety to entertain him. CHAP. 5.

To charity.

5. Perſons in diſtreſs, who are not made unworthy of the liberality of good men by their ſloth or vices, ſhould not be excluded from it; nor ſhould the liberality of good men, who incline to exerciſe it toward them, be reſtrained, unleſs more worthy objects in greater or equal diſtreſs are unprovided.

The importance of liberality.

V. In liberality and munificence the importance of any gift to the receiver is in a joint proportion to the value of the gift and his indigence; and the real loſs to the giver is in proportion to the ſaid value, and to his wealth inverſely: that is, the greater his wealth is, the leſs will an honeſt heart feel the want of what it gives: and that ſenſe of loſs which a poor covetous wretch may have about a trifle is not to be regarded. The virtue of any donation is, in the ſame manner, directly as the value of the gift, and inverſely as the wealth of the giver, as far as men can diſcern it by external evidence; as thus the ſtrength of ſome generous affection above the ſelfiſh is manifeſtly diſplayed.

The addition made to the happineſs of the indigent may be incomparably greater than the diminution of that of the donor, where the donor is wealthy: and this ſhews that perſons in ſuch circumſtances are chiefly obliged to liberality. But there is no determination can be made of the preciſe quantity or proportion a good man ſhould give. The different at-

BOOK II. tachments in life, the numbers of the indigent, and the degrees of their diſtreſſes, make different quantities and proportions reaſonable at different times. Laws fixing a certain quantity, or proportion to the wealth of the giver, would be unreaſonable; and would much abate the beauty of ſuch actions. Liberality would then appear like paying a tax, or diſcharging a legal debt. Spectators could conclude nothing about the honourable or generous diſpoſition of the giver, and liberality would ceaſe to be a bond of love, eſteem, or gratitude.

Several prudent cautions and general rules are delivered about liberality. Firſt, that it be not hurtful to the morals of the object, under a falſe ſhew of advantage, by encouraging them in ſloth, meanneſs of temper, or any vicious diſpoſitions; and again, that it be not ſo immoderate as to exhauſt its own fountain, and prevent the like for the future when more worthy objects may occur; or incapacitate the donor for other offices of life toward thoſe whom he may be more ſacredly obliged to ſupport.

When many claim relief or ſupport from us at once, and we are not capable of affording it to them all; we ſhould be determined by theſe four circumſtances chiefly, (tho' ſome more remote ones of a publick nature in ſome caſes may for the general intereſt be preferred) " the dignity or moral worth of the " objects; the degrees of indigence; the bonds of af- " fection, whether from tyes of blood, or prior friend- " ſhip; and the prior good offices we have received

" from them." The more of theſe which conſpire in any perſon, our obligation to aſſiſt him is the more ſacred. Virtuous parents in diſtreſs are recommended by all theſe circumſtances in the firſt place. The tyes of blood next recommend our offspring and kinſmen. And next to them the tyes of gratitude ſhould ordinarily take place, nay ſometimes be preferred to the tyes of blood. And when other circumſtances are equal, the more virtuous ſhould be preferred to thoſe of leſs virtue*.

CHAP. 5.

Tho' the duties of mere humanity to perſons under no ſpecial attachment ſhould give place to the more ſpecial tyes, yet when they can be diſcharged, conſiſtently with more ſacred duties, they have great moral beauty, and are of more general importance, than one at firſt imagines. Such offices raiſe high gratitude, and by the example encourage the more extenſive affections: they give amiable impreſſions of a whole nation, nay of the human ſpecies. Thus courteſy and hoſpitality to ſtrangers, a general civility and obligingneſs of deportment, even to perſons unknown, are juſtly eſteemed high evidences of ſweetneſs of temper, and are the more lovely, that they are unſuſpected of intereſted views.

VI. The duties of gratitude naturally follow thoſe of liberality, and are alſo exceedingly uſeful; as the neglect of them is very pernicious. The prevailing of gratitude encourages every generous diſpoſition, and gives lovely impreſſions of mankind. The truly

Claims of gratitude.

* See *Cicero de offic. l.* i. *c.* 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

great mind does good to others as its natural work from its own ſweet diſpoſitions and natural impulſe to exerciſe them, whatever returns are made. It has its main end when it acts its part well. But the lower virtues of others are diſcouraged by ingratitude: and the ungrateful are the common enemies of all the indigent, as they diſcourage liberality, and as far as they can, dry up the fountain whence the indigent are to be ſupplied.

No preciſe meaſures can be fixed for returns of gratitude, more than for liberality. Equality to the benefits received would in many caſes be too much, and in many too little. A kind grateful heart with common prudence is to itſelf the true meaſure, *as the liberal mind muſt deviſe liberal things*. There is the ſame reaſon againſt preciſe laws in this caſe, as in liberality.

There is a general obligation of gratitude upon us all, toward thoſe who have done any generous or uſeful ſervices to any valuable part of mankind, that we ſhould eſteem and honour them, and promote their intereſts, and give them juſt praiſe, one ſweet reward to noble minds, protecting their characters againſt envy and detraction. Such conduct encourages every generous diſpoſition, and excites men to imitate ſuch as are eminently virtuous. The hopes of honour overballance thoſe diſadvantages and loſſes which often deter men of weaker virtue from any generous deſigns.

CHAP. VI.

The adventitious RIGHTS, REAL *and* PERSONAL, PROPERTY *or* DOMINION.

I. ADventitious rights are next to be conſidered, and they are either *real*, "when the right ter- "minates upon ſome certain goods;" or *perſonal*, when "the right terminates upon a perſon, without any "more ſpecial claim upon one part of his goods than "another." In perſonal rights our claim is to ſome preſtation, or ſome value, leaving it to the perſon obliged to make up this value out of any part of his goods he pleaſes. *Rights real and perſonal.*

Of real rights the chief is property conſtituted in theſe things which are of ſome uſe in life. As to the origin of it, we firſt inquire into the general right which mankind have to the uſe of things inanimate, and the lower animals; and then into that property which one man may have in certain things to the excluſion of others from all uſe of them.

II. As the inferior animals are led by their appetites and inſtincts, without any capacity of conſidering the notions of right or wrong, to uſe ſuch fruits of the earth as their ſenſes recommend and their appetites crave for their ſupport, mankind would probably at firſt act the like part, without conſidering the point of right, and that from the like inſtincts. When they attained to the knowledge of a wiſe and good *God*, the creator of all theſe curious forms, and *The right to uſe creatures inanimate.*

BOOK II. to the notions of right, they would ſoon diſcover that it was the will of *God* that they ſhould uſe the inanimate products of the earth for their ſupport or more comfortable ſubſiſtence, and that they had a right thus to uſe them, from the following obvious reaſons. They would perceive their own ſpecies to be the moſt excellent creatures that could be ſupported by them, that without this ſupport they muſt ſoon periſh in a miſerable manner; that their inſtincts and ſenſes were plainly deſtined to lead them into the uſe of them; that the inſtincts of lower animals, who had no ſuperior powers to reſtrain them, plainly ſhewed the inanimate things to be deſtined for the ſupport of animals; that theſe forms, however curious and beautiful, muſt ſoon periſh of their own accord, and return to the common maſs of earth without anſwering any ſuch valuable purpoſe as ſupporting animal-life and increaſing its happineſs: that to things inanimate all ſtates are alike, and no diminution or increaſe of happineſs is occaſioned by any changes which befal them, except as they are ſubſervient to things animated. Theſe conſiderations would clearly ſhew that a great increaſe of happineſs and abatement of miſery in the whole muſt enſue upon animals uſing for their ſupport the inanimate fruits of the earth; and that conſequently it is right they ſhould uſe them, and the intention of their Creator.

A new created pair indeed could ſcarce ſubſiſt even in the fineſt climates, without a place cultivated for them artificially, and ſtored with fruits ready for their

subsistence. Their first days must be anxious and dangerous, unless they were instructed about the fruits proper for their use, the natures of animals around them, the changes of seasons, and the arts of shelter and storing up for the future. They would not need a revelation to teach them their right, but would need one to teach them how to use it. CHAP. 6.

III. The right to use inferior animals is not so obvious, and here instruction would be more necessary, if there was early any need to use them; and yet reason would pretty soon teach one the right of mankind in this matter. A rational being, who had notions of right and wrong, and in some distress needed the labours or other use of creatures so much inferior in dignity, being conscious of his natural power by means of reason to make such creatures subservient to his support and happiness, would readily presume upon his right, and a little further reflection would confirm his presumption. *The right to use the lower animals.*

'Tis true these creatures are capable of some happiness and misery; their sufferings naturally move our compassion; we approve relieving them in many cases, and must condemn all unnecessary cruelty toward them as shewing an inhuman temper. Could we subsist sufficiently happy without diminishing the ease or pleasure of inferior animals, it would be cruel and unjust to create to them any needless toil or suffering, or to diminish their happiness. But the human species is capable of incomparably greater happiness or misery: the external senses of brutes may be equally, *Men the supreme part of the system.*

Book II. or more acute, but men have ſuperior ſenſes or powers of enjoyment or ſuffering; they have ſublimer pleaſures by the imagination, by knowledge, by more extenſive and laſting ſocial affections, and ſympathy, by their *moral ſenſe*, and that of honour. Their reaſon and reflection collect joys and ſorrows, glory and ſhame, from events paſt and future, affecting others as well as themſelves; whereas brutes are much confined to what at preſent affects their ſenſes. Thus mankind are plainly the ſupreme part in the animal ſyſtem of this earth.

The right to the labours of beaſts.

Now ſuppoſe an impartial governor, regarding all animals in proportion to their dignity, and aiming at the beſt ſtate of all: ſuppoſe the higheſt ſpecies, mankind, multiplying ſo faſt that neither the natural fruits of the earth, nor thoſe procured by their own labour, are ſufficient for their maintenance; and that they are oppreſſed with immoderate toil and anxiety, as they muſt be without the aſſiſtance of brute animals. In this caſe men could give no aid to the tamer ſpecies of brutes in defending them againſt ſavage beaſts, in providing clear paſtures, or ſtoring forage for the winter: the tamer kinds muſt generally periſh. Some of theſe kinds, by their greater ſtrength, could bear any given quantity of labour, or effect certain works, with far leſs pain than men; and by want of forethought and reflection would ſuffer much leſs by any labour. By their aſſiſtance men might obtain a great increaſe of happineſs, and be freed from evils much ſuperior to thoſe labours impoſed on the beaſts. Men could thus

have leiſure, and it would become their intereſt, to defend and provide for their fellow-labourers, and to incourage their propagating. Here is plainly a well ordered complex ſyſtem, with a proper connexion and ſubordination of parts for the common good of all. It tends to the good of the whole ſyſtem that as great a part as poſſible of the ſeverer labours uſeful to the whole be caſt upon that part of the ſyſtem to which it is a ſmaller evil, and which is incapable of higher offices requiring art and reaſon: while the higher part, relieved from ſuch toil, gains leiſure for nobler offices and enjoyments of which it alone is capable; and can give the neceſſary ſupport and defence to the inferior. Thus by human dominion over the brutes, when prudently and mercifully exerciſed, the tameable kinds are much happier, and human life exceedingly improved. And this ſufficiently ſhews it to be juſt. CHAP. 6.

Beaſts no rights valid againſt men.

But if after all this, men and other animals multiply ſo faſt, that there is not ſufficient food for their ſuſtenance; it plainly tends to the good of the whole ſyſtem, that when both the nobler and the meaner kinds cannot ſufficiently ſubſiſt and multiply, that the nobler ſhould rather be increaſed: and periſhing by violence, by want of food, or any other cauſe which can be foreſeen, is a greater evil to the kinds endued with fore-thought, than to thoſe who feel only the preſent pain. The brutes therefore can have no right or property valid againſt mankind, in any thing neceſſary for human ſupport. Had God intended for

BOOK II. brutes any ſuch right to any parts of the earth, or any goods they once poſſeſſed, ſo as to exclude men in their greateſt indigence of ſuch things; this would have been a right oppoſite to the greateſt good of the ſyſtem, which is abſurd. He would certainly have given to brutes ſome ſagacity to have marked out their bounds, to have made known their claims, and treated with men about them.

Brutes may have rights.

And yet brutes may very juſtly be ſaid to have a right that no uſeleſs pain or miſery ſhould be inflicted on them. Men have intimations of this right, and of their own correſponding obligation, by their ſenſe of pity. 'Tis plainly inhuman and immoral to create to brutes any uſeleſs torment, or to deprive them of any ſuch natural enjoyments as do not interfere with the intereſts of men. 'Tis true brutes have no notion of right or of moral qualities: but infants are in the ſame caſe, and yet they have their rights, which the adult are obliged to maintain. Not to mention that frequent cruelty to brutes may produce ſuch a bad habit of mind as may break out in like treatment of our fellows.

Rights of men to other uſe of animals.

IV. But if mankind ſo increaſe that all their labours, even with the aſſiſtance of that of beaſts, cannot procure them ſufficient ſupport; 'tis plain they can ſpare no labour for the defence of ſuch tameable kinds as are unfit for labour, unleſs they obtained from them ſome other uſe: ſuch kinds muſt be baniſhed from all cultivated lands, and be expoſed to ſavage beaſts, and to the winter colds and famine. It muſt

therefore be for the intereſt of thoſe kinds that men ſhould make any other advantage they can from them by their milk or wool, or any other way, which might purchaſe to them human defence and protection. By this means theſe creatures ſhall have an happier and a longer life, and ſhall be more encreaſed.

Right to uſe them for food.

But if mankind ſo increaſe, that all this uſe of living animals is not ſufficient, men muſt exclude from their care all ſuch animals as yield no ſuch uſe; unleſs ſome other uſe of them is found out to engage and compenſate human care about them, they muſt be left to periſh miſerably in deſarts and mountains by ſavage beaſts, or by want of forage: ſince many of the tameable kinds multiply beyond all neceſſity for any uſes men can derive from them during their lives: nature here points out another uſe; as we ſee many animal kinds led by their inſtincts to feed upon the fleſh of other animals. Thoſe of the inferior ſpecies thus deſtined for food to the ſuperior, enjoy life and ſenſe and pleaſure for ſome time, and at laſt periſh as eaſily as by old age, winter-cold, or famine. The earth and animals muſt have had quite different conſtitutions, otherways theſe ſeeming evils could not have been prevented. The ſuperior orders muſt have had ſome food provided: 'tis better this food be animated for ſome time, and have ſome low ſenſe and enjoyment, than be wholly inſenſible, and only ſubſervient to nouriſh animals. Theſe lower orders alſo during their lives may do conſiderable ſervice in the world, as naturaliſts obſerve that the ſmaller inſects, the or-

Book II. dinary prey of birds and fiſhes, by feeding on all putrefaction, prevent the corruption of the air, and thus are uſeful to the whole ſyſtem.

It would be the intereſt of an animal ſyſtem that the nobler kinds ſhould be increaſed, tho' it diminiſhed the numbers of the lower. A violent death by the hands of men may be a much leſs evil to the brutes than they muſt otherways have endured, and that much earlier too, had they been excluded from human care. By this uſe of them for food men are engaged to make their lives eaſier and to encourage their propagation. They are defended and fed by human art, their numbers increaſed, and their deaths may be eaſier; and human life made agreeable in thoſe countries which otherways muſt have been deſolate. Thus the intention of nature to ſubject the brute animals to men for food is abundantly manifeſt, and its tendency to the general good of the ſyſtem ſhews that men have a right to make this uſe of them.

If all theſe reaſonings did not ſoon occur to men, 'tis probable they had not ſoon any need of the fleſh of animals. When they needed it, their own ſagacity might diſcover their right. And yet this right is ſo oppoſite to the natural compaſſion of the human heart that one cannot think an expreſs grant of it by revelation was ſuperfluous.*

* This point is ſo little debated in theſe Northern nations that theſe reaſonings may ſeem needleſs. But 'tis well known, that many great ſects and nations, at this day, deny this right of mankind. And ſome great names among ourſelves have

V. We next consider the right of private property which one man may have exclusive of his fellow-men. CHAP. 6.

The right of property.

And here first, the natural appetites and desires of men lead each one to take such things as are fit for present use, and yet lye in common, with full persuasion of his right, if he has attained to moral notions; as he sees that such things are destined for the use of men, and none of his fellows have obtained any prior right to them, to preclude him from using them. He must easily see too, should another take from him what he had thus occupied, that, beside obstructing his natural and innocent design for his own support, which must appear odious, as it is ill-natured; such practice obtaining among men must subject them to the greatest misery. What one man now occupies, another without any preferable claim deprives him of: a third person may in like manner deprive him of what he next occupies; he may in like manner be again defeated by a fourth: and thus the whole grant made to him by God and nature of the inferior creatures for his support, might be defeated by the ill-nature and injustice of his neighbours, without any necessity; since these neighbours might by their own diligence provide for themselves, without interfering with his acquisitions. Thus the first impulses of nature toward supporting ourselves, or those who are dear to us, point out the right of the first occupant to such things as are fit for present use. The obstructing this

alledged that without revelation, or an express grant from God, we would have had no such right. Their reasons indeed, if they were solid, would make any grant of it by revelation appear incredible.

BOOK II. innocent design must appear morally evil, as it is ill-natured to hinder any man to take his natural support from the things granted for this purpose by God and nature, while others can otherways support themselves. And reflection upon the general tendency of such practice further confirms this right. These considerations establish the first rule of property, that "things fit for present use the first occupier should enjoy undisturbed." The accident of first occupation may be a trifling difference; but a trifle may determine the right to one side, when there is no consideration to weigh against it on the other.†

Confused notions on this subject.

The difficulties upon this subject arise from some confused imagination that property is some physical quality or relation produced by some action of men. Whereas in our inquiries about the original of property, we only mean to discover what considerations or circumstances shew it to be morally good or innocent that a person should enjoy the full use of certain things, and that it would evidence an immoral affection in another to hinder him. Now from the natural desires of men, of which we are all conscious, and from the manifest intention of nature, it must appear immoral, cruel, or inhumanly selfish, to hinder any man to use

† By occupation is understood sometimes first discovering by the eye, sometimes touching with the hand, sometimes securing by any instrument, such goods as before were common. 'Tis always immoral, when we can support ourselves otherways, to defeat any innocent design of another. If without any design of defeating the attempts of others, several persons at once occupy the same thing, one by first discovering, another by touching with his hand, a third by any other method, they should naturally be deemed joint proprietors. Where the design of one was previously known, 'tis immoral and unjust for another, without necessity, to prevent or intercept his advantage.

any goods formerly common, which he has firſt occupied, while there remains abundance of other things which others may occupy for their own ſupport. And ſuch defeating of the firſt occupiers muſt give perpetual occaſion for the moſt deſtructive paſſions and contentions. CHAP. 6.

Natural reaſons for property of a private kind.

Before mankind were much increaſed, if the regions they poſſeſſed were ſo very fruitful and mild that there was plenty of all conveniencies without any uneaſy labour, there was little occaſion for any further rules of property. But as the world is at preſent, and as mankind are multiplied, the product of the earth, without great labour, is not ſufficient to maintain one hundredth part of them. Paſtures for cattle as well as corn are plainly owing to human labour, ſince almoſt all lands would grow into woods unfit even for paſture, were it not for the culture of man. The very ſubſiſtence therefore of our ſpecies, as well as all our agreeable conveniences, require an univerſal laborious induſtry. Nature hath given to all men ſome ingenuity and active powers, and a diſpoſition to exert them: and each man has not only ſelfiſh deſires toward his own happineſs and the means of it, but ſome tender generous affections in the ſeveral relations of life. We are all conſcious of ſome ſuch diſpoſitions in ourſelves, and juſtly conclude that others have the like. We know that theſe are the ordinary ſprings of the activity of mankind in employing their labour to cultivate the earth, or procure things uſeful in human life. We all feel a ſenſe of

BOOK II. liberty within us, a ſtrong deſire of acting according to our own inclinations, and to gratify our own affections, whether ſelfiſh, or generous: we have a deep reſentment of any obſtruction given to theſe natural deſires and endeavours; while accompanied with a ſenſe of innocence or a conſciouſneſs of being void of all injurious intention, and we muſt diſapprove it as unkind and cruel, where no important publick intereſt requires it, whether we meet with it ourſelves, or ſee others thus oppoſed in their innocent deſigns. From theſe ſtrong feelings in our hearts we diſcover the right of property that each one has in the fruits of his own labour; that is, we muſt approve the ſecuring them to him, where no publick intereſt requires the contrary; and muſt condemn as cruel, unſociable, and oppreſſive, all depriving men of the uſe and free diſpoſal of what they have thus occupied and cultivated, according to any innocent inclination of their hearts.

Reaſons of common intereſt.

If we extend our views further and conſider what the common intereſt of ſociety may require, we ſhall find the right of property further confirmed. Univerſal induſtry is plainly neceſſary for the ſupport of mankind. Tho' men are naturally active, yet their activity would rather turn toward the lighter and pleaſanter exerciſes, than the ſlow, conſtant, and intenſe labours requiſite to procure the neceſſaries and conveniences of life, unleſs ſtrong motives are preſented to engage them to theſe ſeverer labours. Whatever inſtitution therefore ſhall be found neceſſary to promote univer-

ſal diligence and patience, and make labour agreeable or eligible to mankind, muſt alſo tend to the publick good; and inſtitutions or practices which diſcourage induſtry muſt be pernicious to mankind. Now nothing can ſo effectually excite men to conſtant patience and diligence in all ſorts of uſeful induſtry, as the hopes of future wealth, eaſe, and pleaſure to themſelves, their offspring, and all who are dear to them, and of ſome honour too to themſelves on account of their ingenuity, and activity, and liberality. All theſe hopes are preſented to men by ſecuring to every one the fruits of his own labours, that he may enjoy them, or diſpoſe of them as he pleaſes. If they are not thus ſecured, one has no other motive to labour than the general affection to his kind, which is commonly much weaker than the narrower affections to our friends and relations, not to mention the oppoſition which in this caſe would be given by moſt of the ſelfiſh ones. CHAP. 6.

Confirmed by the extenſive affections.

Nay the moſt extenſive affections could ſcarce engage a wiſe man to induſtry, if no property enſued upon it. He muſt ſee that univerſal diligence is neceſſary. Diligence will never be univerſal, unleſs men's own neceſſities, and the love of families and friends, excite them. Such as are capable of labour, and yet decline it, ſhould find no ſupport in the labours of others. If the goods procured, or improved by the induſtrious lye in common for the uſe of all, the worſt of men have the generous and induſtrious for their ſlaves. The moſt benevolent temper muſt decline ſupporting the ſlothful in idleneſs, that their own neceſ-

BOOK II. ſities may force them to contribute their part for the publick good. Thus both the immediate feelings of our hearts, and the conſideration of the general intereſt, ſuggeſt this law of nature, "that each one ſhould "have the free uſe and diſpoſal of what he has ac- "quired by his own labour;" and this is property, which may be defined, when it is unlimited, "a "right to the fulleſt uſe of any goods, and to diſpoſe "of them as one pleaſes."

How community could be tolerable.

VI. Theſe reaſons for property, from the general intereſt of ſociety requiring univerſal diligence, would not hold if a wiſe political conſtitution could compel all men to bear their part in labour, and then make a wiſely proportioned diſtribution of all that was acquired, according to the indigence, or merit of the citizens. But the other reaſons would ſtill hold from the natural ſenſe of liberty, and the tender natural affections. Such conſtant vigilance too of magiſtrates, and ſuch nice diſcernment of merit, as could enſure both an univerſal diligence, and a juſt and humane diſtribution, is not to be expected. Nay, no confidence of a wiſe diſtribution by magiſtrates can ever make any given quantity of labour be endured with ſuch pleaſure and hearty good-will, as when each man is the diſtributer of what he has acquired among thoſe he loves. What magiſtrate can judge of the delicate ties of friendſhip, by which a fine ſpirit may be ſo attached to another as to bear all toils for him with joy? Why ſhould we exclude ſo much of the lovelieſt offices of life, of liberality and beneficence, and grate-

ful returns; leaving men ſcarce any room for exerciſing them in the diſtribution of their goods? And what plan of polity will ever ſatisfy men ſufficiently as to the juſt treatment to be given themſelves, and all who are peculiarly dear to them, out of the common ſtock, if all is to depend on the pleaſure of magiſtrates, and no private perſon allowed any exerciſe of his own wiſdom or diſcretion in ſome of the moſt honourable and delightful offices of life? Muſt all men in private ſtations ever be treated as children, or fools? CHAP. 6.

The faults in the ſchemes of community.

The inconveniencies ariſing from property, which Plato and Sir Thomas More endeavour to avoid by the ſchemes of community, are not ſo great as thoſe which muſt enſue upon community; and moſt of them may be prevented where property is allowed with all its innocent pleaſures, by a *cenſorial* power, and proper laws about education, teſtaments, and ſucceſſion. Plato * indeed conſiſtently with his ſcheme of community takes away all knowlege of the particular tyes of blood as much as poſſible, and all the tender affections founded on them, at leaſt among thoſe of the higheſt order in his ſtate. He is indeed unjuſtly charged with indulging any diſſolute inclinations of thoſe men: but it ſeems too arrogant in that fine genius to attempt an overturning the manifeſt conſtitution of the Creator, and to root out what is ſo deeply fixed in the human ſoul; vainly preſuming to contrive ſomething better than the *God* of nature has ordered. The more extenſive affections will never give the generality of

* See book iii. c. 1.

BOOK II. men such ardors, nor give them such enjoyments, without particular affections, as are plainly necessary in our constitution to diligence and happiness. Leaving a place for all the particular bonds of nature, but keeping them in due subjection to the more noble affections, will answer better all the ends of polity and morals: and such schemes as his will never be found practicable among creatures of our constitution.

CHAP. VII.

The MEANS *of acquiring* PROPERTY. *How far it extends, in what Subjects it resides.*

I. PROPERTY is either *original* or *derived.* The original is that which is acquired by first occupation and culture: the derived, is what is obtained from some former proprietor.

Occupation and culture the means.

The general reasons for property are already explained, and shew the original means of acquiring it, viz. occupation, and labour employed in cultivating. But to apprehend the natural grounds of property more fully, we may observe, that men are naturally solicitous about their own future interests, and those of such as are dear to them, as well as their present interests; and may be miserable amidst present plenty, if they have no probable assurance as to futurity. Again, a great part of those things which yield the greatest and most lasting use in human life after they are improved, require a long previous course of la-

bour to make them uſeful. Now no man would employ ſuch labour upon them without ſome ſecurity for the future enjoyment of the advantages they afford. 'Tis neceſſary therefore that a continual property, beyond all poſſible preſent conſumption, ſhould enſue upon the culture a man has employed upon things formerly common. Of this kind are flocks, herds, gardens, vineyards, fruit-trees, arable grounds, or paſtures. CHAP. 7.

II. Since property thus ariſes from firſt occupation of things ready for preſent uſe, and labour employed in cultivating goods which require it; we juſtly look upon property as begun, as ſoon as any perſon, with a view to acquire, undertakes any cultivation of what was common, or any labour previouſly requiſite to cultivation or occupation. And the property is compleated when he has occupied, begun his culture, and marked out how far he deſigns to extend it by himſelf, or thoſe whom he obtains to aſſiſt him. 'Tis not always neceſſary that we have arrived at or touched the goods occupied. Every ſtep taken which is of conſequence to this end, † by which goods are made readier, or more ſecured for human uſe than they were formerly, gives us a right not to be prevented by others; and it is unjuſt in another to intercept or prevent our enjoying the fruits of our innocent labours which we have begun and perſiſt in. He who wounded or tired out any wild creature in the chace, *When it commences.*

† *Propius humanis uſibus admoventur.*

BOOK II. ſo that it becomes an eaſy prey, and continues the purſuit; or has entangled it in a net, has a property begun, and is wronged by any who intercept his prey, or fruſtrate his labours. One who has fitted out ſhips for a deſcent upon unoccupied lands, towards the occupation of which no previous labour has been employed by others, would be wronged if another hearing of the deſign made greater diſpatch and prevented him, and afterwards refuſed to make a diviſion. Nay had one without knowing the former's deſign, arrived firſt, he could not juſtly exclude him who arrived later, from a ſhare of the land thus lying in common, if it was ſufficient for the purpoſes of both.

How far it may be extended.

III. But as property is conſtituted to encourage and reward induſtry, it can never be ſo extended as to prevent or fruſtrate the diligence of mankind. No perſon or ſociety therefore can by mere occupation acquire ſuch a right in a vaſt tract of land quite beyond their power to cultivate, as ſhall exclude others who may want work, or ſuſtenance for their numerous hands, from a ſhare proportioned to the colonies they can ſend. Thus it would be vain for a private man with his domeſticks to claim a property, upon the circumſtance of his having firſt diſcovered or arrived at it, in a country capable of maintaining ten thouſand families, and requiring ſo many to cultivate it. Equally vain would it be in a nation of eight or ten millions of ſouls to claim, upon the like foundation, a property in a vaſt continent capable of maintaining three times that number; as no nation can ſend a

third part of their people for colonies in one age. CHAP. 7. such capricious claims, beyond all poſſible uſe or conveniency of the claimants, muſt not keep large tracts of the earth deſolate, and exclude nations too populous from obtaining for ſome of their people that uſe of the earth which *God* intended for mankind. At this rate the caprice or vain ambition of one ſtate might keep half the earth deſolate, and oppreſs the reſt of mankind.

Agrarian Laws in natural liberty.

Nay, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter, that ſome publick intereſts of ſocieties may juſtify ſuch Agrarian Laws as put a ſtop to the immoderate acquiſitions of private citizens which may prove dangerous to the ſtate, tho' they be made without any particular injury; the ſame or like reaſons may hold as to acquiſitions made by private men in natural liberty, or by ſtates and nations. If any acquiſition is dangerous to the liberty and independency of a neighbourhood, or of neighbouring ſtates, theſe neighbours have a right either to defeat it altogether, or compell the proprietor to give ſufficient ſecurity for the ſafety of all around him. This would be the caſe if one had occupied a narrow paſs, with the adjacent lands; or the lands ſurrounding a fountain neceſſary to a whole neighbourhood, or a ſtrait ſound, ſo that he could ſtop all communication and trade of multitudes with each other. But of theſe leſs ordinary rights we ſhall treat hereafter.

If it be inquired what is the reaſonable time to be allowed to a family or a ſtate for cultivating the lands they pretend to occupy, 'tis plain they may occupy

Book II. more than the first set of hands they send can cultivate. Private persons may obtain more servants, and a state may send new colonies or new supplies of men. No precise answer can be given. To limit a state to twenty or thirty years for the cultivating all they can justly acquire by occupation may be too great a restraint; and to allow them to keep lands uncultivated for some centuries, in prospect of their sending new colonies, may often be too great indulgence. The measure of time must be different according to the exigences of neighbouring states. If none be overcharged with inhabitants, a larger time may be allowed. If many are overcharged, a less is sufficient. Mankind must not for ages be excluded from the earth *God* intended they should enjoy, to gratify the vain ambition of a few who would retain what they cannot use, while others are in inconvenient straits. Neighbouring states, upon offering a rateable share of the charges of the first discovery and occupation, have a right to obtain such lands as the first discoverers cannot cultivate. In this and all other controversies where there is no common judge, and the parties cannot agree by amicable conferences, the natural recourse is to unbiassed arbitrators; and such as decline arbitration should be compelled by force.

Right beyond present use.

IV. But 'tis plain that our acquisition by labour in any one sort of goods may extend far beyond our own present consumption and that of our families; and they may be stored up for the future: nay it may extend beyond all present or future consumption; as

we may employ the ſurplus as matter of beneficence, or of barter for goods of different kinds which we may need. Otherways each one would be obliged to practiſe all ſorts of mechanick arts by turns, without attaining dexterity in any; which would be a publick detriment. CHAP. 7.

The ſeveral rules of property as they obtain in natural liberty, like all other ſpecial laws of nature, not only admit exceptions in caſes of great neceſſity, but may juſtly be altered and limited under civil polity, as the good of the ſtate requires.

What things are ſtill common.

V. The origin of property above explained, ſhews the reaſon why ſuch things as are inexhauſtible and anſwer the purpoſes of all, and need no labour to make them uſeful, ſhould remain in common to all, as the air, the water of rivers, and the ocean, and even ſtrait ſeas, which can give paſſage to all ſhips without being made worſe. Where the uſe is inexhauſtible, but ſome expence is requiſite to ſecure it, this may be a juſt reaſon for obliging all who ſhare in it to contribute in an equitable manner to the neceſſary expence, ſuch as that of light-houſes, or ſhips of force to ſecure the ſeas from pyrates. But the property in the ſhores on both ſides of ſuch ſtraits can give no right to exclude any who are ready to make ſuch equitable contribution, from paſſing ſuch ſtraits, or carrying on any innocent commerce with the nations who live within them.

Where indeed the uſe of any adjacent parts of the ſea or ſhore allowed to foreigners, may endanger our

BOOK II. poſſeſſions, ſuch as mooring of ſhips of force in thoſe bays which run up into the heart of a country; we may juſtly refuſe it, unleſs ſufficient ſecurity is given againſt danger. We may likeways refuſe to others, or exclude them from ſuch uſe of things naturally common and inexhauſtible, as would occaſion ſome uneaſy ſervitude upon our lands; ſuch as fiſhing in rivers, or drawing water from them through our ground, tho' the river were not at all appropriated by us, and the fiſhing were inexhauſtible.

Property in the ſea. 'Tis ſcarce conceivable upon what other foundation than compact, or conſent of neighbouring ſtates, any one can claim any property in the ſea, or any right in it ſuperior to that of other nations. Each nation indeed for its own defence, ſeems to have a right to prevent any ſhips of force of other nations to ſail ſo near its coaſt that they could annoy any of its ſubjects in their poſſeſſions. But this property can extend no further than a gun-ſhot. Hovering indeed without neceſſity upon our coaſts, tho' at a greater diſtance, may give juſt ſuſpicion of ſome hoſtile deſign, and may be a juſt reaſon for expoſtulation and demanding ſecurity, or obliging them by force to withdraw to a greater diſtance.

Things left by God in negative community, not poſitive. From what is ſaid we ſee abundantly, that this earth, and all it contains, was placed by God in that ſtate the moraliſts call *negative community*, and not *poſitive*. The negative is "the ſtate of things not yet "in property, but lying open to the occupation of "any one." Poſitive community is the "ſtate of things

" in which not any individual but a whole ſociety have " an undivided property." Goods in this poſitive community neither any individual member of the ſociety, nor any other, can occupy or diſpoſe of without conſent of the whole ſociety, or thoſe who govern it. Now from the preceeding reaſons 'tis plain, that any man could acquire property, and ſee his right to acquire any thing he firſt occupied, without conſulting the reſt of mankind; and it would be injurious in any other perſon to hinder him. Thus we need not have recourſe to any old conventions or compacts, with Grotius and Puffendorf, in explaining the original of property: nor to any decree or grant of our firſt parents, with Filmer. CHAP. 7.

Miſtakes about the res nullius.

VI. All things fit for human uſe either yet remain in this negative community, or are in the property of individual men, or of ſocieties. *Bona univerſitatum*, or the goods of corporations are in the property of ſocieties; the † *res nullius* of the Civilians, viz. things *ſacred* as temples and their utenſils, and lands for the ſupport of religious orders, and the defraying any expences of worſhip; burial-places and what things are employed in funeral-rites; and places railed in or ſecured from promiſcuous uſe, ſuch as the walls of cities; are all in property either of ſome larger ſociety, or ſome family; tho' ſome ſuperſtitious laws may reſtrain the proprietors from a free and full uſe of

† *Nullius ſunt res ſacrae, religioſae, et ſanctae. Quod enim divini juris eſt, id nullius in bonis eſt.* Inſtit. l. ii. tit. 1. ſect. 7. &c. where theſe three ſorts of goods are explained according to the notions then prevailing.

BOOK II. them, or from converting them to other uſes than what they were firſt deſtined to. Theſe laws are often very fooliſh, and founded upon ſome confuſed inexplicable notions. All ſuch goods are truly deſigned for the uſe of men alone. The old proprietors, who gave them for theſe purpoſes, may have been moved by devotion toward God to make ſuch donations for the uſe of certain orders employed in religious offices, or of ſocieties, to accommodate ſuch as inclined to worſhip in theſe places; or for the burial of their dead; or for defence of ſocieties by fortifications. But none of theſe lands or goods can yield any uſe to God, nor can his rights receive any increaſe or diminution by any deeds of men. Such donations are acceptable to him as far as they do good to his creatures, by promoting their piety, virtue, and happineſs. Devotion to God may as juſtly move men to make donations for civil uſes to their country, or friends; and theſe may be as wiſe and acceptable to God, as any donations to uſes commonly called pious. But none thence imagine that there is ſome myſtical quality infuſed into ſuch goods that they cannot be applied upon wiſe occaſions to other purpoſes.

'Tis a natural evidence of piety in any perſon or ſociety to provide whatever is requiſite to accommodate men in publick worſhip, in proportion to the wealth of a country. It would evidence avarice, and want of piety, if men would not ſpare from their private uſe what is requiſite to make places of publick worſhip ſafe, convenient, and agreeable. When they

are mean and deſpicable in proportion to private buildings, the attending there may be diſagreeable. 'Tis yet worſe if thoſe whoſe office it is to preſide in publick worſhip, and inſtruct men in the duties of life, are not ſo ſupported as may enable them to attain knowledge themſelves, and diſcharge their uſeful office. But when ſufficient proviſion is made for all theſe purpoſes, 'tis folly and ſuperſtition to employ that wealth which might do more good in trade or other civil purpoſes, either on expenſive ornaments of churches, or on their furniture, or in ſo enriching the inſtructors of the people as to give them avocations from their buſineſs, or temptations to luxury, ambition, and avarice; or to maintain more of them than are requiſite. 'Tis ſtill more fooliſh to maintain men in ſloth, or uſeleſs ways of life. CHAP. 7

A beautiful metonymy has been artfully abuſed by ſome orders commonly called religious, with the baſeſt ſelfiſh purpoſes. Donations to them have been called *gifts to God*, as all wiſe liberality and charity may juſtly be called. But theſe donations alone which are made to their orders, or where they are the truſtees, are called conſecrations. God is proprietor of all things alike, and can receive no gifts from men. Donations can be made to men only. As far as they contribute to the general happineſs of men, ſo far they are acceptable to God, and no further. When they are pernicious to a country in its trade, or liberty, when they corrupt the clergy, as they are called, by opportunities and temptations to luxury, tyranny, *The cauſes of miſtakes.*

BOOK II. or avarice, they are as offenſive to God as any ſins of ignorance can be. 'Tis wiſe and juſt in any ſtate, when ſufficient proviſion is made for the purpoſes of religion, to reſtrain or make void all further donations; to reſume any uſeleſs grants that have been obtained by fraud and impoſture, whether from the publick, or private perſons; to free the publick from the charge of ſupporting uſeleſs ſtructures, or idle hands, by converting the ſtructures to other purpoſes, or demoliſhing them; and by obliging the idle hands to purſue ſome uſeful occupation. This muſt be acceptable ſervice to God.

Some wild notion of conſecration or ſanctity infuſed into ſtones, timber, metals, lands, has made men imagine it impious to convert theſe things to other uſes than what they once were deſtined to. And yet 'tis obvious that no religion or ſanctity can inhere in ſuch materials. We formerly uſed them when our minds were employed in devotion: but what then? ſo we did our bodies, our cloaths, our organs of ſpeech: muſt they never be uſed to other purpoſes? The ſuperſtitious donors perhaps ordered "that ſuch houſes "ſhould only be uſed for accommodating men in "worſhip, and ſuch lands for the maintenance of ſuch "as officiated in it." But is it not folly to confine that to one purpoſe only, which can anſwer other purpoſes, and be no leſs fit for the purpoſe chiefly intended? The ſtate has a juſt right to annul ſuperſtitious reſtrictions in any conveyances, and to make void all ſuch conveyances as prove fooliſh or hurtful to ſociety.

Grant that in the confuſed imaginations of the vulgar, the devotion in churches would be abated, if they were uſed for other purpoſes in the intervals of worſhip. Should this weakneſs be encouraged? And then it requires no more but that ſuch edifices while they are uſed for worſhip ſhould not in the intervals be uſed for other purpoſes. If the worſhippers are as well provided with other ſtructures or utenſils, and the inſtructors provided with other ſufficient ſalaries; nothing hinders the ſtate to apply the former ſtructures, utenſils, or lands, to any other wiſe purpoſes. But in the Popiſh religion the myſtery of conſecration is ſo deeply inculcated that all this appears impious. In that whole inſtitution the chief part God is introduced as acting, is that of a ſharping purveyor, or agent for the religious orders, graſping at and defending whatever they have obtained by any fraud or artifice from the weakeſt and moſt ſuperſtitious of mankind, for the moſt fooliſh or pernicious purpoſes. CHAP. 6.

VII. Things once in property may return again into a ſtate of communnity if the proprietor quits his property by throwing them away, or deſignedly neglecting them: and then the next occupier may acquire them. If the proprietor loſt any goods unwillingly, but being again otherways provided, neglects what he loſt, and puts in no claim tho' he knows who has found them; a long neglect of this kind may ſufficiently declare that he quitted the property, and ſo preclude his future claim againſt the preſent poſſeſſor. This ſeems the only preſcription valid againſt *The right of preſcription.*

BOOK II. the old proprietor, before civil laws. There are juſt reaſons why civil laws ſhould introduce other rules of preſcription, partly to engage the ſubjects to proper care about their goods and claims in due time while they can be aſcertained; partly becauſe in a long tract of undiſturbed poſſeſſion againſt ſome latent titles, goods may be transferred upon valuable conſiderations to fair purchaſers, or be for like conſiderations ſubjected to ſettlements and entails and mortgages, which cannot be ſet aſide without great injuries to innocent perſons; and partly to exclude artful and undiſcoverable frauds, which could not be prevented, if any deeds pretended to be very old, the witneſſes of which muſt be dead, ſhould be ſuſtained as valid to overturn a long undiſturbed poſſeſſion.

The civil law makes a preſumptive title, or the *bona fides*, upon which the poſſeſſor may probably have believed the goods to be his own, a neceſſary beginning to preſcription; ſo that no length of poſſeſſion, begun without a plauſible title, can give a right. But the caſe of a fair purchaſer from an old poſſeſſor, without any intimation made to the purchaſer of a latent title of another, is ſo favourable, and his plea ſo equitable, when he cannot recover his price from the ſeller, that tho' the ſeller had begun poſſeſſion without this juſt preſumption, it would be very hard to ſet aſide all claim of the fair purchaſer, at leaſt to recover the price he paid. Some of the reaſons for preſcription may hold even where the poſſeſſion was not begun upon a preſumptive title.

The rights to accessions.

VIII. As to accessions or any additional profits of goods in property, these rules are obvious. 1. "All "fruits, increase, or improvements happening to the "goods in a man's property, to which neither the "goods or labours of others contributed, belong to "the proprietor, except where another by contract, "or civil law, acquires some right in them." But, 2. "Where the goods or labours of other persons "have contributed to any increase or improvement, "without the fraud or culpable negligence of any "concerned, all those who have contributed by their "labours or goods have a joint property in the com-"pound, or in the fruits and improvements, each in "proportion to the value of what he contributed." If the goods or the fruits can admit of division without loss upon the whole, they should be divided in this proportion among those who contributed to them. If the subject will not admit of division without loss upon the whole, it should be used alternately for times proportioned to the values each one contributed, or be used in common continually if it can admit of such use. If the subject neither admits of common or alternate use, it should fall to that partner to whom it is of the greatest value or importance, in this manner: first, let the proportion of each one's right to those of the other partners be determined, and that partner who bids most for it should have it, upon making compensation to the rest for their shares.*

* See cases of this kind in *Cicero de offic.* l. ii. c. 23. and the judgment of Aratus upon them.

BOOK II. Thus he obtains the goods who values them moſt, and the compenſation to the reſt is the greater. * Where any debate ariſes about the values of the ſeveral ſhares contributed, there is no other remedy, previous to civil polity, but the arbitration of wiſe neighbours who underſtand the goods.

Where by the fraud or blameable negligence of one, his labours or goods are blended with the goods of others, ſo that the compound or the new form ceaſes to be deſirable to the other innocent proprietor, this proprietor has a right to full compenſation for the value of his goods now made unfit for his uſe, and for whatever clear profits he could have made by his goods had they been let alone to him. If my goods are improved for my uſe by another's goods or labour, without commiſſion from me; I am only to pay the value of the improvement to my purpoſes, and not the value it may be of to the purpoſes of the culpable intermedler with my goods. There is no reaſon that through his fault I ſhould either loſe my goods, or be obliged to pay for more expenſive improvements than were convenient for my affairs. The proper puniſhment for this fraudulent or culpable intermedling with the goods of others, is a ſubject of inquiry quite diſtinct from this of property.

Philoſophic reaſons in property.

IX. The right of property, when it is entire and unlimited as it is firſt acquired, contains theſe three

* This ſection may determine in a natural manner moſt of the queſtions of the civilians about the acceſſions, viz. the *nativitas*, *alluvio*, *ſpecificatio*, *commixtio*, *confuſio*, *edificatio*, &c.

parts. 1. A right to the fulleſt uſe. 2. A right to exclude others from any uſe of the goods in property. and 3. A right of alienating and transferring to others either in part or in whole; abſolutely, or upon any condition or contingency; gratuitouſly, or for valuable conſideration. Civil laws may ſometimes juſtly limit men in the exerciſe of theſe rights; and ſome potent reaſons of general utility may even in natural liberty require ſome limitations, and juſtify ſome extraordinary ſteps contrary to the rules which ordinarily oblige us. CHAP. 7.

To this right of property correſponds a general indefinite obligation upon all not to violate this right or obſtruct others in the enjoyment of it. The ſacredneſs of this obligation, we all may find by conſidering the keen reſentment we ſhould feel upon ſuch violation of our rights by others; and by the ſtrong diſapprobation we muſt have of ſuch avarice or ſelfiſhneſs as breaks through all regards to the peace and ſafety of ſociety, and all humanity to our fellows, for the ſake of a little private gain; in thoſe matters too which we look upon it as honourable and the evidence of a great ſoul to deſpiſe. This diſapprobation we muſt feel toward ſuch acts of injuſtice as affect the property of others, even tho' we ourſelves ſuffer nothing by it.

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning DERIVED PROPERTY, *and the ways of alienating or transferring it.*

Rights real and perſonal.

I. ADventitious rights are either *real*, or *perſonal*. All *adventitious real rights* ariſe from a tranſlation of ſome of the original rights of *property* from one to another. And all *perſonal adventitious rights* are conſtituted by transferring to others ſome parts of our natural liberty, or of our right of acting as we pleaſe, and of obliging ourſelves to certain performances in behalf of others. The *real rights* terminate on ſome definite goods. The *perſonal* do not.

The neceſſity and uſe of frequent contracts and tranſlations of property is in a good meaſure manifeſt from what is ſaid above,* and will ſtill more fully appear hereafter. The difference between real and perſonal rights muſt here be explained, and the foundation too for this diſtinction, previous to any civil laws.

The ground of this diſtinction.

One may often incline to incur an obligation to another to a certain value, and have all moral certainty and an honeſt purpoſe of diſcharging it faithfully, while yet he is unwilling to put any one part of his goods more than another in the power of his creditor, and keeps it in his own election what part of them he will alienate for diſcharging this obligation. And a creditor may often be ſatisfied with ſuch engagements from the debtor, if he is aſſured of his

* Chap. vi. and vii.

wealth and integrity, without any ſpecifick goods being ſubjected to the claim. Such an agreement conſtitutes a perſonal, and not a real right. The creditor no doubt in ſuch a caſe has a general ſecurity from all the debtor's goods, ſince upon the debtor's default, he may in natural liberty ſeize any part of them for diſcharge of the debt, if no other creditor has obtained a real right in them. But the advantage of the perſonal obligation to the debtor is this, that he is ſtill maſter of all his goods, and retains it ſtill in his own election, within the time limited, to diſcharge the claims upon him in the manner he likes beſt. And the advantage of the real right to the creditor conſiſts in this, that from the goods ſpecially ſubjected to his claim he may be ſecure, notwithſtanding of any ſubſequent debts incurred to others, or even prior perſonal debts which his debtor may be incapable of diſcharging. CHAP. 7.

If one has done any damage to another, he becomes indebted to the perſon who ſuffered this damage in the full value of it. And yet the ſufferer has only a perſonal right, not preferable to any claims of a third perſon, nor affecting one part of the goods of him who did the damage, more than another. If full compenſation is made, he cannot limit the debtor as to the goods out of which this compenſation is to be made.

When the lender inſiſts on more ſecurity than the faith of the borrower, or ſuſpects his ability, and gets a pledge or a mortgage, this conſtitutes a real right,

BOOK II. as certain goods are assigned and specially subjected to this claim.

Real preferable to personal,

A just man no doubt will observe and fulfil the personal rights of others, as well as the real, to the utmost of his power; but the security is not the same in both, as 'tis abundantly known, where different claims occur against a person who has not effects to answer them. The real rights must take place of the personal. He who consented to accept of a less security, must not expect to be equally safe with one who insisted upon and obtained a greater, nor would have contracted or lent upon other terms.

For what reasons.

The preservation of the necessary faith in commerce requires this preference of real rights, to personal. In the full translation of property, and even in assigning goods as real securities by pledge or mortgage, there must be such publick forms as will secure the purchaser or lender against all prior secret contracts with others, tho' these private contracts gave personal rights. But no man would buy goods, if he could not be secured in the possession of what he purchased against former private contracts of sale. Nor could he be secured if prior secret contracts did not yield to such publick ones with the usual forms instituted for conveying real rights. Nor would men lend upon any pledge or mortgage, were there not some publick forms appointed to transfer a real right preferable to any prior personal rights constituted to others by a latent contract.

All nations agree in having some publick formali-

ties for transferring full property or real rights, not to be defeated by prior latent perſonal rights. Theſe formalities ſhould intimate the tranſaction publickly, or ſome way prevent the perſon who transfers to impoſe afterwards upon others. Delivery anſwers this end in moveables; and ſome publick ſymbolical deeds giving poſſeſſion, in ſuch as are immoveable; or ſome publick regiſtration of the conveyance. Where theſe confirm a contract, a real right is conſtituted, which no perſonal one ſhould defeat. And yet the perſon thus defrauded of his perſonal right by means of the ſubſequent real one transferring the property, has a juſt claim upon the ſeller who defrauded him not only for compenſation of all the damage * he ſuſtains, but for the † full value of all the profit he could have made had he not been deceived. But without this preference of real rights to perſonal, there could be no commerce. CHAP. 7.

II. Derived real rights are either ſome parts of the right of property transferred to another, and ſeparated from the reſt, or compleat property derived from the original proprietor. *Derived real rights parts of property often ſeparated from the reſt.*

The parts of property frequently transferred ſeparately from the reſt of it are chiefly of theſe four claſſes. 1. *Right of poſſeſſion*, thus one may have a right to poſſeſs the goods he knows belong to others, until the true proprietor ſhews his title. This right is valid againſt all others, and often may be turned into compleat property. 2. The right of *ſucceſſion*, which one

* *Penſatio damni.* † *Penſare quod intereſt.*

BOOK II. may have to goods, while another retains all the other parts of property except that of alienating. 3. The rights of a *mortgage* or *pledge*. 4. Rights to ſome ſmall uſes of the goods of others, called *ſervitudes*.

As to the right of poſſeſſion. The poſſeſſor by fraud or unjuſt violence has no right: any one who inclines to recover the goods to the owner may juſtly diſpoſſeſs him. But he who poſſeſſes without fraud or unjuſt violence the goods he knows belong to others, has a right valid againſt all except the proprietor, or ſuch as claim under him. If none ſuch can be found, or if the proprietor quits his claim, the poſſeſſor becomes proprietor by occupation. The poſſeſſor is always obliged to make publick intimation that he has ſuch goods, and to uſe all reaſonable means to make it known to the proprietor. Deſigned concealment of them is no better than theft. When the poſſeſſor reſtores, he may juſtly demand to be repaid all prudent expences made upon the goods, or upon giving publick intimation about them.

Rights of the preſumptive poſſeſſor.

III. In inſtances where one poſſeſſes goods belonging to others which yet he obtained upon ſome plauſible title, ſuch as donation, legacy, ſucceſſion, or purchaſe, and believes them to be his own †; the following rules ſeem equitable. 1. If the goods have periſhed by any accident without any fault of the poſſeſſor, he is not obliged to any compenſation. 2. If he has conſumed them he is obliged to reſtore as far as he

† This is the *bonae fidei poſſeſſor* of the Civilians, not importing that all other poſſeſſors are fraudulent.

was profited by them, or in proportion to the advantage or pleaſure he obtained by them, which otherways would have conſumed like goods of his own: for he is ſo far enriched as he ſpared his own goods. But as to pleaſure enjoyed and not neceſſary maintenance, if the poſſeſſor enjoyed it only becauſe he believed theſe goods to be his own, and otherways would not have been at ſuch expence in matters of pleaſure, one cannot pronounce univerſally that he is obliged to compenſate the value. 'Tis the honourable part to do it whenever the proprietor is indigent, and the poſſeſſor wealthy; or if they are in equal circumſtances; or if the compenſating would not diſtreſs the poſſeſſor in his affairs. But if compenſating would diſtreſs him, if he obtained the goods by an onerous title, ſuch as by paying a price for them which he cannot now recover he would at leaſt in moſt caſes ſeem to be under no other obligation than that of humanity, which might perhaps direct to ſharing the loſs, where it would be too ſenſibly felt were it to fall ſingly on the original poſſeſſor. CHAP. 8.

3. When the goods yet remain, the poſſeſſor is obliged to reſtore them with all their acceſſions after deducting all prudent expences he has made about them. If he purchaſed them, he has recourſe for the price upon the ſeller.

4. If the ſeller is not to be found, or is inſolvent, the caſe is more difficult. Here a certain loſs muſt be ſuſtained either by the proprietor, or the preſumptive poſſeſſor: both are ſuppoſed alike innocent: which

BOOK II. of them muſt bear it? The caſe of both is equally favourable, and no publick advantage requires the caſting the whole loſs on one rather than the other. If freeing the proprietor from it will make purchaſers more cautious and inquiſitive about the titles of thoſe they deal with, and thus thefts may be detected; the ſubjecting the proprietors to the loſs, will make men more vigilant to prevent thefts, and prevent their goods thus becoming a ſnare to honeſt purchaſers. In ſtrict juſtice one would think the loſs ſhould be divided equally among all thoſe through whoſe hands the goods paſſed without fraud, along with the proprietor, until they can recover the whole from the author of the fraud.

A confuſed imagination to be avoided in this matter.

In theſe queſtions our reaſon is diſturbed by ſome confuſed imagination of property as ſome phyſical quality or chain between the goods, and the proprietor, conceived to found a more ſacred right than many other moſt equitable claims. And yet it cannot be of a more ſacred kind than the rights ariſing from contracts and fair purchaſes; ſince 'tis by contracts and purchaſes that property is moſt frequently acquired: and there is no reaſon that an innocent man ſhould ſuffer becauſe of any vice of another in which he had no hand.

Abſtracting from ſuch imaginations; property is thus determined by the law of nature; in certain circumſtances we ſee at once that it would be cruel and inhuman toward an individual, to deprive him of the full uſe of certain goods; as when they were acqui-

red by his own innocent labour, or by any fair contract; and we ſee alſo that like practices generally prevailing would be detrimental to ſociety. In theſe circumſtances we pronounce that the man has the right of property. When equal circumſtances of particular humanity plead for two perſons in oppoſition to each other; we then conſider any circumſtance on one ſide which ſome remote intereſt of ſociety may require to be regarded; and we deem the right to go along with that circumſtance: or at leaſt, when a law or cuſtom is once received on account of this remote utility, we deem the property to be on that ſide, and do not regard the weaker claim of the other: tho' a humane man would not diſregard it altogether. Other caſes happen where the pleas from remote utilities of ſociety are alſo equal: and in them, there is no other remedy but dividing the loſs among all concerned, in ſome proportion or other. CHAP. 8.

One ſells me an horſe this hour, in diſcharge of an old debt he owed me: and next hour, upon a price paid down, ſells and delivers him to another who knew nothing of my bargain. If the ſeller can be found, and is ſolvent, there is leſs difficulty: but if he is not; on whom ſhall the loſs be caſt? The contract and price paid, the grand foundations of the titles and pleas of humanity, are the ſame on both ſides. 'Tis equally hard that either of the innocent men ſhould ſuffer. Cuſtom and civil laws regarding a remote intereſt of aſcertaining commerce, and preventing frauds, make the delivery a moſt important circumſtance for the *Some Example.*

BOOK II. later. But were it not for this remote intereſt, the priority in time would plead for the former. Suppoſe that the horſe had alſo been delivered to the former, but the ſeller allowed to keep him ſome hours in his ſtables. When other circumſtances are now equal, priority of time is of great importance, and is much regarded in all contracts; as there can be no ſuſpicion of fraud in the firſt purchaſer; and as a regard to this circumſtance too is of great neceſſity to aſcertain commerce. In our preſent queſtion about the claim of the fair purchaſer to obtain the price he paid from the proprietor, when he can have no recovery from the ſeller, all pleas, both of a private and publick nature, are pretty near equal on both ſides. And the ſame general obſervation about the original notions of property will be of conſiderable uſe in other queſtions, particularly theſe concerning the rights by teſtament, and by ſucceſſion to the inteſtate.

In this and many like caſes there are obvious reaſons of humanity and mercy to ſhew a good man what is the lovely and honourable part. If the poſſeſſor be poor, and the proprietor rich, it would be barbarous if the proprietor did not indemnify the honeſt poſſeſſor as to the price he paid. If the poſſeſſor is wealthy, and the proprietor poor, it would be inhuman in the poſſeſſor to inſiſt on the price paid, when it bore no ſuch proportion to his wealth that the want of it could diſtreſs him. If their fortunes are nearly equal they ſhould divide the loſs, whatever civil laws may determine: or ſhould bear it in proportion to their wealth, when

their wealth is unequal, but neither in diſtreſs. The want of obvious reaſons for caſting all the loſs on one ſide in this and ſome other caſes, will be little regreted by any but ſuch ſelfiſh wretches as are graſping at every advantage they can obtain without incurring the infamy of direct injuſtice, and have no humanity to others. CHAP. 8.

In general, as far as ſuch poſſeſſors are enriched or profited by means of the goods of others, ſo far they are obliged to reſtore; but they are enriched only by what remains after all expences they made in preſerving, improving, or cultivating are deducted; and theſe expences the proprietor is obliged to reſtore when he obtains his goods. Goods obtained by donation, ſucceſſion, or any gratuitous title, ſhould plainly be reſtored without any other compenſation from the proprietor than that of thoſe expences for preſervation and improvement.

IV. The next claſs of real rights often ſeparated from property is that of ſucceſſions in entails. When one who has unlimited property conveys a right of ſucceſſion to ſeveral perſons, in a certain ſeries, upon certain contingencies, theſe perſons have a right to this ſucceſſion juſt as valid as men acquire by any donation; as unlimited property includes a right of diſpoſing upon any contingency or condition, as well as abſolutely. Such entails may be made imprudently, or contrary to reaſons of humanity, and ſo may donations. When they are ſo, the preſent tenant for life who has all the other rights of property except *Right of ſucceſſion in entails.*

BOOK II. that of alienating, is not culpable in taking all methods conſiſtent with the peace and order of ſociety, to break the entail: as a man would not be culpable who uſed ſuch peaceful methods to prevent imprudent or inhuman donations, or to get them revoked. But where there is nothing imprudent or inhuman in the entail, the tenant in reverſion has as good a right to ſucceed as the preſent poſſeſſor has to enjoy for life; and it would be criminal to defraud him of it. And the peace of ſociety often requires the confirmation even of imprudent and inhuman conveyances, of which hereafter; tho' the perſon to whom they are made cannot with a good conſcience inſiſt on them. Civil laws however may juſtly limit this power of entail as the intereſt of the ſtate, or the neceſſity of encouraging induſtry may require.

Rights by mortgage or pledge.

V. The third ſort of real rights ſeparable from the reſt of the property are thoſe of the mortgagee, and of the perſon to whom moveable goods are pledged, and delivered for ſecurity of ſome debt. By either of theſe a right is given to the creditor, in caſe the debt is not duly diſcharged, to appropriate to himſelf the lands mortgaged, or the goods pledged *, notwithſtanding any prior perſonal rights of others againſt the debtor. The aſſuming a property in the lands mortgaged, or the moveables pledged, upon non-payment, has no iniquity in it if the pledger or mortgager obtain all ſurplus of the value of the lands or goods

* *Lex commiſſoria in pignoribus.*

above what diſcharges the principal debt with all intereſt and expences. CHAP. 8.

VI. The fourth claſs of real rights ſeparable from the reſt of the property are *ſervitudes*, when one has a right to ſome ſmall uſe of the goods of another. All ſervitudes are real rights terminating on ſome definite lands or tenements, or goods. But ſome are conſtituted in favour of a perſon and only for his behoof; and others for the advantage of ſome adjacent farm or tenement be the proprietor who he will. The former, from the ſubjects of theſe rights, and not from the object on which they terminate, are called perſonal ſervitudes, expiring with the perſon; the later for the like reaſon are called real ſervitudes, and may be perpetual. Thus the uſe of an houſe or a farm granted to a friend for his life-time when the property is in another, is a perſonal ſervitude, which cannot be conveyed by him to another: but when a farm is ſubjected to a road for the convenience of the poſſeſſors of an adjacent farm, or the poſſeſſors of one tenement in a town have a right to put in beams into the gabels of the contiguous houſe for ſupporting the floors or roof, theſe are real ſervitudes, which may be conſtituted for the convenience of lands or tenements, and may be perpetual.† The nature of the contracts or deeds by which ſuch ſervitudes are conſtituted ſhews the rights, and obligations of the parties, which too depend much upon the cuſtoms of the places where they are received. *Servitudes.*

† See Inſtit. l. ii. tit. 3, 4, 5.

BOOK II. VII. The complete property may be transferred either by the *voluntary deed* of the proprietor, or by the *diſpoſition of the law of nature*, without his conſent, for the intereſt of others. By deed of the proprietor it may be transferred either *during his life*, or *upon the event of his death*. And by diſpoſition of the law of nature, without his conſent, property may be transferred either during the proprietor's life, or on the event of his death. Of theſe four in order.

Tranſlation of complete property several ways.

Voluntary deed during life.

1. By voluntary deed of the proprietor during his life, either gratuitouſly by donation, or for a certain price or valuable conſideration; of this we treat in the following chapter about contracts.

By teſtament.

2. Property is conveyed by the voluntary act of the proprietor upon the event of his death by laſt will or teſtament. This right of deviſing by will is naturally included in the property, which contains a right of diſpoſing upon any condition or contingency. Take away this right and induſtry ſhall be much diſcouraged after men are tolerably provided with neceſſaries for themſelves and their families during life; or men muſt be forced into a pretty hazardous conduct by actually giving away during life whatever they acquire beyond their own probable conſumption in their lifetime. Not to mention that they muſt give away as ſoon as they acquire any ſurpluſſes, ſince the ſuddenneſs of death, or a delirium, may make them incapable of donations upon the approach of death. This right therefore of deviſing by will ſeems manifeſtly founded in the law of nature, tho' civil laws may li-

mit the exercise of it in common with all other rights respecting property, such as the disinheriting or passing by a child without any fault of his, or the conveying almost all a man's wealth to one of his numerous posterity from a foolish desire of raising one great family. Civil laws also justly oblige men to such forms as shall best prevent forgeries. By the law of nature every declaration of a man's will of which credible evidence can be given, is valid and obligatory on those concerned: but that all men may be engaged to use the most convenient forms, civil laws may confirm no testaments made without them. CHAP. 8.

The foundation of this right of testaments.

That the law of nature and the interest of society establish this right of devising by will is as plain as that they establish other rights of the proprietor. The natural design of mankind in any acquisitions beyond their own consumption is to promote by them the happiness of those they love; this happiness one desires they may obtain not only during his life, but after his decease. These kind affections and suitable offices to make others happy, whether we are to live with them or not, are the natural, joyful, and honourable exercises of the human soul while we live. And 'tis cruel and unjust to hinder a man either from such good offices while he lives, or to deprive him of the joyful hope that his surviving friends shall be profited by the fruits of his labours. 'Tis cruel to these friends to intercept the benefit designed them by their friend now deceased. There is no method so convenient for individuals, or for the society, by which goods can be

Book II. transferred to ſurvivors as that by teſtament, or a "declaration of the will of the proprietor revocable, "and not to take effect till after his death."† To leave the goods of the deceaſed in common open to occupation muſt occaſion the moſt odious contentions and miſchiefs. To all theſe reaſons we may add that a wiſely contrived will is generally in conſequence of moral obligation, and a fulfilling of the rights or claims either of a perfect or imperfect kind which the ſurvivors had upon the goods of the deceaſed. All which proves abundantly the right of deviſing, and the obligation upon all to obſerve and maintain the will of the teſtator, where it is tolerably prudent, and not contrary to ſome ſtrong principles of humanity. Where it is contrary, there may be no injuſtice in annulling it.

Tranſlation by the law of nature during the life of the proprietor.

VIII. The third manner of transferring property is by the plain law of nature, without conſent of the proprietor, during his life, whenever it is requiſite to ſatisfy any juſt claim another had againſt him which he declines to comply with. This will be conſidered hereafter among the rights ariſing from the injuries done by others. Thus for compenſation of damage, or diſcharging a juſt debt, a man's goods are juſtly ſeized,

† Some improper uſe of metaphyſicks in this ſubject has raiſed great controverſies to little purpoſe, as if the validity of wills imported ſome phyſical action done when the agent was dead; ſome trifling objections are raiſed too from the nature of other tranſactions. The queſtion is truly this, whether it is not requiſite for an innocent ſatisfaction of men that their teſtaments be obſerved after their death? and whether the intereſt of ſociety does not require it? which are obvious. See Barbeyrac's notes on Puffend. *de jure nat. et gent. lib.* iv. *c.* 10. and authors there cited.

and the property of them acquired by the perſons who had ſuch claims. CHAP. 8.

The fourth manner of tranſlation is by the law of nature, without the deed of the proprietor, upon the event of his death, in the ſucceſſions to the inteſtate. *In ſucceſſion to the inteſtate.* The grounds of it are theſe. The intention of the deceaſed in all his acquiſitions beyond his own uſe, was contributing to the happineſs of ſuch as were dear to him, as 'tis abundantly known to all. We ſee that one's poſterity, and failing thoſe his kinſmen, are dearer to men univerſally than others, tho' they may happen to have converſed more with others, in matters of buſineſs or pleaſure. When men declare their wills, we ſee the general inclination to improve the fortunes of their poſterity and kinſmen, and juſtly preſume the ſame where it is not expreſsly declared. 'Tis cruel, without ſome publick intereſt requiring it, to defeat this natural hope of ſucceſſion founded by the tyes of blood. Our children, and failing theſe our kinſmen have plainly a right where ſome undutiful conduct has not forfeited it, not only to ſupport from us in their indigent ſtate, but to have their condition improved by any ſurplus of goods we have beyond our own conſumption. 'Tis contrary to nature, as well as humanity, to defeat this claim when no publick intereſt requires it. 'Tis plain alſo that leaving the goods of the inteſtate in common to be occupied would cauſe the greateſt confuſion.

If friends were admitted along with kindred, it

BOOK II. muſt be in ſome proportion to the degrees of friendſhip; but theſe cannot now be determined; and much leſs could they be determined if the hopes of ſucceſſion invited all flatterers. We juſtly too preſume upon the will of the inteſtate from this, that ſince the cuſtom has univerſally obtained, in all nations almoſt, to admit only kinſmen to ſucceſſion, had the deceaſed intended that others ſhould be admitted, he would have expreſsly declared this peculiar and leſs uſual deſire.

The natural way of ſucceſſion. The natural affections of men ſhew that their poſterity ſhould be admitted in the firſt place, viz. children and grandchildren; grandchildren at leaſt admitted to their parents ſhare among them, where a deceaſed child has left more than one: and along with poſterity parents ſhould be admitted, if they are in ſtraits. In default of both, brothers and ſiſters, and along with them the children of a brother or ſiſter deceaſed, at leaſt to the ſhare their parent would have got had the parent been alive. Reaſons of humanity would recommend other proportions ſometimes, but they would occaſion great controverſies. In default of ſuch relations all kindred of equal degrees ſhould generally come in equally, and exclude the more remote.

Unnatural cuſtoms. The notion of having ſome one repreſentative of the perſon deceaſed, ſucceeding to all his rights, and ſubjected to all his obligations, as the Roman heir was, has no foundation in nature; nor is there any rea-

ſon why a far greater part of the inheritance ſhould go univerſally to one of many children, or one of many in the ſame degree; nor why ſeniority among children, or kinſmen of the ſame degree, ſhould have ſuch preference; nor why the diſtinction of ſex ſhould in the firſt degree of children take place of all other conſiderations, and yet be quite neglected in the degree of grandchildren, or be poſtponed to that of ſeniority of the parent, ſo that an infant grand-daughter of an elder ſon deceaſed, ſhould take before an adult grand-ſon by a ſecond ſon, nay before the ſecond ſon himſelf. A niece by an elder brother deceaſed, nay her daughter, take place of even a younger brother himſelf, as well as the male deſcendants of younger brothers. All theſe things are founded only in civil laws. In the ſucceſſion to private fortunes there is ſeldom any reaſon for having one heir rather than many equally related to the deceaſed. Cuſtoms of many nations and their civil laws about theſe matters are very fooliſh, and have ſome pernicious effects upon ſociety.

Perſonal rights how acquired.

IX. Perſonal rights are conſtituted againſt a man when he has limited ſome part of his natural liberty, or his power of diſpoſing of his actions and goods, and transferred it to another, who thence acquires the perſonal right. And when this right or claim of another is fulfilled, or aboliſhed, the natural liberty of the perſon obliged becomes again in this reſpect entire, or the perſonal right is conſolidated with it, as

BOOK II. it was before the right ſubſiſted. Such rights ariſe either from ſome contract, or ſome deed of the perſon obliged; and the conſideration of them leads to the ſubject of contracts or covenants, the main engine of conſtituting either perſonal rights or real.

THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.